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
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Napoleon, Emperor, 1815

Great Captains

NAPOLEON

A HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR, FROM LÜTZEN
TO WATERLOO, WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF
THE NAPOLEONIC WARS

*WITH 167 CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES AND
TACTICAL MANŒUVRES, PORTRAITS, CUTS
OF UNIFORMS, ARMS, AND WEAPONS*

BY

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE

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CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE," "A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR,"
"PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE. A CHAT IN THE SADDLE," "GREAT CAP-
TAINS," "ALEXANDER," "HANNIBAL," "CÆSAR," ETC., ETC.

IN FOUR VOLUMES

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NAPOLEON.

LVII.

LÜTZEN. JANUARY TO MAY, 1813.

THE Russian campaign was the beginning of the end, but Napoleon rose to the situation. Europe scarcely knew the extent of the disaster, and France sustained him. Troops and war material were rapidly collected. He still held Italy, Holland and part of Germany, and Spain was not lost; but England was stirring, Prussia burned to regain her rights, the Confederation was lukewarm, Russia still pushed the war with France, and Austria was arming as mediator. The Russian army, joined by the Prussian, gradually forced the French back from the Oder to the Elbe, and later to the Saale. Eugene, commanding the wrecked Grand Army, was unequal to the situation; but Napoleon was planning soon to cross the Elbe offensively, and French garrisons still held many Vistula and Oder fortresses. By mid-April a new army near Erfurt was reaching out towards Eugene. Napoleon was nearer ready than the allies except in cavalry; but they had crossed the Elbe and were advancing on the Saale, with much less dread of him. The French were largely fresh levies with few experienced officers, but Napoleon had plenty of artillery, and introduced simple manœuvres by which the foot could hold itself against cavalry. On April 28 the two French armies joined on the Saale and moved on Leipsic; though much inferior, the allies determined to do battle on Leipsic plain, crossed the Elster, and on May 2 advanced so as to strike Napoleon's right on the march. Wanting cavalry to reconnoitre, Napoleon was surprised by the enemy about noon; but he at once gave orders to meet the danger, and himself led the troops. Ney held himself in a group of villages near Lützen, as a central nucleus, and the onslaught of the enemy was slow. The rearward corps came up and strengthened the French right; Napoleon brought up the French left with effect, and by nightfall the allies were driven back across the Elster, whence they retired behind the Elbe at Dresden.

ALTHOUGH, as Talleyrand remarked, the Russian disaster was the beginning of the end, it was no time for Napoleon to think of peace; he was sure to have another coalition against

him, and it was more consonant with his character to assume a bold front. He was still at war with Russia, whom Prussia would now join. Austria had begun by assuring him that she would maintain the existing alliance, and Schwartzenberg was sent as minister to Paris; but as the price for this loyalty was to be the return of many of the provinces seized at Schönbrunn, Napoleon avoided any promises, in the belief that a battle won on the Elbe early in 1813 would modify the terms. Time without entanglements was all-important, and to gain this he played his cards; but the game was intricate, for England was ready with a subsidy and the promise of Illyria, or even Italy, if Austria would openly oppose France. Napoleon harbored the idea of returning Ferdinand to the Spanish throne; but as, despite Salamanca, Wellington again retired to Portugal, this wise restitution lapsed. Peace was, however, made with the Holy See.

Napoleon's task was stupendous. As Lossau states it, he had to seek his opponents, the allied Prussians and Russians, to drive them back into the climate which had been so fatal to himself, and to utilize the astonishment which would be caused by a decisive victory to win peace. This was a sensible programme, and one to which the emperor would have done well strictly to adhere. At several moments during this eventful year, it could have been carried out.

Outranking the political embarrassments was the question of a new army; and Napoleon succeeded in a masterful way in transferring his own enthusiastic courage to the nation, and in turning this sentiment into men and weapons. "I have been extremely satisfied with the spirit of the nation. It is disposed to make every kind of sacrifice," he wrote Murat December 19. In three months, six hundred guns and two thousand caissons were started for the Elbe. The cohorts of the *premier ban* (there were two *bans* or levies in mass in 1812)

were turned into one hundred and fifty line regiments by adding twenty new cadres, and the conscripts filled them all. The depot-troops of the forces in Spain were organized into one hundred and eighty provisional battalions. The Young Guard was raised to sixteen regiments, to enter which was paraded as an honor. Courage poured from the breast of this wonderful man upon his subordinates, and through them flowed into a thousand channels, down to the last Gallic conscript: but what the new army would sadly lack was the habit of war, fire discipline, that bearing under danger



French Dragoon.

which experience alone can give; and seasonably to provide them with veteran leaders, on January 22 Eugene was ordered to send back to France all supernumerary officers. Artillerymen had been drilled in the reserves; seventy companies could be sent into Germany; and to these might have been added six regiments of good sea coast cannoneers; but by appealing to their patriotism, Napoleon turned these into infantry, except a few companies reserved for the artillery of the Guard. The cavalymen who returned were partly remounted in Hanover; postilions, young post-road employees and other men used to the saddle were conscripted, and horses seized right and left; and the *gendarmerie* furnished a reserve from which to draw

officers. Out of the débris of the Grand Army, battalions had been made of six companies of one hundred men each, most of which had remained in Glogau, Stettin and Cüstrin, and some had retired with Eugene. Of these latter, the cadres of one battalion per regiment of the 1st, 2d and 3d Corps remained at Leipsic and Erfurt as nucleus for fresh conscripts, the other cadres returned to France. The 1st Corps retained its formation, the 2d and 3d were later merged into Victor's 2d Corps. Before spring opened, to the astonishment of Europe, Napoleon again headed an army numerically equal



Confederation Foot.

to his former ones. And he was not slow to let his allies know it, writing on January 22 to the King of Saxony, whose loyalty he hoped to retain: "The events which happened after my leaving the army, the treachery of General Yorck, have done harm to my affairs in the north; but I have on the way such forces that when a good season comes, the enemy, whatever

progress he may make, will be driven back faster than he came."

Napoleon was still formidable. He held Italy, Holland and a large part of Germany. Except Andalusia and Galicia, the army in Spain retained its conquests, and thirty thousand

conscripts would replace it on a good footing for the coming campaign. Territory had not been lost, and forfeited prestige might be regained by one great victory. On the other hand, opposition had increased. England was busy stirring up another coalition. Austria was arming, ostensibly as a peacemaker. The Confederation of the Rhine was lukewarm; from Kalish, Kutusov, in the name of Russia and Prussia, called on it to throw off Napoleon's protectorate, and secret societies everywhere preached a crusade against Napoleonism. Prussia, burning for war, and with Russian recruits joining her armies, might at any moment burst into flame. Though conservative, Frederick William was loyal to his Fatherland, and among the people, crazy with patriotic fervor, "Liberty and Equality" was the watchword. Finally came the rupture. Prussia made a claim on Napoleon for ninety million francs for stuff furnished the army in Russia. This claim was refused even a hearing, and Prussia openly joined the Russian alliance; a treaty was signed at Kalish February 27, and the czar met Frederick William at Breslau in March. Russia agreed to bring on one hundred and fifty thousand men; Prussia was to put afoot a minimum of eighty thousand, and approaches were made to Austria.

It is characteristic that, after the Russian campaign, Napoleon looked on his situation as by no means desperate. He at first hoped to hold on to Warsaw, and felt that he could still rely on the aid of Schwartzemberg; then Posen became his *point d'appui*, and twisting the facts from what they meant into what he desired, he wrote Eugene from Fontaine-



Warsaw Foot.

bleau, January 26: "From the moment you shall have assembled six thousand cavalry and forty thousand infantry, with fifty guns, you should organize the Posen magazines. . . . From all the facts I possess, I harbor no doubt that you will maintain yourself in Posen. . . . It does not appear possible to me that the Russians should cross the Vistula, unless it be some Cossacks." As a first step he desired to relieve Danzig, with its enormous garrison, and to encourage the viceroy, he spoke lightly of the situation there.

As already narrated, early in February, 1813, Bülow had opened the Prussian lines to Wittgenstein, who crossed the Vistula above Danzig and moved towards the Oder; Schwarzenberg, under a truce, had retired from Warsaw to Cracow; Reynier had fallen back to Kalish, but could not hold it; Poniatowski, permitted to withdraw unarmed through Galicia, had rejoined the French army. But these forces were not only trivial in number, they were still under the spell of the horrible disaster just ended. When the emperor learned that Murat had left, he wrote Eugene, January 22: "My Son, take over the command of the Grand Army. I am sorry that I did not leave it to you on my departure." And next day he wrote: "I find the conduct of Murat very extravagant, and such that I am almost tempted to have him arrested as an example. He is a brave man on the field of battle, but he lacks combination and moral courage."

Quite excusable for being, with his handful of men, unable to bear up against his difficulties, Eugene left Posen February 12, and reached Frankfort-on-the-Oder the 18th. However necessary this step, it evoked Napoleon's criticism, as not keeping up appearances. The Russians had slowly advanced into Prussia, and Napoleon thought Eugene should have threatened their flank rather than retire to a line nearly abreast of Berlin. "If what I ordered for the Elbe had been

done on the Oder," he wrote him March 15, "and if instead of retiring on Frankfort you had assembled in front of Cüstrin, the enemy would have looked twice before throwing anything over to the left side. You would have won at least twenty days, and given time to the Corps of Observation of the Elbe to come up and occupy Berlin." But in a day or two Eugene found even Frankfort untenable, and when the Russians moved around both his flanks, he had difficulty in falling back to the Spree, where, February 22, he drew up with his main body in Kopenik, his centre in Lübben, his right in Bautzen.



Eugene.

Here, under orders to remain as long as possible, he made an attempt to put on a bold front, but the conditions were all against him, and he probably did as well as any other of the marshals would have done. In these days the emperor made several complaints about the surrender of fortresses with insufficient defense.

He wrote to Eugene, March 4: "My Son, they tell me that Pillau has capitulated, without trenches being opened or a breach having been made in the place. As soon as the general who commanded Pillau reaches you, have him arrested, as well as the commandant of the engineers, unless this last named protested, and have them conducted under good escort to the citadel of Wesel. They say that a Russian officer accompanies them. As soon as this officer shall have arrived at the outposts, send him back."

And, anxious to keep Eugene from further retreat, the emperor wrote him, March 5: "Remain in Berlin as long as you can. Make examples to maintain discipline. At the least insult from a Prussian town, from a village, have it burned, were it even Berlin, if it acted badly." "If you leave Berlin at this moment, I fear this corps" (Gérard's) "will be lost. I can give you no order nor any direction, because you fulfill no duty, in not sending me any details, nor any accounts, and that you tell me nothing, neither you nor your staff." But the orders came too late, and Eugene was unequal to the pressure; for when Wittgenstein crossed the Oder between Frankfort and Cüstrin and moved on Berlin, turning Eugene's left, the French retired behind the Elbe. On March 6 Eugene was at Wittenberg, hoping by drawing in Lauriston from Magdeburg, and Victor from the Saale, to hold the great river. Headquarters came to Leipsic.

Later the emperor wrote him: "I do not see what made you quit Berlin. Had you taken up a position in front of Berlin, the enemy would have believed you ready to deliver battle, and would not have crossed the Oder before he had assembled sixty or eighty thousand men; but he was far from able to do this. To-day the Russians cannot have an army equally as available as yours; they weaken and you strengthen." And, dissatisfied with Eugene's retiring to Wittenberg, he wrote, March 7: "You are to defend Magdeburg, cover the 32d military division, the kingdom of Westphalia, Hanover and Cassel. You can take a good position in front of Magdeburg, occupying Torgau with a good Saxon garrison. If you are obliged to quit the Elbe, you have the Hartz mountains for first line, covering Cassel and Hanover; then a second line between the Hartz and Cassel, finally the Weser." In this letter the emperor wrote: "I have always told you that you ought to retire on Magdeburg. In retiring on Wittenberg, in taking your line of operation on Mainz, not only do you compromise the 32d division, but you even compromise Holland, and my squadron in the Scheldt. . . . As soon as you shall have taken position at Magdeburg, and when you shall have cut off all communications with the enemy, you will take every disposi-

tion proper to make people believe that I am coming to Magdeburg, and that the army is going to move forward." And again, March 11 : "It is in front of Magdeburg that you are to assemble eighty thousand men, and from there, as a centre, protect the entire Elbe."

The retreat of the Grand Army thus finally came to an end at the Elbe, over twelve hundred miles from Moscow.

Of the French forces, in March, Reynier, with twelve thousand men brought back from Warsaw, was in Dresden and Meissen ; Davout with the skeleton of the new 1st Corps of ten thousand men, in and about Dresden ; Victor with that of the 2d Corps, eight thousand strong, on the Saale at Bernburg ; Grenier at Wittenberg with nineteen thousand men ; Lauriston with the Army of Observation of the Elbe, some twenty thousand strong, at Magdeburg, and Vandamme at Bremen with six thousand effective: a total of seventy-five thousand men. With this number back of him Napoleon regarded Eugene's action as extraordinary.

"We must finally begin to wage war," . . . he wrote him March 11. "Our military operations are a matter of laughter to our allies in Vienna and our enemies in London and St. Petersburg, because the army habitually decamps a week before the enemy's infantry comes up, on the approach of light troops, or on simple rumors. It is time you should work and act in a military fashion ; I have traced out for you all you have to do. You can reunite at Magdeburg and under cover of this place more troops than the enemy can oppose to you. From then on, it is there you should hold on : and the enemy is not fool enough to advance with all his forces while exposing himself to be cut off by the army assembled on the Main."

Unsparring in criticism, the emperor taxed Eugene with believing the enemy stronger than he actually was ; and to enforce the fact that Magdeburg, not Wittenberg, was the proper place on which to retire, so as to protect Holland by holding the lower Elbe, he ordered Duroc to gather his personal *entourage* and have them sent to Magdeburg.

And on March 13 he wrote Eugene : " Finally, because your movement at Wittenberg has attracted the enemy thither, execute your manœuvres at Magdeburg with the art necessary for the enemy to follow you there, and to make him fear that you are going to take the offensive by way of Magdeburg." Should the enemy march on Dresden and Hanover at the same time, he said it would be Dresden which would have to be given up. " Obligated to choose between the defense of the lower Elbe and the upper, I desire to defend the lower. I would rather see the enemy in Leipsic, Erfurt and Gotha than in Hanover or Bremen," he wrote Eugene, March 15. An offensive position in front of Magdeburg would in fact protect Dresden, he again wrote, three days later. " If there is a fine position, it is the one in front of Magdeburg, where you threaten every moment to attack the enemy, and from whence you will actually attack him if he does not appear in great strength."

Indeed, Napoleon ordered Lauriston to assemble his four divisions three miles in front of Magdeburg, protect them by works, and to spread the rumor everywhere that he was about to assume the offensive. We remember the strategic value of Magdeburg in the days of Gustavus and Tilly. The city had a corresponding value now.

The letters to Eugene at this time are a text-book on the strategic defensive. Of the many dicta the following is a sample: —

" You must make it a principle that the enemy will cross the Elbe where and how he wishes," the emperor wrote March 15. " Never has a river been considered as an obstacle which would retard more than a few days. . . . Nothing is more dangerous than to try seriously to defend a river by occupying the opposite bank ; because once the enemy has surprised the passage, and he always does surprise it, he finds the army in a defensive order very much extended, and prevents its rallying."

On the health of the army Napoleon also wrote Eugene, instructing him to select healthful camps. " It is better to deliver the bloodiest battle than to locate one's troops in an

unhealthful place," he once wrote Davout, in 1811; and now, on March 28, he impressed this on Eugene:—


"Choose especially ground which is quite healthy. Consult with regard to this the doctors and the inhabitants of the country. . . . If you are near marshy or inundated fields, whatever they may say, it is an unhealthful situation. You must move higher. You must feel that in a month's stop in the springtime I should there lose my army. I desire that you should consult the doctors less than your own good sense and the inhabitants." And, March 15, about victualing: "As to the difficulty of living, you have before you the most beautiful provinces of Prussia, from which you can draw by following the principles of military execution, that is, by designating to each village, even at ten leagues distance, the quantities it is to furnish to your camp, and in case a village did not execute your order, sending a detachment there to subject it to contribution, and if necessary to burn down some houses."

To resume the offensive, as soon as he could assemble on the Elbe, was the emperor's one desire: he would, he originally thought, cross at Havelberg, push on Stettin, anticipate the enemy on the Oder, and advance to the relief of Danzig—to save which fortress should be the first object of the army, he wrote Eugene. The Army of the Elbe could be assembled at Magdeburg, Havelberg and Wittenberg, and the Army of the Main at Würzburg, Erfurt and Leipsic; and both could simultaneously debouch across the Elbe and march concentrically on Stettin. In two weeks, by forced marches, three hundred thousand men could reach Danzig by way of Stettin, and by the twentieth day this fortress could be relieved and the lower Vistula occupied. Havelberg at this moment seemed the most important place on the Elbe. "As a defensive measure, the principal aim being to cover the 32d military division, Hamburg and the kingdom of Westphalia," on March 11 he wrote Eugene, "it is the point of Havelberg which accomplishes all that; also for the offensive it would be much better if Magdeburg were opposite Werben;" and it


was a pity, he said, that it had not been made a fortress. This entire plan savors of Napoleon's best thought in boldness and sagacity; under cover of the Thuringian Forest and the Elbe he would concentrate, debouch and advance with his left flank secured by the sea; and by a rapid march prevent the enemy from arresting his manœuvre until he had reëstablished himself at the most important place east of Berlin. He was right in assuming that the moral influence of such a march would do more to restore his prestige than any other thing; and under the reiterated orders of his chief, Eugene did, by March 21, assemble Grenier, Lauriston and Victor in front of Magdeburg. But the Great Captain alone could carry out such a scheme. Not one of his lieutenants was abreast of it.

On April 1 the Army of the Elbe under Eugene stood around Magdeburg, and contained Macdonald's corps, with part of Augereau and Grenier; Lauriston's corps, composed of new regiments organized in Magdeburg of 1812 levies; Victor's corps, organized in Erfurt with old cadres and young recruits of 1813; Durutte and the Saxons under Reynier; and the 1st and 2d Cavalry Corps, being the relics of the cavalry from Russia, remounted in Germany. The Army of the Main under Ney consisted of his 3d Corps, made up from conscripts of 1813 and others, at Würzburg; of Marmont's 6th Corps, made up at Frankfort with provisory regiments and marines; of Bertrand's 4th Corps, made up at Verona with provisory regiments, cohorts (National Guards of 1812) and Italian troops, and marched to Bamberg through the Tyrol and Bavaria; of the Imperial Guard at Frankfort, with a few old battalions, but mostly young conscripts; and of some troops of the Confederation. The cavalry was slowly organizing with the old cadres, conscripts and new levies.

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On the same date the Prussian army had over one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, not counting the landwehr, which was assembling. After Jena, Napoleon had reduced the Prussian army to forty-two thousand men, but Scharnhorst had successively passed through the ranks of this army nearly all the youth of Prussia, giving them a half-way training which they completed in the reserve. One hundred and twelve thousand Russians had crossed the Niemen, of which a third was regular and Cossack cavalry, and twelve thousand artillery with eight hundred and fifty guns. This force was later followed by over fifty thousand men; but as the fortresses of Danzig, Thorn, Modlin, Zamosc, Stettin, Cüstrin, Glogau and Spandau were still held by French garrisons, at least sixty thousand men had to blockade or besiege them.

In front of the allied armies, a body of ten thousand Cossacks under Tettenborn raided the unoccupied country to the lower Elbe, drove the French out of Pomerania so as to isolate Denmark, opened the road for the Swedish contingent which Bernadotte was sending, and on March 12 seized Hamburg. Napoleon's plan to hold the lower Elbe necessitated the abandonment of Dres-



Prussian Landwehr.

den; and to retake Hamburg he instructed Eugene, March 15 and 18, to place Davout with his four divisions on the left of the army, and let him handle the matter, as being most familiar with it. Although Davout's natural place was on the fighting line, the charge was important. He broke an arch of the

ancient Dresden bridge, March 19, not without protest (and later the emperor's disapproval, because he desired to keep the people friendly), left the Saxon troops at Torgau, and marched on Lüneburg. On the 26th the rest of the French vacated Dresden, and next day it was occupied by the Russian vanguard.



Prussian Musketeer.

Late in March Wittgenstein with thirteen thousand Russians, and York with twenty thousand Prussians, lay near Berlin, while Bülow with twelve thousand and Borstell with five thousand Prussians were approaching from the Oder, the Prussian generals being under Wittgenstein's control. The rest of the allied corps were farther back, but all advancing: Blucher in Silesia, Kutusov with the Russian main army

at Kalish. But here the gallant old soldier died, worn out with years and hard work. Napoleon's strategic foresight was quickly proved by the fact that, when Wittgenstein, in following up Eugene, advanced on Rosslau in order to reach out towards Blucher, who was to move on Saxony, the threat against Berlin of Eugene's presence at Magdeburg compelled him to turn aside to march on the viceroy. This he did: on April 5 he pushed back the French outlying parties; Eugene withdrew behind the Elbe, broke the bridges and took up a position from the lower Saale to the Hartz mountains, fronting the upper Saale. The result of the manœuvring up to this date had been that the allies had occupied the Elbe and the French were striving to retain the Saale.

Meanwhile conscripts and new artillery had been for some weeks pouring out of France to swell the cadres in Germany. On April 11 Napoleon wrote Eugene: "My Son, it is probable that I shall be, from the 20th to the 22d, with two hundred thousand men, at Erfurt. I do not quite know



Prussian Landwehr Cavalry.

what you will do. Manœuvre in accordance with this, and act so that I shall have communications assured with you. . . . Keep in touch with me, and in condition to execute the manœuvres that I shall indicate to you. Procure four days' bread. Maintain yourself in front of Magdeburg as long as you can, and especially notify me exactly of all the news you shall get out of the enemy. As soon as I shall arrive at Erfurt, our natural communications will be made behind the Saale."

On April 9 Napoleon ordered Ney to take position in the

Meiningen-Gotha-Erfurt country, Marmont at Eisenach and Bertrand at Bamberg; and told him that the enemy could not approach by way of Dresden with more than twenty-five thousand men. "From your position of Meiningen you would be able to judge the forces and intentions of the enemy. I should like to see you take position in front of Erfurt, which would tranquillize all Westphalia, and might enable us to seize the debouches of the Saale, while sustaining the viceroy. In this case Marmont would move on Gotha, and Bertrand would push his head to Coburg. In every case it is necessary that your corps should be at the debouches of the Thuringian mountains." The emperor's object was to move the Army of the Main on Naumburg, while Eugene would march up to Merseburg and thus touch. "For the moment my great affair is to join the viceroy and occupy the whole Saale from Saalfeld to the mouth." At the time, they were cut apart by the enemy's presence near Merseburg.

Leaving Paris April 15, in forty hours Napoleon was in Mainz, where he found the entire forces thus distributed: The Guard, eighteen thousand strong, was in that city, Eugene with seventy thousand men on the Saale, the left standing at the mouth, the right near the Hartz mountains, the centre at Bernburg, the reserve at Magdeburg; Davout on the march to Lüneburg with thirty thousand men; Ney had crossed the Thuringian Forest and was marching on Erfurt with the "First Observation Army of the Rhine," fifty thousand strong, while the "Second" under Marmont and Bessières, numbering twenty-seven thousand men, was heading for Eisenach and Gotha; Bertrand with the "Observation Army of Italy," forty thousand effective, was nearing Bamberg, on the way to Coburg. These numbers were paper figures, to be reached; but there were doubtless two hun-

dred thousand men converging towards the old campaigning-ground of 1806. The names of these several armies were provisional.

On April 13, in a Note, the emperor said: "I divide the army into two. I await several days before issuing the decree. The Army of the Elbe . . . forms the actual army . . . with line of operation through Wesel. . . . The other army is the Army of the Main. . . . The Army of the Elbe is commanded by the viceroy. It has the intendant and the body of the entire old army. The Army of the Main has nothing. It needs . . . all that is required by an army of two hundred thousand men." To the King of Wurtemberg, April 18, he wrote: "I am going myself to debouch on the enemy with nearly two hundred thousand men, not counting the one hundred thousand that the viceroy has in hand." And next day he wrote Bertrand that, from what he heard from Eugene and Ney, the allies had crossed the Elbe with not exceeding sixty or seventy thousand men.

The army Napoleon was himself to command, which later in the campaign is often called the Grand Army, with Berthier as Chief of Staff, was as follows. The numbers cannot be definitely established, but they were not far from these. Later they increased.

The Guard, under Mortier.			15,000 men.
1st Corps	3 divisions	Vandamme.	15,000 "
3rd "	5 "	Ney.	40,000 "
4th "	3 "	Bertrand.	20,000 "
5th "	3 "	Lauriston.	15,000 "
6th "	3 "	Marmont.	25,000 "
7th "	Saxons	Reynier.	14,000 "
11th "	3 divisions	Macdonald.	15,000 "
12th "	3 "	Oudinot.	25,000 "
			184,000 "

There were three hundred and fifty guns. The 2d Corps, two divisions under Victor, was yet organizing; the 8th was Poniatowski's in Galicia; the 9th, five divisions, was

Augereau's, stationed in Bavaria to hold that land, impose on Austria and observe Bohemia; the 10th was Rapp's big garrison in Danzig. There was no cavalry corps, but later, under Latour-Maubourg and Sébastiani, sixteen thousand horse were collected. Eugene and Davout had special commands consisting of one or more corps each, the former of over forty thousand men (Lauriston, Macdonald and Reynier), and the latter of twenty thousand men.

Napoleon believed himself to be in greater readiness and numbers than the allies. The Russian army, he argued, had marched all the way from Moscow, and the winter campaign must have left its mark; and besides the corps investing Danzig, Thorn, Modlin and Zamosc, and back at Cüstrin, another body had occupied Poland and followed Poniatowski. It could scarcely have over sixty thousand combatants left; and Prussia, trodden in the dust since 1806, could not have put in line more than fifty thousand men. To oppose these Napoleon could count on a quarter million men, of whom one hundred and eighty thousand in the field army; and he would have these at the key-point before the enemy could place as many there. Wittgenstein he opined was marching into danger with the same confidence which ruined the Prussians in 1806, and the Elbe country was not the steppes of Russia, where he could fight in retreat. Moreover, the allies were acting on eccentric lines. To the fact that Westphalia and Hanover were ripe for a rising, except for the fear of the French, Napoleon paid small heed.

The emperor strove to cut down his personal surroundings. On March 12 he had written to Duroc: "I wish that my equipages, now numbering seventy-two carriages, were only ten; and instead of five hundred horses and mules, I consider as being of any use only one hundred and ten. See in what manner this can be arranged." On April 13 he wrote Caulaincourt: "These are my dispositions for my departure. I will leave

with you in a light carriage, the Grand Marshal with Count Lobau in another carriage, Fain and Yvan in a third carriage. These three carriages are to be equally light. . . . In my carriage will be put a choice of books, the maps of the post-roads, the sketches lately made in my topographical bureau, a few maps of the country between the Elbe and Main. Fain will have in his carriage my morning reports" (situations) "and my correspondence with the army. . . . The topographical engineer who remains here will leave with the rest of my maps and papers, and will follow the route of Trèves. *Ma Chambre*" (my personal belongings) "will leave also by the route of Trèves. I shall have disposed of all my aides-de-camp and orderly officers."

On the 19th the emperor wrote Bertrand: "It seems that the enemy has sixty or seventy thousand men on the left bank of the Elbe;" and to Ney: "The news that I receive from all sides tends to make me think that there have passed to the left bank of the Elbe only the corps of Wittgenstein, Yorck and Blucher, and some partisans. That all this is not in condition to hold head to us, but that this cavalry may disquiet us, which makes it necessary to open the lines of the Saale and seize the debouches of Jena, Saalfeld, Naumburg, Merseburg and Halle, so as to keep all the light cavalry of the enemy on the right of that river, and place ourselves in perfect communication with the viceroy."

On April 25 Napoleon reached Erfurt. The lack of cavalry kept him ignorant of what the enemy was doing; there was less than ten thousand horse, and this arm cannot be at once created — new troops can soon be made into infantry, but not into cavalry. No one better gauged this arm. A defensive campaign, especially behind works, can be carried on with a small amount of horse, but if you are beaten in battle in the open and have no cavalry while the enemy has, you are lost; as, conversely, if you win and have no cavalry, you cannot make victory decisive. Superiority in cavalry can hide the movements of the army, develop those of the

enemy. Few instances of its value are more pronounced than the influence the South exerted in the Civil War for the first two years, by reason of its better cavalry. Napoleon had always much relied on his horse, and gave it heavy work to do; and now he must get along without horse of his own, while preparing his young soldiers to meet the enemy's. On this most important subject he wrote Marmont, April 17:—

“Of all manœuvres” (drill), “I should recommend to you the most important, which is, plying into square by battalion. The chief of battalion and the captains should know how to make this movement with the greatest rapidity. It is the only means of providing against cavalry charges and saving an entire regiment.” And, conscious that his new squadrons were not yet reliable, he wrote Ney, April 20: “Recommend General Souham not to leave his cavalry without infantry; and the infantry which is with this cavalry must intrench and post itself in the greatest circumspection, so as to have no cavalry skirmishes.” To Bertrand he had written April 12: “What it is convenient to recommend to you is to march in close order, your two divisions assembled, your artillery well placed, having no tail, bivouacking every evening as soon as you shall have left Bamberg, and having your cartridges in the bags. The enemy is far from guessing the considerable forces which will move upon the Saale. . . . The best means of having your divisions bivouac is in square, unless you are backed up on a river or some obstacle which makes this unnecessary. Avoid cavalry skirmishes, and especially take measures to assure your provisions.” This lack of cavalry was the more serious, because the foot had to hold head against the enemy's excellent light horse, and after a long day's march, infantry battalions had to do the duty of mounted men. The emperor did what he could to fill this gap, writing, *e. g.*, to the King of Saxony, April 20, “I beg Your Majesty, if you remain on the political side that you have taken, to send me at once all the cavalry you can dispose of. It is the only help that I can await from you, and it is what you can do most advantageously to save your states.” And, on April 24, he wrote the King of Wurtemberg, “I should find myself in a position to end affairs very promptly if I only had fifteen thousand more cavalry, but I am rather weak in this arm. . . . I have on the way more than thirty thousand cavalry, which will rejoin me during the coming May.”

While the heavy French columns with the reserve trains were moving towards Leipsic from Bamberg, Würzburg, Frankfort, Eisenach, the Russo-Prussian field army, which had assembled near the Elster early in May with less than one hundred thousand men, was so placed that it must evacuate the left bank of the Elbe or meet superior forces. It could not hold the Elbe, which was not difficult for the French, who had Wittenberg, to cross; but, believing that Napoleon had not yet concentrated, the allies chose a policy of action; for on the Leipsic plain, with the Saale in the



Woronzov.

French rear, they thought their excess of cavalry would enable them to win. They had many more old soldiers in their ranks, and the Russian campaign had lent them confidence. They had cheerfully advanced under energetic Wittgenstein, no longer terrorized by the great conqueror. While Woronzov and Bülow masked Magdeburg and covered Berlin, Wittgenstein had crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and with twenty-five thousand men lay between the lower Mulde and the lower Saale, in the Halle-Dessau region; Blucher with twenty-three thousand men had advanced to Altenburg on the Pleisse; the Russian van, fifteen thousand strong under Miloradovich, lay at Chemnitz with the main Russian force under Tormasov, eighteen thousand effective, still in Dresden; at Merseburg, in the advance, stood ten thousand men under Winzingerode, who later, as Eugene advanced, withdrew to Lützen.

Napoleon's plan, when he discovered that the enemy was marching on Saxony and that it was too late to move to Dan-

zig, was enunciated in a letter to Bertrand of April 12: Ney "will have made you understand that my intention is to refuse my right and to let the enemy penetrate towards Bayreuth, making a movement inverse to what I made in the Jena campaign, so that, if the enemy penetrates towards Bayreuth, I may arrive before him at Dresden, and cut him off from Prussia." This shows how the emperor's broad mind constantly reverted to certain simple but set forms of strategy. In his way, with his maps and pins, he was as much of a diagrammatist as Jomini with his charts is accused of being by some who forget what we all owe to this first great military critic. And mindful of tactical needs he wrote Ney, April 20, to "choose a good battlefield near Erfurt, have a plan made of it, and send it to me, as well as the project of fortification which should be erected there." On April 22 Ney replied that Blücher was at Altenburg and Prince William at Chemnitz, with the light cavalry raiding everywhere, and that Winzingerode still cut the communication between him and Eugene. But the French advance soon compelled the allies to decamp, and on April 24 Napoleon wrote to Cambacérès that they were moving back on their bridges at Dessau. And as to all appearances they simply lay still in Saxony, he changed his plan and, as he wrote the King of Wurtemberg the same day: "The first aim of my operations is to throw the enemy over to the right bank of the Saale, then over to the right bank of the Mulde, and even over to the right bank of the Elbe." For this manœuvre Leipsic was the key-point; and to join the viceroy the main object; and next day Eugene was ordered to recapture Halle and Merseburg, and from there to move forward on that city.

On April 27 Napoleon wrote Ney: "I hope that to-day the viceroy will be at Querfurt and that the junction will be made. The occupation of Jena, Dornburg, Naumburg, Merseburg,

Halle, that is my first project. One might also occupy Weissenfels, if there is a bridge on the Saale and a route by the left bank. All the movements are to be made behind the Saale as behind a curtain, and none on the right bank." He had placed the force of the enemy too low, and hoped to cut him off from Berlin, or perhaps catch Wittgenstein separated from the Prussians, and "as Wittgenstein is rather bold, if we break out with heavy masses, we can inflict great losses upon him." From his point of view, the enemy had come up to the Saale for the mere purpose of being beaten; and with his superiority he was confident of the result, though to gain the result might require heavy fighting.

By inflicting great losses on the enemy, Napoleon meant to do him a substantial and legitimate damage, not merely put a given number of men *hors de combat*. The latter was no part of his scheme. "In war," he once said, "every harm, even if within the rules, is excusable only when absolutely necessary. Everything beyond this is a crime." And, reckless as he was of human life, he always acted on this theory.

On April 25 the French lay as follows: "The Guard in Erfurt; Eugene with Lauriston, Macdonald and Reynier on the lower Saale holding Wittenberg, which was blockaded by the Russians; Ney in front of Weimar, with a detachment holding the Kösen defile; Marmont at Gotha; Bertrand at Saalfeld; Oudinot at Coburg. As the emperor had determined, the Grand Army began to concentrate on the Saale, Eugene with the left wing moving on Merseburg, Napoleon with the right wing on Weissenfels.

On April 27 the emperor wrote Berthier to send out geographical engineers to make reconnoissances of certain roads in his front: "They will report if they are practicable or not for artillery, will describe the defiles, woods, rivers, their width, their depth, the bridges, the brooks, fords. They will

indicate the positions which are susceptible of defense, the towns and villages susceptible of being easily put beyond capture out of hand." Everything was made ready for contact with the enemy.

It had been a wonderful feat for Napoleon to leave the wreck of the Grand Army at Smorgoni the beginning of December, and to be on the Elbe again with a new army of two hundred thousand men before the end of April — but this huge company of uniformed men was not the Grand Army. The soldiers were there, armed and equipped ; but they were not the corps that had assembled on the Vistula the spring before, and much less the veterans of 1809. "We must be careful," Napoleon had said in a former campaign, "not to bring bad troops into danger, and not be so mad as to believe, as many do, that a man is a soldier. . . . A body of troops requires the more artillery the less it is good. There are army corps with which I would demand only a third of the artillery which I would deem necessary with others." Previous to Gustavus Adolphus, the number of guns per thousand men varied from one to five. Gustavus generally had three, but at one time six. In the Seven Years' War the average number was four, though Frederick once increased it to ten per thousand. Napoleon rarely got more than five or six per thousand. On account of the rawness of the foot, the emperor had now striven to make the artillery arm strong. He made every one believe it so at the beginning ; and later it really did reach the enormous total of thirteen hundred guns. He said after Lützen and Bautzen that "it is the artillery of the Guard which decides most battles, because, having it always at hand, I can send it wherever it is necessary," and on June 2 he wrote Clarke, "Great battles are won with artillery." Yet to combat the general and dangerous feeling that the troops were of poor quality, he insisted that his lieutenants might

place confidence in the men ; and he himself fought these youngsters as if they had been veterans. *Napoléon* had the gift of using masses of men with a touch no one else could approach.

While the emperor still had some of his famous marshals, and could rely on intelligent obedience, even these were no longer as active as of old ; some were weary of war, and many spoiled by excesses. Instead of the ancient pride in their profession, in their success, in their commands, there is testimony that self-indulgence was common, and that unless the master was at hand — and this was less frequently than of yore — the duties of high and low lacked in the performance. Nor was the blind faith in *Napoleon's* powers left which once carried general and soldier so far ; and with the regimental officers and sub-officers — most of whom were without experience — it was worse. Young troops with old officers are one thing ; young troops with young and ignorant leaders are another. No one appreciated this fact more than *Napoleon*. “The bearing of a corps resides in the officers and sub-officers,” he wrote *Decrés*, December 15, 1806 ; and now he made loud complaints.

On April 27 he wrote *Marmont*: “You will send back to the depot of Erfurt . . . all the captains who have not made war. . . . You will do the same by the sub-lieutenants and lieutenants who may be in the same case. It is absurd to have in a regiment captains who have not made war.” And to *Clarke* he wrote the same day: “It is impossible to see a finer corps of soldiers, but it is impossible at the same time to see a worse one in officers. If your bureau had taken as a task to name the most inefficient officers in France, it could not have better succeeded. These officers are the laughter of the soldiers. . . . Most of the captains have never seen fire. . . . You send me also young men who come out of college, and who have not been to the school at *St. Cyr*, so that they know nothing, and it is in new regiments you place them. It is impossible to do worse service than this bureau of your ministry has done.”

Napoleon must have been conscious that it was his ceaseless wars that had killed off the officers he now needed; yet he permitted no one to guess his thoughts, and dealt with the existing conditions, not their history.

Though Austria continued friendly, yet matters in Vienna looked threatening, and Napoleon had quietly suggested to his father-in-law that Silesia might again be added to his dominion; but Austria was not to be thus cajoled, she was negotiating with England, Prussia and Russia; Napoleon's position was too delicate to take a positive step, and Austria was not ready for an open rupture. She declared herself ready for armed mediation, but this meant as a condition precedent the independence of the Confederation of the Rhine, the breaking up of the Duchy of Warsaw, and the restitution of Illyria; and Napoleon was unwilling to lop off these provinces, which he had virtually added to France.

Towards the end of April, as we have seen, the situation was improved by the French wings getting closer; and the emperor, on the 28th, wrote to Ney: "The great affair at this moment is the junction;" to Berthier: "Have it known . . . that I shall arrive at Weimar at the moment the infantry leaves, desiring to march at its head;" and to Eugene: "You know that my principle is to debouch in mass. It is then in mass that I wish to pass the Saale with three hundred thousand men."


The junction was completed April 28 and 29 by Eugene with the left wing reaching Merseburg, which Macdonald seized, and Napoleon with the centre and right reaching Weissenfels, and the French army was put over the Saale and moved forward on Leipsic, the cross-roads of that section of Germany. Somewhat parallel to Eugene's march, Wittgenstein was moving from the Dessau country to join forces at or east of Leipsic with Blucher. On April 29 Ney's van-

guard under Souham struck some Russian cavalry under Landskoi at Weissenfels, the French recruits behaved well, and the Russians retired. Next morning, when the French started to march through the Rippach defile, which leads out of the deep Saale channel into the Leipsic plain, Winzingerode held the road, but the French assaulted the defile and the allies fell back. In this unimportant action, Bessières



Bessières.

was killed — a grievous loss. The French army followed on, the emperor remained in place waiting for Eugene to debouch, and sent him orders to deploy in front of Merseburg; and near Lützen Ney reached out to Macdonald, who commanded Eugene's right. At 9 P. M. Eugene wrote the emperor: "It seems that the enemy has assembled, at Leipsic, the corps of Yorck, Wittgenstein, Miloradovich . . . and probably Blucher. . . . Kleist has retired to Leipsic. It is probable . . . that they will defend the Elster on their new



lines of operation on Dresden. All their right appears at least to have withdrawn upon the centre."

On May 1 Ney moved forward to Lützen and occupied Starsiedl and Kaja on the Flossgraben; Marmont was between Weissenfels and Lützen marching through Rippach defile; Bertrand through Dornburg was nearing Poserna, with orders to move to Kaja; Oudinot, through Kahla, was reaching Naumburg; Eugene with Lauriston was at Mark-

ränstadt; Reynier was in Merseburg, and Macdonald still near Lützen. The French were thus echeloned on the several routes from Naumburg to Leipsic. Headquarters, with Ney and the Guard, was at Lützen, covered by a detachment of Ney at Pegau to protect the French right.

That the old marauding trouble continued is shown by a letter to Ney: "They complain that your troops commit many disorders, so that the villages are deserted. It is a great misfortune. Put an end to it." And to keep every able man with the colors, Napoleon wrote to Berthier, April 30: "Name a commandant for Naumburg. Give orders that the Young Guard shall leave there a company of disabled men who can do the service. Bertrand and Marmont can also leave there their disabled men."

The enemy had likewise been concentrating, though how, with his lack of cavalry, Napoleon could not ascertain; and Wittgenstein, Blucher and Winzingerode lay along the Elster and Pleisse, at Zwenkau and Rötha; Tormasov was at Lobstädt, and the van of the main army under Miloradovich was protecting the left flank at Altenburg. Despite the anti-Napoleonic crusade, the czar soon learned that all Germany was not rising to welcome the allies, and also that Napoleon had reached the Saale with a new army; but he still believed that the veterans of Moscow and the Beresina, backed by the finely drilled Prussian battalions, which since 1806 had been under constant discipline, could easily overthrow the conscript youth of France. He underrated the numbers the emperor had brought to the Elbe; he did not credit the French army with being well in hand, and fancied he could attack the separate corps before they had joined. Victory was essential to hold Saxony in the Coalition, whose troops under Thielemann were already standing neutral at Torgau, while the king had been invited by Francis to make Prague his

headquarters, and had fallen under Austrian influence. The czar and Wittgenstein were anxious to do battle, and when they heard that Napoleon was debouching into the Leipsic plain, a council of war decided to move forward so as to come to the front facing north, attack the French army with its back to the marshy river below Leipsic, and thus have it at a disadvantage. In the night of May 1-2 the allies crossed the Elster near Pegau, from which Ney's party seems to have retired, while Kleist held the defile of Lindenau, and sent out detachments to engage the French attention, which they succeeded in doing. Finding no opposition, Miloradovich moved on Zeitz, to watch the roads from Camburg to Naumburg, and cover the allied left and rear. The Russian Guards, grenadiers and cuirassiers had been moving up from Dresden as reserve. The czar and the King of Prussia were both present, and Wittgenstein was in command of the joint forces.

Excluding Kleist and Miloradovich, there were not over seventy thousand men in the allied army. Having crossed the Elster, these moved in little columns over the Flossgraben, and during the morning of May 2, came into line to the right so as to lean the right flank on Werben, and be hidden by a rolling ridge south of Görschen, the left extending towards Taucha. Noon was approaching, and the troops were given some rest, as the Prussians had been afoot nearly thirty-six hours. Napoleon did not expect their offensive at so early a moment, and was far from anticipating that the allies could so manœuvre as to draw up athwart his right flank. Though for want of horse he had not efficiently reconnoitred, he had guessed that they were concentrating behind the Elster near Zwenkau, and had heard that Wittgenstein was in command; but he still deemed his own direction on Leipsic a correct one, for he was debouching on their stra-

tegic flank, and might cut them off from Berlin. Lützen was the key-point, for it was obvious that, by occupying it, the enemy might cut the French in two; and early in the day he ordered Lauriston on Leipsic, with Macdonald in support to Markkränstadt; Ney, to whom Lützen was committed, was bid to reconnoitre out towards Pegau, Zwenkau and Zeitz, Marmont was to advance on Pegau, with Ney in support, and Bertrand to reach Taucha.

All the French army corps would thus be properly moving with relation to the key-point, but their heads did not get up in season to forestall the enemy's action; the reconnoitring appears to have been ill done; and not foreseeing what was to happen, the emperor elected to accompany Lauriston's column. In the Bulletin of the Grand Army, dated Lützen, May 2, we find: "At nine o'clock in the morning His Majesty, having heard a cannonade in the direction of Leipsic, galloped thither. The enemy was defending the little village of Lindenau and the bridges in front of Leipsic. His Majesty was only awaiting the moment when these last positions should be taken to put all his army in movement in this direction, have it pivot on Leipsic, cross to the right of the Elster, and take the enemy in reverse." Kleist, however, gave so good an account of himself as to strengthen Napoleon's belief that the allies must be in and about Leipsic, and that he had their right wing in his front; indeed, so well persuaded was he of this, that to aid in throwing back the enemy, he called in Ney personally, while his divisions remained in and south of Lützen. Meanwhile the rising dust seen from neighboring hillocks indicated to the main allied army that the French were moving through and beyond Lützen on Leipsic; and the troops which could be seen in the Görschen, Rahna and Kaja villages were thought to be flanking parties.

The general and excellent plan of the allies was to move

forward, capture these villages, and then, having taken Lützen, to throw the bulk of their forces around what would be the French right when it faced for battle, and attack it with all arms. Neither side knew just what the other was doing.

Shortly after eleven the emperor, Eugene and Ney had met near the Gustavus Adolphus monument, erected on the 1632 battlefield, and the French van could be seen making its way into Leipsic suburbs; Napoleon had dismounted, and scanning the city with his glasses, was unable to discover any large force this side the town, though the roofs were covered by the populace, eager to view the approaching battle, when suddenly a furious cannonade was heard from the right and rear, apparently not far from where Ney had bivouacked the night before. Thus came the announcement that he had been outflanked. Napoleon did not move, says Odenleben, a Saxon officer in the French service, noted for a few minutes the distant smoke and noise, and on the instant changed his plan. "We have," said Napoleon, "no cavalry, but never mind, this is going to be an Egyptian battle. Good infantry, sustained by artillery, should suffice for itself. We have, to be sure, only recruits to oppose to the old soldiers of the enemy, but we must rely on the natural courage of the French. Ney will hold himself till we all get to the place where the battle began." His orders were simple. "Lauriston was to push the attack on Lindenau, Eugene was to march with Macdonald across the country to take place on Ney's left, Marmont was to march to the guns and fall in on Ney's right, Bertrand and all troops in the rear were to come up at a double towards the sound of the guns," which would bring them in on the left of the enemy. "The Guard and all troops marching towards Leipsic were to file to the right and move up to the sound of the guns." Ney was to hold the centre at all hazards. Lauriston was later to support Macdonald. After issuing

these orders, the wording of which is slightly at fault in describing the movement, the emperor galloped to Lützen, to head the Guard, and lead it up to sustain the centre and act as reserve.

Napoleon's battle of Lützen was fought, not on the ground which the Hero of the Reformation hallowed with his blood, but several miles to the south of it. Similar strategic reasons




Russian Cossacks.

led the two armies into conflict here, for topography always dictates military manœuvres, and we find all over Central Europe a recurrence of the same operations in different centuries. Had the allies debouched from Leipsic with their main force, they would probably have met on the field of 1632.

The Leipsic country is a big rolling plain which reaches up to the Bohemian mountains, is cut through by the Elster, the Pleisse and the Flossgraben, and is covered by villages

and farms. Some three miles south of Lützen lies a group of villages, Gross Görschen, Klein Görschen and Rahna close together, Kaja somewhat to the rear of them, and Eisdorf. The Flossgraben, originally a brook, is a slow, canal-like stream, with artificial banks, kept up as a drain of the Elster, and running down towards Zeitz through the theatre of the battle ; it can be passed at need by cavalry and infantry. To the west, a trifle higher, lies another village, Starsiedl. The Rip-pach brook, running somewhat parallel to and west of the Flossgraben, limits the field on that side, though it had no influence on the battle, which was fought in and about the villages named.

At the first sound of the firing, Ney galloped towards his own troops, upon whom, stationed in the villages, — cooking their dinner, quite unexpectant of battle, — the force of the allied onset had suddenly fallen. Had the allies cleverly used their twelve thousand cavalry, it is hard to say what damage Ney's divisions might have suffered, left alone with but six hundred horsemen of poor calibre. Blucher, on the right in first line, attacked sharply ; but Winzingerode was slow in marshaling his squadrons on the Russian left, when he might have ridden around and crushed the French right ; and four of Ney's divisions had time to prepare themselves for the fray without the flurry of a cavalry attack. The fifth, composed of Germans, on the left of Souham, was first reached about 2 P. M. ; and the young eighteen-year-old conscripts — especially Souham's — held themselves as young troops often will, with astonishing constancy, later aided by Gérard of Macdonald's corps, who came up to sustain them. The allied attack lacked *ensemble* ; its delivery in successive waves saved the French from an initial defeat. Two thirds of the allies were at times spectators merely. Klux, later sustained by Ziethen, advanced on Gross Görschen, with Röder



Battle of Lützen.

in reserve ; Dolf's cavalry rode on towards Starsiedl. Yorck's corps and Berg's Russian division were in second line ; Eugene of Wurtemberg was coming up on the left to sustain Winzingerode. Though a decided lack of momentum was in the onset, yet the contest was severe. Furiously the French strove with the Russians and Prussians for the possession of the villages ; and one and another went lost and was re-taken, without a definitive holding by either side, though the overmatched 3d Corps was gradually pushed back on Klein Görtschen and Rahna, and beyond. The arrival of Ney him-

self lent fresh vigor to his legions. Souham, Gérard and Brenier were again launched on the foe, and recovered Klein Görtschen and Rahna; and this enabled reinforcements to come up on both French flanks, which were leaning on Eisdorf and Starsiedl. It was past two when Marmont fell in on Ney's right, driving back Winzingerode, now deployed near Kolzen. Charged by these heavy squadrons, Compans and Bonnet formed square, each time with success; and finally Marmont took post at Starsiedl, where he maintained himself. By their initial slowness, the allies had let the auspicious moment pass.

The Prussians fought stanchly, Yorck and Berg's Russians in the second line relieving the first, in the attempt to take and hold Gross and Klein Görtschen and Rahna, and gallant Ney had to yield, though he retook the villages twice; and finally the enemy got possession of Kaja by a last effort of Berg. Although Marmont had just arrived, the battle was clearly being won by the allies when Ney, under the eye of Napoleon, made one more effort with Ricard's division to regain the lost ground. Lobau headed this column, and Ney followed along with Brenier, Gérard and Souham. Kaja was recaptured at the point of the bayonet, and a bloody contest ensued for Klein Görtschen, still held by the enemy. To sustain Blucher, Wittgenstein ordered Eugene of Wurtemberg over from the left to the right: one of his divisions debouched through Eisdorf and blocked oncoming Marchand, whom Ney had ordered to the left while refusing his right; the other came up to Berg's support; and not only was Gross Görtschen again taken, but Ney was driven out of Kaja for the third time. Meanwhile the Prussian left had assailed Starsiedl; but here they met Marmont's fresh troops, which fended them off, and held this village firmly as a pivot on the French right, while on the French left, at Eisdorf, the Rus-

sians were equally unable to gain a permanent footing. Fearing that his efforts in the centre would not alone win the day, Wittgenstein had launched the Russian grenadiers under Konovnitzin on Eisdorf and Klein Görschen ; and this manœuvre would have broken the French left had not Eugene's head of column arrived from Leipsic. Reaching Kitzen with Macdonald, — though somewhat belated, — his arrival checked



Prussian Grenadiers.

not only this last onset, but was felt at the centre also ; and its direction so markedly threatened the allied right that this fell back, and weakened the hold of the centre on the villages. By four o'clock Bertrand, heading Morand's division, put in an appearance on the allied left at Gosserau and Pöbles, seeing which, Wittgenstein withdrew the Russian support from the right, to save himself from being turned.

Well aware how important it was, after the 1812 disaster,

to win the first battle, if only as a moral effect on the eagerly watching politicians of Europe, Napoleon had been all day riding to and fro over the battlefield, encouraging the young troops, cheering them to further efforts, and seeing to every detail with his ancient vigor. His presence doubled his forces, and Marmont says that on this day he probably ran the greatest personal danger of his life. The battle in the centre gave him no little solicitude, as he watched the allied line fight its way closer and closer, and saw the key-point of the field, Kaja, in real peril. When, about 5 P. M., this village went lost for the third time, "His Majesty judged that the critical moment which decides the gain or the loss of battles had arrived," says the Bulletin. "There was not a moment more to lose. He ordered Mortier to move with sixteen battalions of the Young Guard on Kaja, to attack head down (*tête baissée*) and to drive out the enemy, to take the village, and to cut down everything that was found there. At the same moment His Majesty ordered his aide-de-camp, Drouot, to assemble a battery of eighty pieces and to place it" on the hill back of Starsiedl, "in front of the Old Guard, which was disposed in echelon, like four redoubts, to sustain the centre, all our cavalry ranged in line of battle behind it." This was just prior to the time when Eugene was deploying on Kitzen, the other side of the Flossgraben, and Bertrand had got ready to strike the allied left. The master-stroke succeeded; Kaja was retaken, the Prussians fell back all along the line to behind Gross Görschen, where for a while they held themselves by the aid of the Russian Guard, which was put in to reëstablish the fight, and for a bare moment succeeded in so doing; but when, some time after six o'clock, the body of Macdonald's corps debouched from Eisdorf on the allied right, all the Russian reserve could accomplish was to obtain a short halt for the retiring Prussians between

Gross Görschen and the Flossgraben. The battle of Lützen, or of Gross Görschen, had been won by the French.

After dark there was a further flurry of arms: Marmont's outposts ran into the Prussians south of Starsiedl, and in the darkness pushed them back. To reestablish the matter, and if possible to create a stampede, over-eager Blucher and his cavalry rode blindly forward and even penetrated the French lines, creating a momentary panic. The second line of Marmont fired on the first, as will often happen with young troops engaged at night, and the Prussian lancers rode as far as the Young Guard. At the same moment some Cossacks galloped around to the rear of the French army and gave an alarm, which, among the camp followers, came close to being disastrous; but the panic did not last long, and Blucher's horsemen suffered severely for what was a plucky but unwise onset in the dark.

During the afternoon, Lauriston had occupied Leipsic and forced back Kleist towards Wurzen; and he was then ordered to leave a detachment in the city and march down the Elster right bank to threaten the enemy's bridges. Under these adverse conditions, the allies recrossed the Flossgraben during the night of May 2-3, and started what was now an essential retreat behind the Elbe in two main columns, heading for Dresden and Meissen, Wittgenstein marching via Altenburg and Chemitz, followed by Bertrand and Oudinot, and Blucher by way of Colditz, pursued by Napoleon with Marmont and the Guard, and Macdonald under Eugene. Ney with the 3d and 5th Corps marched through Leipsic on Torgau, where he was to take over Victor, coming from Magdeburg to Wittenberg. Lauriston was ordered via Wurzen on Meissen, to open the road to Dresden and cover Ney's right. Davout and Vandamme, with the 1st Corps, remained in Hamburg.

At headquarters, May 5, at Colditz, Napoleon ascertained that all the corps of the enemy had come his way, and that nothing considerable was opposite Ney. On May 6, at 3.30 A. M., he wrote him: "I am very impatient to know that you are at Torgau and to see you raise the blockade of Wittenberg, because things take a turn such that it might be possible that I should seize the occasion to move at once on Berlin."

Blucher's rearguard was struck at Gersdorf on the Mulde, but Miloradovich came up and rescued it; Eugene had small combats at Eisdorf, Nossen and Wildsruf. The French kept up their three-column pursuit as best they might; but there being no effective cavalry at hand, it lacked practical value. From Borna, May 5, 2 A. M., the emperor had Berthier write Eugene "that he marches much too slowly, that he occupies far too much room, which embarrasses the march of the army; that there are far too many wagons in his corps, and that



Prussian Musketeer.

there is not order in them; that the cavalry drags along behind it as usual a great quantity of useless stuff and disabled men. . . . Let him carry out the regulations." On May 6, at 3.30 A. M., he also wrote him: "Put a little order into your corps, which needs it very much. The Italians especially commit horrors, pillage and steal everywhere. Have one or two of them shot." On the 7th headquarters got to Nossen, the viceroy at Wildsruf, and the allies crossed to the right bank of the Elbe, the Russians at Dresden and the Prussians at Meissen; and when Napoleon reached the Saxon

capital on the 8th, he found it vacated, and the several temporary bridges, as well as the repaired old stone bridge, afire

and the military magazines destroyed. The French occupied Dresden city, while Miloradovich left a force in the Neustadt on the right bank, which, when an attempt was made to cross and oust it, retired. With some reproaches for their recent lack of fealty, Napoleon forgave the Saxons, who resumed the alliance, and the king was urged to return to Dresden. On his arrival May 12, the Saxons again became part of Reynier's corps. Fouché was brought to Dresden as chief of secret service.

Napoleon could congratulate himself on a brilliant and necessary victory. The losses had been very severe, as the young troops had not the experience of village fighting which enabled them to use cover to advantage. Ney is said to have lost over a quarter of his corps. There was such a vast number of conscripts wounded in the hand, that it could not be determined whether it was the awkwardness of a first battle, or an intentional maiming to escape further service, of which this battle was such a rough prophecy. "His Majesty cannot too highly praise the army for its good-will, its courage and its intrepidity," says the Bulletin. "Our young soldiers did not consider the danger. In this great circumstance they have revealed all the nobility of the French blood. . . . The Old Guard did not fire a shot. Half of the army was not put in. . . . The allied army, one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand strong, commanded by the two sovereigns, . . . was therefore defeated and put into rout by less than half of the French army."



Prussian Pioneer.

Berndt gives the losses as thirteen thousand French killed

and wounded, out of one hundred and sixteen thousand present in the battle; and ten thousand allies, out of sixty-nine thousand engaged.

The loss of the battle of Lützen was alleged by the Prussians to have occurred from lack of support by the Russians, and the two armies separated, Blucher moving towards Grosenhayn and Elsterwerda, as if to protect Berlin, while the Russians marched on Bautzen; but after a week the Prussians came back again towards their allies. Reinforced by the Saxon contingent and the Wurtembergers, Napoleon at once repaired his losses. The allies could not do so until later, but they were still superior in cavalry.

On May 3 Napoleon issued a

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

Soldiers, I am content with you. You have filled my expectations. You have made up for everything by your good-will and by your bravery. You have, in the celebrated day of May 2, defeated and put into rout the Russian and Prussian armies, commanded by the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia. You have added a new lustre to the glory of my eagles. You have shown all of which the French blood is capable.

On May 4 Napoleon wrote the Emperor of Austria: "Monsieur my Brother and very dear Father-in-Law, Knowing the interest that Your Majesty has in anything happy which comes to me, I hasten to announce the victory which Providence was pleased to accord to my arms on the field of Lützen. . . . Let Your Majesty believe in the sentiments of esteem and of perfect consideration that I bear you."

On May 5 he wrote Clarke: "In the last battle I saw with the greatest pain that a good third of the shells did not burst. . . . That comes from their having been loaded for many years. . . . There is no *but* or *if* which can justify the artillery corps for such negligence. . . . A director of artillery who sends out munitions not in condition deserves death."

In the shifting of commands Victor felt neglected, and wrote May 7 to Berthier: "I owe it to myself and to the consideration due to my grade to represent to the Emperor that in placing me in a subaltern rank,

with a command of five thousand men, while several division generals command army corps, His Majesty condemns me to a public degradation and the most shameful. I should be desperate at this disgrace if I had merited it ; but having nothing to reproach myself, having been constantly, as I shall always be, one of the most faithful and most devoted subjects of His Majesty, I shall support it, if it is decided, with the calm of my conscience. All my ambition consists solely in serving His Majesty with honor." . . .



Prussian Hussar.

LVIII.

BAUTZEN. MAY 4-21, 1813.

As Austria became uncertain, Eugene was sent to hold Italy, for Napoleon would not negotiate on terms which, as matters stood, were reasonable. The Elbe was reached, and the enemy withdrew May 10. From Dresden Napoleon could march on Berlin, or follow the enemy to Silesia. He believed he could reach the Oder, relieve the fortresses, and reestablish himself on the Russian frontier. But by mid-May he learned that the enemy stood at Bautzen; and Ney, who was demonstrating on Berlin, was drawn in and Napoleon advanced towards the enemy. His plan was to attack the allies in front while Ney moved around their right on their rear. On May 18 the allies sent out to oppose Ney's approach, but a heavy fight accomplished little. On May 20 the French moved on Bautzen. Napoleon had nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men; the allies, led by Wittgenstein, with one hundred and ten thousand, were strongly posted behind the Spree, with an intrenched second line in the rear. Napoleon forced the Spree and they fell back to their second line, while Ney moved well around their right. At daylight, May 21, the emperor purposed only to demonstrate along the allied front until Ney could reach their rear, and then to give the *coup de grace*. But he failed to instruct Ney definitely, and instead of moving upon the allied communications, Ney was arrested by Barclay and Blucher, and did not move far enough. At the sound of Ney's fighting, Napoleon ordered an advance in force. The onslaught was heavy, and the allies prudently retired before their army was routed. Had Ney pushed on vigorously toward their lines of retreat, the battle would have been decisive, but the allies got away in good order, though with heavy losses.

WHEN the Austrian outlook became less favorable, the viceroy was sent home to recreate the army of Italy, wrecked by the drafts made upon it in 1812, and now promising to be an essential factor in the military problem.

On May 12 Napoleon wrote him from Dresden: "My Son, leave this evening and repair to Munich, and from there to Italy. I instruct the Minister of War to put under your orders the troops which are in my

kingdom of Italy and the Illyrian provinces. You will find in Italy the orders I have given for the formation of a Corps of Observation of the Adige. My intention is to augment it up to eighty or ninety battalions, half French, half Italian, and to exaggerate this number by public opinion so as to have by that means the ascendant on Austria, so that it shall be I who menace, and not she." And on May 18: "It is necessary that you should form with all the activity of which you are capable the army which will be under your orders. . . . Engage the King of Bavaria to fortify some defiles in the Tyrol so as to be master of the outlets, and to control the inhabitants."

On May 12 the Army of the Elbe was dissolved, and Macdonald put in command of the 11th Corps.

Despite her friendly utterances, Austria had determined to recover part of her lost provinces, and the victory of Lützen, indecisive from want of cavalry, affected the political status little. "The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia attributed the loss of the battle of Lützen to faults which their generals had committed in directing the combined forces," says the Bulletin, "and especially to the difficulties attached to an offensive movement of one hundred and fifty to one hundred and eighty thousand men." The matrimonial alliance went for little, but the fear that Napoleon might come to an understanding with Alexander by ceding to Russia the Duchy of Warsaw kept Austria from open antagonism; and acting the ingenuous part of mediator, she pressed her influence all over Europe. Napoleon was ready for an armistice, with a Congress in view which should frame terms of peace; but he was not willing to have conditions precedent thrust upon him after a victory. The terms suggested by Austria — the dissolution of the Confederation and the Duchy of Warsaw, and the return to Austria of Illyria, Galicia and Innviertel — seemed to Napoleon excessive; but desiring to settle differences between Russia and France, he proposed to Alexander conditions which he thought might lead to universal peace.

On May 17 he wrote Caulaincourt : "The essential thing is to have a talk. . . . My intention, moreover, is to make a bridge of gold for the Emperor Alexander. . . . If I have sacrifices to make, I prefer that they should be to the profit of the Emperor Alexander, who conducts a frank war against me, and of the King of Prussia, in whom Russia is interested, rather than to the profit of Austria, which has betrayed the alliance. . . . Beside, before the battle which is going to be delivered, the Emperor of Russia ought not to consider himself very far engaged in the struggle. . . . In treating to-day and in getting good conditions for his ally the King of Prussia, and without the intervention of Austria, the Emperor Alexander would prove to Europe that peace is due to his efforts, . . . and would leave the struggle in an honorable manner."

On the same day he wrote to Alexander that "what Your Majesty tells me in your letter about the interest you bear me has touched me greatly. If Your Majesty takes some interest in my happiness, have an eye to my honor. I am decided to die, if necessary, at the head of all France has of generous men, rather than become the laughter of the English, and to let my enemies triumph." And after an interview with Count Bubna, he wrote Francis : "I desire peace more than anybody. I consent to the opening of a negotiation for a general peace and the assembling of a Congress." And next day to Caulaincourt : "Having resolved by every means to reëstablish peace, general or Continental, we have proposed the reunion of a Congress. . . . We hope that this Congress will promptly conduct to the reëstablishment of peace, of which so many peoples feel the need. We have therefore determined to conclude an armistice or a suspension of arms with the Russian and Prussian armies for the time the Congress shall last, desiring to avoid the battle which, by the position that the enemy has taken, seems imminent, and to save humanity a useless effusion of blood. Our intention is that you shall proceed to the outposts, where you are to ask to be admitted to the Emperor Alexander, to make him this proposition, and to negotiate, conclude and sign every military convention, having for aim to suspend hostilities. It is to this effect that we write you the present closed letter, to make use of it if it shall be demanded, and to stand as full power. NAPOLEON."

The terms Napoleon seems to have had in mind were that the Confederation of the Rhine should be limited to the Oder ; that Prussia, thus denuded of territory and her chief city,

should receive the Duchy of Warsaw, by which she would become part of the Russian system; and thus separated, France and Russia could have no further disagreement. But such a shuffling of peoples and capitals was a mere dream, contrary to the trend of nationalities, and unreasonable to any but one whose ideas, intensely practical in most things, were highly imaginative in others. Alexander's answer, received the day after Bautzen, that he could consider no proposition not satisfactory to Austria, proved that the two monarchs had come, or were fast coming, to an understanding; but as, while waiting, Napoleon had pressed forward at all points the operations of the army, no military factor had been weakened.

From lack of information, the emperor's operations during a couple of weeks succeeding Lützen were more than commonly uncertain, while always strategically sound and abreast of whatever might happen; and as typical of his method of providing against all manner of contingencies, a few of his orders will be quoted. Some are most important as a part of the military narrative. From Pegau, early May 4, he wrote Ney: "My intention is to move my headquarters to-day to Borna, to follow the enemy sharply. There I shall decide perhaps to move on Dresden, but in this case I shall leave you on my left to move on Wittenberg, after having raised the blockade of Torgau and put Reynier at the head of his 7th Corps. . . . I would like at Wittenberg to join to you Sébastiani, who has fourteen thousand men, of whom four thousand cavalry, which could not fail to make there a very fine army. This would permit me, according to the ulterior news which I might receive, either to hold myself on the Elbe, or to debouch through Wittenberg and to move immediately on Berlin." Later in the morning he wrote: "I am marching on Dresden. . . . Assemble Victor to raise the blockade of Wittenberg."


On reaching Dresden the emperor rescued the bridge not wholly consumed, and prepared for a crossing ; and here the Guard, Bertrand, Marmont, Macdonald and Oudinot assembled, Lauriston having marched on Meissen. As we have seen, Ney, after reorganizing his depleted corps in Leipsic, was to advance on Torgau, and to his command were added Reynier coming up from Halle and the Saxons, Victor from Bernburg, and Sébastiani from Lüneburg ; the whole being intended as a distant threat to Berlin, and a nearer one to the allied right, which might drive the enemy away from the east bank of the Elbe ; for Napoleon doubted his ability to force a passage at Dresden without too much delay, should the enemy impede him, the pontoon equipment abandoned in Russia not yet having been fully replaced. From Colditz, May 6, he wrote Ney : “ I do not know if I can cross at Dresden. I fear to find difficulty in crossing, for I have pontoniers and no pontoons. These will not arrive for a fortnight. If I have no boats, and if the enemy seriously defends the crossing and exposes Dresden to the circumstances of war, I shall be obliged to go back to Torgau ; but your presence at Torgau with your army corps must impose on the enemy, and make him renounce the project of defending the Elbe.” For the moment, indeed, the allies opposed the crossing, and erecting on May 9 a battery of forty guns at Uebigau, just below Dresden, from whence, owing to a bend in the river, they could take the French in flank, they cannonaded the bridges ; but on Drouot’s replying vigorously with sixty guns, they retired from the Neustadt. This permitted the repair of the old stone bridge ; during the 10th and succeeding night this work was pushed under Napoleon’s personal inspection, and by next forenoon seven wooden trestles had been placed between the two blown-up arches, and Macdonald, who was to be the vanguard, headed the passage.

Napoleon always believed in the dramatic. From headquarters at Pegau, May 4, he wrote Ney: "I desire that you should go to Leipsic. Make there the finest entry possible and pass the review of your corps." And later at Dresden, order was given to the troops which were to march through the town that they should "traverse it in handsome shape and in a military manner." And Marmont, who was to pass Dresden May 11, was to have "his corps in full dress, with his guns, and in the best order. He will cross his baggage, with everything which is not handsome to see, by the boat of rafts. His cavalry is to be at the head" of his parade column.

To guard even against the improbable, Bertrand was ordered to send a division up to Pirna, and to scout out all the roads to Bohemia.

The emperor with the Guard and Oudinot remained in Dresden, and the successively crossing corps were advanced May 13 along the roads leading east and northeast from the right bank: Macdonald on Bischofswerda, whence he drove the Russians, Marmont towards Kamenz, and Bertrand on Königsbruck, while a reconnoissance moved to Grossenhayn.

Napoleon now had a choice of three courses — to march on Berlin, or on the enemy's army, which he supposed was retiring to Silesia, or to combine the two operations. But it was some days before he was sure as to what his movements would be, for the operation on Berlin seemed to fascinate him. From Dresden, May 9, at 3 A. M., he wrote to Ney that it was important he should rapidly reach Wittenberg; that he was to assemble his corps, Victor and Sébastiani; that he was to leave Reynier in the position where he had placed him; that he had given orders to Lauriston to leave a division at Meissen and to move between Torgau and Meissen, to be able to sustain Reynier. And he ordered Lauriston to keep up connection with Ney. Next day, at 4 A. M., he wrote Ney: "You are the master to cross at Torgau or Wittenberg, but as I suppose you are already at Wittenberg, I send the order to



Dresden-Bautzen Country.

Lauriston to enter Torgau, and to Reynier to take the command of the Saxon corps." This the latter did, after some opposition by Thielemann, who afterwards went over to the enemy. "My intention is that Reynier with his corps should be under your orders. These twelve thousand men joined to Victor and Sébastiani should put you in condition to do something. Lauriston might debouch through Torgau. If, on the contrary, you have not left and you should prefer to debouch through Torgau, Lauriston will also be under your orders."

And to Berthier he wrote : "Ney can debouch from Torgau, if he is still within reach of Torgau, but as I suppose he is already at Wittenberg, he will be more abreast of menacing Berlin." And he told Berthier to notify Ney "that the Russians were retiring through Silesia, that of the Prussians, not more than twenty thousand came out of the battle, and supposing they receive ten thousand reinforcements on the way, they cannot be more than thirty thousand men." On May 13 Berthier was ordered to write Ney: that Victor and Sébastiani, with twenty-five thousand men, would be that day at Cöthen, and had been ordered to debouch at Wittenberg in the morning of the 15th and make a half march in the direction of Lückau and Berlin ; that the Dessau bridge was to be destroyed if the enemy had one there; that Ney was to move with his five divisions May 14 on Lückau, which his van should reach the 15th and headquarters the 16th ; that he was to order Victor to be between Wittenberg and Lückau and menacing Berlin the 16th, that Reynier was to be placed between Lückau and Victor, and Lauriston sent to Dobriluk ; that Bertrand on the 13th was at Königsbruck, and on the 14th would be near Hoyerswerda; that Macdonald the 13th was at Bischofswerda and would be the 14th probably at Bautzen ; that by the 15th the emperor would make his definitive determination according to what the enemy might have done either to occupy Berlin or to order any other movement. Corresponding orders were sent to Victor, Reynier and Lauriston.

Thus abundantly equipped with an army of fourscore thousand men, and a prime factor in the coming manœuvres, Ney on May 8 debouched at Torgau and Wittenberg, and

advanced to the Berlin roads; while the rest of the Grand Army was again across the Elbe and deployed to face the allies, who had taken up a position on the right bank of the Spree near Bautzen, determined to fight another battle. Still lacking his cavalry feelers, and having only common report, and such information as light infantry could pick up, to rely on, Napoleon, although with definite plans, was much in the dark. He guessed that the allies had separated, and wrote, May 13, in the evening, to Ney: "I do not yet quite see what the Prussians have done. It is very certain that the Russians are retiring on Breslau, but are the Prussians retiring on Breslau, as they say, or have they thrown themselves on Berlin, as seems more natural, to cover their capital? This is the news that I expect to-night from Bertrand; and that which I shall receive from your side will let me perfectly understand. You feel that with forces as considerable as those you command, it is not a question of remaining quiet. To disengage Glogau, to occupy Berlin, so that Davout may reoccupy Hamburg and advance with his five divisions into Pomerania, to seize Breslau, these are the three important objects which I propose to myself, and that I would fulfill, all three, this month. By the position which I make you take we shall always find ourselves assembled, able to move to the right or the left with the greatest masses possible, according to the news."

The immediate plan thus was for Ney, basing on the Elbe at Torgau and Wittenberg, to threaten Berlin, while the emperor, operating by his left, should sustain the manœuvre and at the same time definitely separate the Russian and Prussian armies, and threaten the Russian right at Bautzen. This was an admirable conception, on Napoleon's usual gigantic scale.

At 3 A. M., May 14, the emperor wrote Ney again: "I am

receiving positive news as to the movements of Blucher, Yorck, Kleist, the King of Prussia. . . . It seems, then, not doubtful that they are disgarnishing Berlin, and that there are to cover this town only a few horsemen and Bülow's corps; that makes all the more necessary the movement ordered. Have everything belonging to Lauriston rejoin him, so that he may reinforce the army, if the enemy desires to receive battle, as they say that the Russians and Prussians are assembled. Their rearguard shows thirty thousand men and much artillery. They are covering the little town of Bautzen."

Ney meanwhile was equally in the dark as was his master, but in order to be prepared for either a march on Berlin or one to the main army, on May 14 he ordered Victor, after debouching from Wittenberg, to head in two columns on Treuenbrietzen and Juterbog, and then to file by his right on Dahme, Sébastiani to protect his left. These forces would thus be better in hand.

Napoleon now balanced for two or three days between the dash on Berlin and a battle if the enemy should resolve to stand in lieu of withdrawing to Silesia; and his orders to Ney varied from hour to hour as information ran in from the front to one or other purport. This attitude is in the highest degree interesting to the student of war.

Early May 16 Ney was notified that the enemy was certainly at Bautzen in force, and that he was to send Lauriston to Hoyerswerda, while he himself moved to Spremburg. Macdonald was notified that Ney would be at Hoyerswerda on the 18th, on which day the emperor was thinking of forcing the enemy's position. Meanwhile Macdonald was to keep in connection with Bertrand, intrench his position, and not leave himself open to attack. At 1 P. M. Ney was ordered on Hoyerswerda instead of on Spremburg. "His Majesty desires that you should arrive as early as possible with your

corps and Lauriston's at Hoyerswerda, where you will be but one march from Bautzen, where the enemy appears to be in force and to desire to hold himself." On the same day Berthier wrote Ney: "The intention of the emperor is that Victor, under whose orders you will place Reynier, shall manœuvre on Berlin, shall take possession of this town, reoccupy Spandau . . . pursue Bülow . . . and go to the aid of Stettin, Cüstrin or Glogau. . . . You will have a care to prescribe to Victor to place himself in a military manner at Berlin, not to let troops enter it, but to put them in barracks, so as to dispose promptly of them in every direction. Thus the first operation which Victor will have to undertake will be to oblige Bülow to recross the Oder."

During these days, Macdonald in front of Bautzen had been the one in contact with the enemy. On May 13 Berthier wrote him: "The emperor expected to receive several letters from you each day. You are at his vanguard. It is then for you to give news of the enemy, to interrogate, to send spies, seize letters in the village post-offices, and finally employ every means, all the ruses of war, to know what is going on." Bertrand, with headquarters at Kamenz, was moving towards Macdonald's left, Oudinot was to move forward from Bischofswerda to his right. Still the purpose of the enemy was blind to the emperor, for at 9 A. M., May 14, he wrote Macdonald: "The news I receive leads me to think that the enemy has ceased the works he was making at Bautzen, that the bulk of his army has left, and that he has renounced the project of making at that point a strong resistance. You will already have some indication as to this. It is advantageous that you should enter this town, so as to extend ourselves, if that can be done with a simple affair of the vanguard. If you go to Bautzen, you will notify Marmont to come to Bischofswerda." But on May 15, at 10 P. M.,

he heard from Macdonald that the enemy had definitely drawn up at Bautzen, and wrote him that Ney and Lauriston were already moving down to turn the position. Even then he suspected the allies would retire to Silesia, and not until the 17th did the reports satisfy him that they proposed to accept battle on the Spree. Hereupon he notified Ney that he might entirely give up the Berlin project and oblique to the right towards Bautzen, where the enemy had made a stand, which, having received notice of Barclay's arrival, Ney was already prepared to do.

Meanwhile the emperor had undertaken to utilize his cavalry, and on May 16 it was all put under Mortier, who was sent out to Grossenhayn to get into communication with Lauriston at Dobriluk and Ney at Lückau, pursue the enemy and generally to scour the country. But next day he was ordered back to a point between Dresden and Bischofswerda, so as to reach, the 18th, the camp in front of Bautzen. Bertrand was ordered to join Macdonald, leaving an observation corps at Kamenz; Macdonald was notified that both he and Oudinot would smartly come up to sustain his flanks, and on May 18 Mortier was ordered into line. Oudinot was to occupy Neukirch and Neustadt and scour the woods there, so as to lean his right on the Bohemian frontier. Referring to this, the emperor says: "This position of the enemy on our right is disgraceful, and contrary to all the principles of war. It is from Bautzen and Bischofswerda to Bohemia only three or four leagues. The enemy must be chased from there." Each corps commander was ordered to clear the country well in front of him. The Guard, at 8 A. M. of the 18th, was to march towards Bautzen, and Bertrand to keep up communication with Lauriston and Ney, who were to arrive this day at Hoyerswerda. Beaumont was to cover Dresden, Durosnel to command the city; and the pontoon equipages, artillery,

caissons, hospitals, to be ready to cross to the right bank. On May 18 the emperor wrote Durosnel: "Be careful that the service is done militarily. The artillery will park on the left bank until the issue of a battle, so that should the battle be lost, one might pass to the left bank without loss." "Have prepared the palisades of the town, so that everything shall be in good state and well closed, that the troops shall be protected behind them against constant attacks of the Cossacks. Have barriers with palisades erected on the chaussées."

Matters now became more definite; and during the morning of May 18 the emperor wrote to Berthier to notify Ney in cipher: "That we are at a gun's carry from the little town of Bautzen, where the enemy is occupying his head of position, and where he has made intrenchments; that on the right are placed the Prussians and on the left the Russians; that I desire that with Lauriston and all his forces assembled, in military march he should move on Drehsa; having thus passed the Spree, he will find himself to have turned the position of the enemy. He will take there a good position; but I suppose that he is able to arrive with his entire force the 19th at Hoyerswerda. He will approach us the 19th; and on the 20th he can move to the position which will have the effect either that the enemy will evacuate it to withdraw farther, or to place us where we can attack with advantage." Berthier wrote Ney at 10 A. M. by a staff officer: "His Majesty supposes that you are able to arrive at Hoyerswerda the 19th quite completely. You will approach us the 19th and the 20th, and you will be able the 21st to move to the position which will have the effect either that the enemy will evacuate to withdraw farther, or to enable us to attack with advantage." Here is a curious lapse in dates. In the evening of the same day Ney wrote in cipher to Berthier that he had ordered Victor, who had been about to move on Berlin, and Reynier to

march with the greatest diligence to Bautzen, so as to arrive there the 20th or 21st.

About midday, May 18, Bertrand was informed that Lauriston and Ney would arrive at Gross Dobern and Hoyerswerda that evening: "Send a strong reconnoissance in infantry and cavalry in that direction," Berthier wrote. "And have it told by an officer, or by one of your aides, but without writing, or else by writing in cipher, that Ney is to manœuvre to turn the position of the enemy so as to move on Drehsa. As Lauriston and Ney are approaching us, it is indispensable to keep in communication with them by your left. . . . Lauriston is to send and notify Ney that the emperor will sleep to-night in the camp in front of Bautzen."

At 11 A. M., May 19, Ney wrote Berthier from Hoyerswerda that he had interrogated the officer bringing him a letter from Lauriston, "and that what he has told me has confirmed me that the intention of the emperor was that I should move on Drehsa." The Lauriston letter states that "it is the emperor's desire that Ney's, Lauriston's and Reynier's corps, Victor's and Sébastiani's, should manœuvre to debouch by Drehsa, which is between the two Sprees. This Drehsa is written Brosa on the map of the Institute of Weimar." It seems that there is another Brosa close to Gotamelde and out of Ney's intended line; but there is no evidence that this misled Ney. An hour later Ney wrote Berthier: "I will manœuvre to-morrow, the 20th, towards the position of Drehsa, but I believe it to be very important to have my movement sustained, so that if the enemy has decided to await battle on the heights of Bautzen, I might be in measure to contain him, in case he marched on me by way of Bautzen."

This indication of Drehsa as the battlefield objective whence Ney could debouch on the allied right and rear, instead of

Wurschen and Hochkirch, had perhaps to do with this village being given undue prominence on the map Napoleon was using. There are two Drehsas, one of which is placed about where Napoleon would wish the blow to fall, between the two roads on which the enemy must retreat.

The emperor's first dispatches, giving Ney directions to move on Spremburg, had been countermanded, because a manœuvre so far beyond their right flank might lead the allies to quit their position at Bautzen, — as he had feared Kutusov would do at Borodino, — and his later order to oblique towards Senftenberg and Königswartha was in a direction which the allies would interpret as merely a junction of Ney's forces with those of his master. Lauriston had accordingly headed from Dobriluk on Senftenberg, while Ney marched from Lückau on Kalau, followed by Reynier from Dahme to Lückau. The columns were delayed by the low-lying, forest-covered, marshy ground between the Elster and the Spree; but no special harm ensued. It happened, too, that Lützow's light horse had intercepted a number of French dispatches; but though they gave notice of the French advent, the general direction of Ney did not arouse allied suspicion. On the 19th Ney was at Hoyerswerda; Reynier reached Kalau, and Lauriston Weissig, while the main French army was concentrating west of Bautzen.

Napoleon had been expecting several divisions of cuirassiers and light horse, reorganized by Latour-Maubourg, as well as two fresh divisions of the Young Guard. These having come to hand, he wrote Macdonald from Dresden the 18th: "I leave Dresden with all my Guard to move half-way to Bautzen. I shall be at your headquarters at point of day to reconnoitre the enemy. Have a sketch prepared in which is set down all you have seen, to facilitate my reconnoissance. Lauriston and Ney are to arrive at Hoyerswerda. Bertrand

will have put himself into communication with you." He then personally left Dresden, stopped over night at Harthau, and early on the 19th he reached and established his headquarters at Klein Förstgen, to the west of Bautzen; and here he learned that Barclay, Langeron, Sass and Kleist had joined the allies, which led him to estimate them at one hundred and fifty thousand men.

The emperor at once began reconnoitring the enemy's position, and spent the day studying it from various heights near by. Heavy cannonading had been heard towards Königswartha during the day, but though increasing at evening, it died down at midnight. It seems that on learning, May 18, of the advance of Lauriston by way of Hoyerswerda, Alexander seized the initiative, and sent out eighteen thousand men under Barclay and twelve thousand under Yorck in the general direction of Senftenberg, hoping to cut off and beat that general, who was thought to be there alone. Bertrand had also sent out Peyri's Italian division to get into touch, as ordered, with Ney at Königswartha; Peyri had made poor dispositions, did not reconnoitre the neighboring forests, and placed his outlying forces badly. At 4 p. m. he was surprised by Barclay between Königswartha and Klix, and quite cut up, with loss of two thousand prisoners and all the guns. This fight occurred within three miles of Ney's van under Kellermann, who came up and rescued what was left. Meanwhile Lauriston met Yorck's smaller detachment at Weissig, and after many hours' grim fighting, forced it back to Bautzen, Maison's division earning the honors of the encounter, which cost the Prussians five thousand men. Yorck "would have been crushed unless there had been a defile to pass, through which our troops could arrive only successively," says the Bulletin. From Königswartha Ney duly debouched on Leichnam and Klix, keeping on the left bank of the Spree. This

was the fighting the emperor had heard, and he later criticised it, writing, June 6, to Bertrand : —

“I have received your letter. It is true that I was not satisfied with the manner in which your troops were placed the 19th, and that at the first gun you did not inform yourself of what it was, and did not march to the relief of the Italian division. . . . You have given proof in different circumstances that you have distinguished talents, but war can be made only with vigor, decision and constant will. You must neither fumble nor hesitate. . . . Believe, moreover, that my sentiments for you are always the same, and that I expect that with a little experience in handling troops you will merit from me in the infantry arm, as you have merited in your original arm.”

At 10 A. M., May 20, Ney wrote the emperor : “ This morning the troops are moving on Drehsa. I do not know whether the enemy will permit us to take position on his flank and rear without delivering battle. . . . I believe that Your Majesty will have ordered to sustain me in the new direction I have taken.”

Napoleon was again approaching classic ground. It was here on the hillocks of Klein Bautzen and Kreckwitz that Frederick, after his defeat at Hochkirch, sat down opposite Daun and bade stern defiance to the twofold superior numbers of the enemy. The country is full of these hillocks, increasing in height near the mountains which, on the south, form the frontier of Bohemia. Small streams wander around them to the Spree, and villages are dotted over the landscape. Several groups of ponds lie about Malschwitz and Baruth in the northern section, and a few woods on the outskirts of the battlefield proper ; but it is mostly open, strongly accentuated country.

When they drew up at Bautzen for another trial of strength, the allies mustered scarcely more than one hundred and ten thousand men ; and indeed, the number has been set down by Berndt as ninety-six thousand five hundred, about three fifths

Russians. If Napoleon could bring all his troops into action, he would number one hundred and fifty thousand men, but in cavalry he was deficient.

Quite at variance with this estimate are the figures of Foucart, who from the French archives gives us morning reports of May 10 to May 19, from which it appears that their numbers at Bautzen were as follows :—

Guard. Mortier. (Dumoustier, Barrois, Roguet, Walther's 3800 cavalry.) 110 guns . . . 20,000 men.

Army under the Emperor.

4th Corps.	Bertrand. (Morand, Peyri, Franquemont and 1300 Neapolitan and Wurtemberg cavalry.)	49 guns	25,700	“
6th Corps.	Marmont. (Compans, Bonet, Friedrichs.)	65 guns	24,800	“
11th Corps.	Macdonald. (Fressinet, Gérard, Charpentier.)	52 guns	14,800	“
12th Corps.	Oudinot. (Pachod, Lorencez, Raglowich and 700 Bavarian cavalry.)	50 guns	23,700	“
1st Cavalry Corps.	Latour-Maubourg. (Bruyère, Bordesouille, Doumerc.)	18 guns	6,000	“
			<u>115,000</u>	“

Army under Ney.

3d Corps.	Ney. (Souham, Delmas, Albert, Ricard, Marchand, Laboissière's 1200 cavalry.)	84 guns.	52,000	“
5th Corps.	Lauriston. (Maison, Lagrange, Rochembeau, Puthod, Guyon's 1600 cavalry.)	99 guns .	25,000	“
7th Corps.	Reynier. (Durutte, Sahr, Saxon 300 cavalry.)	16 guns	10,500	“
			<u>87,500</u>	“

Army under the Emperor . 115,000 men and 344 guns.

Army under Ney 87,500 “ “ 199 “

202,500 “ “ 543 “

The allies, nominally under Alexander, really led by Wittgenstein as chief of staff, as we should now phrase it, were drawn up back of the Spree, its banks marshy in places, with

Bautzen as a redoubt in the first line, and the Russian army holding the left, Blucher's Prussians the right. The allied left leaned on the foothills of the Lusatian mountains, part of the Riesen Gebirge, where there was small chance of turning them; their right was protected by the Malschwitz ponds, approachable only by a circuit. The position was strong, but it had only one outlet for retreat, that through Wurschen and Hochkirch on Reichenbach and Lobau; for on their left lay neutral Bohemia, on which they might not trespass; and this placed them in danger of being trapped, if the right and rear could be reached in force.


In the Bulletin of May 24 the emperor says: "The 19th in the evening the enemy's position was as follows: his left leaned on wooded mountains at right angles to the Spree about a league from Bautzen, which sustained his centre. This town had been crenelated, intrenched, and covered with redoubts. The right of the enemy leaned on fortified hillocks, which defended the debouches of the Spree near the village of Nimmschütz. His whole front was covered by the Spree. This very strong position was only a first position.

"One could distinctly perceive, three thousand fathoms to the rear, freshly moved ground, and works which marked their second position. Their left still leaned on the same mountains, two thousand fathoms in rear of the first position, and much in advance of the village of Hochkirch. The centre leaned on three intrenched villages, where they had done so much work that they could consider them as strong places. Marshy and difficult ground covered three quarters of the centre. Finally, their right leaned in the rear of the first position, on villages and hillocks equally intrenched.

"The front of the enemy's army, either in first or second position, would be a league and a half long. After this reconnoissance it was easy to conceive how, despite a battle lost like that of Lützen, and eight days' retreat, the enemy might yet have hopes in the chance of fortune. According to the expression of a Russian officer, of whom it was asked what they intended to do: 'We intend,' said he, 'neither to advance nor to retreat.' 'You are masters of the first point,' replied a French officer; 'in a few days the event will prove if you are masters of the other.'"

On the left bank of the Spree, on the evening of the 19th, the French lay in the following position: Ney's head of column under Lauriston was at Weissig, his own corps at Maukendorf, and Reynier away back at Kalau. Bertrand was to march to the aid of Lauriston as soon as he heard guns, so as to make the junction, and Marmont was to support him if necessary. The right of the main force, Oudinot, at Grubschütz, leaned on the hills, the centre under Macdonald faced Bautzen astride the Dresden road, on his left Marmont between Ohne and Nimmschütz, with Bertrand on the left of the line near Jeschütz, and the Guard in reserve at Förstgen. About 8 A. M. the 20th, Soult, who since the death of Bessières had headed the Old Guard, was ordered to take command of Bertrand and Latour-Maubourg, to reëstablish communication with Hoyerswerda and help Ney debouch.

At 8 A. M. of the 20th, the emperor (who had heard of Peyri's fight, but not Lauriston's) took post on the Schmochwitz hill to direct the battle, and ordered Oudinot to cross and threaten the enemy's left, Macdonald to throw three truss bridges just above Bautzen, and Marmont to throw two others half a league below. Soult, "to whom His Majesty had given superior command of the centre," was to cross the Spree to disquiet the right of the enemy, and finally, says the Bulletin, Ney, who had his own corps, Lauriston and Reynier, was "to approach Klix, to cross the Spree, to turn the right of the enemy, and to advance on his headquarters at Wurschen, and from there on Weissenberg." It does not, however, appear that Ney's orders were precisely these. About 4 P. M., May 20, Berthier wrote Ney: "On the battlefield in front of Bautzen, May 20, 1813. The emperor orders, Prince, that you should direct yourself on Drehsa, driving the enemy from his position, getting into connection with us, and that from there you should direct yourself on



Battle of Bantzen, May 20.

Weissenberg in such a manner as to turn the enemy." Napoleon's idea would have been more clearly expressed had he told Ney to move from Klix to cut the two roads by which the enemy must retreat, and then left him to act.

About noon the signal for action was given, the artillery opened, and Macdonald, with the Guard back of him, advancing on Bantzen and finding the stone bridge over the

Spree still intact, — for Alexander had fancied he might fight an offensive battle, — promptly moved across without throwing his truss bridges, while Oudinot took Doberschau and Strehla, and forged on to Binowitz. Marmont and Bertrand put over their troops on four boat bridges, and by three the French army, substantially on the right bank, had begun the attack of Bautzen. Although stoutly defended, by six the town fell to Compans, and having also lost Nadelwitz and Nieder Keina to Bonnet, the allies fell back to the real line where it was intended to fight. Kleist, after gallantly holding the Burck hillocks all the afternoon against Bertrand and part of Marmont, also fell back by eight, especially when some of Marmont's battalions had debouched from Bautzen, and seized the Nieder Keina hills on his left. Oudinot, who had crossed at Grubschütz, drove the left wing allies from the hills they occupied, but was compelled to give them up at nightfall. Firing was kept up until 11 P. M. Ney's foremost column advanced into touch with Barclay's outposts at Klix, but did not cross the Spree; and Reynier came up within a dozen miles of the field at Hoyerswerda. The result of May 20 for the French had been that they had crossed the Spree in the teeth of the enemy, and had gained firm footing on the right bank; that the allies had fallen back into the previously selected second line, which had been protected by elaborate earthworks; and that Ney had reached Klix, from which place he could emerge on the allied right and rear, although he was still separated from the main army. At 10 P. M. he wrote the emperor: "The troops are ordered to be ready to march to-morrow morning by way of Baruth on Weissenberg. I desire to know the intentions of Your Majesty, whether you approve my movement or prescribe me a new direction. The officer whom I sent yesterday to the emperor has just arrived. He has given me the note

by virtue of which I am to move on Weissenberg, but as the cannonade and fusillade begin again in the direction of Hochkirch and Bautzen, I will not make the movement on Weissenberg until I receive new orders."

"This day," says the Bulletin, "which one might call, if isolated, the battle of Bautzen, was only the prelude of the battle of Wurschen. The enemy, however, commenced to understand the possibility of being forced out of his position. His hopes were no longer the same, and from this moment he must have had presage of his defeat. Already all his dispositions were changed. The destiny of the battle was no longer to be decided behind his intrenchments. His immense works and three hundred redoubts became useless. The right of his position, which was opposite the 4th Corps, became his centre, and he was obliged to throw his right, which formed a considerable part of his army, to oppose Ney, in a place which he had not studied and which he believed outside his position."

On the other hand, the allied reports claim that the French had lost so heavily on this day that they were much weakened for the morrow's fighting.

In the evening of the 20th the French battle line was nearly a dozen miles long, with four army corps deployed, and the left wing with two corps moving to turn the enemy. The Guard was in reserve between the right and centre; Reynier was fast coming up. Grouard suggests that after the battle of the 20th Napoleon would have done better to move by his left in such a way as to strike with the bulk of his force the enemy's right flank, and push them up against the mountains,—in other words, to fight an oblique battle. There was little danger, with his superior numbers, of his losing his communications with Dresden, and he had another line on Torgau if needed. But the ground did not lend itself so well to this manœuvre, and Napoleon's plan of battle was good enough; it was the execution that was lacking.

In the coming battle, to which the operations of the 20th

had but led up, Ney's manœuvre was intended to be the important one. He was to bring the heavy column originally intended for an advance on Berlin down to the rear of Bautzen, turn the allies' right and cut them off. As May 20 closed, it looked as if the morrow's operations must succeed as planned; for Napoleon was in a good position to contain the allied main force, while Ney moved his heavy column upon their only line of retreat. At 11 P. M., May 20, Soult reported that the communication with Ney was established. There might, however, be trouble in crossing the Spree in the front of Ney's position.

Although aware of the French flanking movement, Alexander had not made up his mind whether it was a mere demonstration, or a manœuvre to turn his right; for Barclay and Yorek had not discovered that the troops they had fought belonged to Ney as well as Lauriston. No finer battle plan had ever been perfected by the emperor; and by 9 P. M., in excellent spirits, he returned to headquarters at Bautzen, and spent three hours in arranging with Berthier the details of the morrow's manœuvres; then, dismissing him, he worked with other officers most of the hours until 5 A. M. of the 21st, when he mounted and rode out to the front. Roused by the probability of winning a decisive victory, his ancient power had returned to him, and despite scant sleep, he was alert and active. In a defile, from which he could see the plain of Jenkowitz and Baschütz, Napoleon dismounted and viewed the field. His plan as stated was to contain the enemy in his works by feigned attacks until Ney should debouch in force on his right and rear, and then to throw forward all his troops, line and reserve, and give the *coup de grace*.

At this moment the emperor had no news of Ney, whose report of 10 P. M., May 20, saying that he would await new

orders, was not dispatched till 4.30 A. M. the 21st. From Sdier it was nearly nine miles to the emperor's headquarters, and the aide only reached the emperor after seven o'clock. The latter was examining the enemy's lines. He pointed out these lines to Ney's aide, and had Berthier send back instructions by him, and a duplicate by another aide. "In bivouac in front of Bautzen, May 21, 1813, 8 A. M. The intention of the emperor is that you shall constantly follow the movements of the enemy. His Majesty has shown your staff officer the position of the enemy, which appears definitive by the redoubts he has constructed and is occupying. The intention of the emperor is that you should be this morning at eleven at the village of Preititz. You will be on the extreme right of the enemy. As soon as the emperor shall see you engaged at Preititz, we will frankly attack at all points. Have Lauriston march on your left, to be able to turn the enemy if your movement decides him to abandon his position." A copy of this order to Ney was sent to Soult, with orders to "attack the enemy vigorously with your three divisions by marching between Ney and Marmont." These two letters, in the archives, appear to have been hurriedly written.

Jomini, still Ney's chief of staff, in this case a most reliable witness, tells us that this order was on a paper written in pencil, merely instructing Ney to be in Preititz at 11 A. M., and to attack the enemy's right wing; and at the moment of writing, Napoleon probably felt that no more need be said to a man like Ney, who had acted with such vigor at Elchingen, Friedland and Borodino. Therefore, after giving instructions to the right wing to get into touch with the enemy, push him, but not bring on a general engagement, he then lay down, under fire, to snatch an hour's sleep to make up for the labor of the past night. He had always believed that it worked well to rest at such a season, and give time to all the corps to

work out their operations, instead of taking action on what might happen to one or two of them.

The allied army had taken up its second position on a line eight miles long, and fully prepared for artillery work (seventy-eight earthworks were demolished after the battle by the French engineers), with light troops occupying all the villages in front. On the right, Barclay de Tolly, after his withdrawal from Weissig, had occupied the hills between Gleina and the Malschwitz ponds, and back to Preititz, his guns covering all the Spree crossings; in the centre stood Blucher along the Kreckwitz heights, with Kleist and Yorek somewhat back of his left from Litten to Baschütz; the main Russian army and the late van, now in the left wing, held the hills and woods south of Baschütz, with the reserve in rear of this village; the cuirassiers stood back of Baschütz. According to the emperor's plan, the three lines of French attack were to be against Miloradovich, who was holding the road of retreat to Hochkirch; against Blucher, who covered the road of retreat to Wurschen; and against Barclay, who protected the right against a French advance from Königswartha, the last attack being the important one.

After his sleep Napoleon took position on a hill "three quarters of a league in advance of Bautzen," near Nieder Keina. Oudinot and Macdonald had been sent in "so as to prevent the enemy from disgarnishing his left, and to mask the real attack, of which the result could not make itself felt before noon or one o'clock." Oudinot began by pushing through Kunitz, hoping to reach Rachlau; and this he did in good style, but Miloradovich met him heartily and forced him back to Binowitz, where Macdonald came up to his support. The French centre was at first not heavily engaged. The line was active, but did not invite a general engagement, aware that the allies would remain in their strong position :

just enough was doing to monopolize their attention, and let Ney put in his important work. Marmont was held ready to advance, Soult was alert. The Guard and the reserves were kept behind hillocks, with easy debouches. The enemy was as yet uncertain as to the French purpose.

Meanwhile, under his general instructions of the day before and without the further orders requested, Ney had started about 9 A. M. to move on Drehsa; he had crossed the Spree at Klix, put out Maison's division as flankers near the Mal-schwitz ponds, — by a misunderstanding Maison got too far away to the right, — pushed Lauriston with the rest of his corps on Gotamelde, with orders to keep on towards Baruth and Belgern, and led Souham, Delmas and Albert towards the windmill of Gleina. Difficult debouches and heavy firing from the Gleina hill made the work slow. At half past nine Souham had debouched, and learning that Lauriston was moving on Gotamelde and that Delmas and Albert were ready to sustain him, Ney attacked, Delmas in close column, Albert in reserve deployed on two lines. These divisions shortly drove Barclay out of Gleina back on Preititz and Baruth, and about ten, on the heights of Gleina, Ney received the emperor's penciled order, which had been delayed by the *détour* the aide had made, thinking to find Ney at Klix. To this order Jomini states that he himself added: "These forces will be directed afterwards on the steeples of Hochkirch," which in effect conveyed the entire theory of the day's battle-tactics, Hochkirch being on the prolonged line of Drehsa, and to reach it involving the cutting of the allied roads of retreat; but these words were no part of Napoleon's orders. Being ahead of time, and Marchand and Ricard being still in the rear, Ney awaited the closing up of these divisions and of Reynier before pushing on Preititz, where he was due at eleven.

Ney was used to obeying orders strictly: he had personally

felt the ill result of not so doing; and as on the receipt of the penciled order he was over an hour ahead, he did not advance farther towards Hochkirch, as he would no doubt have done, had the order read to cut off their retreat by moving on the allies' communications. Or had it explained to him that Napoleon would wait to deliver his massed attack until from the firing he knew that Ney had got established on the allied communications, he would naturally have kept on towards Wurschen and Hochkirch. It was this Jomini had suggested, and Ney saw the wisdom of the suggestion; but Jomini was his subordinate, not his chief. Napoleon's keeping all strategic and tactical initiative in his own hands was a sign of genius; but at times, as here, it worked poorly. He had never allowed his lieutenants much leeway for their own action, keeping to himself the credit for all that was accomplished, as well as the secret of how it was done. This worked well so long as the leader could oversee everything; but with the enormous forces of these late years, and with his habit of no longer going to all parts of the field, it was capable of working mischief. As Ney's manœuvre was to be the decisive one, Napoleon should have gone to Ney's column, leaving Soult in command of the main force, or else have called Ney to him, as he could well have done, and explained what he was expected to accomplish; in other words, have put him in possession of the tactical plan of the day's work. The pencil order was too inexplicit, for the capture of Preititz only turned the allies' right, it by no means seized their communications and thus led up to a decisive victory. Had Ney felt authorized to go ahead on his own ideas, or had he listened to the suggestion of Jomini, he would have acted wisely; and at times in his career, Ney had done just this sort of thing, so that Napoleon might perhaps have been reckoning on his again putting his judgment and his own natural vigor

into the scale. At the same time, the fault was distinctly Napoleon's in giving so partial an order in so important a matter. But Ney lost a noble opportunity. He was playing against the allies the same tactical part which made his present opponent, Blucher, forever famous on the field of Waterloo; but he did not play out the part, for what specific reasons we do not know. It must, however, be noted that Blucher at Waterloo was commander-in-chief, and free to act, as here Ney was not.

Alexander could now see that the attack on the right was not a mere demonstration, for Ney with seventy thousand men was moving towards his rear, and his dispositions had not been such as to meet this threat.

Ney's position back of the allied right compelled Blucher to reinforce Barclay, and Kleist left the Kreckwitz lines to help free the right flank. It was about this time that Souham and Kellermann, with Delmas in support but not near enough, and Albert too far back in reserve, penetrated to Preititz, and falling foul of both these allied corps, got roughly handled and retreated in marked disorder; and though Ney sustained them as best he might, after a stout contest, about 11.30. A. M., the Prussians won back the village. "Not being able to engage myself completely without drawing upon myself the whole effort of the enemy, Preititz was for a moment evacuated." Thus, in reality, Ney had not got to Preititz at eleven, as the emperor had calculated on his doing, and in several respects the czar was now able to mend his line to conform to the fresh danger. About one, Reynier came up to Klix. In his march through Gotamelde Lauriston had been held back by Chaplitz with a small body that he should have sharply brushed aside. There had been no advance in force on the allied rear.

All this pottering was unlike Ney. What was needed—

as he well knew — was to reach the main road in force, to cut off the allied retreat; but instead of his wonted vigorous action, he here merely fumbled around Gleina, Preititz and Klein Bautzen, while he should have been massing for a dash on Wurschen and Hochkirch; this was the beginning of the indecision that made his inaction so fatal in 1815; and Napoleon's plan, well conceived but ill communicated to his principal lieutenant, went all astray. And when Ney was a second time pushing into Preititz, Blucher, thus attacked in rear, sent a few battalions and twenty guns from the Klein Bautzen hills to take the French in flank, and probably not appreciating the real purpose



Prussian Staff Officer.

of his onset, Ney took post on the hills to the north of Klein Bautzen, which, while they commanded the country, had no real tactical value, and failed to carry out the theory of the battle. Without cavalry he feared to adventure in the plain, where stood a considerable body of Prussian horse, and the value of his entire manœuvre was lost.

Meanwhile, from 8 A. M. the emperor had no communication with either Ney or Soult. Although he could see much of the field from headquarters on the hill, all he could especially control was Marmont in his front, and the reserve. On the

French extreme right, Oudinot — though once driven back — and Macdonald, who supported him, could be seen containing Miloradovich sustained by Eugene of Wurtemberg, in front of Binowitz and Rabitz. In the centre, Marmont and Mortier helped keep the Russian and Prussian divisions in place, and when the emperor at eleven o'clock heard Ney's heavy firing at Preititz, and could see that his position flanked Blucher on the Kreckwitz heights, he ordered Marmont to attack, in the expectation that Ney would soon move down on Wurschen. Marmont advanced through Basankwitz and opened artillery about noon, the emperor sustaining his left by Barrois' brigade of the Young Guard. Opposite Bertrand the enemy was firing heavily from the Kreckwitz plateau, and in accordance with his general instructions, Soult and he debouched between one and two through Nieder Gurik, towards the plateau, fiercely opposed by the enemy, who strove to prevent these corps from debouching, so as the better to handle Ney. To sustain Soult, who could make no headway, the Young Guard and Latour-Maubourg with his horse advanced between Marmont and Bertrand, towards Litten, where they could reach the flank of the enemy's right, now centre, and use artillery briskly. Between Ney's presence and the emperor's attack Blucher was hard put to it to hold himself, for he had largely disgarnished his lines to head off Ney. He had to make front towards three directions, to meet troops coming from Burck, to defend the Spree, and to forestall Ney. The latter was the most important. If Preititz were taken, Blucher would now be cut off from Barclay, and if the French advanced to Klein Bautzen and Burschwitz, his only line of retreat would be through Kreckwitz, and this might be taken. The Prussians made a stanch defense, and Bertrand had hard work to drive them in; but under the flank and front fire, and a heavy cannonade from the French batteries, Blucher



Battle of Bautzen, May 21.

failed to hold himself, and vacated the Kreckwitz heights; and Yorck, whom Wittgenstein sent up to sustain him, found the French in possession. Finally the Young Guard and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, in reserve at Nadelwitz, were ordered forward on Litten. This gave Ney his chance: "It was essential to overturn everything in front of me to touch

my right to Your Majesty, and be able to enter into action," says his report. Kellermann and Souham being exhausted, Delmas was ordered on Preititz again, Ricard and Albert to sustain his right. Delmas took the village, but was thrown out again by the Prussians, until Ricard and Albert moved on the heights north of Klein Bautzen, passing to the west of Preititz, when the French finally remained masters. All three divisions were then ordered forward on Klein Bautzen. But Ney's advance was far too late, for at three o'clock "the emperor announced that the battle was won."

Napoleon's massed advance definitely settled the retreat of the allied line, which, as was clear to the czar, could not hold itself; and preferring to retire in good order, not long after three the enemy started to the rear, the Russians through Hochkirch and the Prussians down the Wurschen road. All this occurred in such season that Ney, who had now established himself on the Klein Bautzen hills, not only had no enemy in his front, but could see them filing away to the east along the road he himself could have seized two hours before; and yet he stood there, and did not fall on their exposed flank. Between four and five, when Soult's attack had been fatal to the Prussians, Ney threw in Marchand and Maison on Klein Bautzen. Lauriston was sustained by Reynier and Pauthod, and Ricard sent on Burschwitz sustained by Souham and Delmas, who formed on the right of Reynier and Lauriston. Barclay, who had retired towards Wurschen, covered the allied retreat by taking up a position at Belgern to fend off Lauriston and Reynier from that key-point. These officers and Ney cannonaded Barclay as best they might, but he held firm, and at nightfall retired in good order. Miloradovich held Oudinot and Macdonald until Marmont threatened his right and rear, when he also made good his escape through Hochkirch. Napoleon followed up this retrograde movement

but absence of cavalry prevented his being able to work havoc in the enemy's ranks, especially as the allies had yielded the field before they had been seriously damaged by his infantry, and were yet in good order. The Bulletin's claim that "seeing his right turned, the enemy began his retreat, and soon his retreat became a flight," is not sustained by the evidence.

In this battle Ney and Lauriston, with eight divisions, had only Kleist and Barclay, with twenty thousand men, in their front. Had Ney with half his usual energy carried out the idea penned by Jomini, to march towards the steeples of Hochkirch, the bulk of the allied army and all its guns and train could have been taken. The left wing alone and the cavalry could have got away, and Bautzen would have been another typical Napoleonic victory. Austria might have joined Napoleon's cause, and the French eagles again have stood on the Nie-



Imperial Body-Guard.

men. But, let it be once more said, the fault was less Ney's than Napoleon's. As this marshal's command was to do the most important work, either Napoleon should have given him more specific directions, or should have gone over to his column

in person, with part of the Guard and the cavalry. Had Latour-Maubourg come up to sustain Ney, and the latter been given the clear idea that he was to move forward far enough to cut off the enemy from his line of retreat, Bautzen could have been made one of Napoleon's most noted triumphs, with all that that implies. As it was, the French took no prisoners and only a few dismounted guns. Berndt gives the French

losses as twenty thousand men out of one hundred and sixty thousand, and the allied as thirteen thousand five hundred out of ninety-six thousand — killed and wounded for little actual gain.

In this 1813 campaign, owing to their dissensions in Russia, Davout was given a rôle inferior to Ney. Remembering Auerstädt, Eggmühl, Wagram, and here seeing a decisive victory lost by Ney's slackness, one is tempted to wonder whether Davout, in Ney's place, would not have done work more valuable to his master.

The emperor's bivouac was pitched at Klein Burschwitz. At 7 P. M. Marmont moved on Hochkirch in pursuit of the enemy, Reynier took Wurschen at 10 P. M., Soult and Bertrand, Drehsa. Marmont pushed as far as Steindörfel, Macdonald to Meschwitz. The front of the army was substantially through Wurschen and



Prussian
Musketeer.

Hochkirch. The rest of the army occupied the field it had won. On the 22d the allies retired from Weissenberg and Lobau to Görlitz. At Görlitz they divided into two columns, Barclay moving in command of the Prussian column, with Blucher serving unwillingly under him. Shortly new arrangements were made: Barclay was given the chief command,

Wittgenstein remained at the head of the Russians, and Blucher at the head of the Prussian troops.

By decree of June 4, a monument was ordered erected on Mont Cenis with this inscription: "The Emperor Napoleon, on the field of battle of Wurschen, has ordered the erection of this monument, as a witness of his great gratitude towards his people of France and Italy, and to transmit to the most distant posterity the remembrance of this celebrated epoch, where in three months twelve hundred thousand men ran to arms to assure the integrity of the empire and of its allies."

As a sample of the cipher of the day, this postscript of Ney's to Berthier, May 17, will serve. "P. S. 698. 641. 782. 673. 652. 1106. 18. 609. 1034. 307. 886. 664. 307. 757. 1057." Being translated this means: "To-morrow I will move on Hoyerswerda."



Russian Infantrymen.

LIX.

THE ARMISTICE. MAY 22 TO AUGUST 16, 1813.

At daybreak, May 22, the pursuit was pushed as fast as the lack of cavalry would permit. The allies headed for Schweidnitz, and Napoleon followed towards Breslau. Everything looked favorable. Had he kept on pushing, he could have caught the allies where, without Austria, they would have been compromised; but though in his old form he would certainly have done this, have won one more victory, and then perhaps have treated with the enemy, he weakly accepted an armistice, and forfeited the results of Lützen and Bautzen. An armistice could help only by increasing his forces and decreasing the enemy's, but it had the reverse effect. Still, while it lasted, from June 4 until August 16, there were occasions on which he could have brought Austria to his side, have finished the war, and retained for France a splendid frontier; but he was obstinate in his requirements, and would not recognize the danger of having all Europe against him. He no longer drew true conclusions from facts. Austria approached him, but Napoleon was unreasonable; and while the Congress of Prague was wasting time, Austria threw in her lot with Prussia and Russia. The new coalition determined to move upon Napoleon from Berlin, from Silesia and from Bohemia, and adopted the sensible plan of having the minor armies under Blücher and Bernadotte retire from the French whenever Napoleon was present, and advance when he was not. Napoleon held the Elbe from Dresden to Magdeburg, and for the first time worked on a broad defensive scheme, in which, from Dresden as the centre point, he could debouch alternately upon the allied armies. He seriously considered a movement on Prague, but kept to the idea of a first advance on Berlin with his left, while containing the Silesian and Bohemian armies with his right. The Congress of Prague accomplished nothing: Napoleon desired peace, but would not yield enough to bring it about. As the armistice closed, he made ready to move Oudinot on Berlin, sustained by Davout from Hamburg and Girard from Magdeburg, while himself at Dresden confronting the Sovereigns and Blücher.

At daybreak on the morning of May 22 the victorious French followed in the track of the enemy, whose legions the day before they had beaten, but not demoralized. The

emperor presumed the allies would aim for Breslau. The left wing was headed by Reynier, sustained by Lauriston; Macdonald led the right wing. The allies reassembled at Görlitz, where reinforcements reached them. At Reichenbach Lefebvre-Desnouettes had a sharp cavalry combat with the enemy's rearguard, and a large body of allied horse was put in; but Latour-Maubourg came up to his aid, and astonished the enemy by deploying fifteen thousand cavalry. The new French squadrons behaved well. "We have acquired a certainty that our young cavalry in equal numbers is superior to the enemy's." Reynier arrived in support, and Napoleon rode to the front to lend the resulting



Duroc.

combat more energy; but it was at grievous personal loss, for Duroc, Duke of Friuli, Grand Marshal of the Palace, his closest intimate, was killed by a stray cannon-ball almost at his side, two other general officers being also wounded, one mortally. Thenceforward the emperor's *entourage* was limited, his military family remaining half a mile in the rear with the headquarters cavalry, and those with him keeping in twos and threes instead of in a body. Daru was made custodian, vice Duroc, of the private treasury.

An order was given May 23 as to who might personally follow the emperor: the Grand Equerry, the Major-General, the emperor's aides, the officers of the day, the marshals whose duty was near the emperor, two of the Major-General's aides and two staff officers, the commandants

of artillery and engineers. Excepting the emperor's aide on duty, two orderly officers, the marshals, two aides of the staff generals, an aide of the Major-General, all others to remain fifteen paces in the rear. When His Majesty reconnoitres alone, he is to be followed only by the Grand Equerry, the Major-General, his aide on duty, two orderly officers and the page with field-glasses, if called. "It is imperatively ordered to . . . every person not above designated to march with the squadrons of the Guard on duty." Another group in the rear to be formed of the led horses.

The allies retired in two columns, via Löwenberg-Goldberg to avoid the Bohemian frontier, and by Bunzlau-Hainau, and on the 23d crossed the Neisse. Napoleon kept close behind, getting beyond Görlitz by noon of the same day; Victor was at Rothenberg, Reynier on the road to Lauban, sustained by Bertrand, Macdonald at Schönberg, Ney back at Weissenberg, Lauriston still at Hochkirch, Oudinot at Bautzen. On the 24th Napoleon dispatched Oudinot on Hoyerswerda and Lückau towards Berlin, with orders to contain Bülow, who previous to the battle had followed Victor down from Wittenberg, had disquieted Dresden, and was threatening the French communications. The Grand Army continued its advance, and "All Saxony is delivered of its enemies, and from to-morrow, the 24th, the French army will be in Silesia," says the Bulletin. At evening, May 25, Ney had come up and crossed the Queisse, and Reynier had reached Bunzlau; Lauriston was half-way to Hainau, Bertrand was beyond Lauban, Macdonald had almost reached Löwenberg, Marmont was east of Naumburg, Victor was at Wehrau on the Queisse, Oudinot marching on Lückau, the outposts within a march of Glogau, imperial headquarters at Bunzlau.

The allies now headed towards Schweidnitz, the right wing marching on Liegnitz, the left wing tarrying in Goldberg. On May 26 Blucher caught one of Lauriston's divisions in an ambuscade, the French cavalry not having cleared the

front. The Prussians were retiring by way of Naumburg and Bunzlau to Liegnitz, followed by Lauriston, Reynier, Ney and the Guard. Near Hainau, Blucher, now in command of his own column, drew up on a rugged ground in ambush. Maison was leading the van rather cautiously, when just beyond Hainau the Prussian cavalry, from its hiding, fell upon the French van, quickly dispersed what there was of French horse, and as the young foot troops were not speedy enough to form squares, cut down or captured three or four hundred men, with all their guns.

With regard to this affair, the allied official Bulletin at Breslau, May 27, reported: "For several days Maison's division was on the heels of our rearguard. Behind Hainau, where the ground favored an ambushade, General Blucher headed the Prussian cavalry on both sides of the route, while the Russian cavalry was placed to sustain it. The rearguard received orders to remain constantly engaged in such manner as to draw the enemy into the snare offered him. . . . The enemy had scarcely time to form masses when he was attacked in front and on the wings. After some resistance, half of Maison's division, which had passed the defile, was partly cut to pieces, in part taken prisoner. Eleven guns and caissons were also taken."

From Bunzlau, May 26, where he paused, Napoleon advanced Ney, with Lauriston and Reynier, on Liegnitz, Ney's own corps remaining in Bunzlau with the Guard, and sent Bertrand and Macdonald forward on Goldberg. Marmont, to whose command Latour-Maubourg's cavalry was added, took a central route to ascertain the direction of the allied army. Victor was ordered on Sprottau to follow any force which had moved towards Berlin, and to get news of Bülow. If the siege of Glogau had been raised, he was to go there. "But his principal aim is to be to hold himself ready to move on Berlin, to sustain Oudinot, who is marching on that city, and to fall on the rear of Bülow."

Matters looked well. Odenleben tells us that Napoleon was

merry in these days, his vanity being tickled by the enemy promptly retiring before him, as of old. And when, instead of retreating to the Oder, the allies turned southerly, Napoleon divined that their negotiations with Austria were progressing. On the 28th he was with the Guard in Liegnitz; Ney, with his



Prussian Volunteer Lancer.

own, Lauriston's and Reynier's corps, was echeloned along the road to Neumarkt, and had sent a party to raise the blockade of Glogau; Marmont was in Jauer; Macdonald and Bertrand between Jauer and Goldberg. Napoleon was aiming to contain the allies with the two latter, and with the rest to turn their right flank by a march in force on Breslau, — the same splendid conception as at Ulm and Jena. When he should have reached the Oder, and

occupied Breslau, he could go on up river and seize the allies' communications, which from Schweidnitz would run through Strehlen on Brieg or Oppeln; having done which, he could then turn on them, drive them up against the Giant (Sudetic) mountains in their rear, and destroy them. The time to strike was at just this moment, before the Austrians were ready; for they could not enter the campaign until July.

So much for the theory, as perfect as any other of Napoleon's creation: in practice, the operation was weakened by his no longer commanding the veterans of 1805 and 1806, nor indeed being himself the same man. It was not only his

physique which years of hard work and self-indulgence had sapped, his force of character had equally suffered ; and under the most favorable conditions, the emperor of 1813 might not have pushed through such an operation to a successful issue. Along with his capacity for bodily exertion, his moral courage had shrunk, and we see the effect of it now. Instead of pushing home relentlessly, he sought the line of least resistance, and as he had done after the incomplete success in the Wagram campaign, he now accepted an armistice, founded on the advances he had recently made to the Emperor Alexander, and supposed to be at the intercession of Austria. Thus occurred a fatal pause in the great soldier's onward sweep at the moment of victory.

Caulaincourt had been sent on May 26 with negotiations to this end ; and on June 1 an armistice was entered into, to begin at 2 P. M., June 2, and last thirty-six hours. Out of this preliminary truce grew a second one until July 20, and then a third one, to last until August 10, with six days' notice ; so that the real armistice was in effect from June 2 to August 16. During this time a Congress, to be held at Prague, was to decide upon terms of permanent peace.

The reasons alleged by the emperor for the armistice — the hostile position of Austria and his own want of cavalry, as well as the desire to gather an army at Laybach, and another at Pirna — are quite insufficient ; and in the instructions given to Caulaincourt we fail to recognize the man who browbeat the negotiators at Cherasco and at Udine, who forced his own terms on the vanquished after Austerlitz and Jena, who won such a diplomatic triumph at Tilsit.

The conditions desired for the armistice, dictated by the emperor May 26, were that Danzig, Modlin and Zamosc should receive subsistence meanwhile, and a courier enter weekly. "As to the length of the armistice, an essential condition is that it should be extended to the whole

time of the negotiations. If the enemy's plenipotentiaries do not consent, one might limit the length of the armistice to three months, that is, to the 1st of September. Finally, after having insisted strongly, one might reduce the armistice to two months, on condition that notice should be given fifteen days in advance, . . . as an armistice which should be less than two months and a half would be of no good to the emperor : he would not have time to reëstablish his cavalry."

And the same want of incisiveness may be seen in the letter to Clarke of June 2 : " You will see by the news in the *Moniteur* that we are negotiating an armistice. It is possible that it may be signed to-day or to-morrow. This armistice stops the course of my victories. I decided upon it for two reasons : my want of cavalry, which prevents my striking great blows, and the hostile position of Austria." . . . He then says he hopes during June and July, the term of the armistice, that Eugene will be at Laybach with sixty thousand men and one hundred guns, and that the Mainz Corps of Observation can be on the Regnitz and at Pirna, " so that Austria will see that I have one hundred and fifty thousand men to oppose to her. . . . Redouble in effort, so that the artillery, cavalry and infantry shall march in the different directions that I have commanded. If I can, I shall await the month of September to strike big blows. I want then to be in position to crush my enemies. . . . Let everything leave as fast as it is clothed, cavalry, infantry and artillery, the artillery especially."

On June 1 the emperor wrote Eugene from Neumarkt that the armistice was practically concluded, that he was at Breslau, that war was still to be expected, and that Italy must be kept ready.

" Austria seems very exacting. We must expect war with her. Keep back the conscripts that were to come here. . . . Retain everything in Italy. Leave Milan. Inspect your troops yourself and get organized. . . . Act as if you were to be attacked at the end of June by Austria. Write secretly to Murat to this effect. As soon as you shall have your army at Verona, you will be able to move it to Laybach. How many men do you think to have at the end of June ? Shall you then have one hundred and twenty guns harnessed ? This letter contains everything. Act accordingly. Do not lose a moment." And next day he wrote more detailed

reasons for his action than appear elsewhere : " I must not dissimulate to you that what leads me to stop the course of my victories are the armaments of Austria, and the desire to gain time, so that your army might be encamped at Laybach ; and to have two armies, one camped on the Regnitz and the other in the camp at Pirna. The insolence of Austria has no limit. With a honeyed, I might say sentimental style, she would like to take away from me Dalmatia, Istria and perhaps more than to the Isonzo. She would like to dismember the Bavarian frontier, retake the left bank of the Inn, and recover that part of Galicia which she ceded by the Peace of Vienna. They have lost their heads, but they are far from their reckoning. It is impossible to be more perfidious than this court. If we ceded what it now asks, it would later want Italy and Germany. It will certainly get nothing from me. . . . I hope by the first days of July you can have camped at Laybach, with fifty thousand men and one hundred guns: This is necessary to influence the negotiations, if they shall be going on well, as I doubt; but this will be possible only by means of the position of your army, menacing a march on Vienna, and the position of the army of Mainz on the Regnitz and in the camp at Pirna, which I count upon going and inspecting myself. When Austria shall thus see three armies ready to be opposed to her, she will commence to open her eyes on the folly and ridiculousness of her pretensions."

The sole object of the armistice was to increase the power of the emperor, and decrease that of the allies. But judicious estimates, not undervaluing the enemy, must have proved that at the end of the term Napoleon could have only four hundred thousand men, with no more coming up, while the allies would have over half a million men, with abundant reserves to draw on. Had Napoleon been reasonable in his demands during the armistice and given up his position on the Oder and Vistula, he could have drawn in garrisons amounting to sixty thousand men, which would have added great relative strength. If he was not prepared to do everything to increase his forces, he ought to have signed no armistice.

There was a good deal of fault found by the emperor with the progress of the negotiations. The Russians desired to

keep Breslau. Napoleon finally agreed that it should be neutral, although "the principle of every suspension of arms is that each one should remain in the position where he finds himself," he said; "the lines of demarcation are afterwards the application of this principle." This faultfinding is expressed several times, much in the manner of the letter to Caulaincourt of June 3:—

"We must not dissimulate that this armistice, such as I propose it in my ultimatum, is not honorable for me." That is, the yielding up of Breslau. "It is I who abandon everything, the enemy nothing. . . . Thus the enemy wish to humiliate me in chasing me by an armistice from the town into which I have entered as the result of the battle." "Tell them then, in breaking, that it was with the sole desire of peace that I consented to so disadvantageous an armistice, and that by pure cajolery I consented to abandon the capital of Silesia. Tell them that before eight days I shall be in Berlin; that they will not be more happy in the battle which will take place than in the two preceding ones; and that finally, they will have shown, instead of pacific dispositions, that they wanted to amuse me and gain a few days. . . . As to the delay in the armistice, the proposed term is an insult. Would one not say that I am in a besieged place? . . . I want an armistice, but I want it as a statesman and a sovereign. . . . Experience has proved that they have constantly deceived themselves. Notify them that they will be beaten in the coming battle, that I shall remain master of Breslau . . . that I shall remain master of Berlin. . . . That I have with me and behind me such forces that nothing can prevent my reaching the Oder from every side."

But finally, on June 4, at Poichwitz, the armistice was signed.

Meanwhile the movements had been continued, and the allies had got into a general line from Nimptsch to Strehlen. French headquarters and the Guard were at Neumarkt; Ney, Lauriston and Reynier were near Breslau; Macdonald and Bertrand near Schweidnitz; Victor had relieved Glogau. On the 27th Oudinot at Hoyerswerda had driven back Bülow's

corps, but advancing on the capital and failing in a second attack at Lückau, had retired to Uebigau on the Schwarze Elster. Davout and Vandamme had moved on Hamburg, held by a weak allied corps, awaiting twenty-five thousand



Davout.

Swedes from Mecklenburg under Bernadotte, who from now on was a part of the coalition forces on the Elbe. But, owing to a recent alliance with Denmark, the Danes reinforced the French, Hamburg was vacated in the night of May 29-30; and this great city, bulwark of the lower Elbe, came into Davout's hands June 9, when the news of the armistice arrived, and so remained until Napoleon's downfall.

We have heretofore seen how much dependence Napoleon placed on the lower Elbe; and on May 24 he had already sent orders to Davout, in anticipation of this event, to "fortify

Hamburg with a citadel or redoubt, where four thousand men can defend themselves a long time. By this means these men will defend the ramparts all the time necessary and always have for refuge this citadel." And for greater precaution: "I have the intention to establish a place at the mouth of the Havel. This place will fill the same rôle as Wittenberg, which is the point the nearest Berlin on the upper Elbe; this Havel place is the point the nearest to it on the lower Elbe, and will complete the defense of the Elbe."

The armistice limits for the French ran from the Bohemian frontier straight via Lahn to the Katzbach, along this and the Oder, the Saxon frontier and thence to the Elbe, and down that river; for the allies, from the Bohemian frontier via Landshut and along Striegauwasser to Kanth, thence, excluding Breslau, to the Oder, and then followed substantially the same course, there being between both armies in Silesia a neutral zone about twenty miles broad. By orders of June 5 Ney was to be cantoned at Liegnitz, with his corps at Breslau and Goldberg, Lauriston at the latter place, Reynier at Görlitz, Macdonald at Löwenberg, Marmont at Bunzlau, Bertrand at Sprottau, Latour-Maubourg and Victor at Sagan, Sébastiani at Steinau along the Oder, Mortier at Glogau, imperial headquarters at Liegnitz, the troops to move by little marches to their cantonments. Poniatowski was at Zittau, Oudinot at Baruth. Soult was put in command in Dresden, to which city the emperor personally went, to be nearer the centre of operations and the business of state.

On June 4 the emperor wrote Arrighi that he intended to assemble in Leipsic a body of seven thousand horse, twelve thousand foot and twelve guns, that this force would constantly increase, and he gave him the superior command of Wittenberg and Magdeburg, with orders to scour the Elbe left bank. Latour-Maubourg led the 1st Cavalry Corps; Sébastiani the

2d; Arrighi was to have the 3d, and the emperor was expecting to raise his force of horse up to sixty thousand men.

Of all the reasons given above, perhaps the most powerful influence persuading the emperor towards an armistice was that he could not see clearly into the position of his old ally, Austria, and he hoped yet to effect such an arrangement with Alexander as to handle Austria singly. He wrote Clarke, June 2, in similar terms as to Eugene, adding: "She hopes to reach these advantages by the mere presence of some hundred thousand men and without real hostilities." This the emperor's soldier nature could not brook.

This armistice was perhaps the most grievous error of Napoleon's life. It is hard to comprehend it. Apparently on the eve of a strategical and diplomatic standing broad enough to satisfy even him, yet by ceding to the formal mediation of Austria, he gave that nation an exaggerated idea of her strength, whereas firmness would have imposed on Francis, for Austria had really sunk to a second-rate power. He had just won two victories; and the allied army, with its right flank threatened from Breslau, stood in parlous case. Had Napoleon advanced against it with his old vigor, he could almost certainly within a few days have dictated peace; Austria would not have dared to give the allies passage across her territory, and backed up against the mountains, Napoleon had prepared for the Russo-Prussian army a very Caudine Forks. Had Austria permitted the passage, Napoleon's position would not have been worse than it became after the armistice; for although the French conscripts gained in discipline during these weeks, and though Napoleon was reinforced by one hundred thousand men, the allies received double this number, not to count the Austrian accession to the allied fighting strength, which resulted from it.

It is clear that the doubtful position of Austria was a reason

why Napoleon should keep on hammering, instead of pausing for breath. Although his army was crude, it had yet shown that it could fight, and his strategic position was as perfect as his numbers were superior. Nor does the want of cavalry go to the root of the matter. Two handsome though indecisive victories had been won without its use; and while in the past he had utilized his cavalry in a masterful way, it was neither this arm nor, despite his dictum, the artillery which had won his campaigns, his victories; it was the keen eye of the strategist, the choice of the right direction of his masses and their speed; it was his ability in recognizing the key-points and his skill in placing a superior number of men at these points. These very factors had won him Lützen and Bautzen. He had known as no one else how to push his army over unheard-of distances, without regard to its discipline or condition, provided only at the proper moment it would fight. He had done this now; and yet he paused on the threshold of success. It was not want of cavalry, it was not fear of Austria, it was not to place three armies at key-points, — it was a certain loss of moral energy in the man himself. At Ratisbon and at Wagram there had been early symptoms of this lapse of resolution, from which the necessities of the moment would rouse him into all his ancient fervor. The same thing was apparent in 1812; yet after the failure in Russia, Napoleon was himself again; he raised an army, marched to the Elbe, and fought his initial battle in his old style. Then at Bautzen he failed to direct the essential stroke by Ney's forces, and lost his chance of winning a decisive victory and dictating to his enemies; and now he asked for an armistice at a moment when he was strategically well placed, and his army, though unseasoned, was in proper mood to win a third victory, — when the old Napoleon would assuredly have dealt another blow to intimidate Austria.

Be it noted that fortune has nothing to do with this failure: up to this moment fortune had in this year favored Napoleon. It was due to the weakening of the man himself; he was wearing out. That the numbers and difficulties were greater will not explain his action: he had handled equal forces in 1805, 1806 and 1809. These initial stops were the first slight breaks in the structure of the machine; they got repaired by the demands of the occasion and the machine went on. But the breaks grew in frequency and importance. He himself told the whole story from headquarters at Passariano, September 26, 1797, when he wrote the Minister of Exterior Relations: "All great events hang always only by a hair. The able man profits by everything, neglects nothing of all which may yield him some chances more. The less able man, sometimes by neglecting a single one of these, makes everything fail." Napoleon had been, above all others, the able man described. Was he such now?

In order to influence public opinion, Napoleon ordered Augereau, June 11, to "have put in the journals of Frankfort and other places, as the battalions arrived, that many troops coming from Spain are passing the Rhine, and that this army is finer and older than that which distinguished itself at Lutzen and Wurschen." And Eugene was "to so act as to cause talk about his army."

Meanwhile the allies were strengthening their bonds of union. The Austrian, Russian and Prussian monarchs were near their armies; and at Reichenbach future plans were discussed, in which England had her share. Russia agreed to put one hundred and sixty thousand men in the field, not counting garrisons; Prussia eighty thousand; and in the event this was largely exceeded. England was to furnish subsidies; and no treaty was to be separately made by any one of the powers. Austria was accepted as a so-called mediator, though

she had already come to terms with Russia and Prussia, and Metternich came to Dresden to discuss the situation with Napoleon, just as if Austria were not pledged. Early in life Napoleon could be diplomatic; he now sank the statesman in the soldier, and acted with unwise haste. Indignant that cessions should be asked of the victor in two battles, he vented his ill-nature on the wily diplomat, the man who of all others could aid or injure him the most, and made of him an enemy forever. This was as ill-advised an act as any of his life, and Napoleon shortly regretted his impatience, upon receiving



Metternich.

the news of the disaster at Vittoria on June 21. But the harm was done. He would have been wiser, under the cloak of a peace lover, frankly to accept the situation at first blush, as he eventually did at the end of the armistice as if from fear, — it would have left France her natural boundaries, plus

Holland, Italy and Naples; but his ancient sense of perspective was gone. He did not gauge the earnestness of the new coalition, nor recognize that they were now to act together to the end.

Fain's account of the meeting of Napoleon and Metternich at Dresden June 23 is given at length in the *Correspondence*. It is as good as any. None can be accurate.

“‘There you are, Metternich,’ said Napoleon, when he saw him. ‘Be welcome, but if you desire peace, why have you come so late? . . . I have won two battles; my weakened enemies are losing their illusions. You come in among us, . . . and everything is embroiled. Without your unlucky intervention, peace between the allies and me would be made to-day. . . . Agree with me. Since Austria has taken the title of mediator, she is no longer on my side, she is no longer impartial, she is my enemy. . . . To-day your two hundred thousand men are ready; Schwartzenberg commands them, he assembles them at this moment nearby, there behind the curtain of the mountains of Bohemia, and because you believe yourself in condition to dictate the law, you come to find me. . . . I have divined you, Metternich. Your cabinet wishes to profit by my embarrassments. . . . The great question for you is to know whether you can buy me off without fighting, or if you are to find yourself positively in the ranks of my enemies, . . . and you perhaps come here only to get better light on the question. Well, then, let us see; let us treat. I consent. What do you want?’ This attack was lively; Monsieur de Metternich threw himself into the breach with a complete equipment of diplomatic phrases. . . . ‘Speak more clearly,’ said the emperor, interrupting him, ‘and come to the point, but do not forget that I am a soldier, who better knows how to break than bend. I have offered you Illyria to remain neutral; does that suit you? My army is quite sufficient to bring the Russians and Prussians to reason, and your neutrality is all I ask.’

“‘Ah, Sire,’ Monsieur de Metternich replied quickly, ‘why should Your Majesty remain alone in this struggle; why not double your forces? You can do so, Sire, for it only depends on you to entirely dispose of ours. Yes, things are at such a point that we can no longer remain neutral. We must be for or against you.’

“At these words the tone of the conversation quieted. The emperor led Metternich into the chart-room. After a rather long interval, the emperor’s voice again rose: ‘Why, not only Illyria, but half of Italy, and the return of the Pope to Rome, and Poland, and abandoning Spain and Holland, and the Confederation of the Rhine and Switzerland; that is, then, what you call the spirit of moderation that animates you. You are thinking only of making profit out of the chances. You are busy only in transporting your alliance from one camp to another, so as always to be on the side where things are being divided. . . . In fact, you want Italy, Russia wants Poland, Sweden wants Norway, Prussia wants Saxony, and England wants Holland and Belgium. In a word, peace is only a pretext.

You all aspire only to the dismemberment of the French empire. And to crown such an enterprise, Austria thinks it is sufficient to declare herself. . . . And I am obediently to evacuate Europe . . . and deliver myself like a fool to my enemies, . . . and this while my flags yet float at the mouths of the Vistula and on the borders of the Oder, when my triumphant army is at the gates of Berlin and Breslau, when I am personally here at the head of three hundred thousand men, it is that Austria, without a blow, without even drawing a sword, flatters herself to make me subscribe such conditions. . . . Oh, Metternich, how much did England give you to decide you to play this rôle against me ?' . . . Metternich changed color. A profound silence succeeded. Each walked rapidly up and down. The emperor's hat fell on the ground. . . . The emperor picked it up himself. Napoleon resumed the conversation with more coolness, and declared that he did not yet despair of peace, if Austria would listen to her veritable interests. He insisted that the Congress should assemble and should continue, even if hostilities were resumed, . . . 'so that this door should at least remain open.' In sending away Metternich, the emperor was careful to tell him that the cession of Illyria was not the last word."

"On June 30 Napoleon wrote Francis : 'I desire peace. If the Russians are as moderate as I am, it will be promptly made. If, on the contrary, they wish to carry me to concessions repulsive to my honor and the interests of my allies, they will gain nothing. They will succeed in nothing. Your Majesty knows the sentiments I bear you. I hope you will not be drawn into a war which will cause the unhappiness of your states and increase the evils of the world.'"

While the Congress of Prague was assembling, a full discussion of a campaign plan between the allied sovereigns was had at Trachenberg Castle, near Breslau, and on July 12 an agreement was signed. Of three armies, each of one hundred and fifty thousand men, one under Bernadotte, of Russians, Prussians and Swedes, was to operate to cover Berlin and threaten Hamburg, with Leipsic as eventual objective in the French rear; one under Blucher in Silesia was to advance on the French army through Lusatia; the Austrian army was to move through Bohemia on the French flank at Dresden. The

allies had guessed Napoleon's maxim of moving against the enemy's armies instead of against geographical points. Alexander desired Blucher to operate in Bohemia so as to cover Prague, while the main force should advance down the left bank of the Elbe. Though this was the better plan, the Austrians opposed it, with the purpose of keeping large armies out of Bohemia; the Prussians because they desired to cover Silesia and be near Bernadotte to protect Berlin; and the three-army plan was adopted, despite its converging lines. But Alexander insisted that the Army of the Sovereigns, so called because the three monarchs had headquarters with it, should have part of Blucher's force; and it was finally agreed that one hundred thousand Russians and Prussians should move from Silesia to Bohemia, under Barclay de Tolly, Wittgenstein and Kleist, and coöperate with the equal number of Austrians who would advance down the Elbe left bank on Dresden. This left Blucher the corps of Langeron, St. Priest, Sacken and Yorck. There was thus to be one large force in two bodies under the monarchs, and two secondary armies under Blucher and Bernadotte; and in order to avoid the defeat of the secondary armies,—and this was the *motif* of the campaign,—it was agreed that Blucher and Bernadotte should never accept battle when Napoleon in person advanced against them, but should always act offensively against his lieutenants. Had Napoleon known this, he would have left Blucher alone, merely containing him with a suitable force; that he did not, led to much trouble. It has been claimed that Moreau, who had joined the enemies of France, suggested this very wise plan of avoiding the emperor's blows; but it is not proved.

The allied plan, with their superior forces, although concentric, was good enough. The Army of the Sovereigns was to turn Napoleon's right flank, Bernadotte to turn his left

flank, and Blucher to harass the emperor in front. "All the coalition armies," say the Trachenberg instructions, "will take the offensive, and the enemy's camp is to be their rendezvous." Despite the general weakness of concentric operations, it still remains a fact that, owing to Napoleon's laxness, the upshot of this plan was the battle of Leipsic, the main point aimed at.

As soon as the armistice was signed, Napoleon had begun studying the theatre on which the fresh struggle was to come in case no terms were made at Prague; and he was inclined to count Austria as one of his enemies. Along the entire half circle, through Prussia and Silesia from Hamburg to Prague, fresh armies would arise to outnumber his; and to meet this gigantic array with his lesser numbers, he must use his internal lines to the utmost advantage. The Elbe was the chord of the arc of the coming theatre of operations; it was his base, and he set to work to strengthen it. He held Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg on the middle Elbe, and began improving their defenses; he would have liked to intrench the mouth of the Havel and of the Plauen canal, but the ground on the left bank was bad, and during the armistice he could not cross to the right bank at this point. For the upper and lower Elbe, Dresden and Hamburg were the key-points. The latter could at need rely on a mere garrison; the former would be covered by the main French army; and as Napoleon might have to defend the right bank, he ordered the Neustadt to be made an intrenched camp, while on the left bank he provided only against a sudden onset: being blockaded in Dresden would mean the loss of his communications with France, and could not be considered.

In 1810 the King of Saxony, anxious not to invite a campaign on his territory by having a fortified capital, had begun to dismantle the works of Dresden; but workmen were set at

repairing them during the armistice, and the walls were put beyond danger of being rushed, while the suburbs were surrounded by an enceinte having thirteen redoubts, and space in the rear to move batteries to and fro at a trot. It could not sustain a siege, nor resist a heavy assault, with a mere garrison; but with an army in the town, it was inexpugnable, although all that was done did not transform Dresden into a fortress. Hamburg, on the other hand, was in a military and a political sense alike of the highest importance; and on June 15 Napoleon wrote Davout, for whom the 13th Corps had been created to protect this region, that he could not be satisfied unless the city could be deemed a "strong place," and was provided with everything needed for defense for several months. It ought to have at least twenty-five thousand men as garrison, and enormous supplies, and be so fortified as to hold out two months after the opening of parallels. To do this properly would take ten years and thirty or forty million francs; yet he insisted that it could and should be put in such a state of defense as to hold out three weeks against even fifty thousand men.

In Napoleon's scheme to defend the Elbe there is an interdependence between army and strong places, which shows a clear conception of how the art of fortification can be best applied, and of its value to armies in the field. No better study exists. Napoleon was sure he could hold the middle Elbe, which was well fortified; he believed he could hold the lower Elbe some weeks by Hamburg alone; but he knew he could not hold Dresden without the army.

With his base well secured, the emperor devoted himself to reconnoitring the country from the Elbe towards Silesia and Bohemia. He had written from Schönbrunn, August 9, 1809, "When I demand a reconnoissance, I do not wish to have a plan of campaign brought me. The engineer should not use

the word 'enemy.' He is to reconnoitre the roads, their character, the hills, defiles, obstacles, decide whether vehicles can pass, and absolutely refrain from plans of campaign." Such reconnoissances he now had made in plenty.

On the theatre of war was a choice of four schemes of campaign. The entire situation is fully set forth in the Correspondence. First, holding all the strong places on the Elbe, Königstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, these, added to Stettin, Cüstrin and Glogau on the Oder, enabled Napoleon to manœuvre as he chose between the rivers, against an enemy who had no fortified crossing on either. Jutting out like Switzerland, Bohemia in a sense took the Elbe position in reverse; but if the enemy operated against Saxony along the left bank, Napoleon could destroy whatever stood between the Elbe and Oder, and then turn on the invading army. This was a sound calculation, entirely justifiable, but under the shrewd Trachenberg plan, Blucher neutralized it by constant retreat from Napoleon's personal advance. Königstein and the Zittau passes enabled Napoleon to operate, himself, towards Prague on the allies' communications if they came far into Saxony; indeed, the position on the middle Elbe was so strong that he might well have calculated to let them operate against it, while he turned alternately against the Army of the North or the Army of Silesia. But this scheme also the allies had counteracted by having their flank armies yield ground to Napoleon's personal onset. Despite all his ability, this simple plan (but the highest in all arts is the simplest) brought much of his manœuvring to naught. Second, with his firm hold on Magdeburg, Torgau and Dresden fully garrisoned, Napoleon might let the allies seize on the middle Elbe, draw in Macdonald, and, placing Oudinot to keep open the Zittau route, operate towards Jung Bunzlau or Prague, and take the Army of the Sovereigns in reverse, basing at need

on the Danube and Bavaria. This was a Napoleonic operation, bold and with attendant dangers, requiring the crossing of the mountain chain on poor roads, but promising great results; for assuming that Napoleon had done this, had beaten the allies in the Laun region and forced them back on Eger and the Böhmer Wald, he would have cut them from Bernadotte and Blucher, seized all their great magazines, and won the campaign by one grand stroke. Third, Napoleon might abandon the right bank of the Elbe and draw a defensive line from Dresden to the Erzgebirge at Plauen or Zwickau, and thus fend off allied attacks from Bohemia; but the allies would then operate in force against the French left at Dresden, and draw Napoleon back to the Elbe. This was too tame a plan. Fourth, the emperor might abandon the Elbe and retire behind the Rhine; and this plan was much in favor among the French generals; but this was yielding more than all the allies demanded; it was inviting the coalition to make a battle-ground of France, without a struggle for all he had won by his life's work; it meant to abandon the Confederation of the Rhine, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, to throw half the four hundred thousand men he had into the frontier fortresses, and to fight the huge allied army with the two hundred thousand left. This scheme was rejected by Napoleon as absurd: it was better to accept any allied terms.

It was natural for Napoleon to first revert to an offensive plan. As early as July 17 he planned that, the armistice ended, Davout with his thirty thousand men should debouch from Hamburg, and by a bold front draw to the lower Elbe as much as possible from the main allied army and Berlin; failing to accomplish this, he was to be joined by Oudinot and Victor, and his operation was to be turned into an offensive thrust on the lower Oder.

On August 5 Napoleon wrote him : " I have already notified you to assemble all your disposable troops as well as the Danes, so as to have a corps of thirty thousand men in front of Hamburg, to take the offensive against the enemy. My intention is to have sixty thousand men march by way of Lückau on Berlin, which will make with your corps nearly one hundred thousand men. They say that the Prince Royal commands Bülow's corps. His first care will certainly be to defend Berlin. Oudinot will be there the third day after the expiration of the armistice. Make an early diversion with your army by threatening to move on Mecklenburg and on Berlin." Again he wrote on August 8 : " There is no manner of doubt that the enemy will break the armistice the 10th, and that hostilities will recommence the 16th or 17th." The emperor then renews his orders, and adds : " You object that the enemy can pass the Elbe and ravage the country. There is no remedy for that;" and then he shows him that with his movement in advance, there was little danger of it. " Austria is against us. This power has three hundred thousand men afoot, effective, which will furnish it an army of one hundred and twenty thousand to march against me in Dresden; another of thirty thousand men against Bavaria; finally, a third of fifty thousand against the viceroy, who is at Laybach. . . . Whatever strengthening of forces this gives the allies I am ready to meet, but you must feel that you need energy, and if your corps . . . was disseminated and did not absolutely fulfill its rôle of holding superior numbers in check, that would compromise all the affairs. . . . I count that Oudinot will be in Berlin the fourth day, . . . and if there was an affair in which they could beat the enemy, break up the landwehr and disarm the landsturm, that would enable me to send you on Stettin, to follow the Swedes, by increasing your forces with Vandamme, and permit me to call back . . . thirty thousand men. . . .

. . . " Or else I would leave you all these men to raise the blockade of Cüstrin and Stettin, march on Stettin, threaten to raise the blockade of Danzig and oblige the Russians to move in all diligence thither, and detach them from the Austrians. There is, in all this army which is opposed to you, much scum (*canaille*), . . . so that eight days' campaign even without great success will reduce by half the enemy's forces in that country. . . . As soon as you shall hear that the armistice is broken, leave Hamburg in pomp; exact that your entire headquarters shall leave there, and that your troops shall be camped or cantoned, according to the maxims of war."

Davout was to be too active for the enemy to neglect him, was "so to manœuvre as to disquiet the enemy on the right flank, and to unite with the corps of Oudinot towards Berlin;" and while Davout was attracting the allies' eye, Oudinot would deal the real blow with three infantry and one cavalry corps, some seventy thousand men. Once in Berlin, he was to throw the enemy behind the Oder, relieve Stettin and Cüstrin, and thus raise the siege of Spandau. It has been said that Davout's thirty thousand men were in a sense lost to usefulness because Napoleon's fortune depended on success on the upper and not the lower Elbe; but Davout did fend off the English, who might have seized Hamburg, and by raising Hanover and Westphalia, or even Denmark, have done vast damage. Moreover, he contained an equal number of allies, and threatened Bernadotte's base at Stralsund. But his personal military capacity was not utilized.

So far as Napoleon's offensive was concerned, this soon changed to a general defensive, — the first defensive plan on the great scale he had ever undertaken, and one quite unnatural to his bent. And as part of it, orders were issued July 28 to the War Minister to "have Cologne and Coblenz fortified so as to complete the line of the Rhine."

The Congress of Prague, meanwhile, dragged on slowly, wasting time on form rather than discussing substance. Its "proceedings were farcical from the outset." Napoleon journeyed to Mainz during the first few days of the Congress, but on his return found from the reports of his representatives that nothing was being accomplished. He wrote, August 4, to Ney: "My Cousin, they are doing nothing at the Congress at Prague. An English agent is mixing up in it. They will not be able to arrive at any result, and the allies have the intention to break the armistice the 10th." And the same day he wrote Eugene, stating the same facts: "As the

enemy does not appear to be much prepared on your side, you ought to reach Grätz." Recognizing that no end would be arrived at, Napoleon instructed Caulaincourt, August 6, to demand of Metternich succinctly what were the conditions on which peace would be made. The answer was, the restitution of Illyria, the reconstruction of Prussia with an Elbe frontier; the abandonment of the Duchy of Warsaw, to be divided among Austria, Russia and Prussia; the renunciation of the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine; and the independence of Holland and Spain, to be later established. From the standpoint of the allies, who had concluded to forget their differences and stand together against Napoleon's dictation, these were reasonable terms, and they were right in fighting for them to the end; but to Napoleon the position seemed strained, when he held the keys of both Elbe and Oder, and was constructing intrenched camps at Dresden and Pirna, and a bridge-head at Königstein. Bavaria was still faithful, and less statesman than soldier, he could not bring himself to permit this ultimatum to be forced on him. He could not see that if he yielded all this for the sake of peace, he would yet leave France great and glorious beyond any dream of his when first he drew sword for her cause; or if he saw it, yet, remembering Presburg, Tilsit and Schönbrunn, in which the vanquished had long argued for better terms, he determined to reject this standing, to play the gambler's game and bluff his opponent's hand. This he did. According to his view, it was humiliation for the victor in two battles to be thus approached with an ultimatum, and he wrote, August 9, to Cambacérès: "I hope to make Austria repent of her foolish pretensions and infamous treason, but in any event nothing can happen worse than what she proposed." Worse did happen.

Yet Napoleon desired peace. He was not so blind that he could not see that here was at last all Europe arrayed against

him ; he must have remembered his own theory of the equality of thousands ; he must have seen the wisdom of yielding for the sake of building up France after her long drain of men and treasure ; he began to recognize the unity of the allied nations ; and finally, on the last night of the armistice, August 9-10, he weakened and accepted the conditions, but insisted on keeping Trieste, and that Denmark should be left intact. These two exceptions were perhaps pardonable, and ten days before might have been accepted, but it was then too late to make them. Napoleon's note reached Prague on the 11th, and found the Congress broken up the day before, the allies deeming the chances of war better than negotiation. A few days later, Napoleon is said to have signified his willingness to accept the ultimatum, but the cards had then been played, and he had lost. He had gambled away his chances, and now had to meet the three Continental powers, not singly as heretofore, but in hearty coöperation, and backed by English gold. When Napoleon entered the armistice, his strong chance lay in frankly saying he was tired of war, and would agree to any reasonable plan which should restore peace. He had not done this, he had shuffled and bluffed, and his downfall was now only a matter of months. It is difficult for one who looks upon Napoleon's greatness with the eye of the hero-worshiper, who sees in him the strongest and most useful man of modern times, to forgive him for thus wrecking his own future.

The coming campaign, then, was to include an advance on Berlin and to the Oder by Davout and Oudinot with the left wing, while the right wing, under the emperor, was to defend the Elbe.

On August 11 Napoleon wrote Davout : " Everything leads one to think that the enemy means to pass the Elbe and advance on the Weser, but your movement on the right bank, which cannot be upset, because you have as leaning point a place like Hamburg and Holstein, will dis-

concert this project, at the same time that the movement from Lückau on Berlin will oblige the enemy to return, and will put everything in confusion." And on August 12 Napoleon gave Oudinot orders for his movement: "There will then be against Berlin your corps of seventy thousand men, Girard's of twelve thousand men, and Davout's of forty thousand men. . . . After having occupied Berlin, you will manœuvre to establish your communications with Wittenberg and Magdeburg, and Girard will be marvelously well placed for that. You will relieve Cüstrin and re-victual the place . . . and you will throw the enemy beyond the Oder."

Napoleon wished to hold as much of Lusatia as would not place him too far from the Elbe, nor divide his forces too much. Let him speak for himself; his own words are an interesting study. There were issued, August 12, instructions for Ney and Marmont: "Austria has declared war. The armistice is broken. Hostilities will recommence the 17th. This is the plan of operation which it is possible that I shall adopt, but which I shall decide on definitely before midnight," which is to establish his base on the Königstein-Dresden line, and send Oudinot on Berlin, while Girard debouched from Magdeburg, and Davout from Hamburg. He assumes the allies to be still in the Schweidnitz country.

"With these three hundred thousand men I will take position between Görlitz and Bautzen, so as not to be cut off from the Elbe, to keep the mastery of the course of this river, to ration from Dresden, to see what the Russians and the Austrians want to do, and to profit by the circumstances. . . . I should prefer to remain at Liegnitz," but it is too far from Dresden: between Görlitz and Bautzen is better. "Meanwhile my left will enter Berlin; disperse all that is found there, and if the Austrians and Russians should deliver battle, we will crush them. If we should lose the battle, we should be nearer the Elbe, and more able to take advantage of their follies. . . . Give me to understand what you think of all this. I suppose that everything will finish by a great battle, and I think it more advantageous to deliver it near Bautzen, two or three marches from the Elbe, than at five or six marches. . . . Still, I feel some regret at abandoning Liegnitz, but in occupying it, it would be difficult to assemble all my troops."

The asking of the opinion of his lieutenants, so as to strengthen his own, is a new departure.

He also wrote, August 13, to Berthier:—

“My Cousin, you will find joined hereto the manner in which I propose to place my army. I desire, then, that you should order the topographical engineers to reconnoitre on the spot a fine position in front of Görlitz, facing towards Zittau. . . . I have written to Marmont to have the position of Bunzlau well reconnoitred. Finally, we must have reconnoitred a third position between Bautzen and Görlitz.” And in instructions for Ney, St. Cyr, Macdonald and Marmont, he says: “This is the plan I have arrived at. If you have any observations to make, I beg you to make them frankly. Oudinot with the 12th, 4th and 7th Corps and the 3d Cavalry Corps will march on Berlin, while Girard . . . will debouch by Magdeburg, and Davout . . . will debouch by Hamburg . . . which has become a place of first importance. . . . I have ordered Oudinot to move on Berlin, while Davout will overturn what is before him. . . . On this side, Dresden is fortified so as to defend itself eight days, even the suburbs,” under St. Cyr, who occupies the Königstein bridges, the debouches on Bautzen, and Neustadt. Pajol is on the roads from Leipsic to Carlsbad, scouting out to Hof, Durosnel in Dresden. My headquarters will be in Görlitz the 16th with five infantry divisions, the Guard, the 2d Corps between Görlitz and Zittau, and the 8th Corps out towards Bohemia as a vanguard. Marmont is at Bunzlau, Macdonald at Löwenberg, Lauriston at Grünberg, Ney between Hainau and Liegnitz. “The Austrian army, taking the offensive, can do so only in three manners; first in debouching with the great army, which I estimate one hundred thousand strong, via Peterswalde on Dresden,” where it would meet St. Cyr, who would retire to Dresden, and in a day and a half be joined by the 1st Corps, making sixty thousand men; and in four days’ march I can myself move there with the Guard and the 2d Corps. Dresden can defend itself eight days. “The 2d debouch by which the Austrians might take the offensive is that of Zittau. Here they will meet Poniatowski, the Guard . . . and 2d Corps, and before they can arrive, I shall have assembled more than one hundred and fifty thousand men. At the same time . . . the Russians could move on Liegnitz and Löwenberg, when the 6th, 3d, 11th and 5th Corps, with . . . cavalry, would reunite on Bautzen, which would make more than one hundred and thirty thousand men, and in a day and a half I should send thither from Görlitz”

what was needed. "The third movement of the Austrians would be to move from Josephstadt, and to unite with the Russian and Prussian army, so as to debouch all together. In that case all the army would assemble at Bunzlau. It would therefore be necessary that the principal position of Ney should be on a level with ours in occupying Liegnitz, if he deems it wise. In this case Macdonald would reconnoitre the enemy. He would notify Ney and Lauriston, and Macdonald would fall back on the position indicated, on Bunzlau. In this case Marmont would have to choose the battlefield at Bunzlau, in front or in rear. I have already notified him to perform this important work."

These instructions Ney and Macdonald both approved; St. Cyr and Marmont did not. St. Cyr was a sound soldier. He had been deprived of his command in Spain with scant reason by Napoleon, who did not like his somewhat rugged ways; but yet he gave him a marshal's baton for Polotsk. Both St. Cyr and Marmont objected to detailing troops for an operation on Berlin, when the success of the campaign must be won against the Sovereigns. Neither believed that Oudinot or Macdonald could succeed alone. "By the division of your forces," said Marmont, "by the creation of three distinct armies separated by such great distances, Your Majesty renounces the advantages which your presence on the battlefield assures you, and I much fear that the day when you shall have carried off victory, and believe that you have won a decisive battle, you may learn that you have lost two." This was almost prophetic.

Even at the risk of repetition, we may quote the emperor's written scheme of August 6:—

"Here is the project which I have determined on, and the position of my army the 17th and 18th." The 13th Corps with the Danes in front of Hamburg. As garrison of Hamburg ten thousand men. Girard in front of Magdeburg. Dombrowski in front of Wittenberg. Durosnel and eight battalions in Dresden. Oudinot with the 12th, 4th, and 7th Corps and 3d Cavalry Corps at Lütkau and Baruth, manœuvring towards Berlin.

St. Cyr's 4th Corps, with headquarters at Pirna, holding the roads from Prague to Dresden. Pajol with one division each of foot and horse on the road from Leipsic to Carlsbad, outposts at Hof. Vandamme, 1st Corps and 5th Cavalry Corps at Bautzen. Headquarters at Görlitz with the Guard, its cavalry, 2d Army Corps and 1st Cavalry Corps. The 8th at Zittau. The 6th at Bunzlau. The 11th at Löwenberg. The 5th at Görlitz. The 3d at Sagan, also holding Liegnitz. "The enemy may debouch by the left bank, and in this case St. Cyr . . . would fall back to the intrenched camp of Dresden, and would be joined, before the enemy could get up, by the 1st Corps, and successively by those I should send from Görlitz. The second operation is by way of Zittau towards Görlitz. In this case they would find the 8th Corps, the Guard, three divisions of St. Cyr. In this case I should give battle between Görlitz and —" (gap). "It is probable that at the same moment when the Austrian army shall attack by way of Zittau, the Russians will attack by way of Görlitz. The 3d Corps and 2d Cavalry Corps will then rally on the 6th Corps at Bunzlau. The three points of resistance, then, are Bautzen, Görlitz, and Bunzlau."

It is interesting to study the map with Napoleon's detailed project before one; but to resume all the above defensive scheme: a stand at Bunzlau would keep the allies from cutting between the French and the Oder, but it was too far from Dresden; a point between Görlitz and Bautzen seemed preferable, combined with holding the Dresden-Königstein line, "so that I cannot be cut off from the Elbe, that I can remain master of this watercourse, and ration from Dresden," "watch the enemy and utilize his errors." Napoleon was again underestimating the allies and overestimating his own strength: he could not reach four hundred thousand men in all, and the allies would have about that number on this part of the theatre alone. There were three things the enemy might do: either advance on Dresden from Prague via Peterswalde, in which case the Königstein and the Bautzen corps would come to its defense, and give him ample time to bring up the Guard and the 2d Corps from Zittau. Or they would

advance via Zittau, where the 2d and 8th would hold them until the Guard, the 1st and two cavalry corps could arrive. Should either of these advances be accompanied by one of the



French Mounted Grenadier.

Army of Silesia, there would still be four corps and a cavalry corps to assemble and fend them off at Bautzen. Should the allies concentrate and advance via Josephstadt, the whole French army would assemble in Bunzlau. And Napoleon naturally looked forward to a great battle at the reopening of the campaign as the best solution.

For the offensive in mass, there were three directions to take: to the left against the army protecting Brandenburg; to the right against the main allied army, which was to advance on him from Bohemia; in the centre against the force coming on through Lusatia. But as he could scarcely permit the main allied army to debouch from Bohemia on Dresden to find it disgarnished, two of these directions were unavailable. If he marched into Bohemia, the other allied armies might combine and march on, or even take Dresden; but this would be counteracted by a victory over the Army of the Sovereigns. Should, however, this latter army retire instead of fighting, might the other allied armies not seize upon his base and cut him off from his communications? It was a scrupulous care for his base and the

fact that the allies outnumbered him — and this was the first time they had done so — which led Napoleon to a defensive attitude, rather than make his usual offensive thrust. When, in 1805 and 1806, he was far from his base, he had such a superiority that, should the enemy assail it, the enemy rather than himself would stand in danger. Under the present conditions, he was wise in selecting the defensive.

Napoleon's form of defense was well suited to the conditions. Against concentrically approaching armies the best defense is one which permits offensive thrusts against those most easily reached or most dangerous; and when a great river protects the position, these thrusts can be delivered, as Napoleon well knew, to the best advantage. The Elbe could not be turned on the left if effectively protected by Hamburg; on the right, by a long circuit, it might be done; but of this Napoleon had small fear. "If the enemy



Swiss Grenadier.

penetrates by way of Bayreuth and reaches Germany with all his forces assembled, as he says he shall, I shall wish him *bon voyage* and let him go, quite sure that he will come back quicker than he will have gone. What is important to me is that they shall not cut us off from Dresden and the Elbe; little I care whether they cut us off from France," he wrote St. Cyr, August 17, from Bautzen. This was a slight exaggeration. The first offensive on Berlin and the Oder was also commendable because it outflanked Saxony and Silesia, while the relief of Cüstrin and Stettin, and the siege of Spandau,

not to speak of the capture of Berlin, would have a great moral effect. It put at risk a hundred thousand men, but in case of failure, there was a safe retreat on Wittenberg or Magdeburg. Napoleon did not consider Bernadotte formidable. That the operation failed through the incapacity of his lieutenants does not weigh against its wisdom: had Davout got to Cüstrin, while Napoleon held the upper Elbe, the result would have been different.

Dispatches were sent out, generally through Berthier, to all lieutenants, giving them full instructions to operate in accordance with the plan described. A few items may be quoted:—

On August 12 Berthier was told to “write along the whole line of the Elbe and of the army to let nobody pass nor communicate with the enemy, and that everything going towards the enemy’s country be stopped, so as to prevent as far as possible the enemy from having positive news of our movements.”

On August 13 to St. Cyr, to cover Dresden and Königstein and the frontier beyond Neustadt to Hof. “You will make him understand that this can be considered only as general instructions. His aim is to cover Dresden on both banks, to assure the communications of the Königstein bridge to Bautzen, and to see to it that the enemy’s partisans do not get on the road from Neustadt to Bautzen. . . . Make him understand that he is authorized to attack the enemy, and to make incursions into Bohemia in all directions, whether to disquiet the enemy, to glean news, or to exercise his troops.”

On August 14 to Eugene: “The King of Naples arrived to-day at the army. Hostilities are to commence the 17th. Cover the Illyrian provinces and Italy. . . . Attack the enemy, if he is inferior to you.”

On August 15 to Cambacérès: “General Moreau has arrived in Berlin. He left America before having heard of the battle of Lützen, and when those gentlemen thought to enter France.” And on the 18th to Clarke: “Moreau, arrived at the army of the allies, has thus entirely thrown off the mask and taken up arms against his country.”

On August 15 to Oudinot: “Here, then, are one hundred and twenty thousand men manœuvring on Berlin. Give me news of yourself twice a day and especially many details.”

On August 16 to Cambacérès: "My Cousin, Austria has declared war. The armistice is broken and hostilities are recommencing. We are in great manœuvres. A part of the Russian and Prussian army has entered Bohemia. I augur well for the campaign. Moreau has arrived at the Russian army."

August 16 to Maret: "According to all the news from the outposts, a large part of the Russian army has been in Bohemia since the 11th, so you see that all Metternich has told you is a tissue of lies. Blucher passed Breslau the 12th, and from then on commenced hostilities. The 15th he presented himself before Liegnitz, where there was some firing. . . . Affairs present themselves under an advantageous look. The enemy is manœuvring as if he counted on my having evacuated the right bank of the Elbe."

The following extracts have their interest: June 17 Berthier was ordered to write to General Arrighi that the emperor had received complaints of bribery; "that this conduct is unworthy of the rank and situation in which he is placed," and that he is at once to restitute. Berthier was also to write to Augereau to the same effect. "This conduct has caused me much pain, in a moment when the peoples are crushed by the lodging of the soldiers and the cost of war. They are to take nothing and to see that nothing is taken." June 21 to Lacuée, disapproving the payment of five hundred and eighty francs for cuirassier horses, five hundred and twenty for dragoon horses and four hundred and twenty for light cavalry horses. "There are to be found horses all through Germany at a much less price." Also disapproving the purchase of four-year-olds.

It was during the armistice that Jomini left the French army and took service with the Russians. Of this Napoleon wrote: "Jomini, Ney's chief of staff, has deserted. It is he who has published several volumes on the campaigns, and whom for a long while the Russians strove to get. He has ceded to corruption. He is a military man of little value, but is nevertheless a writer who has seized some healthy ideas on war. He is a Swiss." And again: "General Jomini, Ney's chief of staff, has deserted to the enemy, without having beforehand thrown up his functions. He is to be judged, condemned and executed for contumacy" in his absence. As

a fact, Jomini was a Swiss, owing no allegiance to France. Berthier did not like him, and when a question of his promotion came up, is said to have opposed it. Nettled at what he considered to be unfair, Jomini threw over his position with Ney, and joined the allies.

On May 24 the emperor ordered an immediate inquiry and an extraordinary court to try some gendarmes who allowed Cossacks to capture part of a convoy. The court found the men not guilty, and on May 27 the emperor wrote to Berthier: "I am extremely discontented with the inquiry . . . and more so with the commission. It is not thus that my intention should be executed." He then explains why the convoy was ill-organized, and the guards behaved badly.



Prussian Pioneer.

LX.

HOSTILITIES REOPEN. AUGUST 16-26, 1813.

DURING the armistice Napoleon collected four hundred thousand men and over twelve hundred guns, extending on a line from the Bavarians at Munich, backed by Augereau at Würzburg, along the Elbe to Davout in Hamburg. He underrated Bernadotte, and forgot that the defeat of the Army of the Sovereigns under Schwartzberg would jeopardize the others. The total force raised by the allies, including militia and reserves, was nearly nine hundred thousand men and some two thousand guns, of which over five hundred thousand men were opposite Napoleon. Their plan was to move the main army through Bohemia on the rear of Dresden, while Blucher and Bernadotte should advance or retire, as agreed. Napoleon stood based on the Elbe, with his main force out towards Silesia, the enemy occupying a huge semi-circle around this position; and from Bautzen he watched matters and reconnoitred through the mountains towards Prague. Blucher, advancing from Silesia, threw back Macdonald, but when Napoleon went out to attack him, retired behind the Katzbach. Meanwhile, as Schwartzberg was approaching, Napoleon went to Dresden, leaving Macdonald to push back Blucher. The Sovereigns started for Leipsic, but changed to an operation on Dresden, and slowly crossed the mountains. Thus all three allied armies were to be met at once. Ondinot, with definite orders to attack, moved on Bernadotte. Unequal to his task, he was badly defeated by Bernadotte and Bülow at Gross Beeren August 23; and this arrested Davout's advance. At the same time Macdonald, moving upon Blucher on the Katzbach, could scarcely have done his work worse, and attacking Blucher blindly on August 26 in five separate columns, was utterly defeated with loss of twenty thousand men and one hundred guns. Thus within ten days after the end of the armistice, Napoleon's two subsidiary armies had been defeated, and the Sovereigns were on the point of attacking Dresden; and to this city, unaware as yet of the disasters to his lieutenants, Napoleon moved with the bulk of his forces.

DURING the armistice, as we have seen, Napoleon had not been idle. He had provisioned and supplied all his strong places on the Elbe; had raised the effective of his armies in Germany to a paper strength of four hundred thousand men, and had brought the artillery up to twelve hundred and fifty

field guns. On his extreme right, facing an equal Austrian force at Linz, were the Bavarians at Munich, whom Augereau



Prussian Volunteer
Rifleman.

was to sustain by a force he was raising in the Würzburg country. On his extreme left Davout held Hamburg and Lübeck with the 13th Corps of French and Danes, facing Walmoden's Prussians. The flying left wing under Oudinot stood near Dahme facing Bernadotte, and threatening Berlin. The Army of the Elbe under Napoleon, eleven corps of forty-three divisions, was cantoned from Liegnitz back to Dresden. Murat had returned from Naples expressing penitence, and been placed in command of the cavalry reserve of four hundred and twenty-nine squadrons. Considering his military standing after the Russian campaign, this was a marvelous showing. But though Napoleon's intellectual work was

still the same, and he was strong in his position and his campaign plans, he was weaker than his wont in morale, and in the growing habit of perverting facts even to himself. He paid too little heed to the earnestness of the coalition, which was waging really what the Germans termed it, the War of Independence. He underrated the allied Army of the North, and overrated the effect of a possible capture of Berlin. Marmont suggests that it was revenge that led him to this raid; he wished the first shells to be thrown into this city. He could not appreciate Prussian patriotism and recognize how brutally he had downtrodden this proud and Fatherland-loving race, when to his own vast gain he might have made a friend of it. He constantly concealed essential facts from his lieutenants and sent them on errands beyond their strength. The desire to keep the threads of his manœuvres in his own

hands was proper enough ; but as a corollary he should have been able to give each one attention, and this he was now with every year less and less able to do. All this criticism may appear strained ; but as Napoleon's marvelous success has so far been proved to be due to his astonishing equipment of mind, body and character, so now his failure was due to the weakening of physique and resolution.

Just before the reopening of the campaign the entire army was organized and located substantially as follows : —

The Emperor, Berthier Chief of Staff, Headquarters Dresden.

		Cantonments in			
The Guard,		58,000 men in	Liegnitz-Glogau Country.		
1st Corps, Vandamme,	3 div'ns,	33,000	“	marching on	Dresden.
2d “ Victor,	3 “	25,000	“	in Rothenburg-Sagan	“
3d “ Ney, later,					
	Souhan,	5 “	40,000	“ “	Liegnitz “
4th “ Bertrand,	3 “	21,000	“ “	Sprottau	“
5th “ Lauriston,	3 “	28,000	“ “	Goldberg	“
6th “ Marmont,	3 “	28,000	“ “	Bunzlau	“
7th “ Reynier,	3 “	21,000	“ “	Görlitz	“
8th “ Poniatowski,	2 “	7,000	“ “	Zittau	“
9th “ Augereau,	2 “		“	Würzburg.	
10th “ Rapp gar.			“	Danzig.	
11th “ Macdonald,	3 “	24,000	“ “	Löwenberg	“
12th “ Oudinot,	3 “	19,000	“ “	Baruth	“
13th “ Davout,	3 “	30,000	“ “	Hamburg	“
14th “ Gouvion St.					
	Cyr,	3 “	36,000	“ “	Pirna Camp
Cavalry Reserve, Murat.					
1st Corps, Latour-Mau-					
	bourg,	4 “	16,000	“ “	Görlitz-Sagan “
2d Corps, Sébastiani,	3 “	10,000	“ “	Katzbach	“
3d “ Arrighi,	4 “	11,000	“ “	Dahme	“
4th “ Kellermann,					
	Jr.,	3 “	5,000	“ “	Zittau “
	Total,		412,000	“	for the field.

There were over twelve hundred field guns, for which ammunition was plentiful. On August 18 Napoleon wrote Clarke: "I have here three hundred and sixty-five thousand gun cartridges, in caissons and wagons. This is equal to four battles like Wagram; and I have eighteen millions of" (musket) "cartridges."

These are the figures it was purposed to reach; there may not have been exceeding three hundred and fifty thousand



Prussian Hussar.

men. Napoleon liked to deal in round numbers; and as usual before action, he over-rated the men on hand, as after victory he understated them. But there are so many estimates of the rival armies, made at the time and from various data since, that any numbers given to-day can be deemed only approximately correct.

A first line was thus on the Katzbach; a second line on the Bober; a third line on the Neisse, with a reinforced flank at Zittau; the reserve in Dresden and Pirna. In German fortresses were enormous garrisons; flying wings stood at Würzburg on the right, and at Magdeburg and Hamburg on the left; and several bodies were echeloned back to the Rhine.

During the Congress the allies had made heroic efforts to raise men and material, but the reports appeared to Napoleon vastly exaggerated. Prussia had put on foot, according to

Ploto, two hundred and forty thousand men, of whom thirty-two thousand were cavalry, a force twice what Napoleon gauged it. The Russians, not counting Sacken and Langeron, received one hundred thousand reinforcements, of which half were veterans returned from hospital, and the other half from the call made in 1812 by the czar at Moscow, which had been organizing and marching to destination all these months. The total of active allied troops, including the forces in Italy, ran up to six hundred and fifty thousand men, backed by eighteen hundred guns; reserves of one hundred and sixty thousand men were in second line to fill gaps; aggregate eight hundred thousand men. This did not include the allies in Spain or the Sicilians in Italy; but it covered militia and irregulars who could wage small war, or so coöperate as to call for detachments from the French army. From England came subsidies, small arms and guns; whole batteries with their personnel, and companies of Congreve-rocket men, were furnished Prussia and Sweden; a total of four hundred thousand muskets and one hundred thousand swords found their way from the workshops of Great Britain to the arsenals of the Continent.

According to Jomini, who had access to the best records, the allied forces were thus divided:—

Under Barclay :	Wittgenstein,	Russians	23,000
	Platov,	“	6,000
	Constantine,	“	36,000
	Kleist,	“	48,000
			—————	113,000
Under Schwartzberg :	Lichtenstein,	Austrians,		
	Bubna,	“		
	Collaredo,	“		
	Meerfeld,	“		
	Giulay,	“		
	Klenau,	“		
	Hesse-Homburg,	“		
			—————	126,000

Under Blucher :	Sacken,	Russians . .	16,000	
	Langeron,	“ . .	29,000	
	St. Priest,	“ . .	14,000	
	Yorek,	Prussians . .	38,000	97,000
Under Bernadotte :	Winzingerode,	Russians . .	9,000	
	Woronzov,	“ . .	12,000	
	Walmoden,	Swedes . .	24,000	
	Mixed,	. .	28,000	
	Bülow,	Prussians . .	41,000	
	Tauenzien,	“ . .	40,000	154,000
Under Bennigsen :	Markov,	Russians	16,500	
	Doctorov and Paskiewitz,	“ . .	26,500	
	Tolstoy,	“ . .	17,000	60,000
		Total,		550,000

In addition to the above there were, of Russians and Prussians mixed, besieging or observing the eighty thousand of French garrisons:—

Under Wurtemberg at Danzig	35,000 men.
“ Plotz “ Stettin	35,000 “
“ Hinrichs “ Cüstrin	15,000 “
“ Rosen “ Glogau	8,000 “
“ X— “ Zamosc	29,000 “
	Total, 122,000 “

Or counting later accessions in Austrian and Prussian militia and garrisons:—

The Army of the Sovereigns had	239,000 men under	Schwartzenberg.
“ “ “ Silesia	“ 97,000 “	“ Blucher.
“ “ “ the North	“ 154,000 “	“ Bernadotte.
Coming on,	60,000 “	“ Bennigsen.
In Bavaria,	55,000 “	“ Wrede
In Italy,	50,000 “	“ Hiller.
Russian reserve,	40,000 “	“ Labanov.
Austrian militia,	60,000 “	
Prussian garrisons and militia,	32,000 “	
Besiegers,	122,000 “	
	Total,	909,000 “

This grand total was sustained by artillery estimated as high as two thousand and fifty-six guns.


Of this enormous force there was substantially a third each of Austrians, Prussians and Russians, plus twenty-five thousand Swedes. The latter were in one body; the other armies were compounded of various nationalities, so as to avoid internal conflict. When later, in December, 1813, the French had been crowded back across the Rhine, the German Confederation ordered a levy of one hundred and forty-five thousand regulars and an equal number of militia, part of which force was set at besieging fortresses on the Rhine, and in Belgium and Champagne, so that far exceeding a million of men were put afoot by the allies, for the campaigns of 1813 and 1814.

From August 12 on, the allies worked on the Trachenberg plan. Barclay moved into Bohemia to join the Army of the Sovereigns, which was to head for Leipsic (later changed to Dresden) along the left bank of the Elbe. The Army of Silesia under Blucher, in defiance of the armistice, moved into the neutral zone, took Breslau, and advanced to the Katzbach, the French retiring to the Bober. Ignorant of these dispositions, Napoleon expected the main body through Lusatia, and not exceeding one hundred thousand men to operate on his right from Bohemia; and his general idea of the campaign was that he would observe each army with eighty thousand men, and with an equal flying corps join one or the other wing, to throw himself on whichever threatened most.

As the armistice closed, the allies were in three groups. The Army of the Sovereigns, mainly the force which after Bautzen had retired towards Schweidnitz, stood under Schwartzenberg, nominally commander-in-chief, really chief of staff to the Sovereigns, not far from Melnik in northern Bohemia, the mountain chains of which protected the allies when taking in reverse the position of Dresden. The Army of Silesia under Blucher, on August 14, was at Striegau.

The Army of the North under Bernadotte, of which a third had been detached on one duty or another, stood about Berlin. The allies were thus markedly stronger than the French.

The army immediately operating under Napoleon, about two hundred and seventy-five thousand strong, stood in a tri-



Schwarzenberg.

angular fashion, with the middle Elbe as base, and the sides drawn from the mouth of the Katzbach to Wittenberg and Königstein. Around this triangle stood the allies in a semi-circle, holding the roads to Dresden from both Bohemia and Silesia. As indicated, Napoleon's general plan was to seize the initiative, and attacking each allied army in turn, to destroy it; and a decisive victory over the Austrians was especially demanded.

The emperor left Dresden in the afternoon of August 15, the day before the expiration of the armistice, and after

inspecting the Lilienstein camp opposite Königstein, reached Bautzen during the night, where he remained the 17th. The Guard followed him. He had heard a rumor that part of the Russians had left Silesia to swell the Army of the Sovereigns, and to meet this he increased his force behind Zittau, where he expected the main advance, by ordering Victor thither. Blucher he gauged at not over fifty thousand men after the above detachment, and thought he might take him unawares; and if for a short time he could eliminate the middle army, he might from his central position successively march on each of the others with a fine chance of beating it. Counting the Guard, he could assemble one hundred and eighty thousand men at Bunzlau; and on August 16 he wrote Macdonald: "When I shall be assured that Blucher, with Yorck, Kleist and Sacken, which does not make fifty thousand men, is advancing on Bunzlau, and that Wittgenstein and Barclay de Tolly are in Bohemia, to move on Zwickau or Dresden, I will march in force to destroy Blucher. . . . I conceive rather fine hopes of all this. It seems to me that the enemy is opening himself to heavy blows." With this in view, he ordered Vandamme to Bautzen, ready to draw him in to Zittau, or send him back to sustain St. Cyr at Dresden, should the allies advance up the left bank of the Elbe. Having instructed St. Cyr to dispute every step, to hold Dresden, and to keep close touch with Vandamme, Napoleon went on to Görlitz the 18th, where he heard that forty thousand Russians under Wittgenstein had crossed from Silesia to Bohemia and had reached Böhmisches-Leipa, and that the Austrians were moving on Dresden or on the Rhine; and he thought to debouch with a large force from Zittau on this body and catch it on the march. But to cross the mountains was no easy task, and as his news was sparse, he decided to wait, and let Oudinot push the manœuvre on Berlin instead.

He wrote, August 17, to St. Cyr : " Either the Russians and the Austrians together will debouch in force on Zittau and Gabel . . . in which case Vandamme will join " the forces there, which will make seventy thousand men, and I will join them with fifty thousand men ; " or else, if all the Austrian and Russian forces should move on Dresden by the left bank, Vandamme will march on Dresden. . . . You will thus assemble near sixty thousand men in Dresden camp. . . . The camp at Zittau, becoming useless, will move on Dresden . . . and you will have more than one hundred thousand men in Dresden. Finally, I will move with the fifty thousand men of my Guard also to Dresden, if the circumstances demand it, and in four days we would find ourselves with . . . one hundred and eighty thousand men around Dresden. . . . Yet the army of Bunzlau . . . can be reinforced by the Guard, and I can debouch on Blucher with one hundred and eighty thousand men. . . . And once that I have destroyed or neutralized this corps, the equilibrium will be broken, and I shall be able, according to the success of the army that is marching on Berlin, to sustain it towards Berlin, or else march by Bohemia behind the army which may have advanced into Germany. All this is not yet clear ; what is clear is that four hundred thousand men, leaning on a system of strong places, on a river like the Elbe, cannot be turned."

If the allies were coming up on the right bank, he wrote Clarke, August 15, they must come by way of Zittau, the only good road ; and here he would meet them ; or if they advanced on the left bank via Töplitz and Peterswalde on Dresden, St. Cyr could in two days have sixty thousand men, and in four days he himself could concentrate one hundred and fifty thousand men there. Should the enemy undertake a wider operation, as into the Nürnberg region, or on Munich, all Bohemia would be open to him for manœuvring on his communications. Or should it prove false that a heavy detachment had gone to the Army of the Sovereigns, he could invade Silesia with two hundred thousand men. But acting on the probability that Schwartzenberg was to cross the Elbe, the emperor determined to return to Königstein, so as, when the allies should have neared Dresden, to have them between two fires, or should

they retire by Commotau, to reach Prague before them. And to aid the simultaneous operation on Berlin, Davout, on August 18, was ordered to move across the Stettnitz to seize Lauenburg, while Girard left Magdeburg the 20th, moving on Brandenburg.

In order to get oriented, the emperor went back to Zittau August 19, and from here headed a reconnoissance under Poniatowski as far as Gabel; and on ascertaining that Schwartzberg had been in Melnik the 17th and at Schlan the 18th, and that he appeared to be marching west with the Russians in support, he returned to Zittau, and wrote Maret, August 20, that "they say that the three sovereigns came together yesterday at Prague to confer on operations;" and to Berthier, after giving orders to fortify the Zittau gap, and showing that sixty-five thousand men would be there "in intrenched positions prepared in advance," he wrote: "Vandamme can crush the enemy and defend himself five or six days. When the enemy learns that I have been at Gabel, he may march on this point with all his force, and St. Cyr can come to the help of Vandamme with two or three divisions. The intention of the emperor is that they shall fight to extinction." Yet he soon recognized that there was no present danger of the enemy's advance through the mountains here, nor any immediate good to be accomplished by an advance on Jung Bunzlau; and his thoughts reverted to an attack on Blucher. Should the allies still attempt the Zittau route, it would consume five days at least to make the countermarch; and Victor and Poniatowski here, and Vandamme in the Rumburg pass, could fend them off until Napoleon could get back from his operation into Silesia and fall upon them. Napoleon's apparent hesitancy, so marked in these days, was due to his being on the defensive, and illustrates the constant value of the initiative.

For the purpose of an advance into Silesia, Napoleon went back to Görlitz. Ever since August 16, Blucher had been pushing the French line, which steadily retired, and on the 20th, Macdonald, Lauriston, Marmont and Ney all stood on the left bank of the Bober at Löwenberg and opposite Bunzlau, Blucher drawing up on the other side. It looked very much as if doughty Marschal Vorwärts was ready to come to battle.

Napoleon could now better gauge the enemy's purpose. Though tempted to go on with the Jung Bunzlau project, neither Oudinot nor Macdonald was ready, and Blucher was



French Hussar Officer.

a present peril; it was uncertain whether the Army of the Sovereigns was to cross the Elbe; and as a thrust into Bohemia might result in a mere attack on their front, he decided instead to rid himself of his nearest enemy. Everything was ready for it. St. Cyr was protecting Dresden; Vandamme,

Poniatowski and Victor were so placed as to hold the frontier, support either St. Cyr or the emperor, and guard the French communications on the Elbe; his own hands were free.

Napoleon reached Lauban in the evening of August 20, and prepared to cross the Bober next day and attack. Macdonald, Marmont, Lauriston, the Guard and Latour-Maubourg assembled at Löwenberg, while Ney was to cross at Bunzlau and turn Blucher's right flank at Alt-Giersdorf; but though Napoleon rapidly pushed the crossing at Löwenberg early on the 21st, Blucher declined the contest and retired behind the *Schnelle Deichsel*. This retreat Napoleon ascribed to his lack of confidence in his new troops; he had no idea that Blucher's withdrawal was a well-considered strategic scheme. Earlier in life he might have guessed it; now he gauged facts less well. Had he suspected the truth, he would have pushed his advance on Prague; as it was, he had given up this for a thrust in the air, for he dared not go so far from Dresden as to follow Blucher to Silesia.

One thing especially annoyed the emperor: his corps commanders appeared to lack initiative. "In general what is annoying in the position of things is the little confidence the generals have in themselves," he wrote Maret, August 22. "The forces of the enemy seem to them to be considerable everywhere I am not present." Yet these were lieutenants he had trained—or failed to train, and this grew worse as the campaign went on. The marshals knew how to obey, they did not know how to lead large forces when left to their own devices. They saw it themselves: all through life they had served under the first of captains, and they had lost, not gained, in self-reliance. When the plan of campaign required that one or another marshal should operate alone, in Brandenburg or Silesia, against Blucher or Bülow or Bernadotte, he failed. Spain had already shown how little the best of these

marshals could do when faced by the exceptional ability of Wellington; the present campaign was to exhibit still more this lack of broad military skill.

While on August 23 Macdonald and Lauriston, with Latour-Maubourg and Sébastiani, continued to push, the enemy retired behind the Katzbach. Napoleon, who had ridden half-way to Goldberg, returned to Löwenberg August 22, and when that evening news came from St. Cyr that the Army of the Sovereigns was entering Saxony on the way to Dresden, and that he feared for the safety of the city, the emperor decided to go there at once. His advance on Blucher had miscarried, while one on Prague might have brought the Army of the Sovereigns to a standstill.

He wrote Maret, August 22: "Tell St. Cyr that I am far from having renounced my operation into Bohemia, and that the operation of Silesia is an episode of it. . . . The enemy's army of Silesia moved on ours, and on the 20th we entered Bunzlau, Goldberg and Löwenberg. I at once went there personally. I had the enemy attacked again the same day, and he was overturned in all his positions, and we are pursuing him with the sword in his ribs." And next day to Vandamme: "On the 21st I beat the Army of Silesia, composed of Russians and Prussians, in front of Bunzlau and Löwenberg, I had it pursued to Jauer." And on August 24 to Cambacérès: "I have just come from Löwenberg, where I beat the enemy's army of Silesia. I entered Bohemia and seized the principal debouches. My troops pushed forward to within sixteen leagues of Prague. I am at the moment moving on Dresden to attack the enemy's corps which have moved in that direction." Then follows an encouragement item. "The army which I have directed on Berlin ought to-day to be in that town."

All this is well as a matter of incentive; but the emperor was no longer drawing the proper conclusions from the facts.

Leaving the Lusatian forces to Macdonald, with orders to throw Blucher back beyond Jauer, and then intrench and hold the line of the Bober from Bunzlau to Hirschberg, cover the

approach to Dresden, and prevent the enemy from moving from Silesia around his right towards Zittau, or around his left to annoy the Berlin column, he assigned him Lauriston's corps, and Ney's corps under Souham, in addition to his own under Gérard, together with Sébastiani's cavalry. And he had Berthier write him: "That my opinion is that in the moral state of his troops and the enemy, there is nothing better for him to do than to march against him the moment he wishes to take the offensive; that in taking the offensive the enemy will move on several points; that on the contrary, Macdonald is always to keep his troops assembled on one point, so as to debouch in force on him, and retake at once the initiative."

Ney, in person, went with the emperor, who was becoming used to having the marshal near him to carry out immediate orders; the Guard, followed by Marmont and Latour-Maubourg, Victor, and Vandamme from Stolpen, were ordered towards the Elbe. Poniatowski and Kellermann remained at the Gabel defile. Should the enemy march on the Saxon capital, Napoleon determined to fight him in the defenses of the place, as he wrote Maret, August 22: —

"What is satisfying is that their infantry is extremely bad. Anyhow, as one can arrive at no result without battle, the most happy thing that can happen is that the enemy should march on Dresden, because there will then be a battle. . . . They thought they had nothing to do but to pursue us, for as soon as they saw our columns debouch to retake the offensive, terror seized them. . . . All the plan of the allies has been founded on the assurances which Metternich gave them that we should be recrossing the Elbe."

The emperor had manifestly not divined the Trachenberg plan.

As in an advance on Dresden the allies would in a way be backing on the Rhine and he on the Oder, the emperor could

retire in case of mishap into his intrenched camp; or at the worst, cross to the right bank, join Macdonald and debouch again to the left bank, through one of his fortresses, on the



Westphalian Grenadier.

enemy's flank. Should the advance on Dresden prove to be in small force, he could resume the march on Prague through Zittau, Macdonald covering his line back to Bautzen, until Prague was reached and a fresh line to Dresden won, when, Macdonald's task being ended, he could act as the occasion demanded. In this scheme Napoleon shows us how a detachment should base itself on the main army instead of on a place, which might at any moment go lost.

Napoleon left thorough instructions for Macdonald, explaining to him the plan of an advance on Prague via Zittau, or that of debouching from Dresden. Should he be attacked by a superior enemy, he was to fall back behind the Queisse, hold Görnitz and keep in communication with Napoleon; or at worst he could retire on Dresden.


The corps intended for Dresden were promptly afoot, and Napoleon remained on the 24th in Görnitz. He purposed to assemble the 25th and 26th at Stolpen; then via Königstein, early the 27th, he would reach the Pirna camp with one hundred thousand men, whence he would at once seize Hellendorf and sit down astride the main road from Bohemia, holding at Pirna town two bridges in readiness to throw, and thus taking in reverse any allied force in front of Dresden.

From the Prague region to Saxony are two main roads, one from Töplitz or Aussig via Berggiesshübel, the other from

Commotau via Marienburg. There are several minor roads, across the range or connecting the main ones. In order to pass the mountains, the Army of the Sovereigns had to form front along the whole range, and move over in several columns, the right one of which would pass Pirna, and the left one make a considerable *détour*. Either they would debouch by Peterswalde, where Napoleon, well concentrated, could attack their head of column, or let them file on Dresden and take them in flank on the march; or should they debouch via Commotau and march on Leipsic, Napoleon would, by diversions along the Elbe, lead them to think he was holding Dresden in force; and vacating that city, would march via Commotau on Prague, thus cutting them from their line of retreat; and so soon as they turned back in their tracks, as they would be sure to do when they found themselves imperiled, St. Cyr would follow them and operate on their rear. This plan for taking the enemy doubly in reverse was clear-sighted in the highest degree.

Although Napoleon's march on Silesia had been so near the Austrian frontier that numberless Austrian officials must have known it, no report had reached the Army of the Sovereigns, which argues poor means of procuring information. Schwartzenberg assumed Napoleon to be still in Dresden, and slowly and with many precautions began to cross the Erzgebirge at various points on August 22. Wittgenstein marched from Töplitz through Peterswalde, Kleist from Töplitz through Altenburg and Dippoldiswalde, the Austrians from Commotau through Marienburg towards Chemnitz, Klenau with the new Austrian levies from Carlsbad through Zwickau. This march in isolated columns was a risky business; and Jomini pointed out to the czar that if these four columns moved past Napoleon's forces at Dresden towards Leipsic by the flank, the emperor could debouch from Dresden, cut their

communications and compromise them. The allies' first plan, in marching on Leipsic, was to have Bernadotte there join them, after brushing aside Oudinot and crossing the Elbe at Dessau. They had not supposed Dresden so defenseless until they captured, August 23, a dispatch of St. Cyr's. Had they marched on Leipsic, and had Napoleon drawn in Oudinot, debouched from Dresden on their rear and beaten them in a decisive battle, they would have been irretrievably lost, for he would have held their line of retreat and all the fortified crossings of the Elbe and lower Oder, and they would have had to cut their way out or surrender. But shortly Schwartzberg changed his mind — he may have feared Bernadotte could not reach



Hanseatic Footman.

him — and determined to march on Dresden, the three columns filing on Dippoldiswalde, and Klenau through Chemnitz on Freiburg; and on the 24th, when Napoleon was still at Görnitz, the allied right under Barclay reached the vicinity of the capital, after brushing aside Claparède at Pirna. The main force was assembling at Dippoldiswalde, and Ostermann was left to observe the Königstein intrenched camp, held by Mouton-Duvernet. This oncoming of a huge army obliged St. Cyr to withdraw into Dresden, where he had orders to defend himself to the last extremity; and in this the allied slowness helped him.

Yet in effect Schwartzberg had stolen a march on the emperor, who had at once felt compelled to give up his Prague scheme and march straight on Dresden. It was as well he did so, for Oudinot's defeat at Gross Beeren, August

23, of which he learned two days later, would in any event have nullified his Bohemian project.

From Stolpen, August 25, Napoleon wrote St. Cyr: "It is indispensable that I should be without disquiet as to Dresden, during the days of the 26th to 30th. Dresden should hold more than six days . . . with determination fifteen to twenty days. . . . My intention is to occupy the camp of Pirna with all my army. I will have Vandamme debouch to-morrow to seize the woods and defiles of Hellendorf. . . . I shall throw two bridges opposite Pirna. . . . If the enemy separates or makes a bad break, I will try to profit by it. If he has taken the line of operation of Leipsic, I shall find myself nearer than he is to Prague."

And to Rogniat, Chief Engineer at Dresden: "The chess-board of actual warfare is complicated. The number of the enemies whom I have to combat is formidable. If the three redoubts already traced had been finished, if the barricades had been terminated in the town, and if the ditch of Pirna had been well established, I should have had more confidence in Dresden, . . . I should have marched on Bohemia. . . . Give orders to have the three redoubts finished . . . and to establish three others according to the first plan. . . . Nothing must be forgotten to well establish the equilibrium between the defense of the left and that of the right bank, so that I may have the conviction that a corps of twenty thousand men, throwing itself into the place, thus raising its garrison to nearly thirty thousand men, can defend itself fifteen to twenty days."


Every lapse in wise conduct is not summarily followed by its legitimate consequences; but Napoleon's gambling policy, in not treating with the allies while yet there was time, was to result in evil for the French cause before it might naturally have been expected. While the emperor was hurrying his best troops towards Dresden to meet the Army of the Sovereigns, his two most important lieutenants, Oudinot and Macdonald, were seriously defeated by Bülow and Blücher. Why Napoleon, when of all things he needed success, put Oudinot in charge of a big army, when Davout was at hand, it is hard to say, but the Davout-Ney quarrels in Russia and a certain

dislike Berthier had for the marshal prevented this great soldier from taking a worthy part in the campaign of 1813. Just as Jerome was put in command beyond his ability in 1812, so here Oudinot and Macdonald were charged with work that Davout and St. Cyr would have done far better.

Oudinot had left Wittenberg and was at Baruth August 18, when, obliquing somewhat to the left towards Lückewalde to pick up his other troops, he took up the route from Juterbog to Berlin and advanced on Trebbin. Misled as to the enemy's forces, he marched in a haphazard way, and without the precautions which alone insure success. He had nearly seventy thousand men, the advance of which Girard, with Lanusse from Magdeburg and Dombrowski from Wittenberg, was to aid by an attack on Bernadotte's right, while Davout was to march on Walmoden and strategically join the operation. This made one hundred thousand men; and Napoleon gauged Bernadotte at not over eighty thousand, including Walmoden opposite Davout at Hamburg, and a flying corps opposite Magdeburg; which calculation would leave him only fifty thousand men in his working army. But Napoleon was much in error; Bernadotte commanded a fine body of ninety thousand men, including twenty thousand cavalry, plus two light corps, Hirschfeld at Brandenburg and Wobeser at Baruth. He had been nearly ready to evacuate Berlin, but Bülow swore that the Prussian bones should blanch in front of the capital, not in its rear; and thus backed, he changed his mind. Nor was Napoleon right in saying he would only "piaffer" (prance in place), — a phrase horsemen will appreciate, — for being offensively inclined, he moved from Potsdam on Juterbog, and after demonstrating for a while against Oudinot, retired and took position at Gross Beeren, covering Berlin, the left under Tauenzien leaning on the lake of Rangsdorf, the centre under Bülow astride the Berlin post-

road, the Russians under Winzingerode and Woronzov, and the Swedes, on the right.

Oudinot, whose orders were positive to attack, moved forward in three columns, his own corps on the left, Reynier in the centre, Bertrand on the right. On August 21 he seized Trebbin. On the 22d the advance continued, Bülow with Tauenzien retiring after a sharp combat, and next day, still in three columns, he advanced on the Army of the North.



Battle of Gross Beeren.

Bertrand headed for Blankenfeld through Johns Dorf; Reynier and the Saxons marched on towards Gross Beeren on the main road; Oudinot leading the 12th Corps was to advance on Potsdam via Arensdorf. The three columns were not intersupporting.

The ground was badly cut up by woods and marshes, and the main roads all led in one direction, converging on Berlin, good cross-roads by which the columns might rapidly sustain each other being absent. Neither were the columns timed so as to act together. Bertrand first got into contact at Blank-

enfeld with Tauenzien, who defended the village with such gallantry that he made no headway, and the French were practically checked here when Reynier struck Bülow's van at Gross Beeren, and drove it from the village—as he imagined, for good. Before securing the place, and while the men were getting dinner, Bülow with his main body fell sharply on him; and though doing his best, he was hustled out with loss of three thousand men. Many Saxons deserted. On hearing the cannonading in the centre, the van of Oudinot's column promptly headed for Gross Beeren, but could do no more than cover Reynier's withdrawal. The French cavalry, deployed west of the village, was charged in flank by the Prussians, and some French squadrons, following up Prussian foot towards Hennersdorf, got roughly handled. When on arrival Oudinot learned the defeat of his centre, he retreated on Wittenberg, the nearest point on the Elbe, but eccentric to the line of communication with Napoleon, which ran through Lückau on Bautzen. He had prior to the battle failed to assemble his forces beyond reach of the enemy's attack; and had Bernadotte followed him up with his fine body of cavalry, he would not easily have escaped.

Girard, advancing from Magdeburg towards the enemy on Oudinot's flank, and unaware of the Gross Beeren defeat, was met, August 27, by Hirschfeld and Czernichev's Cossacks at the Hagelberg near Belzig, and driven back with grievous loss, he himself being wounded. These victories raised the tone of the new Prussian levies, which had behaved well; and by August 31 the Army of the North had followed Oudinot to Treuenbrietzen, and thousands of the German auxiliaries in French service had disbanded.

At the same time Davout with thirty thousand men left Hamburg, and throwing back Walmoden's British, Hanoverian and Hanse troops, reached Schwerin; but as his opera-

tions were secondary to Oudinot's, and the Gross Beeren defeat turned his flank, he retired. Had the hero of Auerstädt and Eggmühl been in command of the army manœuvring on Berlin, this backset would scarcely have been suffered; as it was, he resumed the defensive.

Oudinot's defeat upset all the emperor's calculations looking towards the capture of Berlin and the relief of his fortresses, and markedly limited his offensive-defensive scheme. This was bad enough, but a worse disaster was to happen to Macdonald. As we have seen, Napoleon had advised him, after pushing Blucher beyond Jauer, to intrench on the Bober, wait for his advance, which would probably be on several lines, and to meet him by a sharp offensive in one well-concentrated body. Napoleon left Macdonald opposite Blucher too soon; he might have started his troops towards Dresden and himself remained longer, for he could easily overtake the column. The two days spent at Görlitz and Stolpen would have been better used in pursuing Blucher; for imagining himself able to cope with the Prussian general on equal terms, and assuming him to be withdrawing on Breslau, Macdonald thought it would be well to quicken his retreat. When Napoleon had ordered Ney to follow him, the orders had been misunderstood to mean Ney's corps, and Souham had started towards Dresden. As this left Macdonald only two corps with which to follow Blucher towards Jauer, he had to wait for Souham to come back, thus losing August 24 and 25; and when he was ready to advance, Blucher was ready to meet him. Still, he might not have done better two days before, though Blucher's troops were still somewhat shaken by Napoleon's blows. For August 26 Macdonald ordered an advance across the Katzbach and the Raging Neisse, over difficult ground that might be used to entrap him; and instead of marching in one body, he started his

march in five columns, over a front of sixteen miles, from Liegnitz to Schönau — the very reverse of his orders. The Prussians were reported on the plateau facing the defile of Krain, and though he was unfamiliar with the country, Macdonald advanced without reconnoitring his front. On August 24 Blucher had divined, from hasty movements in one place and gaps in another, added to sundry dispatches and the French cipher captured by Cossacks, that Napoleon was no longer present, and had determined himself to assume the offensive. Drawing up in the country north of Jauer, he was ready when the French reached the Katzbach. Macdonald developed his three infantry corps and one cavalry corps fan-fashion and prepared to cross the Katzbach and the Raging Neisse on this wide front. The former is not always easy to cross: the latter runs in a deep valley and is a most unreliable watercourse, which a little rain transforms into an impassable torrent. Macdonald should have been hypercautious, but he went blindly ahead. He took Puthod and Ledru from Gérard and Lauriston, and sent them by way of Schönau on Hirschberg; Lauriston's other two divisions marched against Langeron at Hennersdorf; Gérard's column started from Goldberg to cross both the streams and ascend the Weinberg by way of Krain; Souham made a *détour* by way of Liegnitz to fall on the enemy's right flank; and Sébastiani was to ascend the Raging Neisse on the right bank to keep Gérard and Souham in touch.


Blucher was himself ready to march on Macdonald, but arriving on the heights of Triebelwitz, he learned that the French were busy crossing the Raging Neisse, and sent out to estimate their force. Early in the day the rain prevented seeing any distance, but scouts and staff officers, among them Müffling, his aide, rode out and ascertained the position of the French. Arresting his advance, he withdrew his centre,

under York, to permit the French to come on up the Weinberg hill, where he stood with superior numbers. The French march had begun in heavy rain, and Souham, finding too



Macdonald.

much water at Liegnitz, crossed above and marched to the right on the same road as Sébastiani. Blucher watched them eagerly, until about 3 P. M., when he found out how the two French masses were separated; and leaving Langeron to look after Jauer, he instructed York to check Gérard, and Sacken to face Souham and Sébastiani on the plateau of Janowitz. In the midst of the heavy storm, which made the muskets almost useless, and when Gérard was partly over and partly up the hill, hoping to aid Souham and Sébastiani to deploy, Blucher sent his infantry in, covered by artillery fire; and as the French head of column nearly reached the top, it encountered York's fierce attack. The French right was fairly protected by the ravine, but the left was in the air, and Sacken fell on this and shook it severely, while the Prussian



Battle of the Katzbach.

centre advanced, and by a vigorous charge hurled Gérard back into the ravine. At this sudden onslaught, the disconcerted French, horse and foot, became inextricably mixed in the awkward defile, and fell into disorder. On hearing of the check, Souham came rapidly up, and on any other terrain might have retrieved the day; but in the deep ravine, he only made a bad matter worse by adding to the number who had no room to manœuvre. The effort to turn the allied right had utterly failed, and the French battalions and squadrons were huddled together like sheep in a pen.

Meanwhile Lauriston was fighting Langeron near Hengersdorf. Here was a key-point, had there been a sufficient force to take Blucher in reverse, but the Russians threw his first onset back, and a second one had no better result; by five o'clock the Russians had driven him out, and on hearing of Macdonald's mishap, Lauriston had to retire. The battle was

lost beyond redemption before Blucher had made an effort. Macdonald had defeated himself by careless conduct.

Torrents of rain had fallen; even the small streams could hardly be crossed, and many bridges were carried away. Lauriston barely got back to Goldberg, and next day to Löwenberg; his detached division under Puthod was cut off. Only the Bunzlau bridge was left; to this Macdonald retreated in bad order, with a loss of one hundred guns, three hundred wagons and over twenty thousand men, of whom half were quoted as killed. The Prussians learned their own value in the field, and from now on Blucher became a marked feature in opposing the Napoleonic scheme.

Macdonald had shown at the Trebbia, and for fifteen years since, that he was incapable of commanding large bodies of troops on the battlefield; he was a man of careful detail rather than broad views; why Napoleon chose him it is hard to say. Still, Macdonald's disaster was due to himself and not to Napoleon, while Oudinot's bad luck was owing to his positive orders to attack the enemy, when he had scant chance of winning. If Napoleon was bound to march on Berlin, he should not have allowed an advance to be made on several lines, Oudinot, Girard, Davout. This was in direct contradiction of his own principle of a single line of operation. It would have been easy to leave troops in Hamburg and Magdeburg, have Davout move up river, join to his own force Girard, and march with Oudinot in one column upon the enemy in his front. But instead of doing this, Napoleon afforded the enemy the interior lines, and he took advantage of his position. But better still would have been to hold back the Berlin operation until he had disposed of the Army of the Sovereigns, when he could have joined Oudinot with a considerable force.

These two disasters could not be repaired. The defeat of Oudinot and Macdonald by Bülow and Blucher, added to the

defeats of the other marshals by Wellington in Spain, shows how far from a perfect training in arms Napoleon had given them.

Quite unaware that defeat lay in store for his two most important outlying armies, the emperor hurried his corps on Dresden, at a rate which carried them forty miles in two days, although on scant rations and wearied by the Löwenberg manœuvre. He was confident he should beat the Army of the Sovereigns.

The operation of the allies was well conceived, but, as so often occurs with divided commands, ill executed. In his sole leadership Napoleon had a marked advantage, but he did not appreciate how great it was. There was a multiplicity of allied advisers — Schwartzberg, Wittgenstein, Barclay, Toll, Knesebeck, Jomini and Moreau; but though the clearest-headed man was the czar, and he remained the natural leader, he over-modestly refused the supreme command, and even permitted the dispersion of his divisions among the armies, whereupon Schwartzberg was appointed to act under the direction of the council of sovereigns. Later, urged by Moreau and Jomini, Alexander would have taken the laboring oar; but Francis desired to keep the command in Austrian hands. Schwartzberg was brave and able within limits, but not capable of so great a charge in front of a Napoleon. He was too tractable. He should have been given an able chief of staff, but Radetzki, Latour and Languenau, his general aides and advisers, were unequal to the situation. The Austrian empire disposed of many good officers; that the army kept its tone, despite constant defeats, showed admirable constancy. The staff was especially good in its scientific attainments, but the Austrians had lost the proper theory of war since Prince Eugene had passed away. An army which produced a Traun, a Daun, a Laudon, a Kray, not to

speaking of Prince Charles, should have found a better leader than Schwartzberg. But the Aulic Council had spoiled the army by constant interference, and by appointing poor generals who would obey blindly, when there were good ones at hand who had ideas of their own. Chief among these was Prince Charles, who had shown ability, but his health was not robust, and there existed private reasons against his appointment. The method used at allied headquarters was for Schwartzberg to draw up the plans, submit them to the council of sovereigns, and then, when approved, with or without changes, to issue the orders for their execution. In theory, the plans were passed upon by a council of which the three monarchs were chiefs; but in practice they were discussed by the English and Swiss ambassadors, and at least half a dozen generals, each of whom seemed to have an influence of his own. When time was lacking, orders were often issued by Schwartzberg without conference. That the allies accomplished anything is a wonder.

This confusion led up to Napoleon's fighting a defensive battle at Dresden without special grand-tactics; and while here he first held himself behind intrenchments, he did not enact a negative part. He had long foreseen that he might have to defend Dresden; to Maret he had written that "his plan might be altered by the operations of the enemy," meaning an attempt to seize Dresden out of hand; and when he learned that the allies were actually approaching Dresden, although, as he wrote Macdonald, August 24, he could be in Prague in three days, he preferred the more prudent method of debouching through the Saxon capital. The troops hurried along, and via Bautzen the van reached Stolpen early August 25, the Guard and Latour-Maubourg not far behind; Marmont and Victor were still a day's march back. Vandamme was in Neustadt and Stolpen.

On August 20 and 21 Pajol had run across the enemy's van, and when, on the 22d, Wittgenstein attacked two French divisions at Gieshubel and Borna, St. Cyr withdrew to Dresden, leaving one division at Königstein. On August 23 and 24 only the right column of the Army of the Sovereigns had been seen by the Dresden forces, but on the 25th the two central columns had come up, and the left column was due the 26th. St. Cyr had only three divisions, some cavalry and some odd garrison troops, twenty-five thousand men, but he took up his position with skill. It had shown considerable cleverness on the part of the allies to come so close to suc-

cess as to put two hundred thousand men opposite twenty-five thousand, but their unnecessary delays saved the French situation.



Prussian Body-guard.

Napoleon's first idea was to meet this movement by holding Dresden with a smaller force and debouching by way of Königstein on the enemy's flank and rear with the larger one, and Vandamme was ordered to Lillienstein, and Victor to Stolpen, Marmont and the Guard following. Napoleon reached this place at 7 A. M. the 25th, and received the first news of Gross Beeren, but not deeming it important, went on with his project. Shortly, news from St. Cyr made him fear for Dresden, and he changed his plan, sending only Vandamme to Königstein. As alone Vandamme could accomplish nothing decisive at Königstein, a better plan would have been to send him at once to Dresden

to help St. Cyr contain the enemy, whereupon Napoleon could have moved all the rest of the troops on Königstein to debouch on the enemy's rear, for assuredly St. Cyr and Van-

damme could have held Dresden a day or two. To move to Dresden and fight there was only a tactical operation, that through Königstein with the main army was a beautiful strategic manœuvre. Thus, the alleged danger to the city persuaded Napoleon merely to threaten his enemy's rear with Vandamme's corps, and to fight his battle at Dresden. This was not a masterful proceeding. Napoleon himself left Stolpen, and reached Dresden August 26, at 9 A. M. While purposing to undertake the larger manœuvre, he had written St. Cyr how to conduct the defense so as to hold on several days; but now Vandamme was ordered to assemble all his forces in the Lilienstein camp, and personally to cross to Königstein and reconnoitre in its front. Although Napoleon learned of Oudinot's defeat, whatever he may have thought, he laid no great stress upon it, keeping up his habit of encouraging his subordinates; and having got a first and erroneous report from the Katzbach, he wrote Maret:—

“In exchange for the bad news which you give me from Oudinot, I can send you good ones received from Lauriston. The news from Oudinot seems to me, as to you, to that extent confused that I cannot draw a conclusion. . . . Lauriston beat, between Goldberg and Jauer, the army of Silesia. He says he counted on the battlefield seven thousand of the enemy dead, and only eight hundred French. He took some prisoners and several guns. The positions of the enemy being very fine, the intrepidity of our soldiers was all the more noticed.”

The emperor's eye was on Dresden, and his hope that the works would be far enough advanced for a small force to hold it while he might debouch from Königstein was defeated. Time had been too limited. To make certain of the status, he sent to Dresden his aide, Gourgaud, who came back late at night with a report that convinced Napoleon that only haste would save this city and his base.

The Guard and Latour-Maubourg were started at daylight,

August 26, for Dresden, while Vandamme moved on Pirna. Marmont and Victor forced the marching; and personally Napoleon hurried on, to find the capital less endangered than he had feared. By 10 A. M. the Guard followed, and began to cross the bridge; it had marched from Löwenberg, eighty-seven miles in seventy-two hours, over twenty-nine miles a day. It was amazing to see how many troops poured into the city in a brief space, which was accomplished by marching the men in close order and by wide fronts, and crowding the masses along the roads instead of marching at deploying distance.

About 3 P. M. of the 26th Napoleon was notified that the allied army was advancing to the attack. He mounted and rode to the castle square near the end of the Elbe bridge, and here remained some time, giving each division as it came up the proper direction to its place in the defensive line. As the troops arrived, Murat, with Latour-Maubourg and Pajol, was put on the right, sustained by Teste's division, on the way from Hamburg to rejoin Vandamme's corps. The rest of the troops were stationed on left and centre. Although the enemy had two to one of his own force, Napoleon never doubted victory.



Sword of the Period.

LXI.

DRESDEN. AUGUST 26 TO 31, 1813.

THE allies might either march on Dresden and take it by assault, or stand across the French communications and oblige them to attack. Believing that Napoleon was still in pursuit of Blucher and that Dresden was slightly held, Schwartzberg waited for the allied army to close up. Napoleon's plan was to debouch in force on the allied rear through Königstein, but lacking time to carry this out, he gave Vandamme this errand and himself marched to Dresden. This city was not a fortress, but had been temporarily strengthened. Had the allies attacked August 25, it would have fallen, but as they waited till the afternoon of August 26, St. Cyr held his own until Napoleon arrived with reinforcements, when a French advance was made, and the enemy driven back from the town. Vandamme crossed the Elbe on the enemy's rear, but not in sufficient force. On August 27 the battle was opened in a heavy rain. The allied army was divided by a deep defile; and of this Napoleon took advantage. Murat and Victor moved against the enemy's left, while Ney attacked their right and Marmont contained the centre. Though on good ground and superior in numbers, the allies were ill-posted and worse handled, and were thoroughly defeated. Vandamme strove to advance against their rear, but was held in check. At nightfall Napoleon was not certain whether he had won or not, and prepared for battle next day; but the allies retreated at daylight, losing heavily in crossing the mountains. Napoleon was not as active as usual at Dresden. The battle might have been made decisive by a proper movement upon the enemy when in retreat. Vandamme was sent across the mountains in pursuit, but was not properly sustained. Napoleon had in mind a much less important movement on Berlin and neglected him. As a result, Vandamme was surrounded by the allies and his corps practically destroyed at Kulm on August 30.

THE allies, who on August 20 started in four columns across the mountains and had concluded to march on Dresden, were limited to a choice of two courses. They might either debouch through Peterswalde, Altenburg and Marienburg, out on the high land of Dippoldiswalde, assemble with

their right at Gieshübel and there await Napoleon's coming out to attack them; or they might march on the city with fascines and ladders, and if the main army had not arrived, capture it out of hand. The campaign depended on taking Dresden, either by battle or a surprise; the only risk in a surprise was the loss of a few thousand men, but it demanded speed; and if they delayed until Napoleon arrived with reinforcements, they would be reduced to battle. While they lay astride his communications, he must in time come out and fight, and disgarnish his other armies to gain preponderance here. If they won, Napoleon would be compromised in Dresden; if they lost, they still had their line of retreat to the Eger. Curiously the allies did not, on August 21, know that Napoleon was still beyond the Bober, nor on the 25th that with a large force he had returned to Stolpen. Schwartzenberg had in fact just received a word from Blucher that Napoleon was pushing him hard in Silesia.

As we have seen, Napoleon had hoped to cross at Königstein and cut the allied communications after they should have passed on towards Dresden, and to protect his own position, Poniatowski was holding the Gabel and Zwickau passes. But when in Stolpen he learned that the allied right wing and centre were in front of Dresden, only awaiting the left under Klenau to storm the town, and that St. Cyr feared he could not hold out more than twenty-four hours, while the turning manœuvre might consume three days, the emperor altered his plan,—reluctantly, as it might have yielded an immense gain,—and gave Vandamme with the 1st Corps the task to do what he himself was to have done.

“Vandamme is to go to the left bank of the Elbe, holding himself under the cover of Königstein and constantly keeping communication with the bridges between this fortress and Lilienstein. Had I been able to carry out my plan, it might have been a means to deliver a capital blow

to my enemies. But the condition of Dresden worries me. I give up my plan with grief. Vandamme himself awaits the events at Dresden. The opportunity may become his to pick up the sword of the vanquished."

During the forenoon, August 26, Napoleon reached Dresden, and little by little his troops came along, very tired but full of ardor.

On the previous morning the sovereigns had assembled on the heights of Röcknitz, to decide what action to take. Only two divisions of St. Cyr held Dresden, backing on the new works between the Grosser Garten and the Dippoldiswalde road. The allies knew the state of the defenses a few months before, and could judge how much they since could have been repaired. Many of the strong generals proposed summary attack, the usually diffident King of Prussia among them; and there should not have been a moment's hesitation if they believed Napoleon still in Silesia, or even one march away. Toll (a Russian general of German birth) and

Moreau were for delay: "If you attack, the army will lose twenty thousand men, and break its nose," said Moreau to the czar. All the Austrians were not yet up over the bad roads from Marienburg, and Schwartzemberg insisted on waiting for them, though the allies had one hundred thousand men at hand to drive back St. Cyr's one corps. Time was of the essence, but the allies deliberately played into Napoleon's hands, and the assault was deferred to the next afternoon. This delay



Gouvion St. Cyr.

brought about their failure, French success. Certain victory was heedlessly thrown away. Fortune was still willing to smile upon Napoleon.

The instructions issued for the assault were lacking in judgment, being an order to make "a general reconnoissance" against Dresden, in five columns, to carry the works and enter the town. A reconnoissance with one hundred and eighty thousand men was "a confusion of ideas" — a military oddity:



Grenadier, Imperial Guard.


what was really contemplated was not a reconnoissance, which is a preparation for further work, though it may lead up to a battle, but a general assault, to be carried through if found practicable. There was now time left for neither. As the emperor approached the Neustadt, batteries were driven up on the hills on the right bank, Wittgenstein's flank was cannonaded, and the allies received their first intimation of his arrival. Na-

poleon assumed there would be no assault. Indeed, this was the intention: Alexander had countermanded the so-called general reconnoissance, but the divided command caused so much delay that the troops had got beyond recall.

Napoleon had written Vandamme, August 26, at 1 A. M. — "All the enemy's army yesterday at midnight showed up at Dresden, and St. Cyr feared to be attacked to-day. I am moving thither, but that is one prob-

ability more to believe that the forces against you are quite inconsiderable. Debouch as quickly as possible and seize the plateau. Master of the extremity of this plateau, you will be so of the town of Pirna, and then you will have the bridge thrown there. Finally, if circumstances are favorable, debouch to move on Hellendorf. This operation will carry terror to the enemy and may bring about a great result." At the same time he wrote Berthier that Vandamme was "to seize the whole plateau of Pirna camp, occupy Pirna, and cut the route of the enemy, to-day or at latest to-morrow, towards Hellendorf and Berggieshübel, at the time the army, which shall debouch by way of Dresden, will sharply push the enemy. The bridge equipage is to be under the orders of Vandamme."

Dresden lies on the left bank of the Elbe, in a plain averaging two miles wide between river and hills and extending upstream to Pirna; and in a hollow bend where the river curves down into the town in a southerly sweep on the right bank lies the Neustadt, connected with the city by an old stone bridge, which had played its part in many a celebrated campaign. Up river the right bank is high, and there is a gradual rise on both banks until, some thirty miles above, through the Erzgebirge or Metal Mountains, the Elbe in the geological past has broken its rapid way in a tortuous defile. Permanent bridges with works near Dresden have peculiar value, as much time is consumed in throwing pontoons on the rapid current; still, this was done at Pirna village, and at Königstein fortress. Three main roads converge on Dresden from south and southwest: one from Freiburg, one from Altenburg and Dippoldiswalde, and one from Peterswalde and Hellendorf. From these towns towards Dresden is a steady slow descent; and until you reach the vicinity of the city, the ground is strongly accentuated. It was along the roads named that the allies approached, through the passes in the mountains, which, though more or less difficult, are practicable at this season. On the southwesterly side of Dresden plain the hills provide good positions for an army; and they are



Battle of Dresden, August 26.

cut in two, opposite the city, by the long Therandt defile, hard for troops to cross, through which runs, northwesterly, the Weisseritz brook, to fall into the Elbe just below the city. Other brooks, in less deep ravines, flow towards the Elbe. On the right bank is the Dresden Forest; otherwise the country has only an occasional wood. Villages dot the plain and

heights, with farms, gardens and other inclosures, all good points to defend; and southeast of the city is a park, the Grosser Garten, over a mile long by half as wide, which makes an excellent outwork. Except near the city, there is no clear ground for large masses of cavalry to manœuvre; but in open order, or smaller bodies, it can move anywhere. There are many roads and excellent posts for artillery.

While there had been no attack during the forenoon of August 26, yet the allies had pushed forward their lines towards Dresden works, and the French outposts had gradually drawn within the lines, with covering bodies left outside. To the repaired enceinte five redoubts (lunettes) had been added, armed with field guns firing over the rampart, and having a palisaded ditch; and although everything had not been completed, St. Cyr had cleverly disposed his divisions, and there was added to them whatever arrived during the battle. The Russians were drawn up on the allied right at Grühna; in the centre the Prussians stood at Leubnitz, Strehlen and in the Grosser Garten; on the left the Austrians took post at Plauen, having driven the French out of the Feldschlösschen and the neighboring gardens and inclosures; and finally Bianchi also captured Löbtau (Löbda). About four came the advance all along the line. Barclay went forward with his right hugging the Elbe, and threw back the outlying French to the town, but was there met by a cross fire from Redoubt No. 1 and a big battery across the river, which brought him to a standstill. Meanwhile Kleist's Prussians had also driven the French out of the Grosser Garten, and advancing on Redoubt No. 2 and the town enceinte, had been twice thrown back with heavy losses, when the Russians on their right renewed the advance in common with them. Coloredo and Lichtenstein had made an onset on Redoubts No. 3 and 4, at first without result; yet after a hard tussle

they captured No. 3, but could not get beyond the *enceinte*, which was manfully defended by inferior numbers.

Every assault had thus failed under the artillery and infantry fire from the city walls, when, about six, the French reserve went forward in a countercharge. Mortier, with two divisions of the Young Guard, advancing from the Pirna suburb, took the Russians by surprise, pushed them out of all the captured inclosures and groves, and forced them back on Streisen. By eight he had got a footing in the village, but it was midnight before he could fully oust the Russians. Against the Austrians Ney led two other divisions of the Young Guard on the Feldschlösschen and Redoubt No. 3, and by one of those splendid onsets which few marshals of Napoleon's ever equaled, he recovered both, and the Austrians fell back to the line Plauen-Röcknitz on the hill slope. A division of St. Cyr's was meanwhile debouching against the Prussians, and the latter, tired by their efforts against the town wall, were thrust back to Strehlen. Against Giulay and Metzko, who had pushed in west of the Weisseritz defile, had taken Cotta and Schusterhäusen, and begun throwing shells into Friedrichstadt, Murat, about six, also debouched with his infantry division and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and quickly hustling them back, regained all they had taken. The allies had failed.



Russian
Grenadier.

Napoleon rode the line during the evening, complimenting the troops on their victory, and preparing for the morrow's battle. He was in happy mood. With seventy thousand French he had held back one hundred and fifty thousand allies, and by a countercharge squarely defeated them; and

this he had done, with far less good troops than his opponents, by husbanding the forces behind the works and hurling the reserve at the proper moment upon the enemy, wearied by vehement assaults.

Meanwhile Vandamme crossed the river near Pirna and exchanged shots with Ostermann, who had been detailed to contain him, and whom shortly Schwartzberg reinforced. During the night Victor and Marmont came up, and this gave Napoleon a well-rounded force, and added to his confidence that he should win the morrow's battle; for it was indeed essential that the enemy should be defeated, to free the now closed French communications with the Rhine.

The morning of August 27 opened with heavy, disheartening rain, which lasted all day. It was a continuation of the same storm which had contributed to the defeat of Macdonald at the Katzbach — a day for artillery and cavalry. The allies had been drawn up along the same slopes, with their right leaning on the Elbe, but their left in the air, beyond the Therandt defile. They ought to have kept within this ravine; but as Klenau was coming up from Freiburg with twenty-five thousand men, Schwartzberg thought to keep the way open for him. The allied centre was strongly posted, the right had not so good a position, and the left was bare; and these conditions led the emperor to a manœuvre novel with him, that of containing the enemy's centre and attacking both his flanks. While Vandamme was threatening the allied communications at Königstein, Napoleon, by six o'clock, began marshaling his men behind the works. On



Wurzburg
Rifleman.



Battle of Dresden, August 27.

the left Mortier faced the Russians, drawn up from Leubnitz through Reisch and beyond; in the centre Ney and two divisions of the Young Guard, the Old Guard in reserve, St. Cyr and Marmont stood opposite the Prussians from Leubnitz to beyond Möckritz, and part of the Austrians between Plauen and Röcknitz; on the right were Victor and Latour-Maubourg

under Murat, who was to dispose of the Austrian left, and of the force under Metzko which the day before had operated west of the Weisseritz, part of which was now in reserve and part still beyond the defile, holding the Freiburg road. This body leaned its left on the Elbe, and later other troops filled the gap between it and the Weisseritz. This precaution of Schwartzberg's was a mistake, for Klenau being astride the road, though at a distance, was better able to hold it than any troops nearer by; and he was in position to threaten Napoleon's retreat to the Saale, should it be undertaken. Of this weak left flank the emperor had not failed to make a note. The battle opened with the usual cannonade.

About ten Murat was ordered forward in such a direction as to open the French line of retreat through the gap held by troops as a mask to protect Klenau. The fighting soon became severe between Löbtau and Görbitz, but Murat had plenty of cavalry, and at this point, where it could be of peculiar use, the Austrians had little. Victor moved up along the ravine with the cavalry on his right. The rain was so heavy as to dull the infantry fire, and the naked weapon had a decided advantage. One by one the French took the villages in their front, Görbitz, Wölfnitz, Nauslitz, and, attacking Giulay in front with his foot while riding around his flank, pushed him as far as Potschapel in the Therandt defile, cut off the allied division on the Elbe, and forced that part of the allied left which stood beyond the Weisseritz to fall back on Döhlen, beyond utility for the rest of the day. Seeing the enemy weakening, Murat threw upon Metzko's isolated division a mass of cavalry, and either cut up or captured the entire body, ten thousand men laying down their arms; and Victor's left took Plauen, the key of the Therandt defile and the only path by which the compromised divisions could be succored, thus containing the left of the allied centre, as

well as checking any advance Klenau might make. While the French right was thus doing excellent work, the centre and left contained the allied array on the hills, Marmont and St. Cyr putting their artillery and that of the Guard to good use. The Austrians and Prussians made several assaults on the Grosser Garten, and on Strehlen, which Kleist had taken the day before, had been ordered to evacuate, and now essayed to recapture. The heavy allied masses near Röcknitz and their strong position on the hills made it inexpedient for the French to assault them, but the cannonade never ceased. It was here that Moreau was killed. He had entered the Russian service, hoping better things than a subordinate position. Many had thought him capable of holding head to Napoleon, but jealousy kept him from work in a line with his high native ability. On the left Ney, with Mortier and the Young Guard and Guard Cavalry, debouched from Grünha against Wittgenstein. The Russians under Roth defended Seidnitz and Döbritz with great tenacity; but as the allies had withdrawn their right flank masses to the heights of Leibnitz, not believing that the French would move up the Elbe valley with this force on their flank, Ney was able to push on to Reisch, down the Pirna road, from which he forced the allies, so that they retained only that to Dippoldiswalde. Here he ran some danger. Kleist, Miloradovich, Colloredo and the reserve under Constantine and Hesse-Homburg had as yet not been put in, and it was proposed by Jomini to the czar to throw a heavy column upon Ney. The beginning of such a manœuvre was made; but Barclay, on whom the duty devolved, half-heartedly carried out the plan, alleging the deep ground over which he could not wheel his guns. Yet such a manœuvre, if successful, would have balanced Murat's gain on the other flank. The allied cavalry was massed in the centre, where it could not operate, but suffered heavily from the French

artillery fire. Had the Austrian cuirassiers been on the left, Murat might not have had so easy a task; but the allies had drawn up their forces with inexpertness, as allies often do. At places the fighting was heavy, and the losses severe; but nothing approached the grand-tactical motion usual in the Napoleonic battles.

While the emperor was fighting at Dresden, Vandamme debouched from Königstein, and drove back Ostermann, who was observing this fortress with the Russian Old Guard and the corps of Eugene of Wurtemberg. Either because ordered to retire on the main army, or because Vandamme turned his right, Ostermann fell back on Pirna. Thus the entire day was consumed, until about five Schwartzberg received word from Ostermann that he had been all day in touch with Vandamme, that the latter was now advancing, that Pirna had been vacated, and he might lose the road to Peterswalde. Vandamme indeed took Pirna and sat down strongly there;



Frederick William III.

and this threat to his line of operations, added to the disaster to his left, induced Schwartzberg to think of retreat. The heavy rain had discouraged the troops; the Austrian artillery had fired nearly its last round; the train with the victual had not yet got across the mountains. Dresden could not be captured. The Prussian king protested, as he thought victory yet to be won, and he was supported by the czar; but weak heads prevailed, the order was issued, and the left fell out of range on the road via Freiburg and Marienburg on Commottau, the centre via Dippoldiswalde on Altenburg, and the

right wing along the main road through Hellendorf on Peterswalde. The retreat began early August 28. But fearing that Vandamme would bar the passage at Pirna, though he had but twenty-five thousand men to face eighty thousand, the allied right wing marched by way of Dohna on Gieshübel. When Ostermann, with Eugene of Wurtemberg, to avoid being crushed between Napoleon and Vandamme, started towards Peterswalde, he found the French established at both Gieshübel and Hellendorf, and prepared to cut his way through. Knowing nothing of the victory at Dresden, Vandamme was uncertain how heavy a body of the enemy was facing him; and though the young French recruits fought well, the Russian veterans were too staunch. Ostermann pierced their long line of defense, and reached Peterswalde in fairly good order. After bivouacking there, he next day fought in retreat, defending the road stubbornly all the way to Kulm; and one of his brigades which had been cut off managed to rejoin him.


It is impossible to estimate, from the many conflicting authorities, the number engaged at this battle of Dresden. The allies probably had one hundred and eighty thousand men, the French one hundred and ten thousand; but these estimates might be considerably varied. The enemy lost fifteen thousand men killed and wounded, over twenty thousand prisoners, and much artillery; and the retreat was so ill managed that the French found, abandoned along the roads and in the mountains, two hundred guns or caissons and one thousand wagons. Their own losses were ten thousand killed and wounded.

Napoleon always esteemed this one of his most glorious victories, because in it he had less than two thirds (Berndt says less than a half) of the enemy's forces. Yet it was not decisive. It is the only one of his battles in which he advanced both wings, which his position backing on Dresden and lean-

ing on the Elbe enabled him to do, and as it happened the only two lines of retreat of the allies lay back of their two wings. This in a moral sense aided the two attacks of Murat and Ney, because in case of defeat the allied forces would be inevitably broken up in the mountain defiles in their rear.

Yet a serious criticism must be made on this battle. During the 27th there was more than one moment when the partial victory could have been turned into a decisive one by a sharp advance in force; but the emperor was inactive; he lunched with Berthier at his headquarters, shunned exposure to the dreary rain, and

seemed to enjoy his comfort, satisfied that his lieutenants would win the day. His eye was not on the field at the critical moment. So soon as the enemy began to fall back, "he demanded his horse, the rain dripped from the skirts and sleeves of his overcoat, the rim of his hat was bent down over the



Napoleon after Bellange.

back of his neck," says Odenleben. "Thus about six o'clock the hero of battles, the terror-spreader, accompanied by the general staff and surrounded by the huzzas of the cold, closely packed troops, rode in his usual butcher's trot into the castle." The rain had impressed itself upon him more than the need of a decisive victory. As at Lützen and Bautzen, so here half a victory sufficed, when the enemy might have been all but destroyed.

Napoleon was far behind his best standard; he had driven back the enemy on the 26th and saved Dresden; this day he had begun well, but he lost the chance of a complete victory; indeed, for lack of viewing the field, he had misapprehended the situation, for at seven he told Berthier to

“write to Murat that the enemy is not in retreat, and that he looks on the affair of yesterday only as an unsuccessful attack, and that it is doubtful if he retreats to-night.” And again, to “write to all the corps commanders that the enemy is not in retreat, and that to-morrow at the point of day they will take arms. Every corps commander will report positively the position of his corps. Make them know that I shall be at my headquarters at Redoubt No. 4, near the mill on the Plauen road;” and an hour later, in giving orders for holding the redoubts in the Dresden defenses: “There is to be a commander for each redoubt . . . and a letter is to be written to each commander to make him understand that he is to let himself be killed in the redoubt, and not to move out of it under any pretext.”

This failure to recognize how marked a retreat it was, and this want of energy in closing the battle by a rout, are not Napoleonic. It was not a question of numbers. The French force sufficed to turn the allied retreat into flight. Read the orders after Austerlitz; they should have been duplicated here, especially as the retiring enemy had a mountain range to cross, and could be herded into disaster at the foot of it. That Napoleon did not recognize that the allies were retreating exhibits want of the master's eye, for even a couple of cavalry brigades sent towards Freiburg and Peterswalde could within three hours have reported all the facts to headquarters. In any case, the beaten enemy should have been struck again and again. But we must take him as he is. Except at intervals, he is no longer the leader who used to prophesy the flight of the enemy at early dawn of the day of battle, and hang to his skirts until midnight with all his forces.

From Dresden, August 27, 6 A. M., he wrote to Kellermann at Mainz: —

“Inform the empress by telegraph that I yesterday won a great victory at Dresden over the Austrian, Russian and Prussian armies, commanded by the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. They are bringing in many prisoners, flags and guns.” And to Cambacérés: “My Cousin, I am to that extent tired and busy that I cannot write you at length. Maref will do so. Affairs here go very well.”

On the 28th Ostermann continued to retreat beyond Peterswalde, the rest of the allied army by way of Pretschendorf, Dippoldiswalde and Glashütte. There was a perfunctory following of the enemy, and the rival forces were often in touch, Murat advancing on Freiburg, Mortier and St. Cyr in support of Vandamme, who was pushing along the Peterswalde road, and Marmont, whose column Napoleon first accompanied, heading for Altenburg. One can imagine how, in earlier days, he would have ordered every available division rapidly in pursuit, but riding during the forenoon over towards Pirna, and observing the road to Maxen glutted with the Russian and Prussian columns seeking to avoid Vandamme, the emperor merely ordered St. Cyr via Dohna to outflank them; and after spending some hours in watching the enemy disappear in the foothills of the mountains, the main Peterswalde road being in his possession, he ordered the Old Guard back to Dresden, and the Young Guard to bivouac where it stood. St. Cyr's advance was also arrested, and though Vandamme was thus deprived of all support, Napoleon had Berthier write him from near Pirna to push on sharply after the enemy. He was to move on Peterswalde with his entire corps, Mouton-Duvernet's division of St. Cyr's, Reuss' brigade of Victor's corps and Corbineau's division of light cavalry. Pirna, he told him, was to be held by Mortier, and his own troops in the Lilienstein camp were to be relieved. A twelve-

pounder battery was to follow him. This was a reinforcement; but one of the above divisions had previously been detached to Murat, and Vandamme was adventuring with some forty thousand men and eighty guns in the midst of the whole allied army. On August 29, at 6.30 A. M., Murat was



Saxe-Coburg
Rifleman.

ordered "to move on Frauenstein to fall on the flanks and rear of the enemy," . . . Marmont "to follow the enemy sharply on Dippoldiswalde and in all the directions he shall have taken," and St. Cyr "to follow the enemy on Maxen and in all the directions he shall have taken. Instruct these three generals of the positions of the other two, so that they may know that they are sustaining one another." This sounds like pursuit; but it was a day too late, and a glance at the map will show how far it fell short of what was needed; it lacked the personal element of former pursuits, and no division went far enough to sustain Vandamme.

The plateau west of Pirna commands the three roads towards Töplitz. The best is through Nollendorf and Kulm, the other by Zinnwalde, and between them is a third, more difficult.

Next day Napoleon wrote Berthier, pointing out "that the difficult point for the enemy is Zinnwalde," where wheels can pass with difficulty; "that it is then on this point that we should assemble and attack; that the enemy, turned by Vandamme, who is marching on Töplitz, will find himself much embarrassed, and will probably be obliged to leave the greatest part of his material." And the same day: "Write to Mortier to sustain Vandamme" with three divisions "if he needs

it. Send an officer to Vandamme to know what is occurring, and let this officer come back at once." This again shows a purpose to pursue, but it was not an old stamp order to do so. On the same day he wrote the King of Wurtemberg: "Vandamme has moved on Töplitz, and during this time four army corps are following the enemy;" but they were not going far enough; and no one was leading the movement. The pursuit was on paper, not an actual one of the Jena pattern.

After having been uncertain of the victory the evening of the 27th, Napoleon next day seemed to think it was greater than it was; and when in his instructions to his lieutenants he says that Vandamme had thrown terror into the Russian army, why should Mortier and St. Cyr have believed that their colleague needed help?

From Peterswalde Vandamme, well concentrated, was ordered to push on into Bohemia, and attack the enemy; it was thought he could reach his communications at Tetschen, Aussig and Töplitz, and thus cut off his train; and the pontoon bridge at Pirna was to be broken so as to be thrown at Tetschen if needed. This was a big piece of work for one corps. Vandamme was the only commander who was following up the enemy across the mountains, and he was to plant himself on their communications; he was assured he would



Empress Dragoon.

be supported; he had the right to assume he would be; and yet the other French columns were left to their own devices, and Napoleon rode back to Dresden, in merry mood, says Odenleben, as if he had done all that was essential. The management of the pursuit was not even committed to some

special lieutenant, but was to be continued in a haphazard way: content with having fended off the enemy, the great




Prussian Reservist.

soldier now sought his ease. In driving the allies back into Bohemia he had won a noble victory; but the old Bonaparte would not have been thus satisfied; and if this was all he required, he need not have sent Vandamme across the range. His orders show that he did not study the situation, that he did not know what his corps commanders were doing to support Vandamme; he was no longer putting his own shoulder to the wheel, and Hercules would not help him. It is said he had got a chill from exposure to the rain on the 27th, that at Pirna next day he was seized with violent abdominal pains, and for this reason returned to Dresden; but at this time he also had a project to take Ney and some of his corps, join Oudinot, and make a sudden dash on Berlin, before the Army of the Sovereigns could recover its equipoise; and this plan, added to the fact that in the night of August 28–29 he got full reports of Oudinot's and Macdonald's defeats, may have finally diverted his thoughts from Vandamme and the pursuit. But this scheming also lacked the idea of unity which was his great characteristic: everything should have been held subordinate to completing the defeat of the Army of the Sovereigns.

While Napoleon was at work in his Dresden bureau on August 29 and 30, writing his "Note on the Situation," Vandamme, secure of being supported, and hoping to win his marshal's baton, pushed across the range to the rugged Kulm country, — perhaps farther than discretion allowed, — and at

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Dresden-Kulm Country.

Straden first got into touch with Ostermann, but after attacking, could not drive him out of Priesen. The Russians, aware that Kulm and Töplitz were essential to secure the allied retreat, fought with obstinacy; and towards evening of the 29th Constantine with the reserve came up, imperiling Vandamme's standing. Meanwhile Schwartzberg, forcing his retreat, had got a large part of his army down upon the Bohemian level, and, not believing the French force large, undertook the offensive himself. The Russians had got to Altenburg, the Prussians to Fürstenwalde, the Austrians to the Dux country, and while Vandamme on the 30th stood at Kulm, on the defensive, with his right on the mountains and his left on Striesowitz, expecting to hold the enemy until the other corps should come up to aid the manœuvre, St. Cyr was still back near Maxen, Marmont near Altenburg, Murat near Frauenstein, and Mortier yet in Pirna. Could Vandamme have guessed he had been thus abandoned, he would no doubt have saved himself by a precipitate withdrawal.

Early on the 30th, Barclay with Colloredo in support advanced on Vandamme with seventy thousand men — nearly two to one. With the French in force the allies would have been in a critical position: as it was, their superiority to this one corps saved them harmless and compromised Vandamme. Still expecting reinforcements, the marshal defended himself several hours with obstinacy, to hold his advanced position until his colleagues could come up and crown the work; and towards noon, when he found himself attacked on all sides, and in danger of being pushed up towards the mountains, he perceived a body in his rear debouching from the defile at Tellnitz, and, naturally concluding that it was Mortier with the Guard, attacked afresh. This hope was short-lived; the corps proved to be the van of the Prussian corps of Kleist, who, escaping from St. Cyr, had thrown himself into the

mountains, and gained the Peterswalde road, which was at the moment empty, Vandamme having already crossed, and the reinforcements being withdrawn. His own line of retreat thus cut, Vandamme, under cover of heavy artillery fire, with fine gallantry attempted to break through; but as the Prussians were in force, his effort failed. Part of Corbineau's cav-



Kulm Country.

alry rode down the Prussian infantry and escaped, and some large bodies of foot managed to follow through the woods, and in broken parties reached Saxony; but part of the squadrons were driven back and increased the confusion, and the corps as a corps was doomed. From the front the Austrians and Russians fell vigorously on the French divisions, which yet proudly held their own, and the Prussians pressed them in the rear. There was no escaping disaster. What remained

of the corps, after desperate resistance, was compelled to surrender, including Vandamme and Haxo. Over fifteen thousand men, killed and wounded and prisoners, and fifty guns fell to the allies, whose loss was about four thousand.

On this day St. Cyr was at Liebenau and Lauenstein, Marmont at Altenburg with van at Zinnwald, and Murat at Sayda. Mortier advanced as far as Gieshübel; on hearing of the disaster to Vandamme he returned to Pirna, but again advanced to Hellendorf.

The emperor wrote, September 1, to Murat: "The misfortune to the 1st Corps is one that we could not expect. Vandamme, who it seems has killed himself, had not left a sentinel on the mountains, nor a reserve anywhere. He had engulfed himself in a bottom without reconnoitring in any way. Nevertheless, many men of his corps have returned. Nearly all the generals have arrived and fifteen thousand men have already come in, so that I do not think my loss will be more than four or five thousand men."

There was no excuse for this disaster. The manœuvre was a good one, which, well supported, might have almost destroyed the Army of the Sovereigns, to effect which everything should have yielded. It is clear that Vandamme received the order to advance on Kulm and Töplitz; it is equally clear that he received no counter-orders, when Napoleon withheld his reinforcements. Had troops been ordered forward from Pirna, they would have struck Kleist's rear, and he would have been the one caught. Between Napoleon and Berthier lies the fault, and it is all the more extraordinary because of Napoleon's habit to pursue a defeated enemy to the end. In case of sickness the work could have been turned over to Murat or Ney; but it should have been done by some officer with orders to do it thoroughly. No other operation would accomplish results which would equal a serious blow to the Army of the Sovereigns. Here lay right at hand the means to close the cam-

paign with glory ; any other success or failure was subsidiary. No doubt Napoleon's getting the details of Gross Beeren and the Katzbach on August 29 had to do with his paying less heed to the pursuit of the Army of the Sovereigns ; but had he delayed his attention to Macdonald and Oudinot for a couple of days, and devoted himself to the pursuit, he would have risked nothing, and have won such a decisive victory over the allied main army as to neutralize the disaster of his lieutenants. There being no pursuit, the allies quickly recovered their equilibrium. Several authors, including St. Cyr, assert that Napoleon was conscious that Vandamme's disaster was his own fault. Other writers, among them Ségur, assert that he destroyed certain documents relating to the disaster. He had no reason to be proud of it.

The idea of joining Oudinot for a march on Berlin was an absurdity, with this task half completed. Napoleon never committed a more grievous fault. He allowed the Army of the Sovereigns to escape in good order, and destroy Vandamme ; and this, added to the defeats of the Katzbach and Gross Beeren, raised the hopes of the allies to the point of further hard pushing ; when, had Napoleon fully neutralized the Army of the Sovereigns, the successes of the other allied armies would have gone for little, and he would have retained the means of winning a peace by reasonable concessions. His sense of perspective was at fault.

The losses of Vandamme, Oudinot, Girard and Macdonald amounted to sixty thousand men, and this was little when compared with the moral gain of the allies.

This being the emperor's first defensive campaign, he failed to conduct it on lines he had always shown to be correct ; he left too big a task to Macdonald ; he organized three offensive movements at the same time from a defensive position ; he did not make sure of his victory over the Army of the Sovereigns.

LXII.

THE ELBE ABANDONED. AUGUST 30 TO SEPTEMBER 24, 1813.

NAPOLÉON had won a victory at Dresden, but his lieutenants had lost three battles, — Gross Beeren, the Katzbach and Kulm. The outlook was doubtful; but he still clung to the advance on Berlin when he should merely have contained Bernadotte and Blücher, and devoted himself to Schwarzenberg. He was leaving the initiative, his strong point, to the enemy. He sent Ney to take Oudinot's place with orders to advance on Berlin, while he himself would move up to sustain him; but when Blücher worsted Macdonald, Napoleon hurried to his aid and drove Blücher back by September 6. He intended to sustain Ney; but news of a fresh advance on Dresden obliged him to return thither, to attack the enemy in crossing the mountains. Meanwhile Ney, at Dennewitz on September 6, was smartly defeated by Bülow and his army broken; and against the one defeat at Dresden the allies could count four important victories. For some days Napoleon watched the allies at the outlets of the mountains, without taking definite action. We scarcely recognize him. During the whole of September he was "fumbling," and meanwhile his central position at Dresden, excellent for a strategic offensive against the several allied armies, was being turned into a tactical defensive position in which he was being surrounded by superior forces. Supplies were getting scarce, the young troops were tired by ceaseless marching to and fro. Instead of manœuvring, which was his strong point, Napoleon was acting on the defensive, which was not; and about September 20 he had concluded to retire behind the Elbe. All through this Dresden campaign he had had constant opportunities of putting the offensive to good use by himself moving against Blücher or Bernadotte; but he could not believe that his lieutenants were less able than these allied generals. No campaign hitherto had shown the great captain so weak as here.

LEAVING the all-important pursuit of the Army of the Sovereigns half accomplished, the emperor had determined to replace Oudinot by Ney for a manœuvre on Berlin, and himself to follow with the Guard, two army corps and the reserve cavalry. Relying on Macdonald to hold head to Blücher, he

deemed the defeat of the Army of the North and the capture of Berlin easy, and this would shift back to his own side the moral influence of which the three late disasters had robbed him, as well as enable him to reach his fortresses on the lower Oder, move up river and take the Army of Silesia in the rear. The assembly was to be made in Lückau. All this was excellently planned, but nothing should have been undertaken until after the total defeat of the Army of the Sovereigns; and as in Wellington's front in the Peninsula, it was destined to fail, because a new and active leader, Blücher, had come upon the scene; and yet more because the allies felt that the balance of victory was on their side, and the Army of the Sovereigns was soon made ready for another essay of arms, as it would not have been had Napoleon personally driven his pursuit home.

The emperor's problems had been growing harder of solution every week. The commanders of his left and centre had suffered reverses; on his right a worse disaster had occurred. Nor was this all: the defensive situation he had created was changing. He had hoped from his central position to debouch on one or other of the allied corps in succession; he had done so, but never to push the enemy to the end, essential as this is in any movement; and now the proximity of the allied armies threatened to change his strategic interior lines to a central position tactically surrounded by superior armies. How would the great soldier meet this danger?

In a "Note on the General Situation of My Affairs," which Napoleon dictated August 30 in Dresden, he reviews the military outlook. Part of this is given in substance only; part in the emperor's own words. It must be read from his standpoint.

"I suppose the Army of Silesia rallied behind the Bober; there would be no inconvenience if it should place itself behind the Queisse." If I order Poniatowski to the Berlin army, the debouch of Zittau would not

be held, but he could reach Kalau in four days, whereupon the Army of Silesia would have to lean on Görlitz, or in fact in front of Bautzen; and with a corps at Hoyerswerda, my operation would not be compromised. By giving up the Bohemian expedition so as to take Berlin and revictual Stettin and Cüstrin, St. Cyr and Vandamme would take position, the left on the Elbe, Marmont in the centre, Victor on the right, all under Murat, with headquarters in Dresden. "This will be a fine army . . . which would be threatening, would run no danger and might fall back on Dresden at the time I should reach there from Lückau. The Army of Silesia could . . . occupy Bautzen and Hoyerswerda." These two armies would be on the defensive while I was operating against Berlin and the lower Oder. "The Russians cannot be indifferent to an army of sixty thousand men at Stettin. . . . It would be a pretext to abandon Bohemia, and I should have the initiative of all the movements."

I have two plans of operation to adopt: First to go to Prague, which, however, I could not take, and the enemy would attack my army in Silesia, which would leave me with a delicate position at Prague, and would leave Oudinot and Davout on the defensive. The line from Prague to the sea along the Elbe is too long; broken at one point it would open access to the 32d division (lower Elbe). Thus the Prague movement has weak points: there is not enough chance of getting Prague. My principal forces would be in another system, and I myself at the extremity of my line, where I could not move on certain points. Foolish things would get done, which would transfer the war to between the Elbe and the Rhine, which the enemy desires. And I should lose my places on the Oder, and not be marching on Danzig.

On the contrary, in marching on Berlin, I should have a great result. I should protect my lines from Hamburg to Dresden, I should be in the centre, where in five days I could reach the extremities of my lines. I should disengage Stettin and Cüstrin, I might separate the Russians and Austrians. I should not be embarrassed for victual. I should have to leave one hundred and twenty thousand men on the defensive between Dresden and Hof. I should be menacing Prague without going there. The Prussians would not want to stay in Bohemia with their capital taken, and the Russians would be disquieted for Poland. Then the Russians and Prussians would force Austria to come back to Dresden, which they could not do in less than fifteen days. I should have taken Berlin, revictualled Stettin, disorganized the Prussian landwehr, and "then if Austria recommenced her foolishness, I should be back in Dresden with

an assembled army ; great events, a great battle, would terminate the campaign and the war." "Thus any plan where personally I am not in the centre is inadmissible." The emperor then recapitulates: "First. The Prague project : I must go there personally, place there the 2d, 6th, 14th and 1st Corps, and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, Davout in front of Hamburg, Oudinot with three corps at Wittenberg and Magdeburg, the Army of Silesia below Bautzen. In this situation I am on the defensive, the offensive is the enemy's. I am threatening nothing. It would be absurd to say that I am threatening Vienna. The enemy can mask the Army of Silesia, debouch some corps via Zittau, attack me at Prague, or else, masking the Army of Silesia, he would send a force to the lower Elbe, advance on the Weser, while I should be in Prague. There would only remain to me to regain the Rhine in all haste. The general at Bautzen would not believe that the enemy was weaker in his front, and my army at Hamburg and Magdeburg would be quite out of hand. Second. Hypothesis : Now the 1st, 14th, 2d and 6th Corps and Latour-Maubourg will remain quiet around Dresden without fearing the Cossacks. Augereau will approach Bamberg and Hof. The Army of Silesia on the Queisse, or the Bober and Bautzen. No disquiet there, for my communications, my two armies, of Hamburg and Oudinot's, will be in Berlin and Stettin."

Whereupon the emperor figures out the various forces, and the cipher letters to be written to the various generals, and continues: "If I carried my headquarters to Lückau, I should be two days from Torgau, three from Dresden, four from Görlitz. I should then be in a central position abreast of choosing my course, either to throw all that I desire on Berlin, or to go there personally. In leaving Lückau I should have to be assured for my rear."

To summarize the above, the emperor concludes that the long contemplated advance on Prague was not a judicious operation ; that his line from there to Hamburg would have too much front, and be liable to be disrupted by an allied operation through the Zittau pass ; that an advance on Berlin was to be preferred as a safer strategic manœuvre. It is true that this Note may in a sense explain or justify an operation on Berlin ; but it in nowise justifies leaving the pursuit after Dresden half accomplished.

The Note also opens up a fresh question. While hitherto we have seen Napoleon at times shun the physical effort of larger operations and exhibit mental weariness as a result of his bodily condition, from which, however, he would spring up again in all his fervor when the occasion demanded, yet he had invariably been strategically sound; his intellectual processes were intact. One of the unvarying rules of his wonderful art had been to direct his thrust straight at the main army of the enemy; but here we see his mind avoiding the key-point, the Army of the Sovereigns, in favor of an operation which might be almost characterized as a raid, because it was safer. He assumed that in Prague he would not threaten Vienna. True, but even there he would be threatening the Army of the Sovereigns, at this moment vastly more important than Vienna. His usual crisp line of thought appears warped, and he refers to geographical points rather than armies. He had just defeated the army on whose success or failure the entire campaign depended; it was in a condition where it could be followed up or outflanked, and again attacked to manifest advantage. And yet Napoleon pushed aside this, the strongest demand of the moment, and argued himself into the belief that a thrust at Berlin would be better. This Note is of exceptional value as showing for the first time a wrong conclusion drawn by the great soldier from the facts he properly arranges. He had got into the habit of misinterpreting facts, so as to make these tell a story flattering to his vanity or favorable to the scheme in hand; but whenever from facts he argued out a strategic plan, he had been correct. Here he was wrong. The Berlin scheme was not only subsidiary, it was not practical, for to carry it through presupposed that Macdonald could hold himself at Görlitz, and that Murat at Dresden could fend off Schwartzenberg for two weeks; while no sooner had the emperor undertaken the operation than both these

factors were proved unsound — for Macdonald fell back, and the enemy again demonstrated towards Dresden. Any plan which disregarded the Army of the Sovereigns was a weak one. He might attack it in Prague, or by following it up; but he should not leave it unpursued. To check that army meant checking the others; to afford that army time meant that the others would manœuvre.

It is clear that the emperor understood this, for on September 1 he wrote to Murat: “Macdonald is to-day at Görlitz, and if he continues his retreat, I shall have to march to re-establish matters. I must not let him fall back behind Bautzen. He might be at Bautzen the 3d, and the cuirassiers of Latour-Maubourg must come to Freiburg so as to be, the 2d in the evening, at Dresden, ready to cross the Elbe at three o'clock in the morning.” To prevent this retreat endangering Dresden, he determined to draw in Marmont, Mortier and Latour-Maubourg nearer the city, and to place St. Cyr and Victor at Pirna and Freiburg — a mere defensive measure. Yet he planned to go on with his raid; and Ney was sent to Wittenberg to take command of Oudinot's forces, with instructions to make a determined advance on Berlin.



Kettledrummer of Chasseurs.

On September 2 Berthier was to write him that “it is really difficult to have less head than Oudinot;” that the emperor had moved on Hoyerswerda, and that Ney was to start so as to be at Baruth the 6th.

“From Baruth you would be but three days' march from Berlin. The communications with the emperor will be established, and the attack on Berlin could take place the 9th or 10th. . . . Manœuvre quickly, to profit from the disarray of the Grand Army of Bohemia, which will make movements so soon as it perceives those of the emperor. Oudinot never struck the enemy. He had the art of putting in one of his corps separately. If he had attacked frankly, he would everywhere have overturned” the foe. Berthier was to write to Oudinot, “that I learn with extreme discontent that with the three corps, of which he made no use, he retired under the cannon of Wittenberg; that he rendered useless this portion of our forces and compromised at the same time the corps on the Neisse. That already perceiving the uncertainty of his movements, I have sent Ney to take command of his army.”

Napoleon was making ready to transfer his headquarters to Hoyerswerda on September 4, so as to advance via Lückau to coöperate with Ney. On this day Mortier was at Pirna, Marmont at Dippoldiswalde and St. Cyr at Dittersdorf, watching the mountain outlets; Victor at Freiburg, and the relics of Vandamme's corps were being consolidated with Teste's division, so as to reconstitute a new 1st Corps, which with a fresh cavalry corps, that had just come up under l'Héritier, was to be under Mouton, Count Lobau. Murat was to command the Dresden country. But Macdonald's situation became serious; he had successively abandoned the Bober and Neisse and got back to the Spree; and no sooner formed than Napoleon felt compelled to alter his plans and send the Guard and Latour-Maubourg on to Bautzen to arrest his backward movement. Marmont moved to Königsbruck to connect Ney with Macdonald, but Ney does not seem to have been notified to suspend his advance until the emperor was ready to sustain him. On September 3 Berthier was instructed to notify Ney: “I shall be to-morrow morning at Bautzen, where Macdonald has arrived with the army, that the enemy follows lively and seems much encouraged; that I will attack during the day

and strive to push him back on Reichenbach, and that after the battle I will march in great haste on Berlin." He was also to write this news to Davout. This scarcely altered the orders of the day before. He might have told Ney to pause.

Leaving Dresden the evening of September 3, the emperor wrote Macdonald to keep his forces concentrated, as he hoped to turn the tables on Blucher: "I shall be, if necessary, at the point of day at Bautzen to make my morning reconnoissance. . . . Have your whole army in hand, whatever position you occupy, and let it be assembled. I will make my dispositions on the battlefield. I wish to be able in half an hour to ride the front of the whole army." And again the same day: "If the enemy follows you lively, my intention is to attack him at once, that is, to-morrow, or the day after at latest."

Although the Berlin project had been set in motion, Napoleon was still working on his broad defensive scheme. Should the Army of the Sovereigns again advance on Dresden by the left bank, the late battle would be repeated; should it advance on the right bank, as by way of Zittau, he would bring up the Dresden forces to join the forces at Bautzen. Should it advance via Neustadt on Weissig (between Dresden and Bischofswerda), to cut the Bautzen road, St. Cyr would occupy Lilienstein and Hohenstein, Lobau and Victor the heights of Weissig, "where there are very fine positions;" and when he should have beaten the Army of Silesia, he could return and beat the Army of the Sovereigns again. But all this was not the old-time manœuvring that compromised the enemy: it savors little of the ancient offensive vigor that resulted decisively.

When, early September 4, riding towards Bautzen, Napoleon ran across the demoralized forces of Macdonald, his ire was roused, and he showed it distinctly to this marshal and Sébastiani. At Hochkirch the van of the allies was met, but the superior French forces drove it back towards nightfall.

Next morning, the 5th, from Hochkirch, the French army again advanced. Blucher recognized that Napoleon was at hand, and this wily marshal, according to the Trachenberg agreement, refusing the gage of battle, retired behind the Neisse, and the French reached Görlitz. The emperor now divined that Blucher was acting with a set purpose, and, unwilling to follow him to Silesia, returned with the Guard and Marmont to Bautzen. On September 6, 2 A. M., he wrote Maret: "I have arrived at Bautzen. I have followed the enemy beyond the Neisse. As soon as the enemy learned that I was with the army, he fled as fast as he could leg it, and in every direction. There was no means of reaching him." The thrust on Berlin again coming to the fore, early on the 6th he ordered Marmont and Latour-Maubourg on Hoyerswerda; but he soon countermanded the order, on account of bad news from Dresden. Blucher, pushed back of the Queisse, was, he thought, apt to keep quiet for a while; Marmont was ordered to Kamenz, and Macdonald again sent on after the Army of Silesia. Then, confident that Ney would hold his own against Bernadotte, although deprived of the promised aid of the emperor in person, supporting Macdonald's flank by Poniatowski and Kellermann from Zittau, and speeding Latour-Maubourg towards Dresden, the emperor hurried thither in person, to find that the allies were again crossing the mountains, and were threatening Dresden by way of Pirna.

This to and fro manœuvring without an attack in force is a disheartening study. Whether the difficulty was due to the emperor's defensive attitude or to his instability, it would seem that he could have done better by taking an extra day or two before succoring St. Cyr, and instead of moving on Blucher from the front, to fall upon his right flank; to let Macdonald lure him on by feigned retreat, while Napoleon placed himself so as to strike after a fashion that he must

fight *au fond*. He might have sustained Macdonald with part of the troops and himself led a flank attack on Blucher with the rest. By dispositions half as cunning as most of those with which he has made us familiar, Napoleon could have assuredly overwhelmed Blucher, a most essential thing to do. But Napoleon was no longer as rapid as of yore. If he would not try a flank manœuvre on him, why could he not have pursued him *à outrance* when he withdrew from his direct attack? He does not seem to have used his forces on the right bank as well as he might. To deliver half an attack is to fumble, "tâtonner," as he called it; it was what he always condemned in his lieutenants, and he was now fumbling himself.

Napoleon was learning, to his sorrow, that his theory of the equality of thousands was true, and with their overwhelming numbers, the allies, patient under defeat, and believing in eventual success, were surrounding him on all sides. The Dresden campaign had begun by his being secure at two points, while he attacked the enemy at the third. Now no single point was secure. A raid of Cossacks had driven the King of Westphalia out of Cassel, and the theatre of operations was growing narrower, and victualing harder. Napoleon would have been glad to risk all on a battle which he might win, and then again have a chance to make peace, but the allies were too cautious to afford him this opportunity, until all the chances were in their favor.

After his comforting success against Vandamme, Schwarzenberg had remained in the Töplitz valley, uncertain what Napoleon would do, but sending a detachment on the 5th forward to Hellendorf to reconnoitre. When, on the 6th, he learned that Napoleon had marched against Blucher, he left the command to Barclay, and put sixty thousand Austrians across the Elbe, to march over the mountains on Rumburg and fall on the French right flank; but he did not go farther

than Aussig, for next day he ascertained Napoleon's return to Dresden. While Klenau remained at Commottau, Barclay pushed Wittgenstein and Kleist, September 7, across the mountains towards Pirna, following along with the main body; and when on the 8th Napoleon, who had brought back the Guard, marched to meet this second oncoming, he found their van on the heights near Dohna. The Guard being thrown upon this van, the allies withdrew some miles. Napoleon knew practically nothing about the enemy except that "we are here in their presence, that they crown the different debouches of Bohemia, and that it is possible that soon there would be an affair there," as he wrote Berthier this day; but as reconnoitring towards Chemnitz showed no threat to the communications back through Leipsic, Victor was drawn in nearer Dresden.

Although without the promised support, Napoleon hoped that Ney had advanced to some purpose on Bernadotte, but the news of another backset at Dennewitz came in late on the 8th. These failures of his marshals must have astonished the emperor. But there was no one to blame but himself. The instructions of September 2 were too positive. After stating that Oudinot's falling back on Wittenberg had allowed Tauenzien and the Cossacks to move through Lückau on Bautzen, and thus threaten Macdonald's rear, Napoleon had said he himself would have his headquarters at Hoyerswerda September 4; Ney (who would have a line through Dahme on Torgau) was to be in Baruth the 6th, on which day the emperor would have a corps at Lückau to connect with him, and the Cossacks and landwehr would retire as soon as Ney approached. Although generally an army commander is held to construe his orders to conform to the conditions, Napoleon's marshals had not been brought up so to act; and the orders to Ney were practically absolute to march on Berlin. Napoleon under-

rated the Prussian armies in numbers and quality; he impressed the feeling on Ney, and urged this fighting leader onward, when, especially after Gross Beeren had taught




Dennewitz Country.

him that the Army of the North had good leaders, he should rather have talked to him of caution.

Ney had arrived September 3 at Wittenberg with fifty thousand men, proposing to head by Juterbog on Baruth to the rendezvous with Napoleon. He reached Seyda September 5 after beating Tauenzien, on Bernadotte's left, at Zahna. The 6th he moved on Juterbog, Bertrand in the lead, followed by Reynier and then Oudinot.

Bernadotte, as Ney should have known, had for two weeks stood astride the main road from Wittenberg via Potsdam on

Berlin, and though Ney's direction exposed the marching French left flank, he did nothing to fend off an attack, but set out in a long column past this dangerous body of the enemy. Towards noon, September 6, Bertrand struck Tauenzien near Dennewitz, seized the heights beyond, and won some success until Bülow appeared on his left. Reynier and Oudinot were still in the rear. Bertrand had fifteen thousand men to forty thousand, but he held on well until Reynier came up and formed a crotchet to face Bülow. Shortly Bülow was



Battle of Dennewitz.

sustained by the Russians and Swedes, but Oudinot also came up to sustain Reynier. Both sides fought well; and for a while it looked like a French victory; but finally Bertrand was overwhelmed by Tauenzien and Bülow, though still clinging to Dennewitz. To hold this place, Ney strove to move part of Reynier and Oudinot to the right, but in the movement the Saxons lost their heads, fell into confusion, and they and the Bavarians were completely routed. By a forced march Bernadotte came up near the battlefield in the afternoon, but did not engage. Though surprised, Ney had exhibited due vigor; but his several corps did not act together,

and owing to his false manœuvre, he was bound to lose the day. "Ney was another Cœur de Lion, born centuries too late:" he was not a battle captain for modern days. Bülow was the hero of the allies. After losing fifteen thousand men, half prisoners, Ney, cut off from Wittenberg, retreated in disorder on Torgau. His chief had misled him as to his task, and then failed to sustain him as promised. "I have been totally beaten," he wrote the emperor, "and still do not know whether my army has got together again."

On September 10 Berthier was told to write Ney to take position in front of Torgau on the right bank, and next day "That if the enemy's army from Berlin should move on Grossenhayn, so as to approach Dresden at the same time that the enemy's Army of Silesia did so, it would be necessary for him to debouch from Torgau to disquiet that army." And on September 14 Napoleon wrote Bertrand: "I received your letter of September 12. I see with pleasure that your corps behaved well, but I have seen with pain the bad issue of the battle, which seems to me to have been ill engaged. I shall myself soon take the command of the three corps, to strive to procure you your revenge."

Napoleon was clearly responsible for Dennewitz. He knew that Ney was a brilliant fighter, but neither a strategist nor a grand-tactician; he needed his work cut out for him; Bautzen had shown his limitations; and the emperor should not have relied upon him in so important a task. His failure to sustain him, or to suspend his advance, was peculiarly blameworthy. The defeat of Dennewitz not only prevented further projects on Berlin, but opened the lower Elbe to Bernadotte, so that later he could without particular fighting join in the allied march on Leipsic. Despite the serious nature of the defeat, Napoleon said little. Only a letter to the Minister of War, telling him to place the fortresses on the Rhine in a state of defense, and to fully provision them, shows how much he appreciated the disaster.

In the fortnight from August 23 on, Napoleon had won a great battle at Dresden in the centre, and his lieutenants had lost five: Gross Beeren, Hagelsberg, the Katzbach, Kulm, Dennewitz; and these victories so far outweighed Dresden — without pursuit — as to enable the allies to draw their toils closer about the Grand Army.

When Napoleon reached Pirna, September 8, he sat down with Berthier, Murat and St. Cyr, and discussed the situation, both specific and general, from a neutral standpoint. This



Bavarian
Grenadier.

discussion, in which alone St. Cyr bore his part, — the others not being as well equipped, — is most interestingly narrated in his Memoirs. It was at this time that Napoleon asserted that he could write a treatise by which anybody could learn to carry on war. The emperor and his lieutenant did not agree, practically because Napoleon, as appears from the narrative, was talking of the science and St. Cyr of the art of war, Napoleon referring to the conception, St. Cyr to the practice. This was entirely natural, for no one at that day understood what to-day is simple to us; indeed, the phraseology of the art had not been created; neither was Napoleon right in saying he could teach all he knew — for the human element always remains the unknown quantity in war.

It being essential to know what was going on beyond the Erzgebirge, and to ascertain what the situation was, Victor, Lobau and the Guard were assembled at Dohna, and on September 9 Napoleon led them against the enemy. At all points the latter withdrew, and by night the emperor and the Guard were in Liebstadt, Victor at Altenburg, Lobau at Gieshübel, St. Cyr at Breitenau. To cross into Bohemia

being no part of the plan, Marmont remained on the right bank, near Dresden-Neustadt; Macdonald was in front of Bautzen, sustained by Poniatowski; Ney reassembling at Torgau, l'Héritier at Grossenhayn; at Leipsic was a body of men under Margaron. "In this state of affairs," Napoleon wrote Maret, September 10, from Liebstadt, "I am going to-day up on the high hills which command Töplitz, to get accurate news of the enemy." The corps were advanced to Peterswalde and Ebersdorf, the enemy still withdrawing, and shortly before noon Napoleon, reaching the Geyersberg, recognized with regret that the Army of the Sovereigns in force on the plain below prevented any operation across the mountains here. The roads, moreover, were badly cut up by constant recent use. Next day, September 11, he rode to Peterswalde and up the Nollendorf heights to view the Bohemian valley below, but with no greater satisfaction. Both nights he spent in the pastor's house in Breitenau and Peterswalde. St. Cyr was of opinion that battle would be desirable in the Comottau-Töplitz country, and Napoleon agreed with him. He could assemble by the 14th all the Guard, Lobau, Marmont, Victor and Latour-Maubourg, which would give about one hundred and twenty thousand men. But Napoleon did not believe that Schwarzenberg would accept battle, or that battle could be forced upon him. On the 12th, with the Old Guard, he returned to Dresden; the other troops followed back; and Marmont and the cavalry were sent to Grossenhayn to cover the arrival of a large convoy of victual from the siege-provision of Torgau, a matter of importance, as victual had become difficult to procure.

While the defeat of Vandamme had encouraged the enemy and lost a corps, those of Oudinot, Macdonald and Ney seriously imperiled the campaign. It was not the fault of the specific plan; it was rather the execution; the lack of good

subordinate army commanders, whom Napoleon could have trained, but never did; of troops with a strong sprinkling of veterans to teach the men how to camp and march and fight; and especially the want of cavalry. The conditions required that the minor armies should at times retire rather than fight, and for such retreats cavalry was essential, for the French foot was none too steady. Interior lines are of value; but with forces up to a hundred thousand men they are more effectively used than with larger numbers. The question of feeding large armies interferes with manœuvring from a strategic centre. There are many generals who can do the best of work with thirty thousand men, who lose their heads in command of an army twice the size. Maedonald had too large a problem in front of Blucher; Oudinot and Ney were outweighed by Bernadotte, with such good lieutenants under him as Bülow and Tauenzien. Napoleon should have kept his lieutenants on the defensive when he was not personally present, a plan that would have enabled him to draw from them, and make his blow the heavier where he was himself directing. After Kulm, his best work could have been done in destroying Blucher and Bernadotte and then coming back to the Army of the Sovereigns. Inasmuch as he controlled all the passages of the Elbe, this was certainly feasible, but he never attacked Blucher seriously, nor himself moved against Bernadotte: this called for an activity of which he no longer seemed capable. During the whole month of September he was "fumbling." At no period did he act with the vigor to which we are used. And not only did his lieutenants not understand the art of war in its broader aspect, but the lack of a good general staff to attend to essentials that he could not, became every day more manifest.

On September 12 Torgau was made the central depot of the army, but still Dresden was not given up. The object of

this seemed to be to allow the use of Torgau as a base for a manœuvre on Berlin, or at least against Bernadotte, on whom Napoleon still purposed to march with Marmont and Ney and the Guard; but this plan, like the others, came to naught.

The Army of the Sovereigns did not move until September 13, when Barclay was left to hold the mountain passes with the right wing of the Army of the Sovereigns, to enable Schwartzberg to move with the left towards the French communications; and Wittgenstein and Kleist, debouching from Peterswalde on the 14th, pushed St. Cyr and Lobau back to Gieshübel. Napoleon assumed that this column was part of a general advance; and on September 15 he drove to Pirna, and had a bridge thrown to open communications with Maedonald, brought up the Guard to Lobau's aid, and pushed the enemy back to beyond Nollendorf. Next day he rode thither, but as overcast weather prevented his obtaining a view, he determined to push a heavy reconnoissance into Bohemia to ascertain the situation; for he had rightly guessed, as he wrote Berthier, that the allies were holding the passes to prevent his undertaking the offensive while they prepared for extended operations. Moreover, he desired to impose on the allies by activity; for so soon as he had driven them back into Bohemia, he could turn against Blucher. This demonstration succeeded. To forestall a French advance, Schwartzberg adjourned his movement and assembled at Kulm to meet the French as they should debouch from the passes; and when they began the attack, early on the 17th, they found the allies



Prussian
Grenadier.

ready ; indeed, Schwartzberg started on a circuit to cut off their van, and compelled the French to retire into the passes without serious fighting. "I descended yesterday into the plain of Bohemia near Kulm," Napoleon wrote Murat, "and I obliged the enemy to unmask his camp and his force. He presented his whole army in several lines of battle and expected an attack. I then withdrew the columns." On the 18th, from the heights, Napoleon viewed the allies below on the plain, and a few skirmishes occurred between outlying posts ; but it was evident that, as matters stood, he could not debouch into Bohemia on this line.

On the 19th the French were placed : Marmont and Murat at Grossenhayn ; Macdonald, who, so soon as Napoleon left, had fallen back from Blucher's renewed advance, was at Harthau and Stolpen, with Poniatowski, who also had to retire, on the right at Lohmen ; the Guard at Dresden ; Mortier at Pirna ; Victor at Freiburg ; St. Cyr and Lobau out near Gieshübel watching the passes. Thus, not counting Augereau and Davout, Napoleon had his army extended from Torgau to Dresden, and from there to Leipsic, one hundred and sixty thousand men about Dresden, thirty-five thousand in the Torgau-Wittenberg country, thirty thousand at Grossenhayn, ten thousand at Leipsic. All these were intersupporting, but where was the Napoleonic aggressiveness ? The one thing Napoleon should have done was to leave Dresden, assemble all his forces and manœuvre on the large scale, — there were plenty of things to do, — but he would not give up Dresden.

Blucher could now communicate with the Army of the Sovereigns by way of Schandau.

Looking for an invasion of Bohemia when so large a force approached the mountains, Schwartzberg concentrated to fend it off ; this defensive purpose Napoleon guessed, but he awaited a better chance for manœuvring, when the allies

should undertake some larger operation. In other words, he left them the initiative.

This changeableness of Napoleon is not of the kind it once was. It is a characteristic of every great soldier that his mind is constantly evolving new plans, as fresh situations are created, or as he imagines they may be so. It is only the commonplace leader who, having given birth to an idea, cannot give it up, or vary it according to shifting operations on the part of the enemy. But Napoleon's changes in this campaign are far less fruitful, less forcible, than they used to be. First it is Berlin, then Bohemia he will attack; and he swings like a pendulum between the two. He was gaining nothing by delay; the defensive was sapping his originality; time was working against him. While he watched Schwartzenberg, hoping he would again advance into Saxony, Blucher had come dangerously close to the Elbe; Schwartzenberg had won his point in calling Napoleon away so that Blucher might force back Macdonald. Neither side had made a marked gain; but Napoleon had lost the more. While delay is one object of the defensive, yet if delay will enable one's opponent to bring on a crisis less favorable to us, then it ceases to be helpful. And so it was here: time was working against the French cause. The only reinforcement Napoleon could expect was Augereau's sixteen thousand men, who on the 17th had been ordered on the Saale to help protect the rear, and were now approaching in the direction of Jena; the allies, on the other hand, had Bennigsen and fifty thousand Russians coming on from Breslau.

Since Dennewitz the river transportation had been uncertain, and it was to keep it safe that Marmont and Latour-Maubourg were established at Grossenhayn. The only two roads for supplying Dresden were along the river, or from Leipsic, and both were now subject to attack. Margaron had

a small force at Leipsic, but not enough to keep away the allied partisans. Platov was so active that Lefebvre-Desnouettes had to be sent that way to keep the country quiet. Breadstuffs were growing scarce in Saxony. The precaution taken to guard the Torgau convoy proved this; the allies knew it, and in no small degree built their hopes thereon.

The emperor wrote, September 18, to Berthier: "We have wheat. It is only the grinding which is embarrassing. Nearly all the villages have mills. We should profit by seizing them for the service of the main army. It would be well by this means if there . . . could be sent from Dresden eight ounces of bread, four ounces of rice. The ration would then be sixteen ounces of bread and four ounces of rice, to which the soldier would add the potatoes and the vegetables which he will find for a long time yet in all the villages." And to Daru, September 23: "The army is not nourished. It would be an illusion to look at it otherwise. Twenty-four ounces of bread, an ounce of rice and eight ounces of meat are insufficient for the soldier. The regulations of all times accorded to the soldier on campaign twenty-eight ounces of bread, and that was only looked upon as sufficient by adding the vegetables and potatoes which he could procure in the country. To-day you give only eight ounces of bread, three ounces of rice and eight ounces of meat. The soldier is living badly, and lives only by means of a great consumption of meat. If one continued, then, to give him only eight ounces of bread, it would result, first, that the soldier would become feeble; second, that he would consume an enormous amount of meat, either by taking it in the country or . . . in the parks of the army. No discipline and no surveillance can prevent the soldier from killing beeves wherever he can find them; and yet meat will become scarce, rather than bread."

It was more and more evident that Blucher must be got rid of. This energetic officer, by his constant thrusts at the centre of Napoleon's position, was threatening its strategic integrity. Poniatowski was covering Pirna, Macdonald from his left through Stolpen to Bischofswerda, Marmont at Grossenhayn. Blucher now stood from Kamenz to Neustadt, and was in touch with Bubna, who was at Hohenstein, and with

Bernadotte at Elsterwerda. In the afternoon of the 18th he moved on Macdonald, who fell back to Weissig. Next day the emperor threw Mortier through Pirna forward to Lohmen, to shoulder the intruder away; but no actual operation was undertaken — this time on the score of the weather.

On September 19, from Pirna, Napoleon wrote: "I should not be far, if the weather was less horrible to-morrow, from marching on the enemy and pushing him beyond Bautzen;" and next day to Marmont: "Yesterday and this night are so frightful that it is impossible to move." And to Berthier: "Write to Murat, to Mortier, to Macdonald, to Poniatowski, that the frightful weather which continues to-day, makes every movement impossible, and that if to-morrow the weather betters, preparations are to be made for the day after." And on the 22d it is ordered that an important march by Macdonald "is not to be adjourned under whatever pretext, unless the weather should remain as bad as during the 20th; but if the weather is the same as the 21st, the attack is to take place." And on September 22 to Macdonald: "In making a brisk attack between noon and two o'clock, some prisoners will be taken. There will be, moreover, some news at Bischofswerda, and then according to circumstances we shall be able to attack strongly to-morrow. I gave you notice that my intention was to attack the moment the weather should be less bad. In a war of combinations like this, the days are of the greatest importance. Make, I pray you, your dispositions."

Only once or twice before have we seen Napoleon arrested by the weather: the veterans of the early years would have laughed at such a cause. Napoleon once called a storm a pre-sage of victory, and dread of bad weather is one more of the by themselves small factors which go to build up Napoleon's growing indecisiveness. Proper care for troops — especially young ones — often demands that they shall not be unduly exposed; but the battle of Dresden was won in a heavy storm, and here, despite equinoctial rains, there seems to have been no especial cause for delay. Indeed, a stormy day is often favorable to a sudden advance, because this is unexpected.

On September 21 Napoleon thought it would be well to assemble the whole army near Dresden and give the men




Saxon Drum Major.

a rest; and he placed Lobau and Lauriston under St. Cyr to cover the Elbe from Pillnitz to Königstein, while Mortier was brought back to Pirna, Latour-Maubourg and Marmont sent to Meissen to observe the Elbe up and down, and Ney was to cover the river from Torgau to Magdeburg. Napoleon was hanging on to Dresden beyond all reason. Had Dresden been a strong place of the first importance, one can understand his anxiety to retain it, but it was not this. It was a mere geographical point. If Dresden could aid him by holding out a fortnight against the Army of the Sovereigns, so that he might act

on the right bank, it was useful. If it could not, it was useless, and had better be abandoned. Had St. Cyr received orders to defend Dresden as long as possible and then cross to the right bank and destroy the bridges, defending the river with part of his force, and joining his master with the other part, Napoleon could certainly have destroyed both Blucher and Bernadotte before Schwartzenberg could have done the French equal harm. But only to this extent was Dresden useful.

The news from Blucher was disquieting. Napoleon could not divine whether he purposed manœuvring to his right or his left: so long as the French maintained the offensive, Blu-

cher would keep still ; so soon as they assumed the defensive, the old marshal became active ; and on the 22d the emperor ordered Macdonald forward to ascertain where the enemy's main force lay, and he himself, towards noon, drove out to Fischbach, and thence rode beyond Schmiedefeld. Souham and Gérard were advancing through Harthau ; Blucher's outposts fell back, and Bischofswerda was taken. Lauriston moved on Neustädt. Next day, on the French pushing their advance, Blucher again retired, consistently avoiding Napoleon, who though he would have been glad to do so, adopted none of his usual means to bring him to battle : as Blucher had dispatched a corps to Kamenz, which could readily fall on the French left should Napoleon advance too far, this may



Prussian Dragoon.

have deterred him. At Harthau he received a dispatch of the 22d from Ney — he had had one the day before — that the enemy had finished a bridge over the Elbe at the mouth of the Elster. This began to look ominous, and Napoleon was doing nothing to counteract the danger. He had been ineffectively moving to and fro, much as his enemies had been

in the habit of doing, while the allies were making ready for a large manœuvre, only awaiting Bennigsen.

Napoleon had long been contemplating and now about concluded to yield to the enemy the right bank of the Elbe, and to withdraw Macdonald, holding him ready to break out again across the river in case of necessity. On September 23 he wrote Rogniat, chief engineer at Dresden :—

“My intention is to bring back Macdonald’s army to the left bank of the Elbe, keeping a bridge at Königstein, . . . a bridge at Pirna, . . . a bridge at Pillnitz, . . . the three bridges of Dresden, . . . the bridge of Meissen.” And the same day to Murat : “I have pushed the enemy ; he is everywhere in retreat, and Macdonald will be this morning in Bautzen. The enemy thus refusing every engagement, my intention is . . . to bring the troops back to the left bank, to give them some repose. All the bridges will be defended by good bridge-heads, and we will occupy all the debouches of Dresden forest. In this position I will keep an eye on the enemy, and if he drops into any offensive operation, I will fall on him so that he cannot evade a battle.”

Napoleon had first undertaken his Elbe defensive scheme because it afforded excellent offensive possibilities ; but as these had one by one been tried and failed, the strict defensive had become his reliance. The allies, by their persistent pushing, even if less able method, had forced him into a negative rôle. He had not been acting as he was wont. His offensive had been weak. The corollary of the proposition to attack only at one point at a time is that the onset shall be pushed home. But at no time had he attacked Blucher with the ancient vigor or ability. Whatever the explanation, he was weakening, and he saw it : the French armies were dwindling, not only by battle losses, but by the forced marches to and fro of the young soldiers, unaccustomed to hard campaigning ; victual was becoming scant, and though he never says as much, it is manifest that Napoleon must have foreseen early retreat.

The withdrawal began on the 24th, when Schwartzberg was about to move; Mortier reached Dresden, and Souham and Lauriston on the 26th; Poniatowski retired via Fischbach; Macdonald with his corps and Sébastiani covered this operation at Weissig, and remained awhile on the left bank;



French Lancer.

Arrighi was to go to Leipsic to take command between the Mulde and the Saale, including Margaron's ten thousand men; reinforcements were coming up under Lefol, and Auge-reau was due October 10; Marmont and Latour-Maubourg had moved to Meissen; l'Héritier remained in observation at Grossenhayn. The emperor rode out towards Bischofswerda to watch the operation, and then returned to Dresden. During the coming few days, the Old Guard and two divisions of

the Young Guard, Macdonald, Sébastiani and Souham assembled in Dresden; Marmont and Latour-Maubourg moved back from Meissen to Wurzen to sustain Ney at Torgau or Arrighi at Leipsic; Lauriston, and Mortier with his two divisions of the Young Guard, took post opposite Pillnitz; St. Cyr at Borna near Chemnitz, Lobau at Gieshübel, and Victor on their right, covered the main roads from Bohemia. Poniatowski marched via Nossen on Waldheim, lest the allies should cross by the western passes of the Erzgebirge, and to sustain Victor and Lefebvre-Desnouettes. When Ney retired from Dennewitz, he had assembled his troops at Torgau, September 8, while holding the right bank, and he now moved to Düben. On the 19th Oudinot's corps was broken up and added to the two others, and he was given command of two divisions of the Young Guard. Dombrowski was added to Ney's command. Meanwhile the enemy slowly advanced to the Elbe and threw bridges at Elster, Rosslau and Acken; on Ney sending Bertrand to Wartenburg, which he took on the 24th, the enemy broke the Elster bridge; but Ney could not capture the Rosslau bridge-head. He then stationed Reynier at Oranienbaum and Wörlitz, and Bertrand from Kemberg to Wartenburg.

The campaign of 1813 does not exhibit the great captain to advantage. Having undertaken a defensive seems to have paralyzed his efforts. For some time he had felt that he must fight a great battle, but he let every chance of so doing slip until his enemies assembled all their forces on his rear. At Dresden it was not he who brought about the battle, but the allies. His plan of the defensive on the Elbe at Dresden was excellent, but he did not carry it out effectively. Even up to the 24th of September, had he been willing to throw up Dresden and move vigorously upon Blucher, put him to rout and then turn upon Bernadotte, he could yet have

retrieved the campaign, and Schwartzberg's march on Leipzig would have been quickly shifted into a movement to the rear. To the worshiper of his genius, it is amazing to see Napoleon moving all around Dresden without attacking anybody seriously. "Victory," he said, "belongs to the armies that manœuvre," and "The force of an army is in its mass multiplied by its speed;" and neither of these maxims was he putting into use. All this induces the student to bring up certain questions, which, however academic, have their bearing. Similar ones were indeed shortly suggested by the emperor himself. It would have been good strategy for Napoleon to operate on the right bank immediately after Dennewitz; it was absolutely essential that he should do so after his reconnoissance in the Bohemian defiles September 15 to 17. Having ascertained that he could do nothing there, his one chance of getting out of his difficulties without a retreat to the



Prussian Lancer.

Saale was to move substantially his whole army over to the right bank and manœuvre there against Blucher and Bernadotte. We can well understand that by leaving St. Cyr and Lobau with some cavalry in Dresden, and quickly assembling the Guard, Victor, Macdonald, Lauriston, Marmont, Poniatowski and the main body of cavalry on the right bank, Napoleon might have driven Blucher well back, have held Poniatowski at Zittau and Victor at Hoyerswerda to keep open communication, have followed Blucher well beyond the Katz-

bach, and then have sent Macdonald and Lauriston with some cavalry to Glogau, Cüstrin and Stettin to gather in the garrisons, and bring them back to the main army. Whereupon, leaving Marmont to face Blucher, Napoleon would have been in force to turn on Berlin, or on the Army of the Sovereigns.



Bavarian Artilleryman.

With Blucher put to rout, Berlin captured, and the French army reinforced by the garrisons named, even if the Army of the Sovereigns took Dresden and Leipsic, Napoleon still had his crossings of the Elbe at Torgau and below, and his line of retreat on Magdeburg and Hamburg. It is not for the mere critic to suggest to the great captain, but there are a dozen manœuvres that we can imagine Napoleon undertaking, if he would only throw up Dresden. By assembling all the forces possible, including Davout

and Augereau, he could unquestionably have disposed of Blucher and Bernadotte, and thereafter defeated the Army of the Sovereigns. But Dresden seemed as the apple of his eye; and no manœuvre that implied leaving it found favor.

The following extracts have their interest. September 19 to Berthier: "Write to Victor that it is not by four thousand men, but by four hundred, that General Bruno was carried off. He was quietly sleeping in the town with all his men. So long as light troops serve so badly, accidents will happen. Instead of bivouacking in a military position and changing camp every day, General Bruno shut himself up in the town. . . . Express to Victor my discontent that he did not give General Bruno such instructions as not to have shut himself up in the town. The marshal ought to have known . . . that he was living with the inhabitants instead of

bivouacking. . . . The order must be repeated to light troops never to pass a night in a town. They must bivouac, and change bivouac in the evening, so as to sleep a half league or a league from the place where they were at sunset. This is the means of never being surprised. . . . Light cavalry should not take position like an infantry corps. Their object is to reconnoitre, and not to fight. . . . It is to be made known that the death penalty hangs over commandants of light-troop patrols who pass the night in a town." On September 20 Berthier was instructed to "Write to Macdonald that it is regrettable that he made a movement without necessity and moved his bivouacs and his camps on such a horrible day, which made his troops suffer infinitely ; that General Maurin seems to carry on war very badly, that he was not at his post, that he was cantoned in a castle with his cavalry, and had but one battalion of infantry and twenty chasseurs as outposts. . . . Express to him my dissatisfaction ; that it is not thus that a general of light troops, flanking an army, should serve." On September 24 to Berthier : "Write to Ney to make him know the strange conduct of Colonel Biberstein, who retired with four hundred well-mounted cavalrymen, five hundred infantrymen and six guns as far as Göttingen. Let General Franquemont make these men return and make an example of them."

These offenses gave rise to an

ORDER.

His Majesty is discontented with the manner in which the service of light troops of cavalry is made. General X. was in position on the flanks of the army without a grand-guard, and with all his horses unbridled. Military law imposes on such negligence the pain of death. His Majesty surprised a brigadier of the Guard, who, placed in grand-guard near Pirna, had his horse unbridled. His Majesty orders that this brigadier be cashiered. General Bruno with one hundred and fifty horse . . . instead of bivouacking, of changing his position every day, and of never passing the night in a place where one could have seen sunset, of never entering in the day into towns and villages, simply cantoned in Freiburg, placing his horses in stables, and was there surprised by four hundred Austrians. His Majesty orders that General Bruno shall be suspended and his conduct sent before a commission of inquiry.

Every officer and sub-officer, who, being on grand-guard, shall neglect the precautions prescribed by military regulations ; every commander,

whoever he may be, of light troops sent on reconnoissance, or detached without infantry on scout duty, who shall neglect to take the prescribed precautions ; every cavalry general who, flanking the position of the army, shall neglect to place his grand-guard as required by military regulations, and shall expose the army to a surprise of the enemy, shall be sent before a military commission and condemned to death.



French Staff Officer.

LXIII.

LEIPSIĆ MANŒUVRE. SEPTEMBER 25 TO OCTOBER 16, 1813.

ELATED by their victories, the allies now proposed to seize Leipsic in Napoleon's rear, the sovereigns advancing from the south and Bernadotte and Blucher from the north and east. Napoleon should have divined this possibility, and from his central position attacked one after the other. Blucher had been gradually moving down the Elster, and on October 3 crossed the Elbe and captured Wartenburg, while Bernadotte crossed near Döbtau. Ney retired, and both advanced on Leipsic. Napoleon now had a last chance to save himself by a smart manœuvre against Blucher and Bernadotte, followed by one against Schwartzberg; and he initiated the first one well by a movement on Wurzen. He devised a number of clever operations by which to outwit the enemy, but failed to do the one thing needful, — to move sharply against the northern armies, and having defeated them, to move against the sovereigns. Moreover, he insisted on holding Dresden, when he should have given up the city and recovered the initiative. Bernadotte was timid, but Blucher held him to his work, and the two got ahead of the French and reached the Saale. Napoleon then conceived the idea of operating on the right bank of the Elbe so as to call the allied armies back to save their communications, but he was unstable. Striving to contain Schwartzberg, Murat was forced back, and by October 12 it became apparent that all the allied armies would concentrate at Leipsic on the French communications. There was still a chance for Napoleon to reach the Saale and adopt a new line, but he ordered the army to Leipsic, where he would have to fight the combined allies; and yet he left two corps in Dresden. On October 13 he heard that his friend, Bavaria, had joined the allies, which gave them an overwhelming force. Even then there was a chance for him to escape by calling in Murat and the Dresden forces and moving around to the north of Leipsic, defeating Blucher and Bernadotte before Schwartzberg arrived, and taking up the Saale as a line of defense; but he persisted in moving on Leipsic to do battle.

WHILE, with a view to some broader strategic movement, Napoleon was studying his maps, and weighing rumors and

dispatches from the front, the Army of the Sovereigns stood at Töplitz awaiting Bennigsen, who had lately crossed the Oder. Some of the army-council desired Bennigsen to remain in Silesia, while Blucher via Zittau should join the Army of the Sovereigns, which, three hundred thousand strong, could then manœuvre against the French communications; and indeed the sovereigns agreed with this plan and ordered accordingly. But doughty Marschal Vorwärts had no idea of serving under Schwartzberg; he preferred to manœuvre by his right and join Bernadotte, who he justly said would accomplish nothing alone; and he urged that Berlin ought not to be thus disgarnished. Blucher was in fact right; with their excess of forces, two armies were at this moment better, and Blucher's view prevailed; the sovereigns, appreciating his honest ardor, gave way. The allies might have proposed to surround Napoleon in Dresden, but as they felt that he would cut himself out, their plan to march on Leipsic was renewed, the conditions being now essentially in their favor. Blucher was to demonstrate in front of Dresden until Bernadotte was ready to pass the Elbe below Wittenberg; then to move rapidly down and himself cross between Torgau and Wittenberg, while Schwartzberg with Bennigsen in support should debouch into Saxony. All this was determined on by mid-September at allied headquarters. Bennigsen reached Leitmeritz September 22, and everything was then ready to move towards the common goal. From this point on, French affairs were to go downhill.

Napoleon had given up the idea of further operating against Blucher on the right bank. His eyes were on the lower Elbe, where Bernadotte was threatening; but instead of giving up Dresden and assembling all his forces for a great blow from his central position, first on one and then on another of his enemies, he persisted in holding the city, and permitted the

allies to keep on with their initiative and constantly gain in morale. He had long felt sure that the Army of the Sovereigns would cross the Erzgebirge by its western passes, while masking those nearer the Elbe, and take Dresden in reverse. Though it opened Bohemia to a French thrust, it was the proper thing for them to do; and the correctness of his view was soon shown by an allied attack on Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who at Altenburg was protecting the French rear from raids. He had driven back the light parties of the enemy; but on September 26 he was attacked at Altenburg by Platov from Chemnitz, sustained by Klenau, and they, with the aid of Thielemann from the Saale, forced the French cavalry back of Weissenfels.

How much this might mean, Napoleon did not know, but unless he was prepared to undertake some definite offensive manœuvre, he had no choice but to concentrate to the rear. Marmont was sent to Leipsic, leaving Latour-Maubourg at Wurzen; Lauriston went to Waldheim, Poniatowski to Frohburg, out of which he drove Platov September 30, Victor to Chemnitz with l'Héritier, Souham to Meissen. As October opened, Napoleon became convinced that Schwartzberg was manœuvring in full force by his left; he wrote Macdonald that all news indicated that the enemy was moving from Comottau to Marienburg; and again that the Army of Silesia was moving by its right on Elsterwerda and Grossenhayn, which seemed to him to point to Blucher's attacking Dresden from the north, to avoid the Dresden Forest. But Blucher



Hanseatic Infantryman.

had a broader aim ; and on September 25, leaving an Austrian and a Russian corps opposite Dresden, he started down and back of the Schwarze Elster by way of Kamenz, Königsbruck and Elsterwerda, to cross the Elbe somewhere near the mouth of this affluent. Bernadotte drew in his left ; and Sacken demonstrated opposite Macdonald and Marmont, while York, Langeron and St. Priest filed in his rear. This was done with skill enough to deceive Napoleon ; for until October 4 he was in the dark as to what Blucher was doing. But he then wrote to Macdonald : —

“ I attach a great importance to know positively what has become of Langeron, Sacken and York. I desire, then, that to-morrow you should make a reconnoissance of seven or eight thousand men . . . on Grossenhayn (Sacken has been in that country), and that you should make reconnoissances in every direction, so as to know positively what has become of the enemy’s Army of Silesia.”

It is as interesting for the military student to watch the growth of Napoleon’s indecisiveness as for the medical man to study the course of a grave disease. During the campaign of Jena, he used with regard to the Prussians the memorable words: “ While they consult, the French army marches.” But the case was now reversed. Napoleon sat in his office in Dresden, making plans suited to many contingencies which never were to happen, and the allied armies were slowly but surely marching around his flanks. Formerly he had always held the initiative ; had made and set about his general plan, closely observed the enemy, so as to modify, but not to vary, what he had predetermined as the best strategic manœuvre, and had carried it through to the end, obliging his opponents to watch him and fashion their operations on what he did. Now he seemed to be waiting for some manœuvre of the enemy to which he could apply a merely temporary check ; the broader scheme was lost to view in the lesser. His position in Dres-

den had become untenable as a strategic centre; and yet he remained there waiting to pounce on any invader, forgetful of his ancient method of imposing by sheer audacity on the enemy. Moreover, he was ill-served by his lieutenants. On October 4 he wrote to Marmont: "You send me officers who are children, who know nothing and cannot give verbally any report. Send me men." This was frequently his complaint.

On October 4 there were in Dresden the Guard, St. Cyr, Lobau, Macdonald, Sébastiani; Souham was at Meissen; Marmont and Latour-Maubourg stood at Taucha; Augereau, with Milhaud's cavalry, had reached Jena. Murat, whom with the right wing, on October 2, Napoleon had detached to fend off Schwartzberg, had Poniatowski at Altenburg, Victor and l'Héritier in the Freiburg country and Lauriston at Mittweida. Ney, with Bertrand, Reynier and Dombrowski, was on the left between Wittenberg and Düben. This entire force, now all on Saxon soil, numbered two hundred and twenty thousand men. There had been a slight shifting of the divisions in the army corps: Albert's division had gone from Souham to Macdonald; and Marchand's Germans to Reynier; but the organization remained much as heretofore.

Meanwhile Blucher had been moving down the Elster. Having collected boats at Elster village, he threw two bridges, and crossed during the night of October 2-3, Yorck at the head, followed by Langeron and Sacken. He had to capture Wartenburg, but Bertrand, though but a quarter his strength, met him stoutly — Morand holding himself six hours — and then



Brunswick Rifleman.

retired on Kemberg to get nearer Reynier and Dombrowski on the Mulde. "The head of the Army of Silesia threw during the night a bridge at Wartenburg," Napoleon wrote Macdonald. "Bertrand occupied the isthmus behind dikes and marshes. He fought twelve hours. The enemy advanced seven times to the assault to dislodge him without being able to do so. Seeing in the evening that the " enemy "was being reinforced at every instant, Bertrand retreated." At the same time as Blucher, Bernadotte was crossing near Rosslau, his van at Dessau. Ney, threatened on both flanks, retired to Bitterfeld, calling on Marmont for help. The latter responded, and on November 5 arrived at Eilenburg with his corps and Latour-Maubourg, Ney falling back on Delitsch. Between them they had about half the force of Bernadotte and Blucher.

On October 5 Blucher with sixty thousand men was heading for Düben on the way to Leipsic, Bernadotte had an equal number at Acken and Rosslau, partly across. Both were moving prudently and building good bridge-heads in their rear. Schwartzberg, with one hundred and seventy thousand men, had started down the Eger September 27, and debouching from Commottau on Chemnitz, and from Carlsbad on Annaberg and Zwickau, was on October 4 at Marienburg, while Bennigsen had come up to Töplitz with fifty thousand fresh Russians, to replace him and later follow on. Napoleon remained ignorant of all these movements. He thought Blucher would stay in front of Dresden some time longer, and the cavalry skirmishes south of Leipsic did not let him suspect that Schwartzberg was so near. Now that his unwarranted pause from operations had worked against him and in their favor, in numbers, position and morale, the allies were ready to march their two armies, Schwartzberg's, and Bernadotte's and Blucher's combined, around his right and left

flanks and sit down on his line of communications. There was but one answer — and that was a perfect one — to this manifest strategic challenge : for Napoleon to give up Dresden, assemble to the last man, throw himself in mass, while yet there was time, between the two bodies, and beat each in detail. This was an operation which, a half-dozen years before, he would have carried out to immediate and complete success,



Saxon Hussar Officer.

and he now addressed himself to it. But he opened it by an error he would not then have committed : for less than sufficient reasons, he held on to the Saxon capital. Meanwhile he constantly had to bolster up his lieutenants, writing to Berthier October 2 : “ One should not lightly cause an alarm.

One should not let one's self be frightened by shadows. One should have more firmness and discernment. Write to Arrighi that he gets alarmed too easily, and that he is too quick to believe all the false rumors spread by the enemy. It is not thus should act a man of experience; he should show more character."

We all know how easily forces in the rear get demoralized.

It was during the night of October 4-5 that Napoleon heard of the defeat of Bertrand, and of the advance of Schwartzberg. As Schwartzberg was the farther off, he determined to move against Blucher; and ordering Marmont with Latour-Maubourg and Souham to march towards and take orders from Ney, which gave this marshal eighty thousand men, he instructed him to throw the enemy back behind the Elbe and seize his bridges, while Oudinot replaced Souham at Meissen. Next day, after studying his position from all its standpoints, Napoleon decided to turn with his whole army, except Murat, on Blucher and Bernadotte, and by a novel manœuvre force them to battle. "I propose to move on Torgau," he wrote Marmont October 6, "and from there march by the right bank so as to cut the enemy off and take away all his bridges, without being obliged to fight against his bridge-heads. In marching by the left bank we have the inconvenience that the enemy may recross the river and avoid battle." The Old and Young Guard and Sébastiani were speeded to Meissen; Murat, basing on Leipsic, was to feud off Schwartzberg; St. Cyr and Lobau were to withdraw from the Erzgebirge to Dresden, and Macdonald to follow the Guard when relieved. Napoleon always kept in mind the possibility of being forced into one great battle against all his foes, but he saw safety in bringing about a first contest with Blucher and Bernadotte, and then one with Schwartzberg.

“The emperor is going to deliver battle,” Berthier wrote Daru; “Dresden will be occupied by thirty thousand men. If His Majesty loses the battle, the place will be evacuated. In this case, the artillery will destroy the gun carriages and spike the guns. The engineers will burn the block-houses. The administration will distribute the clothing to the thirty thousand men who remain here.” The hospitals will be left in charge of officers. “The carriages of the military equipage train will be burned. But as His Majesty will win the battle, Dresden will remain always his centre of operations.”

St. Cyr arrived in Dresden in time to talk with the emperor, who instructed him, with his two corps, to hold the city while he himself should fight Blücher, or Bernadotte, or both. St. Cyr tells us that Napoleon’s speech was quick and decided, and his resolve so positive that he could not permit himself a word; but having so ordered, the emperor turned to Soult’s defeat in Spain by Wellington, and discussed the subject with great clearness and point. At midnight Napoleon again called St. Cyr, and told him he had changed his plan and decided to take the two corps with him; that in the battle he would fight, he ought to have all his forces; that if he lost, St. Cyr would be cut off, and that after all Dresden was of no further strategic value, and later, when frozen, the Elbe would also be of none. He proposed a better position for the winter, with right on Erfurt and centre along the Saale, whose high left bank is easily defended, and his left on Magdeburg. Dresden, he said, was too near Bohemia to permit of manœuvring in the broadest sense; but in a more distant position he could form a species of sack, and into this lure the allies. This was sensible; he had clearly grasped the danger into which his long dwelling in Dresden had placed him.

Thus Napoleon created four masses: Ney with eighty thousand men opposite Blücher and Bernadotte, Murat with forty thousand and Arrighi in Leipsic with thirty thousand men in support, holding back Schwartzberg, and St. Cyr with

thirty thousand men in Dresden; while with the Guard, Macdonald and Sébastiani, sixty thousand men, Napoleon was to move on Wurzen, so as to be able to sustain either Ney or Murat. If Ney and Marmont got the better of Blucher and Bernadotte, Napoleon would join them and finish the matter; if they were driven back, he would call them in and move to Leipsic.

During the night of October 6-7, the entire new offensive plan was clearly dictated in a

NOTE ON THE MOVEMENTS OF DIFFERENT ARMY CORPS.

Dresden, October 7, 1813, 1 A. M. 1st. Make during the 7th a strong march on Wurzen. I can have my headquarters there with Sébastiani's cavalry, with all the Guard, Oudinot's corps four leagues from Wurzen, so as to be to-morrow, the 8th, at Leipsic, if absolutely essential. 2d. The 3d Corps will probably be at Wurzen, because Mortier has headed it for the Mulde. 3d. Lauriston can take position at Röchlitz; he has but three leagues to march. Victor can go to Mittweida, beginning his movement a little late. They will find themselves in communication with Poniatowski, who is at Frohburg. To-morrow they can be at Frohburg, thus containing the head of the enemy's army. St. Cyr can to-day, the 7th, direct the 1st and 14th Corps on Dresden, have Meissen occupied to-morrow the 8th, and commence his movement, evacuate Dresden the 7th, and move promptly on Wurzen.

By the result of this movement I shall be master to do what I will: from Wurzen I can move on Torgau and on the enemy, debouching from Wittenberg, or else head my whole army on Leipsic, and have a general battle; or else recross the Saale.

Murat would move on Mittweida, masking his movements; he would not evacuate Flöhe until the night of the 7th. The enemy would only know on the morning of the 8th that there is nobody left on the road from Chemnitz to Dresden. Lauriston would reach Röchlitz, and would not abandon Mittweida until the head of the 2d Corps had arrived.

On the 8th, the 2d Corps would move on Röchlitz, and would remain in observation from Röchlitz to Frohburg, occupying Colditz, so as to get in connection with the army. It would remain there until new orders,

unless the enemy should push it. In this case, it would approach Leipsic without losing touch with the Mulde.

On the 8th, the army that I command in person would be about Wurzen ; on the 10th, the corps of St. Cyr would be about Wurzen.

This entire Note is clear and to the point. For the moment Napoleon was himself again. Satisfied that Dresden had been strategically outworn, he had chosen Wurzen on the Mulde as a position from which to fall on any force which should cross the Elbe, crush it, and drive it back across the river ; whereupon he could in safety join Murat and deliver battle to the Army of the Sovereigns. The subsidiary idea in the Note, retiring on Leipsic, is faulty, in that this would enable all the concentrically marching allied armies to join here for battle and overwhelm him by mere force of numbers ; but Napoleon still felt himself so able in battle that he weighed this little.



Silesian Hussar.

Battle to him, as to Frederick, was the sword with which to cut a knot when strategy could not untie it ; and he felt that, with equal factors, he could defeat any opponent. Why he had not sooner offensively resorted to it is a mystery.

In default of a grand manœuvre, to retire behind the Saale was really the wisest, because the most cautious plan. Starting now, he could reach this line first, and would be constantly

gaining while the oncoming enemy would be steadily losing ; on this stream he could adopt a fresh defensive position similar to that of the Elbe. The difficulty was that Napoleon could not afford to retire : it was a matter of reputation, and consequent moral influence. How could he vacate Saxony without a battle ? Giving this reason due weight, the Mulde was a proper substitute for the Saale.

And yet it seems as if, had Napoleon in due season forced back Blucher, released or not the Oder garrisons, and even temporarily defeated Bernadotte, had he drawn in Augereau and Davout and retired towards the Rhine, he was strong enough to turn back upon the sovereigns, who would meanwhile have overrun Saxony, and give them battle in one body with every chance of success. In any case, what Napoleon needed was battle, and if he was not to manœuvre on the right bank, he could have got it better by leaving Dresden, and drawing in all his forces to a point in the rear. It is also not improbable that had Napoleon assembled all his forces and marched towards the Rhine, the allies, seeing him willing to evacuate Germany, might have made him a bridge of gold. Nothing shows the weakening of his resolution more than the fact that, when he saw his strength dwindling, he did not strictly concentrate his troops. Both in 1813 and 1814 he lost the campaign by not giving up unessential points for the sake of winning at essential ones.

The French troops, on October 7, lay as follows : Souham was at Torgau ; the Old Guard, Oudinot, Mortier, Macdonald and Sébastiani at and near Meissen ; Marmont at Taucha ; Ney not far below Wurzen ; St. Cyr and Lobau in Dresden ; Arrighi in Leipsic ; and Murat fending off the sovereigns.

Orders were issued by Berthier in accordance with the Note, Napoleon working continuously until morning, when he left Dresden for Meissen. Arrived near Wurzen the same even-

ing (October 7), he learned that Blucher had scarcely passed Düben, and that Schwartzberg's van only had got to Altenburg. This gave him more time than he had expected in which to move upon Blucher. Ney and Marmont had not acted together, and Ney had come back up the Mulde and Marmont returned towards Leipsic.

During October 8 the emperor's plan grew more definite. As Blucher and Bernadotte were still separated by the Mulde, during the night of the 8th-9th he gave orders to concentrate forward, Ney in the centre at Eilenburg and thence to Düben with Souham, Dombrowski and Reynier, on the right Bertrand with Macdonald in support on Mockrehna, on the left Marmont, whom Latour-Maubourg was to join, on Düben, the Guard sustaining the centre. He had one hundred and forty thousand men, and hoped to drive Blucher across the Elbe, disengage Wittenberg, and destroy the enemy's bridges, so as to keep them for some days from interfering with the attack on Schwartzberg that he would then turn about and make; and he accordingly sent orders to Murat to hold firm. This scheme seemed to be so certain of results that he again notified St. Cyr not to leave Dresden, but to remain there with his two corps, as, if he crossed to the right bank, he might want to come back to Dresden. He felt that he had the enemy in a false position, and should not need St. Cyr's forces.

Here is again an inexplicable lapse. Napoleon was aiming to bring about the most important of all military events, one or more general engagements; and yet in defiance of the principle which had made him great, the principle of bringing together all his forces for battle, he permitted a quite subsidiary desire, that of retaining a hold on Dresden (for the mere vanity of possession, it has been suggested), to diminish his forces by two whole army corps. If he won, as he well knew, Dresden would be his again; if he lost, he must also forfeit

Dresden. There is perhaps no one maxim on which Napoleon, in all he said and wrote, laid so much stress as this one, to have every man in every division under the colors on the day of battle, to have every division present, to beware of detailed forces, to bring up each and every body, large and small, within reach. Reread the orders before the battle of Borodino. Yet at this important moment he himself broke the rule he had dinned into the ears of his subordinates for many years. His reason for this error cannot be guessed. The remote chance of his needing Dresden bridge does not suffice. Torgau would have done as well. Yet error it was, and it proved to be a bitter one. How had the man changed since the days when he deliberately gave up the siege of Mantua, to fight a battle with all his forces and win Mantua back — and many things besides!

On October 8, while Napoleon was moving down the Mulde to the attack, Bernadotte was at Radegast, Tauenzien at Dessau, and Blucher not yet across the Mulde, Yorck being at Bitterfeld, Langeron at Düben, Sacken at Mockrehna. Both allied armies were advancing prudently, knowing little of the French movements. On hearing of Napoleon's oncoming in force, Bernadotte, timid about meeting his old master, wished to recross the Elbe; but all Blucher would agree to do was to avoid battle until they could join the sovereigns. The day before they had intended to march on Leipsic; now Blucher's opinion prevailed to move towards the Saale to join the sovereigns back of Leipsic. He was unwilling to give up the Leipsic plan, although he was cutting loose from his communications with Berlin, and must rely upon the country, which, however, was friendly. If he could not reach Leipsic, he might join the sovereigns in the Lützen country; and the gallant old soldier carried out his plans with as much fearlessness as he later did at Waterloo. While it was doubtless

Blucher's courage that was the heart of the matter, Gueisenau's head was in it for an equal amount.

Believing Blucher to be at Düben, Napoleon broke up early on the 9th to march on that place, writing the governor of Torgau: "I march to-day on Düben, to-morrow on Wittenberg. Either I shall deliver battle to the enemy, and with the aid of God I hope to have a complete success, or I shall oblige the enemy to raise the siege of Wittenberg, and I will seize his two bridges at Dessau and Wartenburg; and as he has immense baggage on the left bank, his retreat will be difficult." At the same time Blucher was strung out from Bitterfeld to Mockrehna, and Langeron was to hold Düben until Sacken could come on; but Ney in the afternoon, moving down from Eilenburg, chased Langeron out of Düben, and Sébastiani and Bertrand attacked Sacken, who only joined the other forces by a northerly night circuit. Macdonald was near Mockrehna, Marmont and Reynier approaching Düben, Souham Priestäblich, Bertrand beyond Audenhayn, the emperor and the Guard reaching Eilenburg. Blucher kept up his march towards the Saale, Langeron and Yorck reached Jessnitz and Mühlbeck during the day. On October 10 Blucher crossed at Bitterfeld and Jessnitz, the French feeling his rearguard. He had been smart enough to escape Napoleon, who, indeed, did not know what direction he had taken, nor whether he had crossed the Mulde the more easily to cross the Elbe, or else to make a circuit towards Schwartzenberg; but when, at Düben, the emperor heard from Murat that the sovereigns were advancing, though he might have guessed that Blucher and Bernadotte were moving towards their colleagues, he still held to the belief that they would recross the Elbe in retreat, so soon as he threatened their bridges.

On the 10th, accordingly, Napoleon pushed Macdonald on Wittenberg, Bertrand to Schmiedeberg, Ney to Gräfenhayn-

chen, Reynier via Schköna on Kemberg, Sébastiani on Trebitz; with the Guard, Marmont and Latour-Maubourg he himself reached Düben. Until this day he had made a good effort to get at Blucher and defeat him singly, but now, out of all patience with what he thought was another evasion of battle by this wily soldier, he began working on a wrong theory. He must have been conscious that Schwartzberg was slowly but inevitably drawing nearer Leipsic, and that Murat could not long stave him off. On October 7, at 1 A. M., he had written Berthier: "Murat's principal aim is to be to retard the march of the enemy on Leipsic, never letting himself be cut off from the Mulde, so that we can all approach Leipsic at the same time, keeping the enemy at a distance, or, if necessary, deliver a general battle." He could not give up the idea that Blucher and Bernadotte, unwilling to risk battle, had moved farther down to cross to the right bank, and determined to follow and force them to battle in case they defended the river crossing. And this produced a new strategic idea: to cross the Elbe himself and assume the Dresden-Magdeburg line along the right bank as his line of operations, leaving Murat, who had over sixty thousand men, to hold Schwartzberg in Leipsic, or, failing to do so without a general engagement, to march via Eilenburg to Torgau or Wittenberg, and also cross the Elbe. This would withdraw from Schwartzberg his main objective, Murat's army, and (on the assumption always that Blucher and Bernadotte had passed to the right bank) he would have placed the Elbe between the two allied armies, he holding all the crossings, and be enabled surely to deal with each one single-handed. It was curious that the emperor knew so little of the enemy's movements; but the half-hearted Saxons now were spies rather than allies.

On October 10, during the afternoon, he addressed Berthier: "My Cousin, you will write to Murat that I have . . . raised the blockade of

Wittenberg ; that I have cut off . . . Sacken from . . . Langeron and . . . Yorck ; that I have ordered Arrighi to send away everything which embarrasses him to Eilenburg and Wittenberg ; that Augereau is at Lützen or Leipsic this evening ; that Arrighi . . . united to Augereau will make for the king a reinforcement of . . . thirty thousand men ; that one of two things will happen : I shall to-morrow . . . defeat the enemy, or if he retires, I shall burn his bridges and move over to the right bank. Thus Murat should manœuvre to conserve Leipsic and give me time to beat the Army of Silesia ; but if compelled to leave Leipsic, he is to direct everything to the Mulde ; that the bridges of Eilenburg and Düben are guarded ; that my intention, in this case, is to pass to the right bank of the Elbe, and to manœuvre between Magdeburg and Dresden, debouching by one of my four places to surprise the enemy. Murat should manœuvre in accordance, etc.”

On October 10 Napoleon from Eilenburg told Maret to write to St. Cyr “that my head of column will be to-day at Wittenberg ; that it is possible that to-morrow or day after to-morrow there will be a battle ; that this event passed, I will return towards him. Make him know that you have news from Murat, who is at Altenburg. . . . That . . . I count on his holding Dresden. . . . That if . . . he could not hold himself, . . . St. Cyr can retire on Torgau by one or the other bank ; that if there is a battle and I beat the enemy here, the Austrians will retire within their frontier, and I will approach Torgau by the right bank, . . . and thereupon make a visit to Berlin, but after having disengaged him. If, on the contrary, there is no battle, . . . I may manœuvre by the right bank of the Elbe, because all the projects of the enemy having been founded on movements by the left bank, I also wish to fall on their line of operation ; that the result . . . of to-day and to-morrow may be incalculable ; that I count on his firmness and his prudence. . . . I am in haste to receive information from Leipsic . . . and to know if the enemy is going to the rear or to the front. . . . His great force is between the Mulde and the Saale. It is between the Mulde and the Elbe I am preparing to manœuvre, until new information and the event make me move to the Elbe.” To this letter is appended : “His Majesty is just getting into the saddle, and orders me to sign this letter. BARON FAIN.” A number of letters of Napoleon’s are signed after a similar fashion.

Again he wrote Maret, 3 P. M., October 10 : “My intention is, if Murat is obliged to evacuate Leipsic, to recross the Elbe with all my army, by throwing the Army of Silesia and of Berlin on to the right bank and taking

all the time to destroy them, or if they prefer to abandon their bridges, to leave them on the left bank, and to take my line of operation on the right bank from Dresden to Magdeburg. . . . Send word of this to Paris, so that they may not be astonished at anything the enemy may publish, and that they may know that it is a combined movement on my part to bring the enemy to battle, and to something decisive. . . . It is unnecessary to confide this secret to Murat. You will only let him understand that affairs are going well. . . . But if combined movements do not permit him at this moment to go to Leipsic, that it is preferable that he should come to Wittenberg or Torgau. It is Torgau that St. Cyr is to have in view by one bank or the other, and as soon as I shall have overcome the Army of Silesia, I will manœuvre by the right bank to put myself in communication with St. Cyr." An hour later he wrote Arrighi : "I suppose that Murat, joined to you and Augereau, can hold Leipsic. If it is otherwise, my intention is that the retreat should be made on the Mulde by the bridge of Eilenburg and Düben, and if it becomes necessary, on the Elbe by Wittenberg and Torgau, my project being to entirely disconcert the enemy (in case I should not have time to beat the Army of Berlin before the enemy can reach Leipsic), to give up the entire left bank, and thus have time to destroy this army, having magazines and debouches on Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg and Magdeburg. This demands the greatest secrecy. . . . My intention is, however, and you will make it known to Murat, that Leipsic is not to be abandoned, unless it should be necessary so as not to engage an affair with inferior forces. Choose a good position so as to show it to Murat, assemble your troops and Augereau's to there receive his army." And at the same time he wrote Reynier : "Everything leads one to believe that the Army of Berlin has manœuvred on the Saale, in concert with the movement from Zwickau. As a means of upsetting everything, I will go to the Elbe, where I have the advantage, because I have Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau and Dresden."

This was a handsome conception ; but the emperor's major premise was wrong — that the two allied commanders would recross the Elbe — and his conclusion failed ; for Blucher, by throwing up his line of retreat, marching to join Schwartzenberg, and compelling Bernadotte to stand firm, made it valueless. On the 11th the two allied armies approached the Saale

country. The emperor's intellectual alertness overrode his physical, and the situation led him to devise still another of his brilliant strategic plans. It was a corollary of the proposition of October 10. The Elbe and the Oder were held by his fortresses; the Baltic closed the third side of the quadrangle: if he should draw in Murat and throw himself bodily into this theatre, live on Prussian resources, and close the fourth side on the south, would his enemies have courage enough to play so big a game as to advance on the Rhine? He did not think they would; the Rhine was too well fortified, and the whole business was too risky. Would they not rather return to defend their own base? Blucher and perhaps Bernadotte had escaped him, and were on the Saale, reaching out to the Army of the Sovereigns. Between these two masses the strategic area was now not wide enough for Napoleon to manœuvre; he had worked too slowly to keep them apart. Beyond the Elbe was all the space needed; and while the sovereigns were debating at Leipsic, Napoleon could seize Berlin and destroy the allied detachments which stood in front of Magdeburg, Torgau, Dresden, Glogau, Cüstrin and Stettin, and add the garrisons to his own army. Would not this compel the allies to return to the right bank of the Elbe and to stay there? Napoleon would have two hundred and fifty



Pomeranian Dragoon.

thousand men ; could he not beat the allies in battle with the moral forces in his favor, better than near Leipsic with the moral forces against him ?

But, reports Caulaincourt, Napoleon's marshals protested. The plan seemed wild to them, and his staff begged him to give it up. The troops were not equal to such a campaign ; the cavalry was wanting in numbers and quality. Could the arsenals of Prussia now supply material enough after equipping so large an army ? Were provisions really obtainable ? It was true that by drawing in all the garrisons of the Elbe and the Rhine, Napoleon could march to and fro throughout the lands of his foes ; yet what the Consul Bonaparte might dare, the Emperor Napoleon dared not. But it was a bold, splendid conception.

The emperor continued unstable : he wavered between Wittenberg and Leipsic ; and again, on the 11th, though he believed the enemy to be near Dessau, he could not help seeing that Blucher might have been aiming for the Saale, and in this view still pushed on to Wittenberg to threaten his rear. Reynier and Dombrowski were there to cross the Elbe, Souham to go to Dessau, Bertrand and Sébastiani to Wartenburg to break the bridge, Macdonald in support, and the Guard in reserve at Düben. Marmont was to cross the Mulde at Düben, and guard the approaches to Leipsic. The troops were to reconnoitre on all sides to get in touch with the allies, when they should return to the Elbe. The French advanced, meeting only rearguards, and Marmont saw evidence of the allied movement to the Saale. In the evening news ran in from Murat that on the 10th he had fought the allies : he thought Schwartzenberg might be on the retreat.

Napoleon would not give up hope that his threat to Dessau and Rosslau would induce Bernadotte and Blucher to come back to the protection of Berlin ; but, determined to occupy the

line of the Saale, Blucher had pushed on to Halle and Lobejun, and Bernadotte remained in the Cöthen-Rothenburg country. Tauenzien, left near Dessau to protect the Rosslau and Acken bridges, seeing the French advance on Wittenberg, feared to be cut off from Berlin, and crossed to the right bank at Rosslau. Reynier had also crossed at Wittenberg, and drove an allied detachment observing the place back on Coswig. Macdonald followed to Wittenberg, Bertrand reached Wartenburg, Latour-Maubourg Kemburg.

All this savors of hesitancy, and eye-witnesses testify to the emperor's want of the old vigor which earned him so many victories. Odenleben tells us that he saw him on a sofa in his office at Düben, before a table at which he was idly marking a sheet of paper, while his geographer, d'Albe, and his assistant were waiting for work to be given them. He was looking for reports from the Elbe. Marmont brought him news late on the evening of October 11, and the emperor talked to him until his six o'clock breakfast next morning about the whole situation. "One does not recognize Napoleon during the campaign," Marmont writes. "Instead of being up and about, riding from place to place in the saddle," says Fain, "he remained almost constantly locked in his room, where his bed and his maps had been brought."

These reports must be taken with a grain of allowance. It is questionable whether Napoleon was as inactive as he is sometimes stated to have been during these days. The Correspondence of the 12th and 13th shows considerable activity. Yet St. Cyr asked: "What has become of the man of Marengo?" And it is true that he no longer thought out his plan and issued his orders; he consulted with his *entourage*, he waited to hear what the enemy was doing before he himself acted. On the other hand, the allies, who had constantly acted with prudence in withdrawing from Napoleon when they were

in danger, now that they saw that they could unite, were equally bold. While Napoleon seemed to be beset with alternate lassitude and energy, the allies were acting sanely and steadily.

The Army of the Sovereigns had arrived on the theatre October 6, the Austrians by Chemnitz, the Russians and Prussians by Zwickau, Colloredo and Bennigsen on the right opposite Dresden, and Lichtenstein and Thielemann's light cavalry on the left reaching out to the Saale. On October 7 Wittgenstein was at Altenburg, Klenau at Penig. Next day Schwartzberg was at Chemnitz, Murat in observation at Flöha, but not covering Leipsic. On October 8 Murat moved to the Mulde at Röchlitz between the two great allied columns, which enabled Wittgenstein to debouch from Altenburg on Borna. Murat returned to Frohburg the 9th and to Borna the 10th, where he attacked the Russians and drove them out. October 10 Augereau at Naumburg had met Thielemann and Lichtenstein and forced them back on Zeitz. By the evening of the 11th Napoleon heard of all these movements, but was not clear as to what Bernadotte would do. "What a tangled skein all this is," he said to Marmont; "I alone can untangle it; and even I shall have much difficulty." Indeed, he did not succeed.

About 10 A. M., October 12, Napoleon heard from Murat that instead of retiring, the Army of the Sovereigns during the afternoon of the 11th was moving forward, and that he himself was retiring towards Leipsic. From Ney he heard what led him to the wrong conclusion that Blucher was to join Schwartzberg at Leipsic, and that Bernadotte had recrossed to the right bank of the Elbe to protect Berlin. This would leave him only Schwartzberg and Blucher to fight, a task to which he felt equal, and he kept on with the purpose of destroying Bernadotte's bridges, and then returning to Leipsic for a general battle. Thus having, as he

thought, more time, he ordered Marmont, who had moved to Delitsch to watch Blucher, to draw nearer to Leipsic to assist Murat if needed. During the night of October 11-12 the news that ran in developed so much uncertainty as to the movements of Blucher and Bernadotte that it led the emperor to doubt whether an operation on the right bank was the best one to undertake, and changing his mind, he gave definite orders to concentrate on Leipsic, although he continued to believe that Bernadotte had crossed the Elbe. October 12 and 13 were used in what seemed to him the most important work. But Bernadotte was with Blucher; it was only Tauenzien the French forces were following; the emperor's clear-sightedness had failed him, and he was pursuing a shadow. His ancient power of truly gauging the meaning of the reports running in from the outlying forces had deserted him.

At 9.30 A. M. of the 12th, Napoleon told Berthier to order Ney to Düben, thence to Taucha, where he was to arrive the 14th, "My intention being to deliver battle there with all my force assembled; in consequence he will leave nothing behind;" to order Macdonald to move to Düben where he must arrive the morning of the 14th; to order Reynier and Dombrowski to be in Düben the 13th and at Taucha the 14th; to order Bertrand, Sébastiani and Latour-Maubourg to move at once on Düben. He also ordered Marmont to Taucha, so as to join the Guard within reach of Leipsic. "All my army will start moving in the day of the 12th; it will all have arrived, and I can deliver battle to the enemy with two hundred thousand men," he wrote him at 3.30 P. M.

In the Note he now made, he carefully figures out the marches of all the corps, from the hour at which they would receive the order, so as to show when they ought to reach Taucha. This Note is too characteristic of the great captain to omit.

NOTE ON THE ASSEMBLING OF THE DIFFERENT ARMY CORPS
AT TAUCHA.

DÜBEN, October 12, 1813, 10 A. M.

I give order to Ney to move on Düben. Ney will not receive this order until 2 P. M. His troops will move at 3 o'clock ; they cannot pass the Düben bridge till to-morrow, 13th (the Guard will then have passed it); they can be the 13th in the evening without difficulty at Taucha.

Latour-Maubourg being at Kenburg, there is also no difficulty with him.

Macdonald will not receive the order till 3 P. M. If he has crossed the Elbe bridge, he will need the night to recross ; he will not be in Düben till to-morrow, 13th, and during the 14th he will march on Taucha.

Reynier, who is marching on Rosslau, cannot be at Wittenberg before to-night. He might reach Taucha the 15th. He can come by way of Eilenburg.

The same applies to Sébastiani.

As to Mortier, and Oudinot, and the Guard reserve, all that will pass Düben bridge to-day, and will be to-morrow at Taucha at an early hour.

Murat is to-day, 12th, at Crobern ; he will be to-morrow, 13th, at Leipsic or at Taucha, where I shall have arrived to-morrow with Curial, the Old and the Young Guard, and Marmont, which with Murat's will make near 90,000 men.

These . . . will be reinforced during to-morrow, 13th, on which of necessity the enemy cannot attack, by Ney, Bertrand and Latour-Maubourg.

The 15th all our army will be assembled.

To-morrow, 13th, the enemy will arrive at Crobern ; he will know that the Grand Army has arrived. The day of the 14th will be passed in marshaling for battle. I then have the 13th and 14th to assemble. I say more : even if the whole army were at Düben, it could not arrive before, unless it had five or six debouches.

Murat is at Crobern the 12th, Marmont at Lindenhayn ; they can be to-morrow at Taucha in good position. My Guard, to-day at Düben and Eilenburg, will be to-morrow easily at Taucha. Oudinot and Mortier will be to-day at Düben with Ornano, Walther and Latour-Maubourg.

To-morrow all that will be at Taucha.

I will then have to-morrow, at Taucha, in first line : Murat, . . . the garrison of Leipsic, . . . Marmont, . . . the Guard, . . . Latour-Maubourg, . . . total nearly 120,000 men.

In second line, Macdonald this evening at Kamburg, to-morrow at Düben ; Ney this evening at Gräfenhaynchen, to-morrow at Düben ; Bertrand to-morrow at Düben ; Sébastiani to-morrow at Düben ; Dombrowski and Reynier, the 13th, to-morrow, half-way to Düben.

The 14th all can join me: Macdonald, . . . Ney, . . . Bertrand, . . . Sébastiani . . . Dombrowski and Reynier. . . .

Thus in first line nearly 120,000 men, second line 70,000 men, total nearly 190,000 men.

The Note details the strength of each corps.

In order to be sure of his calculations, the emperor wrote to Murat the afternoon of October 12:—

“Can you without compromising yourself hold the entire day of to-morrow, 13th, your position and Leipsic? . . . You will be increased by eighty thousand men whom I will bring up, and the 14th all the rest of the army. We shall have in the morning of the 15th two hundred thousand men. . . . I think that the whole Berlin army has recrossed to the right bank, and that thus we can deliver battle without it.” And on the same day in the evening: “I count that you have actually sixty thousand men. Marmont will be to-night within four leagues of Leipsic. If I do not decide to go there myself, I will send him to you, which will make you eighty-five or ninety thousand men ; with that you ought to be able to gain several days. A good *ruse* would be to have salvos fired as a rejoicing for victory over the other army. You might also have a feigned review passed, as if I were there, and have *Vive l'Empereur!* shouted. . . . It is of great importance to hold Leipsic. . . . They say that towards Schkeuditz is a good position to take against an army coming from Halle ; have the ground reconnoitred.” And on October 13, 6 A. M., to Macdonald: “Murat with ninety thousand men is covering Leipsic against the Austrian army. . . . The Army of Silesia, according to all information, is apparently rallying on Halle. We are at a very important moment. I believe the battle will take place the 15th or 16th. If all the Army of Berlin has passed to the right bank, as they assure us, we should be disembarassed of forty thousand men.”

The orders for carrying out the movement do not appear to have been issued by Berthier until during the succeeding night.

This Note shows how each corps would march and when

it would reach Leipsic. On the 13th there would be one hundred and twenty thousand, on the 14th one hundred and ninety thousand men there. On the 13th the Sovereigns would reach Crobern and learn that the Grand Army had arrived. The 14th would be consumed in marshaling the forces, which gave additional time to assemble. But despite his decision on the 12th to concentrate on Leipsic, Napoleon did not arrest the movements of the corps on the Elbe. Reynier continued his march on Rosslau against Tauenzien, and this officer, seeing Ney also advancing on Dessau, broke the bridge and retired by a night march to Zerbst.

Although the emperor's belief that Bernadotte was on the right bank and Blucher alone at Halle led him to deduct forty thousand men from the allied aggregate he should have to meet at Leipsic, yet in looking over the theatre, he grew nervous about Murat and sent a courier to ascertain his status. Meanwhile Blucher occupied Halle and Merseburg and got in touch with Schwartzberg, thus fully establishing his army on the French communications back to the Rhine. However nervous Bernadotte had been for days, when Napoleon started on the way to Leipsic, he was satisfied. The conduct of Blucher during this week, in persisting at whatever risk in rejoining Schwartzberg, is in the highest degree praiseworthy, and peculiarly so in that he deceived Napoleon, who should have followed him, but did not. Bernadotte was less dangerous. Meanwhile the Army of the Sovereigns had slowly advanced, Murat retiring before it in excellent order.

Napoleon seemed to have concluded that there was nothing left to do except to march on Leipsic and fight there; and yet, on the doctrine of numbers, this was equally to invite destruction, for the enemy was concentrating his entire force there, and was in ample season. The opportunities of the French interior lines had been forfeited; there was scant time

left for manœuvring. Whether it was a question of a last battle effort or not, the allies had outmanœuvred the great captain, and stood in full force across his line of retreat with their own open: he was in as bad a case as he had ever placed one of his enemies. And he alone was to blame. Even on the 11th he might have marched on Grimma, or some other point near by, have joined Murat and with him fallen on Schwartzenberg before Blucher and Bernadotte, properly contained, could come up, or he might have attacked the latter, or even drawn in Murat and marched on Berlin. But he had taken no specific action, he had waited and waited, and Dame Fortune will not smile on those who stand and wait, in war or in any other business. It is not the service she demands. The emperor's old power of acting by instinct on a soundly conceived strategic plan, marching straight on the most sensitive part of the enemy's position, and modifying his plan only as he found the enemy's operations antagonistic to it, seemed to have passed from him. He was no longer conducting war as he had taught his enemies to do it. The allied commanders were putting to use against him — though inexpertly and slowly — his own methods. He had wasted the time which for a week past had been more than ever of the essence.

Napoleon's dispositions in the early days of October had been excellent, to move down the Mulde and attack Blucher and Bernadotte, while containing Schwartzenberg by Murat. His purpose to move to the right bank of the Elbe was less immediately practical. Instead, however, of moving down the right bank to the mouth of the Mulde, knowing, as he did



Hanoverian
Infantryman.

at Düben, October 10, that Blucher was moving across the river to join Bernadotte, it seems clear that he could have done better to file to the left himself across the Mulde and force Blucher and Bernadotte back into the angle of the Saale and Elbe, where he could fight them *au fond*, and thus prevent their moving up the Saale towards Schwartzberg. If Bernadotte had recrossed the Elbe, so much the easier task. After learning the facts, the rest of the 10th could have been employed in assembling the troops, and early the 11th the Mulde could have been crossed and the whole army have advanced on this errand. If, against such a manœuvre, Blucher and Bernadotte had sought to cross the Elbe, they could have been all but destroyed; and if part of them got across and moved towards Berlin, Napoleon with his bridge at Wittenberg could then follow them up on the right bank. If they had striven to move up the Saale, Marmont, already at Delitsch, could have prevented their reaching Halle. If they crossed the Saale below Halle, they could also be roughly handled during the operation, and a comparatively small army could then contain them, while Napoleon moved up to Leipsic to deliver battle to Schwartzberg, before Bennigsen could come up. If, however, Blucher and Bernadotte managed to reach Halle, it was then time enough to move over to the right bank, avoid a general battle, draw in Murat and St. Cyr, and base on Magdeburg and Hamburg.

Halle was a strategic knot, "and one must be astonished," says Grouard, "that Napoleon, who formerly had so well appreciated the importance of Stradella before Marengo, of Donauwörth before Ulm, and the defile of Kösen before Jena, had not been struck by it; for if he had been able to prevent the Army of Silesia from arriving there by throwing it back on the lower Saale, he would be almost sure to be able to return against Schwartzberg before Blucher could sus-

tain him." Had Marmont, early October 11, been directed from Delitsch to Landsberg, sustained in force, this could have been accomplished. Up to the 10th Napoleon had the chance of beating each body of the enemy separately. Had Blucher been seriously worsted, Schwartzenberg would have retired, and a vigorous pursuit would have much unsettled him. But after this date Napoleon had no chance of fighting his enemies separately, nor indeed to advantage.

Instead of going to Leipsic, Napoleon ought to have avoided battle. He would have done much better, even on the 14th, to attack Blucher and Bernadotte, and turn that flank of his enemies so as to reach the Rhine. By manœuvring in that direction Blucher and Bernadotte would have either been separated from Schwartzenberg, or they would have joined him up river so as to open the road for the French. St. Cyr should have been ordered out of Dresden by the right bank to Torgau and to cross to join the army, which he could have done by the 15th, or else to escape towards Magdeburg. Had Napoleon sharply demonstrated against Blucher and Bernadotte to hold them in place, he had ample time to take up St. Cyr, to destroy Blucher and Bernadotte, who were bound to be slow, and then move against Schwartzenberg with all his forces. If he failed in this, he would still have been able to draw in Murat, cross to the right bank of the Elbe and move on Magdeburg. Done with Napoleonic vigor, this might have enabled him to be rid of his enemies for a while, and one may even imagine the allies so deliberate and puzzled as to enable him to draw in the garrisons of the Oder. But Napoleon always took risks and acted the grand part, and he was doing so now. All this again is academic, and these suggested manœuvres required what Napoleon no longer exhibited, the activity of 1805 and 1806. Yet nothing suggested could have resulted worse than what he did do.

Interior lines are not always available against a superior enemy, for he may surround you. A central position is excellent as a strategic place of assembly, from which to march against an enemy divided by considerable distance; but as a tactical position for battle, it may fail. From his central position Napoleon should have moved against Schwartzberg, or Blucher and Bernadotte singly, or else have got away, after calling in St. Cyr, Murat and Davout. On the 10th he committed two errors: not to have followed Blucher, and

then not to have manœuvred away from Leipsic. On the 15th he had strategically lost the battle, for Blucher and Bernadotte would in all probability join the sovereigns. But despite this failure, interior lines have none the less their eminent value, as Napoleon had demonstrated in his first and other campaigns, and would again, in 1814 and 1815.



Swiss Guard.

At noon on the 13th the French corps began heading for Leipsic, and Napoleon heard that Bernadotte was at Bernburg. Worse still, he heard that his old and constant ally, Bavaria, had finally been compelled to turn against him; and though this would not affect the immediate situation, it had a direct moral effect on the battle to be fought. The troops on the Inn had joined the Austrians, and were to march towards the Rhine. All Germany was now his enemy, and Jerome had been chased from his Westphalian kingdom. His delays had steadily worked against him instead of in his favor, and nothing but a great victory could save the situation. He had sent the greater part of his forces in a wrong direction, and as he was to fight at Leipsic, he must have three days to assemble them there for battle. Meanwhile it seems as if he should have

hidden his movement on Leipsic; have kept Marmont at Delitsch, and filed the army behind the curtain so formed; instead of which, by sending Marmont to Leipsic, he disclosed it to Blucher. On the 14th Blucher remained in Halle, having no purpose to march on Leipsic and there meet the French single-handed. Had Marmont, duly supported, been used to fend him off the 14th and 15th, Napoleon might then have drawn Marmont in, leaving a slender curtain to contain Blucher, and have fought Schwartzemberg the 16th with a strong show of victory. For Blucher was cautious until he was certain that Schwartzemberg was ready to join in the attack on the emperor.

In the Bulletin of the Grand Army, October 15, we read that

“After having thus seized all the enemy’s bridges, the emperor’s project was to pass the Elbe to manœuvre on the right bank from Hamburg to Dresden, to menace Potsdam and Berlin, and to take for centre of operations Magdeburg, which with this view had been provisioned in munitions of war and food. But on the 13th the emperor learned at Düben that the Bavarian army had joined the Austrian army and menaced the lower Rhine. This inconceivable defection led him to foresee the defection of other princes, and made the emperor adopt the part of falling back to the Rhine, an annoying change, because everything had been prepared to operate on Magdeburg. But it would have necessitated remaining separate from and without communication with France for a month. This had no difficulties at the moment when the emperor had determined his project; it was no longer the same when Austria was going to have disposable two fresh armies: the Bavarian army and the army opposed to Bavaria. The emperor then changed with these unforeseen circumstances, and carried his headquarters to Leipsic.”

But while this loading of the entire blame on Bavaria was a good excuse for a Paris audience, it cannot shift the responsibility from the emperor’s shoulders. Whether it was this defection that made Napoleon march on Leipsic, or the hope that he could keep the allies apart and still fight each army

singly, will ever be debated. It is probably the latter, for he did not definitely hear of the defection till the 13th, whereas he gave his orders to march on Leipsic the 12th. Yet Marbot says that the King of Wurtemberg wrote Napoleon several days before the 13th that Bavaria was about to abandon him. He may have feared it.

But the causes lay deeper than this. As Hannibal gradually taught his Roman foemen how to conduct war on methodical and intelligent lines, so that men like Marcellus, the Consul Nero and Scipio finally learned how to meet him, so had Bonaparte during the past dozen years been educating the generals of Europe until they too fathomed his method; and as he declined in numbers and they increased, they were able to lay him low. He had fashioned the sword to smite himself, and his procrastination had handed it to his antagonist.

To crudely summarize the facts, Napoleon started for Leipsic in the belief that Bernadotte was on the right bank, and when he shortly learned that he was not, he yet moved towards Leipsic, first because, though Bernadotte was on the Saale, he hoped to get through with Schwartzenberg before he could get up, and perhaps even before Blucher could do so. Second, he had been so long and impatiently awaiting battle, that having great faith in what he could do, and perhaps out of patience in trying so long to secure it, he cast prudence — the one thing he now needed — to the winds. He himself had not yet been beaten in battle; only his lieutenants had been. Third, he imagined that he could come to battle when and how he pleased. "I shall not deliver battle except when I desire," he said to Marmont in the night of October 11-12. "They will never dare attack me." A fatal error!

At this moment the emperor put into effect a new method of drawing up his troops. To Murat he wrote October 13:—

“I yesterday issued an Order of the Day that all my infantry should be placed in two ranks; put it at once into execution. I do not wish that it shall any longer stand in three ranks. The fire of the third rank, the bayonet of the third rank are insignificant, and when it goes into columns by division, each battalion will find itself formed in column of six ranks, not counting the three ranks of file closers. That is more than sufficient, and it has the great advantage that a battalion of five hundred men will appear to the enemy to have seven hundred and fifty men, which will have a very good effect at this moment, when the enemy does not know this new order; and it will make him gauge the army a third stronger than it is. An hour after the reception of this order, let everything be arranged thus.”


The same was written to Marmont, and through Berthier to the rest of the army. How the sudden change worked, we do not know; in the battle the troops fought well.

On the 12th Murat had occupied a strong position behind the Goselbach, covered by Pajol and Kellermann, the right under Poniatowski near Crobern, the centre under Victor near Güldengossa, the left under Lauriston at Stormthal and beyond, the reserve under Marmont at Stötteritz. Here he received Napoleon's notice of his immediate march on Leipsic, and, replying that he would hold a position in its front until the 14th, proceeded to throw up some field-works. Marmont was ready to lend a hand by the 13th, and Augereau brought him two divisions and some cavalry, giving Murat five army corps, with sufficient horse. The emperor hurried forward his own forces, writing on the 14th to Ney: “It is probable that we shall be attacked to-morrow at Leipsic. If you hear the cannon to-morrow, redouble your march.” But Murat, lest he should be drawn into battle with superior forces, and assuming that Napoleon would strike Blücher and Bernadotte on the north of Leipsic before coming up to reinforce his own line on the Goselbach, conceived the project of retiring behind the Partha, while holding Leipsic as a sort of bridge-head; and

when Napoleon ordered Marmont on Schkeuditz to watch Halle, Murat began its execution on the 13th. In this withdrawal, which conflicted with the general plan, he was arrested near Liebertwolkowitz by one of Napoleon's dispatches. But the allies at once took possession of the important crossings along the Goselbach, and on the 14th advanced upon Murat in a general reconnoissance. To repair his error, Murat held Liebertwolkowitz, and went forward beyond the heights of Wachau, striving to reach Magdeborn; Barclay put in his cavalry; and against this the French dragoons, fresh from Spain, did such excellent work, that despite Pahlen's fine manœuvring and the heavy charges of the Russian reserve, the French held on, and Murat was near to victory; but at the last moment a charge of Prussian cuirassiers decided the combat for the allies. The engagement was partial, and the Army of the Sovereigns took no advantage of it.

On the 14th, while Blucher was still at Halle and Merseburg, and Bernadotte at Rothenburg, the belated French corps were all in full march on Taucha. Bertrand reached Eutritzsch, Latour-Maubourg Radefeld, Macdonald got well on towards Taucha, Souham passed Düben, the Young Guard was in Widderitsch, Marmont at Lindenthal. Reynier was getting back to the left bank; unable to cross at Rosslau on Bernadotte's pontoon bridge, he had to go up to Wittenberg, which delayed him two marches. Yet so soon as he had determined to concentrate on Leipsic, the emperor had shown that he could bring along his troops better than the allies. Leaving Düben early in the day, he reached Leipsic at noon, established headquarters at Reudnitz, and after riding around the city, took up a position south of the Wurzen road, where he could watch the course of Murat's fight. He would have liked to bring on a general engagement on the 15th before Blucher and Bernadotte could arrive, but his dispersed corps

could not get up in season; the roads were encumbered with marching divisions and their trains. Detachments held Eilenburg, Wurzen and Taucha. In the evening the emperor called his corps commanders together, and exhibited his dissatisfaction with the status by serious fault-finding with some of



Battle of Leipsic, October 16.

his marshals. To Augereau he said that he was not the old soldier of Castiglione, to which Augereau replied that with the old soldiers of Italy he would still show him what he was.

Up to mid-October the allies had avoided the battle which Napoleon had sought to thrust upon them; but when they

marched upon Leipsic, it was evident that the supreme moment had come. Still, for Napoleon battle was no longer so desirable — strategically or tactically: the circumstances were different; Bavaria, his ally of many years, had taken sides against him, the Confederation of the Rhine seemed ready for dissolution, and the position of the allied armies threatened to close the road back to France. It had become a question whether he could save himself, not whether he could defeat his enemies.

Early on the 15th Murat reported the details of the battle of the day before. About ten Napoleon and he rode to Liebertwolkowitz, took their stand on a hill to its west, and placed the oncoming corps on the field where the great captain had decided to fight against Europe in arms. Lauriston was placed at Liebertwolkowitz, Victor at Wachau, Poniatowski at Markleeberg and Dösen, with his right flank thrown back in a crotchet to face the Pleisse River and the lowlands as far as Connewitz. Augereau's corps was placed at Zuckelhausen. Macdonald was to come up and take post on the left astride the Colditz road. The entire Old and Young Guard was in general reserve nearer Leipsic, at Reudnitz and Grottendorf. Back of Dösen stood the Polish cavalry corps of Kellermann; Latour-Maubourg's was farther to the left at Zweinaundorf; Pajol's in front of Holzhausen. Northerly of Leipsic, Bertrand was at Eutritzsch, Marmont at Lindenthal. Two of Souham's divisions had got to Mockau; the third was still on the way from Düben. West of Leipsic, at Lindenau, the only outlet for retreat, a small force under Margaron (later reinforced by Bertrand) held the road. Macdonald was passing through Taucha, Sébastiani marching thither, and Reynier had now reached Düben. Arrighi was in command in Leipsic.

Napoleon rode the new lines during the afternoon, and especially examined the ground in front of Poniatowski along the Pleisse. His reports led him to believe that Bernadotte

was at Merseburg, and he looked for Blucher on the Weisenfels road. The Army of the Sovereigns he assumed to be stretched out between Naundorf and Crobern. But in reality Blucher was advancing on the Halle road and had passed Schkeuditz, as indeed Marmont had reported, but Napoleon refused to credit; while Bernadotte stood in support on the line Wettin-Petersburg-Zörbig, with van at Oppin. Schwartzberg's right wing was in the Pommers-Güldengossa-Magdeborn country; his left wing was across the Pleisse and Elster, part being near Lützen and Markkränstadt; his reserve lay back of Audigast.

On October 15 in the evening Napoleon had strategically lost the campaign. He had started after the armistice with four hundred thousand to meet five hundred thousand men. He was ending with a battle in which on the first day he would be outnumbered, and on the second he could put only two hundred thousand against three hundred and twenty thousand. As the acceptance of the armistice was a fatal political error, so the emperor's military conduct since the middle of August had been faulty. Whence proceeded these defects it is difficult to explain, except on one of two hypotheses: either that Napoleon was no longer the same energetic man, or that having for the first time adopted the defensive on a large scale, he had not clearly worked out in his mind the method of conducting a campaign on interior lines. He did not take up the defensive on the Elbe, with centre at Dresden, for the purpose of defending Saxony, but for the purpose of destroying his adversaries or bringing them to his terms by one or more decisive victories; and he had not adopted the means at hand to bring this about. As he had shown as early as 1796 that he understood the offensive value of interior lines, the first hypothesis seems the more probable. Except Macdonald's defeat at the Katzbach, the other disasters (at Gross

Beeren and Kulm and Dennewitz) were distinctly the emperor's fault, and it may be said that Macdonald, in being ordered forward to Jauer, was also hampered in his movements. All the advantage won in the battle of Dresden was lost in the minor defeats, and these seem to be traceable to Napoleon's failure to carry out his own rules. Interior lines are advantageous only when utilized. If you take up interior lines and wait for a superior enemy to surround you in them, they possess no advantage. To utilize interior lines certain things are essential: 1st, you must attack and not remain quiet. 2d, you must attack at one place at a time, so as to transfer thither the bulk of your forces from your central position. You must not make several isolated attacks. 3d, when you attack, you must drive the attack home, so as to disable the enemy at that point from usefulness for some time. 4th, you must by these means keep your enemies at such a distance that your central strategic offensive position shall not be turned into a tactical surrounding by superior forces. 5th, you must never depend on a town unless it is a fortress capable of resisting for a long period.

Napoleon did not in 1813 act according to these, his own, principles, as we have seen. By initiating several attacks at once so that they could not be properly carried through, he lost the force of all of them. He did not push home any one of his attacks where he commanded in person. He could on at least three occasions have destroyed Blucher, as he could after Dresden have destroyed Schwartzberg. He was continually conceiving brilliant manœuvres, and never putting any of them to use. Instead of keeping the allies at a distance, he unconcernedly sat down in worthless Dresden and waited for them to surround him. And in going to Leipsic to fight a battle, he deliberately committed strategic suicide. Any manœuvre was better.

On learning of Napoleon's return to Leipsic, lest he should turn on and crush Blucher, the sovereigns determined to force a battle on the 16th, though Bennigsen and Colloredo could not get up until the next day. They hoped less for a decisive victory than to keep the French in place until all their forces could join for a second struggle, and for this they were ready to pay a price. Schwartzenberg had conceived the queer idea of advancing on Leipsic with a large part of the allied mass between the Pleisse and the Elster, via Connewitz over the Moorfeld, an open low-lying meadow-land, having no outlet to the north except one bridge, which debouched into the midst of the French army; while the right under Barclay should advance on the Pleisse right bank. This abnormal tactical manœuvre would have exposed Barclay to the whole French army, and brought on certain defeat; the czar saw its danger, and forbade the Russians and Prussians to be thus placed; and as a result, Schwartzenberg led his Austrians into the Connewitz trap, while Kleist and Wittgenstein in the centre and Klenau on the right — all under Barclay — remained on the east bank. Giulay was detached by way of Zwenkau to seize the road from Leipsic to Merseburg.

This plan spread the allies too much. With Blucher and Bernadotte at Halle, they would have better marched on Zeitz and joined hands on the French communications, while Bennigsen could march from Colditz on Altenburg to cover the road to Bohemia during the operation. But the sovereigns were not clear as to what Blucher and Bernadotte were doing, and were partly manœuvring in the dark.

Bennigsen was fast approaching. From October 9 to 13 he had advanced via Peterswalde and Dippoldiswalde, thrown back St. Cyr, and by way of Nossen reached Waldheim the 15th. Between Bernadotte and Bennigsen were one hundred and twenty thousand men, who could come into line October 17.

On October 16 Napoleon would only have before him Schwartzemberg with one hundred and sixty thousand men to his own one hundred and twenty-five thousand, and Blucher with sixty thousand to oppose Marmont with twenty thousand; but thirty thousand men under Bertrand, Souham and Dombrowski, all under Ney, were coming up. The allies had behind them large reserves, Napoleon had not. The French morale was still good, the allied morale had risen immensely during the last six weeks, and they were willing to risk defeat in view of the reserves sustaining them.

Meanwhile St. Cyr with his two corps was holding useless Dresden, while he might have well turned the tables at Leipsic. Some twenty thousand men of Bennigsen's were there containing him.

All included, the allies thus largely outnumbered the French; but for a battle south of Leipsic on the 16th, the forces were not unequal, especially as the French had interior lines. Only Reynier would not be up, and Napoleon would marshal about one hundred and seventy-five thousand men, while the allies would put only two hundred and twenty thousand men in line; for neither Bernadotte nor Bennigsen could get up. Had Napoleon kept St. Cyr and Lobau with the army, he would have had as many men as the allies. While this near equality was valid for the 16th, the enemy could within two days concentrate an overwhelming superiority, as Napoleon could not. Unless won on the 16th, the battle would clearly result in defeat.

The strategic plan of the allies, to march straight on Napoleon's army while conserving their own line of retreat on Bohemia, was a good one: but the tactical idea of marshaling forty thousand men between the Pleisse and the Elster was a lapse hard to explain. If Napoleon was to be headed off from retreat, Giulay alone at Lindenau could do this long enough

for the rest to come up by filing to the left; and it needed but a division to keep touch with Giulay. Not expecting such an advance, Napoleon did not at first discover it: to his eye the high land at Wachau was the point to which to devote his attention. Ney had been intrusted with the command



Lobau.

north of Leipsic, having his own corps under Souham, and those of Bertrand and Marmont. The reports and all the probabilities were that Blucher would move to Merseburg to get in touch with the Army of the Sovereigns, and then attack from there; but as he might advance in whole or in part straight from Halle via Schkeuditz, Napoleon had to provide against both contingencies.

Now, the emperor had depended on drawing in two of Ney's corps for his massed blow on Wachau. Souham, on the way from Düben, was to relieve Marmont near Möckern, where the latter had intrenched a fine position, and Marmont and Bertrand were then to come down to the main line, so as

to give Napoleon over forty thousand additional men, with whom to deliver his decisive blow towards the end of the day. With Schwartzberg's error in placing the Austrians where they were of no use, this reinforcement, properly arriving, should have led to a defeat of the enemy. But things no longer worked Napoleon's way. As formerly at Bautzen, and later at Waterloo, he was destined to find Ney wanting. On Giulay's approach, the small body at Lindenau had to be reinforced, and Ney sent Bertrand thither, thus diverting him from the main line at Liebertwolkowitz, towards which at ten o'clock he was marching. Marmont had not yet been relieved by Souham, who had been delayed at the Mulde crossing, and could not come up as early as expected; nor, when Blucher put in an appearance, could Marmont leave without endangering Leipsic, and he felt bound to hold himself between Möckern and Eutritzsich. Neither could Ney spare him, as he was familiar with his position; but in lieu of his corps, Ney detached two of Souham's divisions, so soon as they arrived. Thus the large reinforcement on which Napoleon had counted for his massed blow on Wachau was not to reach him; and he must more than once have longed for St. Cyr and Lobau, lost in the purposeless defense of Dresden.

There was still another view to take. Suppose Ney's line were drawn upon heavily, this marshal, with even a handful, although the chances were against him, might possibly fend Blucher off from Leipsic during the day; for Blucher was not yet quite ready, and Ney had done some wonderful work of this kind in the past; and even if Blucher seized the town, provided Napoleon could positively beat Schwartzberg, as would then be probable, the harm could be rectified, for Blucher would have smartly decamped. If, however, Napoleon were defeated, without Ney to fall back upon, the defeat would become a rout, and this neglect of Leipsic be fatal. It

was clearly a risk. Yet, with these additional forces, added to the allies' errors, Napoleon might have turned their right and driven them up against the Pleisse, on the other side of which Schwartzberg would have stood, an idle spectator of the disaster. This plan would not only have earned a decisive victory, but by throwing the Army of the Sovereigns back on Zeitz, would have opened a new line of retreat for the French via Naumburg; and Blucher might then take Leipsic and welcome. Still (though within the compass of Napoleon's former vigor), all this was a hypothesis — *Kriegspiel* rather than actual war. Had Napoleon won, it would have been but one more victory to add to Lützen and Bautzen and Dresden; for Blucher, Bernadotte and Schwartzberg would again have assembled with two hundred and fifty thousand men, after Bennigsen and Colloredo had come up.

As at Waterloo, Napoleon's winning could only delay the event, while a retreat via Naumburg would have abandoned the French train, now at Eilenburg. It was a big game to play, and a handsome one, this disgarnishing of Leipsic to beat Schwartzberg, and in the true Napoleonic style. But with Russia, Austria, Prussia and the rest of the allies all of one mind, could Napoleon, by even another half-dozen victories, divert the current which had so decidedly set against him?

Meanwhile Davout was practically as useless as the garrisons on the Oder and beyond; and Walmoden moved skillfully around Hamburg, aided by the anti-French fervor of the population. It does not seem that, in this year and the next two, the emperor made proper use of this marshal's exceptional talent, which had so often turned the tide of victory towards the French eagles.

LXIV.

LEIPSIK BATTLE. OCTOBER 16-19, 1813.

THE battle of Leipsic was a series of heavy fights around the city, rather than one general engagement in which grand-tactics was employed. On October 16 Blucher defeated Ney northwest of Leipsic; on the west the lines of retreat were held against the allied forces; on the south Napoleon fought Schwartzberg. The allies here were ill handled, being separated by the Pleisse. At the key-point east of the Pleisse, the emperor's forces outnumbered the allies, while Schwartzberg was to the west of it. The fighting was obstinate and costly, and Marmont, who was to come down and clinch the victory, did not reach the field. The battle here was drawn, but owing to Ney's defeat, Napoleon had to narrow his lines. His only safety was in promptly moving to the Rhine; and during the succeeding night he should have prepared to withdraw through Leipsic to Naumburg and Erfurt; but he determined to fight another battle, although allied reinforcements were placing him at an utter disadvantage. On October 17 the allies amended their position, and on the 18th again attacked. The French withdrew to a position closer to and surrounding Leipsic. On this day the fight was still more desperate, and at a critical moment the Saxons went over to the enemy. The French held themselves with difficulty. There was but one main bridge from Leipsic west. Several other bridges should have been built; but for lack of proper orders or a staff which could attend to details, this was not done. At evening of October 18 retreat was imperative, but Napoleon's dispositions lacked vigor. Early the 19th the French fought in retreat, corps by corps, into the city and towards the one bridge, the allies following. By ill management the bridge was blown up before all the troops were over, and twenty thousand men were captured. The French retreated. Instead of pursuing, the allies slowly followed. The Bavarians moved up to cut Napoleon's retreat on the Main, but were defeated at Hanau, and then the French army, in almost as pitiful a condition as in Russia, made its way across the Rhine, ending the campaign with an epidemic of typhus.

THE battle of Leipsic, rather than one great engagement, was a series of desperate conflicts around the city, in which half a million of men and two thousand guns were engaged.

The field was not favorable to the French, as Leipsic was the lowest part of the theatre of action ; and especially perilous was the crossing to Lindenau, made awkward by the fall rains, which softened the meadows and filled the streams.

The city of Leipsic lies on the right bank of the Elster, at the point where the Pleisse runs into it. Between the rivers, for several miles above and below the city, lies low meadow-land, where the footing is rarely firm, and marsh land. On the north of the city comes in from the east a smaller stream, the Partha. The only outlet from Leipsic to the west, towards Merseburg and Weissenfels, is over a long causeway bridge that crosses the several arms of the two rivers, making a network of streams and marsh that cannot be passed unbridged ; and at the western end of this long bridge is Lindenau. The road to Halle runs across the Partha and north of the river. All around the city, on the right bank, the ground is open and rolling, with an occasional high knoll commanding the country, with good roads radiating in every direction, and numerous small farm roads connecting these, available for all arms. Many villages dot the landscape, mostly of the long, straggling, one-street variety, and all so built as to be capable of stout defense, as are also several sheep-farms, with walled inclosures. Despite small brooks and ponds, troops can move at will in all directions ; but the rivers are bridged only at some of the villages, and cannot be forded. There were in 1813 a few woods, not interfering with manœuvres ; but ten miles south of the city was a large stretch of woodland known as the University Forest. Natural obstacles being absent, the villages became the most important features of this theatre, on which was to take place the Battle of the Nations.

The battle of October 16 was fought out at three points : to the north of Leipsic, where Blucher, coming from Halle, attacked Marmont, Ney being in supreme command at this

part of the field ; to the west, where Giulay, an allied flying left wing, strove to take Lindenau, so as to control the one direct line of retreat now left the French ; to the south, where Napoleon hoped by equal numbers and superior tactics to break down the defense of the Army of the Sovereigns. Let us consider these in succession.

Marmont had drawn up with his left at Möckern and part of his right at Eutritzsch, and about noon the Polish division under Dombrowski came up on his right and occupied Gross and Klein Widderitsch, making a force of nearly thirty thousand men, covering the road from Düben. Ney had seven divisions north of the Partha, — an ample force ; but some had not arrived as the battle opened, and there was not time to get them well in hand. Moreover, the danger that Souham and Reynier, coming up from Düben and Eilenburg, might be cut off, made Ney anxious for his right flank. As already narrated, Marmont had expected to move south to the Liebertwolkowitz lines, but Blucher's early attack prevented his so doing. In his advance, Yorck, Blucher's van, ran across the French outlying posts at Radefeld, Freyroda and Lindenthal, and succeeded, about 1 P. M., in driving them back on the main line. But as Yorck came on towards Möckern, he found the French resistance spirited. Here were stationed the French marines ; their conduct was exemplary, and it was only after heavy losses that he managed by five to capture the village, and push Marmont back on Göhlis and Eutritzsch. The stubbornness of the fighting is shown by the French loss of twenty guns and four thousand men, while Yorck lost over a third of his twenty thousand men. Late at night a Cossack dash carried off a French artillery park of thirty pieces more. Blucher slept on the field. On Ney's right, too, the fighting had been severe. The Widderitsch villages were captured by Langeron ; but Delmas' division of Souham's corps oppor-

tinely came up from Düben with the 3d Corps artillery, and drove out the Prussians, who lost the opportunity of cutting it off. The other two Souham divisions, twelve thousand strong, Ney dispatched to reinforce Napoleon's line, though hard-pressed Marmont pleaded for them. They might as well have been kept north of the Partha, for they arrived too late to aid Napoleon, marching and countermarching all day without getting under fire; for on hearing of Marmont's strait, Napoleon turned these divisions back, lest he should forfeit Leipsic, the outlet on which he counted. Bertrand had also started about ten o'clock to join Napoleon, when Arrighi, in command of the city, fearing for its safety as he saw the approach of Giulay's corps from Lützen, sent him an earnest call to come to the defense of Lindenau with his fifteen thousand men, which he did. Giulay first captured Leutsch about noon; an hour later he forced his way into Plagwitz, and at two the southerly part of Lindenau was lost. But on receipt of orders from Napoleon to hold Lindenau at all hazards, Bertrand put in his last man, and managed to push Giulay beyond Plagwitz. Thus for the day Leipsic was made secure, but at the expense of the emperor's reinforcement for his main line — that is, at the expense of victory.

At the critical point, south of the city, it was the emperor's intention to take the initiative and himself attack; he waited until about 9 A. M. for the fog to lift, and then the allies anticipated him. They were growing in audacity as they found that their numbers told. "Meervelt," says Schwartzberg in his report, continued his advance between the Elster and Pleisse "from Pegau through Zwenkau, in the direction of Connewitz," and "Wittgenstein advanced with the corps of Kleist and Klenau through Crobern and Guldengossa on Liebertwolkowitz." West of the Pleisse Schwartzberg thus had nearly forty thousand men; east of it Barclay with

sixty-four thousand occupied a front from Crobern to Gross Possna and beyond, with twenty thousand men in reserve, and the allies were faced by about one hundred and fifteen thousand French. Counting Schwartzenberg as neutralized for the day in the Moorfeld, Napoleon possessed a superiority, — especially if his reinforcements came up, — and now was the moment to make it avail.

The allied fighting was marked by a furious determination to make an end of it; the morale of the enemy was high, and the troops fought as rarely before against Napoleon; they were met with equal fervor by the French on the defense; indeed, several times Napoleon, who personally placed the divisions, had to retire out of range. On the allied left Kleist first pushed in on Markkleeberg; in the centre Wittgenstein advanced on Wachau; on the right Klenau debouched from University woods on the Kohlberg and Liebertwolkowitz. Lauriston held fast to Liebertwolkowitz; Victor could not be driven out of Wachau, but the Prussians made so strong a bid for Markkleeberg, that Poniatowski yielded momentary possession of it. Napoleon had been followed from Reudnitz by the Old and Young Guard, and Macdonald was coming up to reinforce his left. Perceiving Poniatowski's dilemma, he sent Augereau over from the French left with a division of the Old Guard to sustain him at Dösen; Markkleeberg was recovered, while Lefol defended Connewitz. The capture of Dölitz Castle, the village being held by Sémélé, was the only gain Schwartzenberg made during the day, except to contain the emperor's right wing; on the other bank, with the main army, he could have been of distinct use. "The attack on Connewitz was not practicable in front, because the enemy defended the bridge and dike with much artillery and infantry, and because the ground made it impossible to put in artillery," says the report of Schwartzenberg.

While Mortier's two divisions of the Young Guard manœuvred against the right of Klenau, the two others under Oudinot went to the succor of Wachau. The positions held by Victor and Lauriston were taken and retaken again and again; the Old Guard stood ready at the Galgenberg; Macdonald reached Holzhausen. Between Liebertwolkowitz and Wachau, Drouot placed a battery of one hundred and fifty guns; Murat's heavy cavalry was massed behind the centre, except Sébastiani, who was off on the left at Klein Possna. Somewhat after noon, when the allies had made no real gain and their onset was slightly flagging, Napoleon saw the chance of an offensive thrust. Drouot was firing to good effect and the allied batteries replying promptly. The cannonade was severe, and on the whole a slight gain had been made by the French corps. Everything looked as if victory were at hand. Macdonald was about to debouch from Holzhausen on the allied right. Marmont and either Bertrand or Souham were still expected; and with this accession of force, the emperor felt sure he could crush the enemy. His purpose was to push forward the line of foot at the proper instant, launch Murat on Güldengossa in a massed charge, and by advancing his now strong left on Seiffertshayn and the University woods, to turn the allied right. Under the fire of the Drouot battery the French line strode forward: Macdonald on Seiffertshayn with Mortier on his right; Victor, with Oudinot in support, on the sheep-farm buildings of Auenhayn; Angereau through Markkleeberg on Crobern.

It was not long after two that this advance all along the line was made; the weight of masses was in its favor, and at nearly all points the French assault won its way; Kleist and Wittgenstein fell back; but Güldengossa held out against even Lauriston's reserve. An hour later Napoleon threw Murat on the allied centre with Latour-Maubourg in the lead,

followed by Kellermann and part of Pajol. The charge was magnificent. Forward went this great mass with irresistible force, onward through the village of Gündengossa, where the Russians held the field, and their cuirassiers were driven back to Crobern. One effort more and the allied right would be broken. The news of victory reached Leipsic. Part of the French regiments rode so near the position whence the Emperor Alexander was viewing the battle, that he was obliged to throw in his Cossacks of the Guard to stop the head of column, and himself to retire to a safer place. But Latour-Maubourg was wounded, and, met by the vigorous Cossack onset, the column appeared to pause, as if with exhaustion. These were not the old Eylau squadrons; man and horse lacked endurance. Moreover, the Russian batteries opened on the tired mass, and Barclay's fresh cavalry rode up and fell upon it. Not sufficiently sustained, the column halted, trembled, and began to drift to the rear. It had failed to shake the allied line. For eight hours the battle had swayed to and fro in the little space marked out by the Wachau valley; it now rolled back to Wachau.

Schwartzenberg's report says: "The enemy had succeeded in advancing near Crobern with a great mass of cavalry sustained by several infantry squares. . . . Nostitz threw himself with his cavalry on the enemy's cavalry, overturned it, cut to pieces several infantry squares and entirely broke it up.

"The enemy undertook this with astonishing stanchness, and attacked on the right wing. His intention was to break it from the centre. Wittgenstein and Klenau received him in the utmost cold blood, and even when he had advanced with his column of cavalry up to near Gündengossa, the Russian grenadiers remained firm."

Napoleon now learned why his reinforcements were delayed: except the Guard, he had put in his last man, and the climax-blow had against all expectations failed. Nor was this the end, for immediately afterwards fresh divisions came

in to the enemy. Alexander had perceived that the last French thrust was coming, and lest it might prove fatal, at his instance Schwartzberg ordered up the reserve from Audigast, and, recognizing his error in operating beyond the Pleisse, brought back by way of Baschwitz two of his cuirassier and Hesse-Homburg's grenadier divisions. It was now the turn of the allies. These joint forces were put in through Crobern, and piercing between Augereau and Murat, forged on into the French line. It was not far from four o'clock. A lodgment was made in Markkleeberg, Augereau holding manfully the upper end; but Victor, after gallant defense of Auenhayn, ceded it to the Imperial Russian Guard shortly before five o'clock, and with Oudinot fell back to Wachau. Macdonald drove Klenau back, but, partly owing to the wounding of Pajol, who had sustained him, was forced out of Seiffertshayn. It was this onset of the allied reserve that held Napoleon back from putting in the Old Guard to complete the work of Latour-Maubourg. Yet, shortly determining on one more effort to turn fortune towards the eagles, he was preparing for a final rush on Stormthal and Crobern, when Meerfeldt, after an all day's struggle, managed to debouch from Dölitz; and to meet this fresh danger Napoleon was compelled to throw in the Old Guard under Curial, in lieu of pushing it out to the front. Poniatowski used his troops well, and the gallant Austrian was surrounded, his corps cut to pieces, and he himself captured. Still, this brilliant feat of arms was subsidiary: the French centre had failed to deliver its last blow, and Napoleon had not utilized his momentary superiority to crush the Army of the Sovereigns. Darkness stopped the fighting. The Bulletin says: "Our loss in this day was twenty-five hundred men killed and wounded. It would be no exaggeration to give that of the enemy at twenty-five thousand men." The casualties were probably about equal.

From a certain standpoint, few of his battles illustrate Napoleon's military sense better than this first day at Leipsic. Although the enemy had an excess of a hundred thousand men, by his singular logistic skill in bringing his troops to the battlefield at the critical point, he opposed to them equal numbers. He recognized the moment for assuming the offensive with unerring judgment, while the enemy lost the use of forty thousand men in the Moorfeld. Full of faults as the last months had been, yet here the old battle fervor again showed itself in full effulgence. Had his reinforcements from the Partha not been delayed by Blucher's hard onset, his superiority would have told. On the other hand, he had failed to make use of his one chance to win the battle; and nothing shows the better quality and morale of the allies than their tenacious fighting of these days. They had banded together to put an end to the dictation of Napoleon, and having found out that numbers told, even against this great captain, they did their work in courageous and patient if not in perfect fashion. While gallant, the French fighting was not that of the veterans of 1807.

It has been claimed that on this first day of the Battle of the Nations, Napoleon had won a victory against Barclay at Wachau; but Ney and Marmont had been driven back nearer Leipsic by Blucher, and Bertrand had barely held his own against Giulay at Lindenau. The victory was barren; it had taught the allies their error in moving through the Moorfeld, and next day they would do better. The emperor had not accomplished his object — the defeat of the enemy; for despite utmost effort, neither side, as darkness set in, had won a rood of ground. If, with a force at the key-point equal to the enemy's, Napoleon could not win the field, what hope was there for the morrow, when he would be largely outnumbered?

During the night the balance of the 3d Corps, and Reynier

with ten thousand men, came up, all Napoleon could expect, but by no means making up for the losses of the 16th, while St. Cyr and Lobau had to be abandoned, like Ney in Russia. On the other hand, the allies were increased by Bernadotte,—who, having convinced himself that Reynier's movements were only demonstrations, resolved to join Blucher, and advanced nearer Halle,—Bennigsen with Russian, and Colloredo with Austrian reserves. Their full force of three hundred thousand men, less the losses, would be on hand, and with fourteen hundred guns. The French would number not much over half this effective. The emperor had beaten the same odds behind the defenses of Dresden; but since then the allies had gained much.

In Napoleon's tactical theory, preponderance of thousands at the point of contact always won the day. Frederick's rule disregarded numbers. He made up for strength by vigor: discipline, fighting quality, stood in lieu of men, and in all his early battles he showed that his grenadiers, his line horsemen, were superior to those of the enemy. Not so here. The allied troops, properly led, were equal, man for man, to the French, if not better. The earlier superiority of Napoleon's veterans no longer existed. The men who had won at Rivoli, Austerlitz, Friedland, had mostly perished in Spain or on the steppes of Russia; and however marvelously the young French conscript held his own, he had more than his match in the Russian and Austrian veterans, and in the Prussians trained under the new army system. All the allied soldier had needed was to find out that the Frenchman was not invincible; and he had now done so.

Military discretion left but one thing for Napoleon to do: to retire at once to a new base. At Leipsic he had no further chance of victory, of even holding himself.

After the battle of the 16th, he should have recognized that retreat was necessary to save the relics of his army, and dur-

ing the 17th he should quietly have prepared to move away during the night of the 17th–18th. This he could well have done, while the allies were preparing for a fresh day of battle; and by sending orders to St. Cyr to rejoin him by the right bank, and by calling in Davout, he could still have made a strong and perhaps successful fight on the Saale. Or better still, he could have retired to Torgau, crossed, taken up St. Cyr, have kept up the morale of his troops by an apparently successful manœuvre, marched rapidly down to Magdeburg, called in Davout and manœuvred towards the Rhine. But he could see nothing but battle before him, here on the spot. Retreat meant ruin to the Napoleonic political scheme. The structure was fictitious; it depended on a bold front, and the emperor's native obstinacy came to the fore. Reports from St. Cyr led him to believe that Bennigsen could not arrive for some days; he knew that Bernadotte would join Blucher. There was still some chance. If Leipsic were lost, Napoleon must fall back on the Rhine, defending every step; and the loss of another battle could scarcely bring about a worse result than that; it meant merely another score of thousands lost. What imported men? The emperor bivouacked near some old brick-sheds hard by his battle-stand, where he passed a restless night, calling several of his generals to his side. He had resorted to the outworn bluff of a truce, sending Meerfeldt back to the allied headquarters with a proposition which included the evacuation of the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder. He would have yielded those on the Elbe. But no heed was paid to the message; Schwartzemberg referred it to Alexander, who, as at Moscow, made no answer. Napoleon no longer weighed with the sovereigns as he had; his credit had waned. As at Moscow, he waited, on the chance of a favorable reply. All military prudence was staked on the political gaming-table, on which he had long been playing.

Now was the moment to retire. The allies were waiting, and would give him ample time to march on Torgau; if he preferred to march to the Saale, the road to Naumburg and Erfurt was practically open, for to replace the troops sent from the Moorfeld to the main army on the afternoon of the 16th, Giulay had been drawn in to Zwenkau. The allies should rather have reinforced him; but content to drive Napoleon from Leipsic, they dared not play for greater stakes. If the French were not to retire on the 16th, or if Napoleon was to wait for a reply to his proposition, it behooved him to construct several bridges on the Pleisse and Elster, so that Leipsic could be speedily emptied, when it was finally determined to leave it, or he was driven out. It is said he told Berthier to attend to this, but there was no written order given, nor anything definite done; and this shows how far his forgetfulness had gone in the minor matters he at one time so scrupulously oversaw. To say that this was the duty of the general staff will not do; for Napoleon was to blame for there being none: what he had, though it contained good officers, was not worthy the name.

Next day, a rainy Sunday, Murat and he spent some hours together, walking on the causeways of the brick-ponds; most of the day he remained in his tent, while preparations for another struggle were made by his lieutenants. He understood that if he did not retire, he must at least withdraw to narrower lines about Leipsic, so as to be prepared to retreat; and at 2 A. M. on the 18th the French troops were ordered under arms.


In his report Schwartzberg says that as Bernadotte, Beningen and Colloredo could not come up in time to take an active part in a battle on the 17th, the general field-marshal-in-chief considered it wise to await the morrow to renew the combat; and as every hour improved the allied situation, the sovereigns had spent the Sunday in reorganizing their shat-

tered ranks and in preparing for a fresh struggle. They were now confident of the ultimate result. Bernadotte came in via Landsberg, Bennigsen, less the force left to watch Dresden, marched via Colditz on Leipsic; and Colloredo came up with his two divisions.

The emperor's explanations of his manœuvres grow lamer. The Bulletin of the Grand Army, October 24, tells us that "The battle of Wachau had disconcerted all the enemy's projects, but his army was so numerous that he still had reserves. . . . After the retreat of the 16th . . . the enemy occupied a fine position two leagues in the rear. The day of the 17th had to be spent to reconnoitre this and to determine the point of attack, . . . to bring up the reserve parks, and replace the eighty thousand artillery cartridges consumed in the battle. . . . Having recognized that the position of the enemy was very strong, the emperor resolved to draw him to another field. On the 18th, at 2 A. M., he drew nearer Leipsic by two leagues."

Personally, Napoleon drove back to Reudnitz during the night of the 17th-18th, and here spent some hours consulting with Ney; about 5 A. M. he drove into Leipsic, inspected Lindenau and vicinity, and ordered Bertrand to march through Lützen on Weissenfels, so as to scour the plain, seize the debouches of the Saale and open communications with Naumburg and Erfurt. The emperor then returned to Stötteritz, where by eight o'clock the Guard had arrived, and the artillery fire began to be pronounced from all quarters. The French army had been gradually withdrawing from the old battlefield, and began to take up a preliminary position surrounding Leipsic from the Pleisse to the Partha. Poniatowski still held Dölitz and Connewitz, Augereau leaned on the Lössnitz ponds, Victor occupied Probsthayda, on his left Drouot and his big battery. Behind Augereau stood Kellermann's cavalry, Oudinot on his left. Behind Victor was Bordesoult, who took over the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, and Pajol. All this, the right wing, was under Murat. Macdonald stood

from Zuckelhausen to Holzhausen, to his left rear Sébastiani's cavalry, and Lauriston in second line. Marmont held Schönfeld, with Dombrowski at Pfaffendorf, Reynier held Paunsdorf with a useless detachment out at Taucha, Souham was in



Battle of Leipzig, October 18.

reserve near Leipzig, and Arrighi's cavalry stood in support. The Old Guard under Curial, the Young Guard under Mortier, and the Guard cavalry were in general reserve at Thonberg; and near by on a hillock beside a tobacco factory, the emperor took up his stand. Mortier later went to Lindenau

to replace Bertrand. The situation was purely defensive, and only assumed to cover a shorter line, with salient near Probsthayda and Stötteritz, to which the French soon retired.

Opposite the French convex array the allies formed several parties for attack. For some reason Blucher had given a number of his divisions to Bernadotte, whose army was ninety thousand strong; and with what was left, he and Sacken started from Göhlis to attack Leipsic at the Halle gate, while Bernadotte crossed the Partha between Schönfeld and Taucha to join the right of the Army of the Sovereigns in an advance on the city. Schwartzberg had three columns: one of fifty thousand men, led by himself, pushed in on Connowitz along the Pleisse—how many on the left and how many on the right bank is not clear; one of sixty thousand men under Barclay advanced through Wachau and Liebertwolkowitz on Probsthayda; and one of sixty-five thousand men under Bennigsen from Sieffertshayn against Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen. Giulay was again to attack at Lindenau, although part of his twenty thousand men had been drawn in by Schwartzberg. In his report Schwartzberg states that “The principal attack began in three columns at 8 A. M., Bennigsen and Klenau on the right towards Holzhausen, Barclay with Wittgenstein and Kleist in the centre towards Wachau, with the Russian and Prussian Guard in reserve, the third column under Hesse-Homburg occupying the plateau between Dösen and Lösning, with Colloredo in reserve. Nothing could resist the bravery of the allied troops.”

Small display of grand-tactics is apparent on the 18th. It was a battle in concave against convex order, with fighting all along the line, in which the better though no more gallant troops of the allies, far superior in numbers, crushed the fewer divisions of the French, who fought with a river in their rear and practically but one outlet. This inexcusable

position must be charged to Napoleon. History narrates but one brilliant victory gained by an army fighting with a river at its back — Cannæ; and choosing this position for valid reasons, by his extraordinary tactical ability Hannibal won against vast odds. In his situation Napoleon could not expect to rival the great Carthaginian. There were three hundred thousand allies, equally strong along the line, with twelve hundred guns giving concentric fire, and never a gap or a false manœuvre which afforded him a chance to break the chain. His one hope that Blucher and Bernadotte would remain north of the Partha and not join the main allied line was in vain; and the Saxon and Wurtemberg troops in the French army proved unreliable.

In his report Schwartzenberg says that “the three allied monarchs were yesterday, the decisive day, upon the heights between Wachau and Probsthayda,” and watched the battle with keen interest. The French were moving to the rear to occupy the new line, and Napoleon was still awaiting an answer to his proposal, when the oncoming of the allied columns was announced. The column along the Pleisse was received with stout hearts, and Dösen and Dölitz long held their own; but finally numbers told and both fell to the Austrian assaults, though Lössnitz and Connewitz could not be taken. In Barclay’s front the French did not intend to hold the first line, and Wachau was evacuated before Kleist and Wittgenstein fairly attacked. Liebertwolkowitz followed suit; by ten the allies had captured the sheep-farm Meusdorf, and Barclay turned on Probsthayda.

This rapid gain was due to the French purpose of yielding ground: until noon the battle was not fully engaged. Then



Saxon
Sharpshooter.

the allies were well in hand and strode forward at all points. Augereau and Poniatowski on the French right came close to losing Lössnitz and Connewitz, until Oudinot came up with his two divisions of the Young Guard, and here along the ponds the French held themselves nobly. In the centre the enemy made his main effort on Probsthayda, but though Bennigsen advanced on and took Zuckelhausen, and after a lusty fight, Holzhausen, which success seriously imperiled Probsthayda, yet Victor, with Lauriston, the Old Guard, Mortier, and two cavalry corps under Murat at his back, clung to the place with a gallantry above praise, the emperor riding forward to Probsthayda and inspiring the French divisions with fresh confidence. By two the allies were ready to storm the place. Advancing in deep columns, as the allies came on concentrically their masses became deeper, and so rapid was their approach that only a part of their artillery could keep up. Kleist and Wittgenstein, sustained by Gorchakov, headed straight for Probsthayda. As the leading battalions got near, the French line made a countercharge: a hundred guns, and sharpshooters in the buildings and gardens, poured in their fire. This counter proved only partially effective: the allied columns were checked, but they remained in place, and opened their artillery fire as fast as the guns could be got up. Bennigsen strove in vain to take Stötteritz, where Macdonald and Sébastiani held the line, but in edging towards Bernadotte on the Wurzen road, he and Klenau captured Baalsdorf and Zweinaundorf. Bernadotte reached Taucha at noon, and unable to seize it out of hand, turned it by a manœuvre, and Ney withdrew his right to a line from Schönfeld through Sellerhausen to Stuntz. So soon as they got in touch, Bernadotte and Bennigsen took Molkau and Paunsdorf, Reynier and the Saxons retiring to the second line, while Marmont defended Schönfeld with vigor against

Blucher, who, leaving Sacken to force his way from Göhlis towards Leipsic, himself headed Langeron and St. Priest in an attack on Schönfeld. The fighting here was desperate and the loss in officers heavy. The village was taken and retaken no less than seven times. Reynier at Sellerhausen was holding Bubna and Bülow in check, when suddenly the Saxons advanced towards the enemy with a heartiness which earned them praise from all sides; but on reaching the enemy's line, they turned and opened fire on the French. This unexpected defection would have broken Reynier, had not Ney brought up Delmas to his aid. Encouraged by this sudden accession to their ranks, the allies, though Durutte came to the front, shortly forced Ney back out of Sellerhausen on Reudnitz, and he was lucky to rally on Strassenhausen, by the aid of Napoleon, who came up just in time with Nansouty and fell on Bülow's flank; but after a brief moment of aid he returned, giving Ney orders to hold his line at all hazards, as he could not send him a single regiment. The courage of the young soldiers, who at the Katzbach and Dennewitz had misbehaved, was here shown up, under the eye of the emperor, as brilliant.

But courage availed naught. The battle degenerated into an artillery duel at Strassenhausen and Probsthayda. These salients long remained in the hands of their brave defenders, but at most points the French were forced back towards Leipsic. Blucher pushed in Marmont, and Ney was finally compelled to retire before Bernadotte and Bennigsen, though at the Halle gate Dombrowski and Arrighi staved off the assaults of Sacken. The allies had not used their cavalry to



Saxon
Musketeer.

advantage. The French corps had been so repeatedly unsettled as to enable well-handled squadrons to make a marked impression; without attack they conserved their integrity. But ammunition was running low: the French had fired two hundred and twenty thousand rounds during the two days, and there were but sixteen thousand rounds left. This alone made it essential to retire. Napoleon should have foreseen it.

Bertrand was able to carry out his orders. As he debouched from Lindenau, he ran across Lichtenstein's division, all Giulay had left on this bank; and driving it back to Knauthayn, reached Lützen, and by noon pushed his van to Weissenfels, and seized the Saale bridge. The czar had proposed that part of the army be withdrawn from the useless slaughter and sent across the river to Lützen, to cut the French line of retreat, but, as is usual in divided command, the excellent suggestion was not carried out.

The Bulletin again tells a tale of victory on this day.

"At ten the artillery opened. Poniatowski . . . defended Connewitz bridge, Murat . . . was at Probsthayda, Macdonald at Holzhausen. All the efforts of the enemy during the day against Connewitz and Probsthayda failed. Macdonald was overthrown at Holzhausen. The emperor ordered him to take post at Stötteritz. The cannonade was terrible. Augereau, who defended a wood in the centre, held himself all day. The Old Guard was arranged in reserve on a height, making four great columns directed on the four principal points of attack. . . . The success of the battle was in the village of Probsthayda. The enemy attacked it four times with considerable forces. Four times he was repulsed with great loss. At 5 P. M. the emperor advanced his artillery reserve and deployed all his fire on the enemy, who fell back a league from the battlefield.

"During this time the Army of Silesia attacked the Halle suburb. . . . Three times Ney drove it out and overturned it with the bayonet. At 3 P. M. the victory was ours, on this side against the Army of Silesia, as on the emperor's side against the main army, but at this moment the Saxon army, infantry, cavalry and artillery, and all the Wurtemberg cavalry, passed in a body to the enemy. . . . This treachery not only made a gap

in our lines, but delivered to the enemy the important debouch confided to the Saxon army. . . . A moment of disorder ensued. The enemy passed the Partha and marched on Reudnitz, which he seized. He was now only half a league from Leipsic. The emperor sent his mounted Guard . . . to take in flank the troops which were advancing along the Partha to attack Leipsic. He himself moved with a division of the Guard to Reudnitz. The promptness of these movements reëstablished order. The villages were retaken and the enemy pushed far off. The battlefield remained entirely in our possession, and the French army remained victorious on the field of Leipsic, as it had been on the field of Wachau. At night the fire of our guns had at every point pushed back a league from the battlefield the fire of the enemy."

As, in the Bulletin, Bavaria had been responsible for the lapsed manœuvre of a week before, so here Saxony has to bear the brunt. The real causes lay far deeper.

Nothing could now save Napoleon from annihilation by numbers, unless he succeeded in crossing the Pleisse and Elster, and in getting well ahead of the allied pursuit. The men had been fighting all day, and were so worn with hunger and fatigue that he did not deem it prudent to begin the retreat that night; and yet there was not a minute to lose, and no one knew better than he how much farther than one thinks possible troops can really march; how much longer human endurance can be taxed. By proper precautions, full half of his train might already have been on the road to Weissenfels, which Bertrand had opened; instead of this, it was blocking all the avenues into Leipsic needed by the retiring troops. A proper general staff is never so much in demand as on such an occasion. The chief of engineers had been without orders, and his bridge equipage was back at Eilenburg, but he had under his command plenty of sappers and miners, and there was abundant material at hand. The alleged order for three supplementary bridges to be constructed over the rivers did not find its way to the proper officers; only one was thrown,

and this speedily broke. Every one waited on Napoleon, expecting him to provide for every detail. No one was habituated to act on his own motion, and no one took the lead, though all must have divined the inevitable end. Unless one has been part of an army in disorderly retreat, striving to make its way through the defiles of a town and over an unfordable river by a single bridge, he can scarcely conceive what a scene of error and terror it is. Even the cool-headed by nature find it hard to preserve their balance; the breakdown of a single vehicle arrests an entire corps; and it is here that the poltroon plays his fatal part in his frenzy to escape.


There had been some movement to the rear on the 18th, but most of the troops had rested during the night; and daylight of the 19th caught the Grand Army in the midst of a disastrous retreat, to cover which so as to conserve even a semblance of order, Napoleon must fight still another battle at the gates of Leipsic. The corps were beginning to withdraw towards the suburbs, which had been barricaded; and here, had the troops been marshaled and fought as at Dresden, they could have held the allies at bay during the entire day, while the train and then successive corps filed across, for Leipsic was a perfect bridge-head. But for the Grand Army and its immense number of vehicles, there was need of at least two or three bridges above and below the permanent causeway, for there were the two rivers and the low-lying alluvial basin between, cut by its network of small but unfordable branches — all of which invited disaster. But what with the late arrival in Leipsic, the hope of victory, the emperor's delay to await an answer to his proposed truce, and the lack of a general staff which should of itself act when the emperor did not, no one had provided for the probable retreat.

It was all of a piece with Napoleon's growing unfitness for excessive labor. At times he could work with the old flame

of genius, but not, as in the past, at all times, and no one else could do his work when lassitude overcame him. He was in the prime of life; but he had lived too fast; he had worked too much and had indulged to excess; and he was no longer a sound man. Jealous lest others should learn his methods, he had kept all power, all initiative, in his own hands; and he was now failing from the very cause which insured him his early success. The blame for this particular lapse at Leipsic cannot fairly be thrown on the chief of staff or on the chief of engineers; the emperor, to be sure, was busy dictating letters to suit the new conditions of a retreat behind the Rhine; he had to send dispatches to the strong places on the Oder and the Elbe, — whether they could be reached or not, — to Spain, to Italy, to the Rhine, to the Regency in Paris; he had to plan for the now questionable future; he had to see the King of Saxony and bid him, while submitting to the allies, not to forget France. Berthier might himself have taken up the matter of the bridges; Napoleon may have given orders on the subject; but somehow the work was not done, and the fault must be laid to the leader, not the subordinate.

The first attempt on the 19th to fall back provoked a sharp allied attack, and soon there was fierce fighting in retreat from all sides into Leipsic. The suburbs were still held by what remained of Ney and Reynier, with Lauriston, Poniatowski and Macdonald, but they were shortly forced, and the French withdrew within the city walls. Langeron and Sacken fell sharply on Pfaffendorf, which Durutte stubbornly defended; Marmont and Ricard held themselves with effort at the eastern gates of Leipsic, which Woronzov and Bülow assailed; the Poles were contained by Schwartzemberg and could with difficulty retire; Barclay pressed hard on the heels of Macdonald and Lauriston, who were falling back through Strassenhausen.

No tactical manœuvring was prescribed: each division commander must hold his own and save his men from a panic. Napoleon rode to the bridge about nine o'clock. Victor and Mortier had passed over; Souham and Marmont were preparing to do so; Lauriston was next in order. The French withdrawal was sharply followed up, and a portion of the suburbs was shortly in possession of the enemy. Parties soon gained the boulevards; the Baden troops gave up Petrus gate, and the allies began to enter the town proper. Soon the last French corps weakened, and all poured back, each brigade



Battle of Leipsic, October 19.

striving only to defend itself and reach the bridge. Formation could not be kept in the streets; regiments became disorganized, and the scant order in which the troops had retired

was quickly lost. Parts of the train obstructed all the streets, each driver fiercely pushing for a passage towards the only exit; to get through was difficult for bodies of troops; companies soon broke into squads, squads into groups of three or four. The allies were following hard upon; they too were not in order, but they had the coherence of success. Langeron came along the northern boulevard towards the river, and threw parties of sharpshooters into the meadows to harass the French column filing over the bridge. The



Poniatowski.

colonel of engineers, in charge of mining the bridge so that it could be blown up when all the troops had passed, had gone to Lindenau to find out from Berthier which corps was to form the rear, and left the match to the mine in charge of a corporal of sappers. A duty of this kind should have been intrusted to an officer directly responsible to the emperor; but there was no head to anything. Seeing Langeron's men coming on in great numbers, and the shot and shell of the enemy's guns beginning to fall nearer and oftener on the bridge; knowing, moreover, nothing about how many divisions had passed over and how many were still in the town, this man naturally lost his head, and regardless of the thousands still on the right bank, ignited the fuse. The single bridge was blown into the air. Thus cut off, the troops still on the right bank fell into panic and sought safety as best

they might, many by swimming the river. A few thousands succeeded in gaining the other bank, among them Macdonald; Poniatowski was killed while swimming his horse across the river; and twenty thousand men thus abandoned laid down their arms, with Lauriston, Reynier and a score of other generals. A considerable part of the train stalled in the city was captured. Including those cut off, the French losses at Leipsic aggregated fifty thousand men and three hundred guns. The Grand Army had no further safety this side of the Rhine.

Neither Napoleon nor any one representing him had paid heed to the withdrawal of the troops, or to the passage through Leipsic. Odenleben describes him as riding to and fro in the city, sunk in thought and listless, oblivious of what was going on around him, and finally following the main stream out towards Lindenau. Here he stopped and stationed officers to check the stragglers, or small isolated parties, and tell them where their several corps would rally; but his general attitude was one of complete absorption, and as in Russia, of indifference to his surroundings; and with lucid intervals, this attitude continued until he reached Paris. Being at Lindenau when the bridge was blown up, he put the Guard in line and ran their guns in battery, to protect the retreat, and the Grand Army moved on Weissenfels to seek the safety of the river Saale. During the march order was fairly reëstablished, and when that town was reached, the army was more like its old self.

In his Bulletin of October 24 the emperor strives to find excuses for the days of Leipsic, which he still persists in claiming as victories. But though they no doubt had their effect in France, the excuses grew worse and worse. The defeat at Leipsic is ascribed principally to a poor corporal of engineers. Was it not solely due to the Little Corporal?

“At 6 P. M. the emperor ordered the disposition for the next day,” but at 7 P. M. he learned that “they had fired ninety-five thousand” (artillery) “rounds and that the reserves were exhausted, that only sixteen thousand rounds remained, which sufficed scarcely to keep up the fire two hours, and that afterwards we should be without munitions, for what might result; that the army in five days had fired more than two hundred and twenty thousand rounds, and that a fresh supply could not be got except at Magdeburg or at Erfurt. This state of things made a prompt movement on one of our two great depots necessary. The emperor decided for Erfurt, for the same reason that he had decided to come to Leipsic, so as to be at hand to weigh the influence of the defection of Bavaria. The emperor gave at once orders for the baggage, park and artillery to pass the defiles of Lindenau. He gave the same order to the cavalry and different army corps, and came into the suburbs of Leipsic . . . at nine o'clock.

“This circumstance obliged the French army to renounce the fruit of two victories, where it had with so much glory beaten troops very much superior in numbers, the armies of the whole Continent. But this movement was not without difficulty. From Leipsic to Lindenau there is a defile of two leagues, crossed by five or six bridges. It was proposed to put six thousand men and sixty guns in Leipsic, . . . to occupy this town as head of defile, and to set fire to its vast suburbs, so as to prevent the enemy from taking it. . . . However odious the treachery of the Saxon army, the emperor could not resolve to destroy one of the beautiful cities of Germany . . . and that under the eyes of the king, who since Dresden had wished to accompany the emperor, and who was so greatly afflicted by the conduct of his army. . . . Macdonald and Poniatowski were charged with guarding the suburbs. . . . The enemy learned that the greater part of the army had evacuated Leipsic . . . and sharply attacked Macdonald and Poniatowski. They were several times thrown back. . . . The emperor had ordered the engineers to build mines under the big bridge . . . so as to blow it up at the last moment, to retard the march of the enemy, and to leave time for the train to defile. General Dulauloy had charged Colonel Montfort with this operation. This colonel, instead of remaining on the spot to direct and to give the signal, ordered a corporal and four sappers to blow up the bridge when the enemy should present himself. When the corporal, a man without intelligence and ill understanding his mission, heard the shots fired from the town ramparts, he lighted the match and blew up the bridge. A part of the army was still on the other

side, with a park of eighty guns and several hundred wagons. . . . We cannot yet gauge the losses occasioned by this unfortunate event, but they are carried by approximation to twelve thousand men. . . . The disorder which this carried into the army changed the situation of things. The victorious French army arrived at Erfurt as a beaten army would arrive. . . . The enemy, who had been in consternation at the battles of the 16th and 18th, gained again, by the disaster of the 19th, courage and the ascendant of victory. The French army, after such brilliant success, lost this victorious attitude.

“We found in Erfurt, in victual, munitions, clothes, shoes, all that the army can need.” And next day Napoleon wrote to Cambacères: “I am moving to Mainz, and I shall concentrate the army on the frontier. The treachery of Bavaria, as inconceivable as unexpected, has deranged all my projects, and obliges me to bring the war nearer our frontier.”

On this retreat, the disaster in Russia, and the flight from Waterloo have been based the charge that in reverses Napoleon lost his head. But Rivoli, Arcole, Marengo, Eylau, Essling, testify to the contrary; and whoso has seen defeat in a great army knows what extravagancies are resorted to by men who in times of success are admirable soldiers. Leipzig will serve as well as Waterloo to point the moral. In this campaign, the emperor was guilty of many a lapse, among them that of not providing his bridges; but he did not lose his head. As in Russia, when matters were at their worst, he shrugged his shoulders and let them take their course, aware that no one could mend them. He had many things to occupy his mind; but whether he dwelt on the demands of the future, or on the failure his ambition had made of the past two years, we do not know. Neither history nor Memoirs cast light on this question.

From Lindenau Napoleon rode to Markränstadt, where, while the troops filed by, he heard that Bertrand had occupied Weissenfels. Oudinot still stood at Lindenau as rearguard. Early October 20, accompanied by the Old Guard, he himself

drove to Weissenfels, and Bertrand — Kösen having been seized by Giulay — moved to Freiburg. Blücher followed on to Lützen; from Merseburg — whither he had marched via Halle — Yorck debouched to the south to threaten the French flank; Schwartzberg was in the Naumburg-Weitz region. Napoleon looked keenly at Kösen, and wrote Bertrand at 7 A. M. on the 20th, that nothing must be allowed to debouch from this defile, until the army was well past the place.


“I see with pleasure that you are in Weissenfels and master of the bridge. . . . If you see no obstacle against seizing Naumburg and Merseburg by detachments, do it. . . . It is indispensable to send a column of infantry, cavalry and artillery on Kösen. The infantry is to intrench there and guard the bridge. Place posts in crenellated houses, between Lützen and Weissenfels. Place a good infantry post in the defile where Bessières was killed.”

Bertrand accordingly occupied the heights of Neu Kösen and threw back a partial attack by Giulay; and under his shield the Grand Army filed by and across the Unstrut at Freiburg. Here Napoleon personally supervised the crossing, striving to get the troops into better formation, and providing against pursuit. Blücher built a bridge at Weissenfels and pushed on in his rear. Schwartzberg remained at Kösen. But as Bertrand left Kösen too early, Napoleon, on October 22, told Berthier to write him “that his evacuation of Kösen had no motive, that it exposed the headquarters, the communications with Freiburg and especially the rearguard.”

The march was continuous. Napoleon saw he could not again face the enemy until he had crossed the Rhine, and the Grand Army, no longer such, plodded on towards this goal, heartsick and footsore, but glad to look forward to once more treading the soil of La Belle France. On October 22 the French got to Büttelstädt, where some Cossacks put in an appearance, and during the succeeding night the emperor and

the Guard reached Erfurt. In this city a short rest was afforded the men. No immediate pursuit was undertaken by the allies. Their triumph had been grand; and the sovereigns dwelt in Leipsic three days to settle on future operations. As a beginning, Klenau was ordered on Dresden, and Bernadotte and Bennigsen on Hamburg. After a day or two the allies started through the Thuringian Forest on a parallel course with the French, throwing out light horse towards them to harass their march, but accomplishing little, as Schwarzenberg did not reach Erfurt until the 26th. But by the insinuating policy of Metternich, the allies made inroads into the domain of the late French allies, and even into Napoleon's family, for Murat, poisoned by the suggestion that he might preserve his kingdom by joining the coalition, left the army for Naples. Blucher entered Freiburg October 22 and joined Yorck, but, the Unstrut bridge being hard to repair, headed by way of Sommerda, Langensalza and Eisenach to turn the French flank at Erfurt, where he supposed the emperor would stand. Napoleon, however, had no other idea than to reach the Rhine, especially as the Bavarians were known to have marched on Anspach as if aiming to reach Mainz first; and the retreat continued by way of Gotha on Eisenach.

The Bavarians had indeed moved towards the Main to threaten the French retreat. Had Napoleon at the outset forced the king to join Augereau, he might have created an army of seventy-five thousand men, which by a diversion into Bohemia might have influenced the Dresden situation; but now the coalition fell heir to a fresh army of fifty thousand men under Wrede. Leaving Braunau October 15, Wrede crossed the Danube at Donauwörth on the 19th, on the 24th was at Würzburg, and three days later at Aschaffenburg. Detaching ten thousand men on Frankfort, he marched to Hanau to bar the Grand Army the way through the valley of




Leipzig to the Rhine.

the Main. From Eisenach, to avoid the Thuringian Forest, Napoleon headed by way of Vach, Fulda and Schluchtern on Mainz, and Blucher marched via Giesen and Wetzlar, to anticipate the French at Coblenz should they turn away from Wrede's column.

But Napoleon had no idea of turning from Wrede, who had reached Hanau October 27 and stood behind the Lamboi and Bülau Forest, his van at Rückingen. Late October 29 Napoleon reached Langenselbold, followed by Macdonald with the 5th and 11th Corps; Victor and Augereau had got to Gelnhäusen; Marmont to Saalmünster, followed by Bertrand; Oudinot and Mortier were back at Steinau and Flieden, this and the other side of Schlüchtern. Having heard of Wrede's advance since the 26th, Napoleon had sent his train by way of Coblenz, and was in light marching order.

At Schlüchtern the French van announced Wrede's presence. To fray a passage was the one thing to do, lest Blucher might approach down the Nidda from the Hersfeld country and fall on the French left, or Bubna come up with the rear, or the Army of the Sovereigns get abreast with the right through Franconia. There were still eighty thousand men in line, plus twenty-five thousand wounded or stragglers; but these forces stretched out all the way to Fulda, and Napoleon had not over twenty-five thousand men at hand. This was but two thirds of Wrede's force, and this general had placed himself athwart the main road, backing up on the Kinzig. Early October 30 Macdonald met the Bavarian van and threw it back into the forest, but on advancing, was stopped by the strong position of the enemy and a hearty artillery fire. Drouot suggested that a heavy battery could be established so as almost to enfilade the enemy's left. This was done, and fifty guns brought up. Macdonald and Victor held Wrede's right in place, while Napoleon collected the cavalry on the

main road. About 3 P. M. Wrede strove to drive Drouot away by a cavalry charge; but the French horse proved superior, and Drouot took up a still nearer position. At four Wrede essayed the same manœuvre and failed again; and when at five Napoleon advanced upon his line, the event was not long doubtful. Wrede's left was thrown back into Hanau,



Battle of Hanau.

and the right got across the Kinzig as best it might. Many were drowned. Hanau was then shelled, and Wrede evacuated it and sought safety towards his right on Aschaffenburg. There was no gain in following up the blow, as Blucher and Schwartzenberg were near at hand; and the French pushed on down the Main by a night march. As at Krasnoi a year before, Napoleon had broken through the net laid for him, by energy and clever manœuvring. On October 31 Marmont remained behind with the 3d, 4th and 6th Corps to hold Wrede in check, and let the rear of column come up; and the Grand Army marched on towards Frankfort and Mainz.

Next day, the rearguard having reported, Bertrand remained alone, and, after a hearty defense at Hanau, retired at night.

The Bulletin dated Frankfort, October 31, says : " Our army quietly conducted this movement on the Main. Arrived at Gelnhausen the 29th, . . . we learned that the Austrian and Bavarian army . . . coming from Braunau had arrived at Hanau, and purposed to bar the road to the French army." The action is then described at length. " The enemy abandoned precipitately the road to Frankfort, which he was barring, . . . began his retreat and soon after fell into complete rout. . . . The victory was complete."

The Bavarians in Frankfort marched away on Napoleon's approach, and on November 2 Napoleon reached Mainz, where the Grand Army crossed the Rhine, Guilleminot's division losing heavily in covering the operation. Napoleon reached St. Cloud November 4.

The retreat had been costly. By hunger, exposure and trial thousands had perished, and a nervous fever now broke out among the troops, with the result that the lives which this campaign cost France almost equaled those she had seen perish in 1812 : in that year half the losses fell on allied countries ; here it was France which chiefly suffered. The Grand Army was in so pitiable a plight that, had the allies not been fearful of the line of frontier fortresses, they might at once have followed Napoleon to Paris. But they deemed it safer to await the levies of militia which were to observe the fortresses, and assemble all their line troops, before adventuring on the soil of France.

St. Cyr, shut up in Dresden, received none of Napoleon's dispatches to move down river to Torgau and Magdeburg. He might have cut himself out along the right bank, have given a rendezvous to Davout at Minden, and both armies been thus saved. St. Cyr essayed this feat too late : when Klenau came up, his loss was inevitable. He capitulated, with the

right of exchange ; but this being disapproved by the sovereigns, he became a prisoner of war with all his men.

Bülow and Winzingerode were detailed to overrun Westphalia. Bernadotte and Bennigsen joined Walmoden and marched on Hamburg. The Danes serving with Davout signed a peace ; but the doughty marshal entered Hamburg to defend it ; and here he held head to Bernadotte and Bennigsen many months, though the citizens were all against him. Napoleon had abdicated before Hamburg surrendered. The city remembers Davout with terror, but the marshal, in doing his duty, showed the stuff that was in him. Why had he not been earlier used?

Rapp had been in Danzig a year, and still held out some months, finally surrendering the garrison as prisoners of war. Wittenberg, blockaded by Tauenzien, made a long defense before capitulating. Stettin, Modlin, Zamosc and the citadel of Erfurt defended themselves honorably until December. Glogau, Cüstrin and Magdeburg held out until the end of the war ; for knowing that they would eventually fall, the Prussians preferred not to destroy the works by artillery fire or assault.

Eugene's campaign in Italy against the Austrians was not successful. Early in the campaign Napoleon thought of having Augereau, the Bavarians and Eugene unite for a march on Vienna. This would have been a serious operation for the Austrians to meet ; but the Bavarian defection anticipated the manœuvre. Hiller with seven strong divisions operated against Eugene at Tarvis and Laybach. In October, leaving a small force opposite Eugene, Hiller marched by way of Trent on Verona, and the viceroy retired to the Adige. Hiller



Bavarian
Artilleryman.

then marched by the Brenta and attacked Vincenza, an English division aided in blockading Venice and Ferrara, and Istria, Dalmatia, Illyria, the Tyrol and the States of Venice were lost to France. To reduce the viceroy to still sadder straits, Klenau, having taken Dresden, joined Hiller with twenty-five thousand men.

Although the campaign in Germany had been lost, like that in Russia, it was not for the same reason. In Russia



Prince Eugene.

the emperor's calculations had gone amiss, and the army which reached Moscow (or possibly Smolensk) could not have accomplished the result aimed at; in Germany the calculations were exact, and the army was equal to the work to be done; but the emperor had failed by unsteadfastness. At times he was himself; at others by no means the great soldier of 1805. He had not properly utilized his interior lines. Moreover, his rule of moving on one line in one well-concen-

trated mass was shown by the allied and his own operations to be less applicable to enormous forces than to the lesser armies he had formerly led. "Ten thousand men can live anywhere, even in the desert," he wrote Clarke in 1807; but armies beyond two hundred thousand men make the question of victualing so serious as often to influence strategy.

"He who seeks to hold everything will end by losing everything," had said wise old Fritz. Napoleon had lost this campaign by forgetting this rule, and was to lose the campaign in France for the same reason. Had he at an early enough date recognized his danger, and concentrated all his forces, he would not have been outnumbered.

Schwartzenberg wrote a Relation of the Battle of Leipsic which is well poised and accurate from his standpoint, but the statements in it were exacerbating to Napoleon, who annotated it for publication in the *Moniteur* with a great many memoranda, mostly exclamations, such as "False, very false," "Fabrication," etc. In one thing Schwartzenberg imitated the emperor, putting down the French loss at forty thousand, and the allied loss at ten thousand men.

Napoleon had now to fight not only the outside enemy, but the fears of his French ministers and subordinates. From Mainz, November 3, he wrote Cambacérès: "My Cousin, say a word to the pusillanimous councilors of state and senators. I am told on all sides that they show great fear and little character. Be well persuaded that my infantry, artillery and cavalry have such superiority over those of the enemy that there is nothing to fear. . . . I am sorry that I am not in Paris. They would see me more tranquil and more calm than in any other circumstance of my life."

LXV.


WELLINGTON INVADES FRANCE. 1813 TO 1814.

VITTORIA had settled Spanish affairs, but Wellington did not stop. He laid siege to San Sebastian and blockaded Pampeluna. Napoleon sent Soult to Spain, and the marshal's first effort was to relieve Pampeluna, and reach out to Suchet on the east coast. Late in July, 1813, he started across the mountains and drove the English troops towards Pampeluna; but he was stopped long enough for Wellington by rapid marching to come up to the aid of his lieutenants. Soult's right under Erlon was delayed; and at Sauroren, despite gallant attacks, on July 27-28, he was checked and had to withdraw. Wellington followed him with unusual promptness, and Soult had difficulty in getting back across the mountains. Suchet might have accomplished great results for his master by working with Soult, but he declined to do so. A month later San Sebastian was captured, despite an attempt by Soult to relieve the place, which led to a heavy fight on the Bidassoa on August 31. Wellington now slowly pushed forward, and little by little crowded Soult back, and Pampeluna was captured. There was a good deal of manœuvring in October and November, in which Wellington was constantly but deliberately aggressive, and several hearty actions were fought. Soult withdrew to Bayonne, and Wellington in December crossed the Nive. Meanwhile, on the east coast Suchet had been forced towards France, and had left garrisons in most of the fortresses. At the end of 1813 Napoleon restored Ferdinand to the throne, but too late to be of use in his Spanish scheme.

THE battle of Vittoria in June, 1813, had settled the fate of the Spanish monarchy, but Wellington did not relax his efforts. Although the capture of Pancorbo had opened the Royal road, the allies could no longer rely on so distant a base as Portugal, and it was essential to reduce San Sebastian so as to utilize that port. Siege was accordingly laid to it, while Pampeluna was merely blockaded. Having little confidence in the stability of the Continental allies, Wellington hoped to capture San Sebastian before the armistice in Germany should

to get in the rear of the allied position, where he could draw in Suchet — as the emperor had himself planned — and operate against Wellington to advantage. A force was left under Villatte to hold the Bidassoa, and Erlon was first to mask the movements going on behind his front, and then to join in the advance. Bayonne was to be the point of rally if Wellington advanced; if he retired, San Sebastian was to be relieved. The plan was good.

On July 24 Soult stood ready to force his way through the Roncevalles pass, and farther to the west Erlon was to cross



San Sebastian.

the Col de Maya; but mountain warfare is difficult, and Soult must have known that his calculations were subject to many contingencies. Having made a stirring address to his troops, on the 25th he started the two French bodies forward, he himself only having the main ridge to cross, while Erlon had the Maya ridge as well. The French were in large force, and Soult's corps won its way through to the southern slope despite rain and bad roads, the allies retiring slowly, and disputing the advance with a combat at Roncevalles. Usually a vigorous officer, Erlon was on this occasion slow, and inter-

ferred much with Soult's purpose by failing to advance with energy, even after he had won a partial success at Maya.

Wellington was quick to seize the bearings of the position, but it was a question as to whether he would be able to gather his troops in season to parry the thrust at Pampeluna. Having guessed Soult's object, and convinced that Picton would withdraw beyond the range, he collected all the troops at hand and directed them towards Pampeluna by way of the Lanz valley, while the Light Division should move to the great road from Tolosa to Pampeluna, and hold the gap in the Pyrenees so as to connect Graham with the new position of the army; for Wellington proposed, should he fail in holding Pampeluna, to move by his left on San Sebastian.

On July 26 Picton, who was in command of all the troops assembled in the Zubiri valley, had retired from Soult's advance, scarcely hoping to be able to save Pampeluna, and Reille and Clausel marched down the Guy. The Pampeluna garrison made a sally, and O'Donnell was on the point of giving up the blockade; but some Spanish reinforcements came up and saved him from disaster. Picton soon arrived, and, drawing up in line on the ridge north of Pampeluna, called in all the troops he dared take from the blockade. Cole was to occupy some hills in his front, and did in fact seize upon a strong height overlooking Zabaldica from the west, which Soult in his advance had attempted to take. This action by Cole arrested Soult's march down the valley, and in order to meet the manœuvre, he threw Clausel along a ridge leading towards Sauroren to face Cole, and a smaller force towards El Cano to outflank him.

Wellington was leading Hill's troops down the valley of Lanz, when he heard that Picton had been forced back from Linzoain. He at once saw that he could not reach his lieutenants by the way he was heading, and sent back word for

safe, for troops were arriving at every moment to sustain the almost overtaxed allied regiments of the 28th, but he undertook nothing like pursuit. Soult was losing ground, and though Erlon reached Ostiz at noon of the 29th, he did not feel equal to fighting another battle in this position; but leaving Foy on the field, he made dispositions to withdraw, by way of Lizasso and the Doña Maria pass, so as to get between Wellington and the Bastan, and if possible anticipate the allies in a movement towards San Sebastian.



Erlon.

Wellington was, however, alive to this probability, and sent some of Hill's troops to Buenza, where on July 30 was a sharp combat for the possession of the road, Soult maintaining his point. On the same day Wellington attacked what was left of the French line of battle. Sauroren was captured, and Foy on the French left was cut off from Reille and Clausel. The loss of the allies had been severe, but Soult had suffered much more. Hill was in his front, double Hill's force was in his rear, and the road in front of him was by no means open. Wellington guessed him to be in retreat towards the Bastan, and believed he would march through the pass of Velatte; but by the retreat of Foy, Soult was cut off from Lanz and obliged to force his way through the Doña Maria pass, whence he could march via Estevan on Elizondo. Even then Wellington might, from Lanz through the

Velatte pass, reach Elizondo before him, and in fact, after Soult had escaped, Hill was ordered by Wellington to head that way.

Soult was unable to draw in his divisions and get through the Doña Maria pass without a rearguard fight with Hill, and when he reached Estevan, he found himself nearly surrounded. The allies, who had moved by the Velatte pass, were on one side, the Doña Maria pass was occupied by them, and the Light Division and some Spaniards were on the way to block the roads on the west. But Soult gained an exit by way of Sombillo. From here he could have marched to Echallar; instead of which, however, he marched on Yanzi through a deep gorge, where he suffered much loss from the Light Division, which, marching on heights above him, was trying to intercept his column. Wellington thought that Soult might have been entirely cut off, but he did in effect reach Echallar in the worst of conditions; and after combats at Echallar and Ivantelly, he reached Ainhoa, Sarre and St. Jean de Luz.

In this nine days' struggle, during which ten actions had been fought, the allied casualties were seventy-five hundred men, and the French twice the number. Throughout the campaign Wellington had led his troops, not merely directed them. Soult had not been aided by fortune. The weather was against him, and Erlon failed him when most essential. After he was beaten at Sauroren, his plan to march by his right through the Doña Maria pass and succor San Sebastian, instead of retiring the way he came, was a bold and well-conceived operation; but Soult and his men had met more than their match in the allied army and its splendid leader.

The condition of Wellington's army was fairly good, that of Soult's was bad. Maucune, Soult reported, had only one

thousand men left in his division on August 2, and four days later there were still one thousand stragglers. The rest of the army was almost equally ill off.

Suchet might have proved himself a great factor in Spain after the battle of Sauroren, and it would have redounded to his credit. After Murray's fiasco, he might have marched to the field of action with a large army, and have done much to turn the scale.

Soult had called on him for aid, which was declined; and upon Soult's reporting the state of affairs, the emperor, already overtaxed, replied that, having given him all his confidence, he could add no more to his strength or his orders. The failure of the marshals to coöperate always interfered with the French operations in Spain.

After his late defeat Soult retired to somewhere near his old position, with Erlon behind Ainhoa on the left, Clausel in the centre at Sarre, holding the debouches from Vera and Echallar, as well as the Great Rhune mountain, Reille on the right along the lower Bidassoa. Foy's division still stood at St. Jean Pied de Port, and some reserves were behind the Nive and Nivelle rivers.

Wellington reoccupied his old lines from Roncevalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa, with his troops somewhat changed in location, and his right under Hill at Roncevalles strengthened. No longer fearing for Pampeluna, he devoted his main attention to the siege of San Sebastian.

At this fortress the arrival of the allied siege-train was the beginning of the end. The island of Santa Clara had been captured, and the Urumea River was found at certain points to be fordable. Graham had been over two months in front of the place, but a half of this period had elapsed practically without work. On August 31, after a heavy bombardment, the final assault was delivered. Even this came close to fail-

ure, but an explosion of ammunition within the French lines momentarily disturbed the defense, and the gallant stormers swept over the walls and into the town, which was sacked in the worst sense. Rey retired to the castle of La Mota, where he held himself eight days and then capitulated September 9, just after Dennewitz, with all the honors of war. San Sebastian had resisted for seventy-three days, and is said to have cost the allies over five thousand men. It had been a notable defense.

While this was going on, Soult, unwilling to let the place fall without aid on his side, made his plans to cross the Bidassoa. His former attack on Pampeluna had interrupted the siege of San Sebastian, and a new attack might do the same. As he did not feel strong enough to move again on Pampeluna, and as to attack Wellington's centre towards Echallar required the crossing of mountain ridges, he chose to move along the great seacoast or Royal road towards Irun. Here he could bring together more strength, and the fighting, by reason of the mountainous country to the east, would be apt to be confined between Vera and Irun. To this effect, then, Soult made his preparations, hoping to reach Oyarsun, from which place he could, he thought, rapidly raise the siege. On August 29 two columns were assembled on the lower Bidassoa, one under Clausel of twenty thousand men, and the other under Reille somewhat larger, with a bridge equipage and thirty-six guns; and Soult hoped that his dispositions would not be observed, and that he might attack by daybreak of August 30. He was, however, delayed until next day; Wellington, who seems to have kept a close watch of what his enemy was doing, made his counter-dispositions with skill; and as the whole course of the Peninsular campaign had shown, his defense was extremely strong.

At daylight, August 31, Reille crossed the river and made

along the San Marcial hill, and cleverly concealed his forces. At seven o'clock of October 7 the crossing of the river began, in seven columns along a front of five miles. The French were not in force; had Soult been prepared, he could have checked the allies after their crossing, and have had them at his mercy when the tide rose behind them. Reille was surprised and fell back. Clausel attempted to defend the crossings near Vera, but the allies were well across, and finally the Bayonette and Commissari heights, with the Vera gap, were taken, and the French were driven back to the Great Rhune. Clausel still held this height, and continued to do so on the second day, although later it was lost. Wellington slowly pushed his advantage. The operation all told lasted three days, costing about fifteen hundred men on either side, the allies showing commendable valor in assaulting the French works. Wellington's preparations were fully equaled by his skillful manœuvring after crossing the Bidassoa, and he always managed to place at the point of assault a larger number than the enemy could dispose of. The French had scarcely done themselves credit. The generals, Soult complained, had not been careful to watch the enemy, nor had they fought as firmly as on former occasions.

Wellington might have pushed on, taken St. Jean de Luz, and turned the French position, but he contented himself with the gain he had made; he was still watching the war in Germany, determined to take no risks so long as matters there were undecided. Adopting Vera as headquarters, he reorganized the allied army in three grand divisions, under Hill, who held the right, from Roncevalles to the Bastan, under Beresford, who held the centre in the Maya-Echallar country, and under Hope, who extended to the sea. Graham returned home.

Although Soult shortly retook the works at Sarre, he had

been driven back to a much narrower and less favorable position than he had formerly held; and here he maintained the defensive to gain time to reorganize and to rehearten his men. Reille on the right held the main road along the sea, Clausel in the centre was intrenched between Ascain and Amotz, and occupied the Little Rhune, and the left was still at St. Jean Pied de Port. The whole line was covered with field-works.

Wellington had constant difficulties in keeping Portugal and Spain to their work. It is natural that he should have had many political enemies, for these were numbered by the men who wanted and did not receive command, or had friends who were not given preferment. It was also natural that many of his acts as well as the mere presence of the army should arouse hatred and distrust in so excitable a race; and the political turmoil through which Spain and Portugal had passed during the French régime complicated the situation. This went so far that it was at one time suggested in the British Cabinet that the Peninsula should be left to its own resources, and Wellington be transferred to Germany. These annoyances, coupled to many arising from the home government, had, in view of Wellington's defensive plan of campaign, a large influence on what he did; but there has rarely been a soldier who has not had annoyances and difficulties to overcome in his rear commensurate with those in his front. At one time Wellington resigned his position as generalissimo of the allies; but the next Cortes replaced him on his own terms. He had long been urged from Germany to invade France, but he was averse to winter campaigns, and declined to undertake so extensive an operation until it became evident that the emperor had lost the German campaign, and that the allies would shortly cross the French frontier. On the other hand, Soult clung to his project of again invading Aragon

until the snows of winter made such a scheme impracticable; and without Suchet's coöperation, the plan could not succeed. Each army had the usual difficulties in victualing, and suffered more or less. Expecting meanwhile that the allies might invade France, Soult kept on improving his intrenchments; and anxious about Amotz near his centre, and about Foy on his left, Soult proposed that Foy should withdraw to Bidarry, and seize a position in the mountains so as to fall on the allied right, as they debouched from the Col de Maya.

Before attacking Soult, Wellington had paused for the fall of Pampeluna. This having occurred, after four months of stout defense, he now projected a fresh advance on Soult. On November 6 and 7 Hill had descended from Roncevalles to the Bastan, leaving Mina and his Spaniards to hold his position. Sundry delays as usual took place, but on November 10 ninety thousand men, of whom less than twenty thousand were Spanish, with ninety-five guns moved forward on some sixty thousand French. As Soult had guessed, Wellington designed his attack for the French centre—which was the weakest point—and the left. Hill was to attack Erlon at Amotz, and Beresford to attack Clausel between Amotz and Ascain. On the left was Hope to contain Soult's right, which, under Reille, leaned on the sea. Foy was at Bidarry.

Hill debouched from the Maya country against Erlon, and Beresford moved on the works at Amotz to turn his right. While Reille and Clausel were contained by feigned attacks, Hill and Beresford were, above and below the bridge of Amotz, to break in between Clausel and Erlon. Early on November 10 the allies moved forward to the assault. The French were well intrenched, but the allied troops, under the cheering example of their leaders, did their work in a masterful manner. The line of principal fighting in this battle of Sarre was some

eight miles wide, but on either flank were the above named collateral operations by flying wings. Hill on the right from the Pass of Maya reached the French defenses before noon, and attacked them with vigor; they delayed the exuberant allies but a short while: connection between Erlon and Clausel was cut, and Hill and Beresford could unite their forces; the French centre was ruptured and Soult forced back beyond the Nivelle; while on the right Reille was kept busy and pushed some distance towards Bayonne.

On November 11 the allies again advanced. Hope forded the Nivelle above St. Jean de Luz and moved towards Bidart; Beresford marched on Arbonne; Hill seized Espelette; Soult retired to a new position leaning on the intrenched camp of Bayonne. The allies arrested their movements with Hope in Bidart, Beresford in the Arbonne country, and Hill on the right, striving to push in Foy.

In a few hours' combat, by clever concentration, the French army had been driven from the intrenchments it had been working on for many weeks, and had lost a good part of its artillery. Soult had relied too much on his line of intrenchments, never a safe plan, because precluding grand-tactics. The enemy throws a strong column against one point, the line is ruptured there, and defeat ensues. Soult had received better lessons, but may have been influenced by the late operations on the Elbe. The allies lost nearly three thousand men; the French about the same.

Bayonne was not yet fully intrenched, but Soult took up his headquarters there, and sent Erlon to reinforce Foy at Cambo. Wellington would have liked to push into France at this time, but the clay soil at the foot of the Pyrenees made the roads much as were those we remember in Virginia during the Civil War, and he saw no chance of moving with success. The force at Cambo, however, flanked the allied

position, which was confined between the sea and the river Nive, with the left at Bidart, the centre in front of Arcangues, and the right facing Erlon and Foy, from Ustaritz to Itzatzu. There was some skirmishing between the outposts.

On December 10 Wellington forced a passage of the Nive. Beresford crossed at Ustaritz, Hill above Cambo, and Hope moved in by way of Biarritz; as a result, Wellington's army got separated by the Nive, and Soult determined to fall upon the allied wing that was on the left bank of the river. Wellington's position was unsound, and had Soult thrown his whole force forward towards Arcangues, so as to seize and hold the Bussussari ridge, he might have inflicted a heavy blow upon the allies; but for some reason he changed his mind. Reille marched against Hope by the Royal road, where a heavy combat ensued; and Clausel and the Light Division disputed the Bussussari heights, on which the allies held themselves masterfully. Wellington drew three divisions from the right flank over to the left and maintained his ground, at a loss on either side of some two thousand men.

During the night the French withdrew to a more concentrated position, Soult expecting Wellington to make a counter-attack. There was another sharp fight between Hope and Soult's right, but it was mainly accidental. On the 12th a fresh combat broke out between the outposts, and each side advanced batteries, but nothing came of it. During the night of December 12-13 the Nive became swollen by the rain, and the main bridge between the two wings of the allied army was broken, cutting Hill completely off from the centre and left, at a time when the doubly superior French were advancing upon him, besides a force which was threatening his rear. Erlon was in the French front, followed by Foy, with plenty of reserves; but the ground and the roads were such that a line could not be readily formed, nor the troops put in to

advantage. In the early morning fog Soult pushed back Hill's centre and attacked with some vigor, but Hill maintained himself stoutly, until Wellington managed to restore the bridge. The fighting was bitter and at heavy loss, but Hill used his reserves to advantage and clung to his position, while Wellington from the left bank brought up supports, and the allied line remained intact. Not over one half Soult's forces came into fighting contact; but this does not detract from Hill's splendid defense. Hill was the hero of the battle of St. Pierre. On the other hand, Soult had not executed his plan with as much force or cleverness as might have been expected of him. He labored under difficulties, in that on the 11th several German regiments, whose countries had joined the allies, went over to the enemy, which made him for the moment uncertain of his standing, but as an army commander, he was not doing himself justice.

Although Bayonne was a fortress of no strength as such, it had become of the highest importance in preventing the allies from penetrating France. Wellington did not feel safe in merely observing it in moving into France, and preferred operations which would oblige Soult to abandon it, or reduce his force there so that he might storm it. His late operations had cut Soult off from the main road to St. Jean Pied de Port, and opened a means for him to play into the hands of many French malcontents. Soult's task was to force Wellington back towards the Ebro; and indeed the deep roads and winter weather arrested Wellington's offensive, but Soult was obliged to confine his operations to what would defend France. In this view he planned to retire, if he must do so, along the Pyrenees foothills rather than into the heart of the land. In his own quiet, systematic manner Wellington kept about his work, preparing for further advance.


After the battle of Vittoria, Suchet was forced to abandon

Valencia, which he evacuated July 5, and marched to Saragossa; whereupon General Paris left to join Soult. Thence Suchet retired via Tortosa to Tarragona, where he remained four months. Bentinck crossed the Ebro, seized the Balaguer mountains, and invested Tarragona, being joined by Delparque. At Barcelona Suchet drew in Decaen with the Army of Catalonia, and advancing in August on the allies, forced them back to the mountains, while Delparque invested Tortosa. Suchet blew up the walls of Tarragona and retired to Barcelona. On hearing that Suchet had sent troops to Soult, Bentinck ordered Delparque's forces to Wellington, and shortly returned to Sicily. He was succeeded by Clinton, between whom and Suchet there were various exchanges. When Napoleon began to withdraw his troops, Suchet reinforced the garrison of Barcelona, which was invested by Clinton, and withdrew to Gerona.

Under orders from Napoleon, Suchet kept garrisons in Tortosa, Tarragona, Maquinenza, Lerida, Gerona, Figueras and other places. With Wellington between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, Suchet could have collected over thirty thousand men, which force, operating on Soult's left, would have compromised the Anglo-Portuguese. Soult constantly begged his aid, but Suchet did as he chose. In December he sent ten thousand men to Napoleon.

At the end of 1813, but altogether too late to accomplish the good that speedier action might have brought, Ferdinand, who had been a political prisoner in Napoleon's hands, was, under the treaty of Valençay of December 11, sent back to Spain, and Suchet surrendered the towns he still held on the Ebro to the new king. This treaty was one drawn up by Napoleon and accepted by Ferdinand, who, though recognized as king, was to compel the English to leave Spain, the French doing so at the same time, and all acts of the French gov-

ernment under Joseph were to stand. The Cortes refused to confirm this treaty. Ferdinand could no longer be a factor in any plans which Napoleon might make, although he returned to Madrid, and once again became King of Spain March 24, 1814.



Sword of the Period.

LXVI.

THE ALLIES INVADE FRANCE. NOVEMBER, 1813, TO JANUARY, 1814.

AFTER 1812 France still supported Napoleon ; after 1813 she was lukewarm. The considerable forces Napoleon raised were largely consumed by sickness. The old rules by which he had succeeded — rigid concentration and speed, the yielding up of unessential to win at essential points — seemed to be lost. Napoleon should have drawn in his forces from Italy, Spain and many garrisons, and assembled them in one body to meet the allies at the Rhine ; but though they proposed to give him no time, he would not believe they would advance during the winter. The defense of France, and not conquest, was to be looked to ; yet he occupied the Rhine from Switzerland down to its mouth, a political dissemination of forces rather than military sense. He believed that the first allied blow would come through the Netherlands. The Confederation of the Rhine deserted, and the allies in overwhelming forces came on, Bernadotte to blockade Hamburg and move into Holland, Blucher to cross the Rhine near Mainz, and the sovereigns between Mainz and Switzerland. Napoleon calculated that they would have to leave so many troops to observe the fortresses that they would advance on Paris with few. The allies were still ready to treat on a reasonable basis, but Napoleon continued to demand the basis of Frankfort : though this year he showed military skill of the highest order, his political scheming was weak. From December 20 to 30 the several allied armies crossed the Rhine and slowly moved forward to a concentration near Langres and Troyes, a force being detailed to meet Augereau at Lyons. Little by little Ney, Victor, Marmont and Mortier were pushed back of the Meuse, and Macdonald was called in from Belgium. Napoleon was unprepared. Instead of having an equal force, which by measures early taken he could have had, he now opposed the allies with less than half their forces ; and when he made his first assembly at Chalons, the French army was already compromised. Blucher moved towards Brienne to join Schwartzberg. Here on January 29 Napoleon defeated part of his force. Blucher retired, and Napoleon followed. He would have done better to withdraw.

THE enormous drafts Napoleon had made on France for men during the past decade had almost destroyed her power

to contribute to fresh levies. The last two years had literally robbed the cradle and the grave. Yet there were a hundred fortresses to garrison, and field armies which must be raised and equipped. The relics of the Grand Army which had sought refuge behind the Rhine in November, 1813, were wasting with a fatal epidemic of typhus, and this had been communicated to the inhabitants of Mainz and Strasburg. Public spirit was lukewarm. After the Russian campaign all France had arisen to save the honor of her eagles; now the French people had lapsed into indifference. The emperor's words at the opening of the legislature, "I had conceived and executed great designs for the prosperity and happiness of the world: monarch and father, I feel that peace adds to the security of thrones and families," fell dully on the nation — it no longer had the true ring for even Gallic ears. Following Vittoria, the disaster at Leipsic had drawn the spirit out of ever-patient France. Bulletin victories no longer cheered her. Intriguers of all sorts and the old aristocracy were breeding trouble; Talleyrand headed the malcontents; royalist committees were formed in the west and at Bordeaux; Paris salons breathed treason to the empire; Murat was soon to yield to the corrupt approaches of the allies. During November even Eugene was sounded through the King of Bavaria, with a suggestion that he might be made King of Italy; but unlike Murat, he refused all advances, answering that "he was sure that the king would always prefer to find his son-in-law a private citizen but an honest man, rather than a king and a traitor." As Rome saw Hannibal, so the Paris officials saw the enemy already at the gates, and to cheer them up, the emperor wrote, November 3, to Savary: "Your alarms and your fear in Paris make me laugh. I thought you worthy to hear truths. . . . I fear nothing. I will beat the enemy more quickly than you think." But the great

man's influence was no longer what it had been. He strove to make head against the many evils by convoking the legislative body, dismissing Maret, and making Caulaincourt Minister of Foreign Relations. But the legislative body was intractable. It began by demanding guaranties for future liberty, and was shortly dissolved by a *coup d'état*, Napoleon choosing to rely on the Senate alone to legalize his proceedings. Yet even he, for form's sake, had to take notice of the altered face of European affairs. In his Allocution to the Senate, November 14, he said: "Senators, I accept the sentiments that you express to me. All Europe was marching with us a year ago. All Europe is marching against us to-day. This is because the opinion of the world is made by France or by England. We should then have everything to fear without the energy and the power of the nation. Posterity will say that, if great and critical circumstances presented themselves, they were not above France and myself."

The French fortresses, for twenty years beyond danger, had not been properly kept up, and to the principal ones Napoleon first devoted his efforts. Those of secondary importance had to wait: it would have required vastly more men and money than France could now raise to place them all on even a respectable footing. As a fact, although they were largely garrisoned by men needed for the field, they did not long retard the allied invasion, nor consume great forces to observe them, for the fear of fortresses had been gradually lost by the study of Napoleonic methods. But Paris was put in as good a state of defense as possible. On January 11 Napoleon wrote Clarke: "My intention is to make Paris a strong place. If the enemy carries out the project he announces of coming there, I will await him, and in no case quit Paris." Huge numbers of palisades were got ready, with *chevaux-de-*

frise and other entanglements to close the barriers and the unfinished parts of the city enceinte; but not to alarm the populace, this was done secretly; and when the time came to put them to use, they proved of no avail.

As to the army, Napoleon had to do what he could. After 1812 the nation was still ready to recreate it; now the emperor had to encounter lukewarmness or opposition on every hand. He would have been wise during the past campaign to organize the national guard of the provinces, which would now have furnished garrison troops and left all others to be drafted for the field armies. This Provincial Guard had been created in 1805; but as all French wars had been waged outside the limits of France, there had been no cause for calling it into service; and its real utility had never yet been tested. As the trend of affairs was no longer in his favor, it might possibly not have been a reliable force to mobilize.

It must have become evident to Napoleon what an error he had committed in delaying to send Ferdinand back to Spain, when he could have made of him a friend and ally, and perhaps rid himself of the English. An equal lapse was not to have drawn in Suchet's forces to a point where he could put them to use: the Peninsula had long been lost, and by recognizing the fact Napoleon might have added to his forces on the Rhine fully fifty thousand veterans,—perhaps enough to turn the tables and help him to a satisfactory peace. Until the battle of Vittoria, Napoleon had feared to show weakness, lest its political effect should be bad at home and abroad; and he had overrated his own strength. After the Prague negotiations of 1813 had failed, the knot of the difficulty should have been at once cut, as a measure of military caution; but Napoleon the statesman had got the upper hand of Napoleon the soldier; he relied on unreal political factors, and forgot the essential military factors. He no longer brought the

political situation up to aid the military problem, certain that to solve the latter would enable him to mould the former ; but he strove to shape the military scheme so as not to disturb the shaky political structure. Some of his big garrisons were too far away to be drawn in except by manœuvres he would not adopt ; but when Napoleon saw things going against him in 1813, had he but put to use his old rule of rigid concentration, had he drawn in Eugene, Suchet, Davout, St. Cyr, and for the moment abandoned their holdings, and others, to add to his field army, there is no question whatever that he could have kept the allies beyond the Rhine, and have conquered for himself a France with a liberal frontier. But before he was willing to acknowledge the superiority of the allies, the time had passed. He got nothing from his garrisons, nothing from Italy ; all he got from Spain was two weak divisions from Soult and ten thousand men from Suchet, whereas these two marshals with half their force could have staved off the enemy in Spain long enough to give the additional veterans a chance to accomplish something helpful on the Rhine, especially as Wellington would not have invaded France while the campaign was doubtful, and as pronounced success in France would yield fruit in other lands.

Italy could have been made most useful, if matters had been taken in time. At first Napoleon proposed to fight for this kingdom, and wrote, November 3, to Eugene : —

“The King of Naples sends me word that he will soon be in Bologna with thirty thousand men. This news will permit you to remain in communication with Venice, and will give the time to await all the army that I am forming to retake the country of Venice. Work with the king the best way possible.” And on November 20 : “The viceroy is not to quit the Adige without a battle. He is to have confidence. He has forty thousand men, he may have one hundred and twenty guns. He is sure of success. To quit the Adige without fighting is dishonor. It would be better to be beaten.”

Later he had planned to have Eugene enter into an armistice with the allied commander Bellegarde at any fair sacrifice, and quickly to fall back across the Alps on Geneva; and as a rallying-point for this force, Augereau was to assemble twenty-five thousand men at Lyons, of which Suchet's ten thousand were to be the nucleus, — all of whom would furnish an army of sixty thousand men with which to fall on the allied rear when they invaded France. But Eugene's soldiers were mostly Romans, Tuscans or Piedmontese, who would not willingly leave their own soil, and might prove unreliable in France; and the viceroy eventually remained in Italy, where he conducted a loyal and able campaign on the Adige, but to no end.

Although Napoleon was grossly deceiving himself, yet taking his views from a certain standpoint, his calculations were not lacking in astuteness. It was true that the allies would have to observe or blockade all the fortresses on the Oder and the Elbe; that so soon as they passed the Rhine, they would have to invest not only Mainz and Strasburg, but a number of minor strong places; and subtracting what men would be thus consumed, Napoleon was in a way justified in estimating as small the force they could bring as far as the Aube or the Seine. And to meet this, he had reason to believe that he could have ready an equal number, to whose momentum his own ability, and the fact that the French would be fighting for their hearthstones, would add the winning element. What Napoleon had forgotten was that he had taught Europe how to sacrifice lesser things to accomplish greater; he had taught her how to raise troops, how to utilize militia; he had taught her the equality of thousands. And moreover, the Confederation of the Rhine turned against him, and, including the Bavarians and Wurtembergers, furnished one hundred and fifty thousand men; and the allied land-

wehr was equal in number. The latter easily blockaded the fortresses held by the French in Germany, and left the whole allied field army free to invade France. Napoleon had lost sight of many of the changed factors; and his method of calculation proved false at a critical season.

Suggestions for peace had again been made when Napoleon was at Frankfort, on terms which would give to France the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees as boundaries, and he would have been wise to follow up and quickly close with such a proposal; Leipsic should have taught him that he could not conquer better terms against Europe in arms; but he desired to know what was to become of Italy and Holland, and while this new element retarded the negotiations, it in no wise held back the allied advance. As a fact, Austria wanted Italy again, England desired the Low Countries freed from French influence, Russia was determined to have Warsaw. There was scant time to discuss these questions, and meanwhile the invasion of France proceeded.

With an idea of adding to his available forces (from the beginning Napoleon foresaw the want of men, a fact which accentuates all the more his failure to draw in his outside armies), on November 18 he told Berthier to

“Write to Marmont to send an intelligent officer to the Prince of Schwartzberg to offer to treat for the surrender of Danzig, Mödlin, Zamosc, Stettin, Cüstrin and Glogau. The conditions of the surrender of these places would be, that the garrisons should reënter France, with arms and baggage, without being prisoners of war. That all the field artillery with the French arms” (meaning to exclude captured guns), “as well as the magazines of clothing, which are found in the places, should be left to us. That means of transportation for bringing them back should be furnished us, and that the sick should be sent back when they are well. Let him make it known that Danzig can hold out a year; that Glogau and Cüstrin can also hold out a year; that if they try to get these places by a siege, they will spoil the towns. That these conditions,

then, are advantageous to the allies. . . . If they speak of the surrender of Hamburg, Magdeburg, Erfurt, Torgau and Wittenberg, answer is to be made that my orders will be taken on the subject, but that there are no instructions. . . . These communications will also serve to procure us news. You will say nothing to Marmont relative to the citadel of Würzburg."

While all this was well enough, it was only sparring for time and gained nothing: it did not go to the root of the matter.

It had been evident to Napoleon, ever since the indecisive result of the first day's battle at Leipsic, that the right bank of the Rhine would soon have to be vacated by the French; and when, on the retreat from Germany, he reached Mainz, he began arrangements for dividing the course of the river into military departments. The old division which had long existed in the strategic manœuvring of the past was again adopted by order of November 3: the Upper Rhine, from Hüningen to Landau; the Middle Rhine from Landau to Coblenz; the Lower Rhine from Coblenz down. Berthier was left in full control. On November 7 Napoleon wrote him: "I leave to-night for Paris. My intention is that you should go to-morrow to Bingen, and that you should successively pass in review all the corps, to fill all the vacant places and do all that is necessary to put order in these corps." Of the Upper Rhine the command was given to Victor, under whom only the existing garrisons and such new levies as were locally made there, some sixteen thousand men, were placed. The Lower Rhine, with headquarters at Cologne, was assigned to Macdonald, who here assembled his own two divisions of foot and Sébastiani's three divisions of horse, say twenty thousand men. The more important Middle Rhine was turned over to Marmont, who with eighteen thousand men was to establish himself firmly in Mainz. Here the wreck of his own corps, to

which that of the 3d Corps was added, made up two divisions, which were complemented by three cavalry divisions under Milhaud; in Coblenz he had the 5th Corps, now consolidated into only one division, and three divisions of Arrighi's cavalry; at Wörms he stationed the 2d Corps with its one division; at Kreuznach the four divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps; and opposite Mainz, at Castel, Bertrand's Corps, strengthened up to four divisions. Ney had a reserve in Nancy of ten thousand men; and there were troops collecting in Namur temporarily under Mortier, and in Lyons under Augereau.

This was a wide separation of the much dwindled French forces, and in a high degree unwise. Though essential in a way to protect the various stretches of French territory in which fresh levies were to be made, it was but the old cordon-theory revamped, and the scheme reflected rather the political desirability of covering the entire French frontier than the military essence of concentration for defense. Napoleon's old maxim, and Frederick's before him, to yield up unessential points in order to mass and win at essential points had gone lost. We shall see Napoleon now, for mere political expediency, seek to keep his hold of Italy, the Pyrenees, Belgium, when the momentary loss of some of the territory he had added to France might enable him to concentrate, beat the several allied armies in detail, drive them in disorder from French soil, and recover prestige and land at one blow. If there ever was a moment in the career of this great captain when military prudence demanded the denudation of all outlying territory for the sake of rigid concentration, it was now. The single question of the defense of Paris demanded it. But Napoleon did nothing of the kind, and this throwing of his first principles to the winds is amazing. It was evident that the soldier had been sunk in the monarch, striv-

ing to hold what he had patched together by his wars. It was like a miser hugging his piles of gold instead of seizing a pistol. We no longer recognize the man whose uniform practice had been to mass every soldier and every gun for battle.

The next essential matter was the raising of fresh levies, to sustain the cordon on the Rhine. The pending conscription would produce one hundred and fifty thousand men; those running back to 1804-07, and not yet called into service, could be counted on for one hundred and twenty-five thousand more. It had been thought that forty thousand men could be drawn from Italy, and twenty-five thousand from the Spanish forces. This was perhaps true; but time was required, and the allies gave the emperor no time — which again showed faulty calculation, for he knew that their big armies must be kept employed to remain useful. With the first arrivals of the levy, Napoleon proposed to strengthen the forces along the Rhine, so as to raise the 2d Corps to three divisions, the 5th Corps to two divisions, the 6th Corps to four divisions, and to recreate a 1st Corps with three divisions; the next arrivals would form active reserves in the rear. In addition to this, he proposed to anticipate the levy of 1815 so as to raise two hundred thousand men for depot-reserves, to be posted in large bodies, one of thirty thousand men in Turin, a like number in Bordeaux, eighty thousand at Metz, forty thousand at Antwerp. All this was feasible, but again required time: it should have been done months before. As to the probable direction in which he would be called on to use his new armies, Napoleon believed that the enemy had designs on Holland; and that if they crossed the Rhine, it would be on its lower course, as a shorter and easier line of operations. The fortresses there were universally known to be in lamentable condition, and this would be an additional

basis of such an invasion. Blucher indeed had harbored this intention ; but the sovereigns decided otherwise.

Now if the emperor had convinced himself that the next allied blow would come from the Low Countries, it is all the more extraordinary that he should have left those armies which lay beyond the Alps and along the Pyrenees where they were, instead of drawing the main part of them in to the vicinity of the capital. He must have recognized that he was on the eve of a last contest for the conservation of his empire ; and that the troops he left in Italy, Spain, and the south of France were lost to use in defending Paris. Unless he purposed, if he lost Paris, to move to the south and begin a fresh struggle, — as the balance of evidence shows he then did not, — there is small excuse for this division of forces. Had the emperor for one campaign enacted the rôle of the captain of 1796, and massed his full strength for operations against the several allied armies in turn, he might still have conquered a proper peace on the soil of France. His chance of doing so was almost as good as during the armistice of 1813 ; but it could be accomplished only by adopting timely means to meet the danger. There had been abundant time, and any harm that the allies might have done from Italy, or Wellington from Spain, would be more than counterbalanced by the decisive victory over the Army of the Sovereigns.

Neither did the emperor seem to measure the immense numbers he would have to meet. The allies, including the contingent of those countries which had forsaken the Napoleonic régime, had a force which, with reinforcements, good authorities estimate as high as nine hundred thousand men ; to wit : Austrians and Russians over a quarter million each, Prussians one hundred and sixty thousand, Swedes twenty thousand, German troops two hundred thousand ; and of this one sixth was horse. These figures were on paper ; but if

we count the militia, nearly this number was actually raised. Of these, in first line, stood — 1st. The Army of the North under Bernadotte, one hundred and seventy-five thousand men, Bülow in the van, with the duty of blockading Hamburg, occupying Holland, and moving into Belgium by way of Utrecht and Düsseldorf, to debouch through Brussels. 2d. Blucher's Army of Silesia, one hundred and forty thousand



Austrian Hussar.

strong, posted in the Mainz and Mannheim country, and connected with Bernadotte by the corps of St. Priest. This was to drive the French out of Westphalia, cross the Middle Rhine and penetrate into France through Metz. 3d. The Army of the Sovereigns under Schwartzemberg, two hundred and fifty thousand strong, accompanied by the monarchs, was, in order to protect the Danube line back to Austria, cantoned between the Main and Switzerland, after securing which, so

as to isolate Italy, it was to move forward into France and seize the plateau of Langres. 4th. The Italian Army under Bellegarde, eighty thousand strong. 5th. Behind all this were reserves numbering two hundred and thirty thousand men.

It must not, however, be imagined that any such huge forces swept into France. Schwartzenberg had in hand but two hundred thousand men and Blucher but sixty-five thousand, with which to open the campaign. There were, under the former, two light divisions, Bubna and Maurice Lichtenstein, the Austrian corps of Colloredo, Lichtenstein and Giulay, the German corps of Wrede and Wurtemberg, the Russian corps of Wittgenstein, the Austrian reserve under Hesse-Homburg and the Russo-Prussian reserve under Barclay; and under Blucher three corps, Sacken, Langeron and Yorek.

The plan of operation of the allies, which they had learned from the lessons of the past two years, was simplicity itself. It consisted in marching on Paris in as many columns as would afford most easy means of victualing, and would be, as they concentrically approached one another, mutually sustaining. By mid-January both main armies would reach their objectives, — Langres and Metz, — and by the end of the month be able to concentrate at Troyes, this being the place set by the allies, if they could keep the initiative, for the great battle which was to put an end to the French empire.

The shortest road from Leipsic to Paris is through Mainz, Metz and Chalons, and later Napoleon expected the allies that way. While a quarter million men could not march on one road, neither was it necessary to move too far apart. Between Coblenz and Mannheim were three routes: through Treves on Luxemburg, through Kaiserslautern on Metz, through Phalsburg on Nancy. Three columns on these routes would have sufficed. The French fortresses to consider were Erfurt,

Würzburg, all those in Alsace, Strasburg, Mainz, Landau, Saarlouis, Thionville, Metz, Luxemburg, Longwy and Verdun. France once invaded, the Netherlands could be neglected as of no strategic value.

Napoleon had hoped, by peace propositions, to win time to put his new army into the field, but when it shortly became evident that the plan of the allies was promptly to enter France, and not mainly from Holland, but from Switzerland and across the Middle Rhine, he altered his distribution of troops, temporarily sending Marmont to Colmar and Victor to Strasburg; while Mortier at Langres, Ney at Epinal and Augereau at Lyons were each to assemble an army; but Macdonald was still left on the Lower Rhine, though the upper Marne was the point of danger.

The allies had won much confidence from the last two campaigns; but although they were far from preferring war to peace, knew their redoubtable adversary and dreaded his methods, they yet had determined to fight to a finish, unless a satisfactory basis could be arrived at by negotiation. To this the door was constantly kept open, and a Congress was to assemble at Chatillon-sur-Seine to discuss the pregnant subject. Here again lay Napoleon's chance. On January 4 he wrote to Caulaincourt, who was to be his representative:—

“I think it is doubtful whether the allies are acting in good faith and that England wishes peace. I myself wish it, but solid, honorable. France without its natural limits, without Ostend, without Antwerp, would no longer be on a level with the other states of Europe. . . . You must listen to everything, observe everything. It is not certain that they will receive you at headquarters; the Russians and the English will wish to keep away all means of conciliation and explanation with the Austrian emperor. You must try to guess the views of the allies and let me know day by day what you learn. . . . Do they wish to reduce France to its ancient limits? That is to degrade it. . . . Italy is intact. The viceroy has a fine army. Before a week has passed, I shall have assembled means

of delivering several battles, even before the arrival of my Spanish troops. The devastation of the Cossacks will arm the inhabitants and double our forces. If the nation seconds me, the enemy is marching to his destruction. If fortune betrays me, I have taken my stand: I care no longer for the throne. I will not degrade the nation nor myself in subscribing shameful conditions. . . . You must ascertain what Metternich wants. It is not for the interest of Austria to push things to the end. One step more and the first rôle will escape her. In this state of things I can give you no instructions. Limit yourself to hearing everything and reporting to me."

The above were secret instructions; Caulaincourt's open ones of the same day are more in detail, with regard to all the countries under French dominion.

With his usual habit the emperor made on January 12 a Note on the Actual Situation of France. In this he carefully goes over the condition of the allied armies, and figures them down to one hundred and eighty thousand men. As a part of our study of the emperor's present capacity, this is largely quoted. Concerning certain estimates, he says:—

"This calculation must be very exaggerated, for the enemy himself, in his greatest emphasis, does not carry them beyond two hundred thousand men. . . . We believe, then, that in estimating Bülow's army at twenty thousand men, Blucher's at sixty thousand, Schwartzberg's at one hundred thousand, one has got near the reality." He then figures out of these totals that Bülow must leave eight thousand men at Gorkum, Bergen op Zoom and Breda; and will have only twelve thousand men left. "If the army of Blucher is sixty thousand men, a number probably exaggerated, he cannot have left less than twenty thousand men in front of Mainz; Luxemburg, Saarlouis, Thionville will occupy some ten thousand. The army of Schwartzberg must leave at least ten thousand men in Switzerland, . . . fifteen thousand men at Besançon and twenty thousand in front of the places from Hüningen to Landau, a corps in front of Belfort and Auxonne. Thus he cannot march on Langres and on Nancy with more than fifty thousand men.

"Let us suppose, then, that the twenty-five or thirty thousand disposable men of Blucher are joined to the fifty or sixty thousand of

Schwartzenberg. But this does not say that they can march on Paris with more than eighty thousand men. This operation, then, would be insane, but we must assume it."

Then follows a review of the means possessed by France, and he goes on: "Macdonald can move on Liège and Charleroi, menace the right flank of Blucher by holding the Meuse. This marshal and Sébastiani can assemble ten thousand men and forty guns, . . . and if the enemy marched on Paris, he would be able to arrive before him." Marmont, he says, must have fifteen thousand men, Victor twelve thousand men, Mortier twelve thousand men. "These four corps, after having retarded the enemy and disputed the ground, if he should actually march on Paris, could arrive before him . . . and be joined by sixty thousand men. . . . One could then have by mid-February, in front of Paris, an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, after leaving a garrison of thirty thousand men in the city. . . . In every state of the case we should take proper measures, and in no case admit the abandonment of Paris."

Résumé. "1st. Make no preparations to abandon Paris, and bury ourselves in its ruins if necessary." 2. Collect all the guns possible. 3. Collect all the cadres and bring them to Paris, so as to form new battalions. 4. Collect all the conscription men in Paris and establish clothing and equipment factories there. 5. Victual Paris for four or five months. 6. Assemble in Paris a thousand guns and two or three hundred thousand rounds, and eight or ten million cartridges. 7. Bring the park from Metz to Paris, as well as from other places. 8. Construct gun carriages for sixteen and twenty-four pounders for the heights of Paris. 9. Prepare palisades to close the walls where unfinished. 10. Also collect a large number of palisades to make defenses for the gates. 11. Bring from every quarter forty to fifty thousand implements, and a number of road workers, to make Paris a strong place. 12. The same thing in less measure should be done in Lyons. 13. A Board to carry this out should be formed.

The interest attaching to the utterances of the great soldier at the moment of opening this vital campaign will explain the long quotations from the Correspondence; the St. Helena writings are to a certain extent theoretical, the former were part of the personality of the emperor.

In his General Instructions of January 13 for Antwerp,

Macdonald, Marmont, who was back on the Saar, Victor, Ney and Mortier, the emperor recapitulates much of the above Note so far as numbers are concerned.

If Blucher "passes the Saar and moves on the Moselle, he will have to mask Luxemburg, Thionville, Marsal and Metz. His corps will scarcely suffice for all these operations. Marmont must observe him, contain him, manœuvre between the places, and if, by a chance which is not presumable, this marshal were obliged to repass the Moselle, he would throw Durutte's division into Metz and still anticipate the enemy on the great road to Paris. In this supposition Macdonald, who is assembling his corps on the Meuse, would observe the right flank of the enemy, would defend Liège and the Meuse, and always follow the right flank of the enemy, so as not to cease to cover the debouches of Paris. If, on the contrary, Blucher, having felt of the Saar, moves on the lower Meuse to menace Belgium, Macdonald will defend the Meuse, and Marmont will follow the left flank of the enemy to observe his movements, contain him, retard him and do him the utmost harm possible.

"Schwartzenberg's army . . . is to be contained by Mortier at Langres, by Ney at Nancy and Epinal, and by Victor in the Vosges." The emperor then orders Mortier, Ney and Victor to work together "to seize the gorges of the Vosges, barricade them, assemble there the National Guards, the Field Guards, the Forest Guards and volunteers, and should the enemy penetrate into the interior in force, these three corps are to close the road to him, always cover the route to the capital, in front of which the emperor is assembling an army of one hundred thousand men. . . . The marshals may make proclamations to offset the invectives of the generals of the enemy. They are to make it known that two hundred thousand men of National Guards have been formed in Brittany, in Normandy, in Picardy and about Paris, and that they are advancing on Chalons, independently of an army of reserve of the line of more than one hundred thousand men; that peace being made with King Ferdinand and the Spanish insurrectionists, our troops of Aragon and Catalonia are in full march on Lyons, and those of Bayonne on Paris. Finally, to foretell to the enemy that sacred territory he has violated will consume him."

The above was an intelligent strategic scheme, provided the marshals had numbers and ability equal to the enemy's; but

with the forces on either side, the instructions were well-nigh worthless. We are unfortunately not permitted to know whether Napoleon issued these instructions to bolster up the enterprise of his marshals, or because he believed they could be executed. Much or all of it sounds like whistling to keep up one's courage; and yet, although the masterly conduct of the succeeding campaign leaves one in doubt, we can but feel that this was no longer the man to whom facts once were solely hard facts.

Not only did the emperor exhibit a marked decrease of mental balance in his estimates of his own force and that of the enemy, but he essayed means of negotiation which must have proved his weakness to the enemy. On January 16 he wrote to Metternich a letter couched in terms very different from those of his last interview. He states the case from his own standpoint, with his old force, but more courtesy; yet it is evident in the letter, as it must have been to Metternich, that the emperor was not what he had been.

"Finally," says he, "Austria protests that she wants peace, but is not to continue hostilities to put herself in a situation of not being able to reach, or else of getting beyond this aim, when on both sides it is desired to come to an end? All these considerations have led me to think that in the actual position of our respective armies, and in this rigorous season, a suspension of arms should be reciprocally advantageous to both parties. . . . You have shown me so much personal confidence, and I have myself so great an one in the honesty of your views, and in the noble sentiments which under all circumstances you have expressed, that I dare hope that a letter which this confidence has dictated, if it cannot reach this object, will remain between Your Excellency and myself." This lacked the old self-poise.

And next day he ordered Eugene to do what could no longer be accomplished in season.

"My Son, you will have learned, by the different matters that have been published, of the efforts that I have made to have peace. I have since

sent my Minister of Exterior Relations to their" (the enemy's) "outposts. They put off receiving him, and yet have kept on marching forward. Suchet will have told you that Murat is placing himself with our enemies. As soon as you shall have received the final news of this, it seems to me important that you should reach the Alps with your whole army. In case you do this, you would leave Italians as garrison of Mantua and other places, having a care to bring the silver and precious property of my household, and the army chests."

To summarize the emperor's figures given above, Bülow was coming on into the Low Countries with twenty thousand men, which the necessary detachments would reduce by a quarter or a third, and the balance could easily be held in



French Fusiliers.

check by Antwerp. Blucher with sixty thousand men would advance on Metz; but half of this force would have to be left to observe fortresses, and could be contained by Macdonald and Marmont. Schwartzberg, debouching from Basle with a hundred thousand men, must leave half of his effective in Switzerland and in front of the strong places, and

would be held in check by Mortier, Victor and Ney. According to this arithmetic, Blucher and Schwartzberg would not have a force of over eighty thousand men with which to advance on Paris. These curiously false assumptions are further illustrated in a letter to Maison of January 20:—

“You have, then, no other step to take to defend Antwerp and Belgium than to assemble all your troops in Antwerp . . . with strong outposts. . . . In this situation Belgium runs no danger and your troops are all assembled. The enemy will never throw himself on Belgium, so long as you can place yourself between him and Breda and can march on Gorkum. . . . You are to choose, at one or two leagues from Antwerp, a good position on which you can withdraw your vanguard and your isolated corps and deliver battle.”

It was in accordance with a scheme based on these utterly inexact estimates that Napoleon issued orders to his marshals.

The wrong-headedness of the entire plan is obvious. Even had the effectives of the several oncoming armies been accurate, as they were far from being, the number of detachments which the allies would have to make might be so markedly cut down as to make their manœuvre against Paris by no means the “insane operation” he terms it. Napoleon’s habit of deceiving himself had grown to fatal proportions, and his judgment had deteriorated every year. In 1812, the means he possessed could not possibly accomplish the end he was aiming at. In 1813, the disregard of actualities became yet more marked; he had means enough, but he failed to employ them in a correct or decisive manner. And for the campaign of 1814, his plans were founded on estimates and assumptions the like of which scarce one of the generals he had beaten in the past was capable of equaling in absurdity. The most mediocre leader could scarcely have made worse military blunders. Whether these were worse than his political blunders, it is hard to say. And yet, when it came to action, Napoleon was never more like himself than in this memorable campaign. It is all like a strange case of mental aberration.

As the allied operations developed, the emperor recognized how vain his calculations had been. To begin with, the sov-

ereigns had determined on a winter campaign rather than allow the French time to recover from the blow received at Leipsic; and the crossing of the Rhine took place so much earlier than Napoleon had anticipated as almost to nullify his preparations. Before the plan had been well settled, the corps of Bülow and Winzingerode entered Holland with thirty thousand men, and, despite Maison at Antwerp, easily reduced all the country to the Waal, while Nimwegen and Graves voluntarily opened their gates. This for the moment was not a dangerous element; but greater dangers were at hand.

According to the well-devised plan, in the early days of December Schwartzenberg had assembled his army in the angle of the Rhine between Basle and Schaffhausen, and in the night of December 20–21, in five columns he crossed and concentrated in Solothurn. The left column under Bubna marched towards Geneva, and sent a body to seize the mountain passes of the St. Bernard and Simplon, while the rest headed on Lyons. The other four columns debouched upon Besançon, Auxonne, Dijon and Vesoul, leaving bodies to mask these places. There was little opposition. Wrede had been sent over ten days before to protect the flank of the crossing forces by besieging Hüningen and Belfort, Breisach and Schlettstadt, and then to move on Colmar; while Deroz seized the small fortresses of Blamont and Landskron. Wittgenstein later crossed and invested Strasburg. Wurtemberg passed below Hüningen on a pontoon bridge; he and Barclay were to sustain these operations.

Schwartzenberg was thus extended over a front of nearly two hundred miles. Had the French been ready, he might have regretted his dispersion of troops, but they were still far in the rear. He had started with two hundred and twenty thousand men; but seventy thousand were left before the

fortresses, Bubna had twelve thousand, Homburg and Lichtenstein were off to the left with thirty thousand, Wrede and Wurtemberg towards the right with forty thousand, Barclay's reserves were in the rear, and Schwartzenberg with Giulay and Colloredo, forty thousand strong, was the headquarters body that advanced on the enemy. Bubna's detachment may be justified, but scarcely the absence of the others from the fighting line. During the bulk of the campaign Schwartzenberg was constantly reaching out towards Lyons, as if fearful for his left. He overestimated what Augereau could accomplish. But before he had advanced far towards Langres, he saw how exposed he was, and drew in Wurtemberg, Wrede and Wittgenstein, leaving but small detachments opposite the fortresses.

On the last two days of December, Blucher crossed at Coblenz, Bacharach and Mainz, Sacken on the left, Langeron and York in the centre, and the right under St. Priest. Langeron was left with twenty-five thousand men to observe

Mainz. Both allied armies were met by hordes of armed peasants defending their homes, despite that many were caught and shot as guerrillas. It was natural that the soldiers of countries which for a dozen years had been overrun and depredated by the French should now retaliate in kind; La Belle France felt all the worst horrors of war; but no burning of villages or execution of armed peasants deterred these *franc-tireurs*.



Russian Grenadiers.

The actual force Napoleon had so far been able to get together to meet this flood of invasion by little exceeded a hundred thousand men, all told, for field service, while in the Dutch fortresses were twenty thousand, and in those along the Rhine frontier thirty-five thousand men. Beside the huge masses of one and two years before, this seems a sorry exhibit. In 1812 Napoleon had opened the campaign with a half million men, of whom three quarters perished. In 1813 he had opened the German campaign with four hundred thousand men; of these not much over fifty thousand had returned across the Rhine; in December he again had collected over one hundred thousand, but typhus is claimed to have invalidated sixty thousand men. Thus, although he had managed to raise a large force of new men by January, 1814, he was able, when the allies invaded France, to place on the first fighting line, or approaching it, only the above small tale. How was he to hold head against the quarter of a million allied troops which were pressing on towards Paris?

There was much difficulty in collecting arms. Constant mention of it occurs. On January 1 we find in the orders to Berthier:—

“The great trouble will be muskets. You must be careful to give moulds for balls for sporting-guns, or even have cast a great quantity of little balls for the insurrectionists.” And next day, and several times thereafter, the same thing is repeated in orders. On January 9 he wrote Clarke: “Is it true that in St. Etienne there are twelve thousand muskets which are not perfect but might serve?” “The great difficulty for the National Guard is arms; we have none,” to Joseph on January 24. To Clarke, February 6: “You have told me that the artillery had a great number of pikes. Some should be given to the National Guards, who are assembling in the environs of Paris. They will do for the third rank. Print instructions how to use them. Also send pikes into the departments, they are preferable to scythes, and moreover in the towns even scythes are wanting.” Later, many arms were captured. Napoleon wrote to

Joseph, February 15 : "The peasants picked up on the Montmirail battlefield more than forty thousand muskets, which the rapidity of the movement has not allowed us to gather. Perhaps the National Guard at Paris, by sending agents to the peasants, could get many of them."

All available means were put to use to raise men. On January 4 a levy in mass was decreed, and the generals of territorial divisions were appointed.

"Article 3. The generals commanding the levy will organize them in the villages and communes. They will organize free corps, they will give commissions as partisans to move on the flanks and the rear of the enemy. Finally, they will take all measures suitable to harm the enemy."

On January 10 to Macdonald : "You must feel how important it is to arrest or at least retard the march of the enemy, and to present him all possible traps. Employ the Forest Guard, the Field Guards, the National Guards, to do the utmost possible harm to the enemy."

The want of sub-officers was marked. The emperor wrote, January 10, to Clarke : "They assure me that there could be found in the Invalides seven or eight hundred individuals whose wounds are healed, and who would gladly serve. If that is true, it would be a precious body from which to take sub-officers."

Blucher and Schwartzberg took their time, but shortly the Army of the Sovereigns stood on the front Dijon-Gray-Vesoul; and on January 6 Giulay and Colloredo were at Langres, from which Mortier retired, while Wurtemberg and Wrede were moving down the Rhine, and Barclay was on the Saone in reserve. Mortier did his best to arrest the onward movement: and in combats at Chaumont, Colombes les deux Eglises and Bar-sur-Aube, January 18 and 24, the Imperial Guard fought at the outposts. Mortier fell back to Troyes, followed by Colloredo. Giulay remained at Bar-sur-Aube. Victor, after a sharp action at Colmar, and threatened on the right from Remiremont by Wurtemberg, and on the left from Luneville by Wittgenstein, summarily retired, followed sharply by Wrede, towards Chaumont. Wurtemberg headed


for Ney at Epinal, and on January 11 threw back his van in a sharp action. He then joined Giulay at Bar-sur-Aube. Wittgenstein fell into line with Blucher. Pahlen was constantly in the van.

Meanwhile the Army of Silesia pushed Marmont beyond the Vosges and the Saar on Metz; and leaving Yorek to observe this fortress as well as Luxemburg, Thionville and Saarlouis, Blucher followed on with Sacken to seek a junction with Schwartzenberg.


Thus Victor and Marmont retired towards Ney in the valley of the Moselle, the artillery park was withdrawn from Metz, Mortier manœuvred in the Chaumont country, Macdonald remained on the Lower Rhine until Winzingerode crossed at Düsseldorf January 12, when he was ordered on Chalons. Alsatia was evacuated, and the valley of the Moselle opened, which as yet there was no army to defend. Despite Napoleon's orders to cover at Langres the road to Paris, it was too late, and there could scarcely be a semblance of a stand made against the overwhelming allied forces. The emperor's first line of defense had been broken through like a cobweb.

Although he saw that the general initiative of the European war had quite fallen from his hands, and that he had left only the minor initiative of the theatre at the upper Seine and Marne, yet with a sure eye Napoleon seized the key-point and began to concentrate his columns on Chalons-sur-Marne. Lefebvre-Desnouettes, with some cavalry and an infantry division, was sent to occupy Chalons, while Mortier held on to Troyes. Battalions of the National Guard were set in movement on Troyes, Provins, Montargis, Meaux and Soissons to be armed and clothed and put into line. The reserve divisions of Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nimes and Montpellier were increased. The cavalry-remount depot was transferred to Versailles.

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ON'S MANGEUVRES IN 1814

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By suitable concentration Napoleon might have stood at Dijon January 1 with one hundred and fifty thousand men, and the allies would not have dared to march on Paris. But Napoleon with seventy thousand men at Chalons opened the Seine to Schwartzberg. He announced to his marshals that he would be at Chalons January 25. All were falling back on the Marne to this point of assembly, Victor and Ney together, Marmont from Metz, Macdonald up the Meuse, starting from Maestricht January 14. Thus would be completed a concentration Napoleon with his small forces should have ordered at the beginning, as a point from which to move forward to the Langres plateau. The emperor apparently watched these operations quietly, as if it were a natural sequence of events, not one telling fatally against him; and Blucher was able to head towards the Marne to a junction with Schwartzberg, while his cavalry followed the French to St. Dizier.

This falling back had not been accomplished without much fault-finding, Berthier writing Victor, January 17, "the emperor disapproves your having abandoned Nancy. His Majesty orders you not to leave the Moselle without fighting." And two days later Napoleon wrote Berthier: "My Cousin, one can understand nothing in the conduct of Victor. Reach the outposts before to-morrow morning, 20th. Make secure the defense of the Meuse. Give the command to the best general. Join to it the divisions of the Young Guard. Send off Victor. Give the command of everything to Marmont, and stay there until Marmont has taken all measures for the defense of the Meuse and to fight." This is a sample of a number of such letters at this period, the directions in which were not always carried out.

By mid-January the two main allied armies had thus got into central France, had practically made the proposed junc-

tion, and reached the point whence they could give battle or move down the Seine and Marne valleys on Paris, while Napoleon had as yet been unable to accomplish what was essential to meet them. Blucher with fifty thousand men was advancing towards the Marne at Joinville and St. Dizier; the sovereigns with one hundred and twenty thousand men were slowly moving down river on Chaumont, whence Troyes was the objective: Napoleon had but seventy thousand men, and these were on far too wide a front. Mortier, reinforced up to fifteen thousand men, had retired to Troyes on the right to protect the Seine; in the centre, between Vitry and Chalons, Ney, Victor and Marmont had forty-five thousand men; on the left Macdonald with nine thousand men had got up as far as Réthel.

Napoleon had determined to assume the offensive, but he was far from ready to do efficient manœuvring. On January 23 he wrote Aide-de-Camp Lamezan, whom he sent to the front to announce his speedy arrival: "I wish on the 26th to fall on all the places where there is some infantry of the enemy, to crush some corps. . . . My intention being to assemble my troops so as to march on the enemy. . . . My object is to fall well assembled on some corps of the enemy and to destroy it." This limited plan is apparently adopted as a means of surprising and for a few days checking the enemy, so as to give time for further combinations, and the concentration of troops. Though his numbers were few, he believed he could supplement them with enough energy and ability to fend off, at least for the moment, the further allied advance. "I suppose that Victor will have held himself at Ligny or St. Dizier; that Ney with the . . . Young Guard will be near by; that Gérard is at Brienne; and Mortier at Bar-sur-Aube. I will assemble all these forces, and fall on the first corps of the enemy which shall be at hand," he wrote

his aide, Belliard, January 23; "keep secret the news of my arrival." This all does not sound like the old ring of battle when Napoleon headed a successful army in 1805 or 1806, but rather like partial work to gain time.

Next day, in reviewing the military situation, he says:—

"The army is assumed to be at Chalons, Vitry and Bar-sur-Aube. The enemy does not appear to be threatening from the side of Soissons and the Ardennes. From the side of the northern fortresses he has not yet got Belgium. The whole movement of the enemy is towards Langres, St. Dizier and Dijon. The movement of the enemy by way of St. Dizier and Langres is held in check by the army; that by way of Dijon is not held in check. From Dijon to Paris there is one road via Troyes and one road via Sens. . . . It is probable that the effect of the movement I am going to make will cause all the enemy's parties to fall back." And he adds: "I do not suppose that on this" (the Dijon) "road there can come more than a few cavalry parties."

Before daylight of January 25 Napoleon left Paris, after having sworn the National Guard to loyal protection of the capital and of the imperial family; and having appointed the empress regent, and Joseph to the command of Paris and the troops there, he reached Chalons early next morning. His general plan had been to move forward so as to strike Blucher's head of column and throw this army back upon the Moselle; and had he been able to accomplish this smartly, it might, added to Augereau's threat to Schwartzenberg's flank, have indeed had the effect of pushing the sovereigns back to the Rhine; but Napoleon was a day or two late. When he reached Chalons, both Blucher and Schwartzenberg had already started on their concentric march towards the Aube and the Marne, and this brought the emperor in contact with larger bodies than he expected. He had not in season assembled out of reach of contact with the enemy.

On January 26 the French stood thus: Detachments under

Allix in Auxerre, and Montbrun in Pont-sur-Yonne, and a division of National Guards under Pacthod forming in Montereau, made a small division in the valley of the Yonne. The upper Seine was held by Mortier's men at Troyes, and a detachment under Dufour at Arcis. Ney, Marmont and Victor had assembled and were protecting the Marne valley, holding the centre of the army in Vitry. The emperor had hoped to find them in St. Dizier, and wrote, January 26, to Berthier: "It is annoying that Victor has evacuated St. Dizier. Had he been personally with his assembled army corps, he would have kept for us this important point." Originally intended to hold the Ardennes, Macdonald had been called in to the Marne, leaving some troops in the strong places in his rear; and while his withdrawal uncovered the French left on the Oise, Bernadotte was too far away to make this a present danger.

In Schwartzberg's first line, on the same day, were Giulay and Wurtemberg at Bar-sur-Aube and Colombes les deux Eglises; in second line Wrede near Joinville; behind him Wittgenstein moving up on the road from Nancy; Colloredo was marching on Troyes, and the Guards and reserves were coming on from Langres. Blucher had in first line Sacken and Olsuviev and an abundance of cavalry, near Vassy and Montierender; in second line Yorck, who, relieved on the Moselle by landwehr, was marching towards Bar-le-Duc and St. Dizier, at which last place Landskoi with a Russian division was keeping up connection for him with Sacken.

Though the emperor had only partial knowledge of the whereabouts and strength of the allied armies, yet his general idea still was that he could push on up the Marne and in between Blucher and Schwartzberg by way of Joinville and Chaumont, so as to attack either in turn before they could join hands,—the same manœuvre he had planned before

the battle of Leipsic; and his preference was to fall on the Army of the Sovereigns, whose corps he presumed were the more spread, owing to the heavy roads of the winter season, and by detachments of which he had heard. Proposing to move on the enemy next day, orders from Chalons were issued on January 26 for Victor to take position astride the road from Vitry to St. Dizier as near as possible to St. Dizier, and for Marmont, Ney and Lefebvre to take similar positions each a league in rear of the other, headquarters to be behind Victor. "It will be announced to the army that the intention of the emperor is to attack the enemy to-morrow." On the same day, at 4 P. M., he wrote to Victor: "I have reached Vitry. I will be at your headquarters before daylight. The major-general will have sent you the order to the army. Everything is in column between Vitry and your vanguard. It is necessary that to-morrow at the point of day you should be in line of battle. I do not suppose that the enemy is marching on Vitry. The general plan of his operations appears to be to move on the road to Troyes."

Napoleon then drove to Vitry. He assumed, as he wrote Mortier January 27, that Blucher stood at St. Dizier, and that Schwartzberg was beyond Bar-sur-Aube, coming up. The latter assumption was nearly correct; but Blucher was actually at Dommartin, having started for Brienne on the way to Troyes, with only Landskoi left in St. Dizier, who, when on the 27th the French reached the place, was quickly disposed of.

Thus Napoleon's movements on St. Dizier and Blucher's on Brienne had cut both the Army of Silesia and the French army into two parts. This would enable Napoleon's St. Dizier column to fall upon Yorck, but a success against this officer was not sufficient to impose upon the masses of the enemy, which were already on the Aube. Mortier meanwhile

was cut off from the main army; the emperor was obliged to give up his general plan, and sent orders to Macdonald to speed on to Chalons and hold back Yorek, so as to protect the retreat of the great artillery park from Metz; Marmont from St. Dizier was to watch the country from Joinville to Bar-le-Duc to mask the movements of the main body; Napoleon himself, with Victor, Ney and Oudinot, marched across country, January 28, on Montierender, so as to gain the road to Brienne and fall upon the flank of Blucher, reach Mortier by way of Lesmont and Piney, and hold head at Troyes to the main allied army. It was of the essence to reach Blucher before the latter could join the Army of the Sovereigns.



Russian Hussar.

As it happened, when Blucher reached Brienne, he remained there, deeming it practically a junction with the sovereigns; and meanwhile Schwartzberg had kept his columns moving slowly in the general direction of Troyes, Mortier falling back before him. Napoleon's letters at this time show how blind the situation was to him, even in France, within a hundred miles of his capital. He wrote Marmont, early January 29: "I am going to Maizières, where I shall probably be at ten o'clock. From there I shall see what will have passed. The whole column of the enemy which has already passed St. Dizier has filed towards the Aube. Has it been at Arcis? Has it crossed the Aube? This is what I do not know." He

had, however, learned that Blucher's main force had crossed the Marne and was moving in the direction of Arcis, with Sacken and Olsuviev heading for Brienne and threatening the all-important Lesmont bridge; that Mortier had fallen

back from Schwartzberg and occupied Troyes; and that Macdonald was marching on Vitry.

Ignorant of the numbers which had marched towards the Aube, on the 29th Napoleon pushed Victor on Maizières, and drew in Marmont on Vassy, hoping that his own appearance at Bar-sur-Aube would hold back any forces which were heading on Troyes; and so as to complete the French concentration, Mortier was ordered to Arcis-sur-Aube, but the dispatch was captured. At Montierender there was a small affair between the flanking parties. The roads were very deep, and none of the armies could move with much speed. "The thaw continues strongly. We will pull along to-day, but to-night we cannot hope to do anything more across country," he wrote Joseph.

Driven out of St. Dizier, Landskoi had moved by way of Joinville to Doulevant and reported to Blucher, who, deeming the affair only a French reconnoissance in force, and having sent Sacken towards Lesmont to push parties on Arcis and Troyes, so as to be at the latter place to meet Schwartzberg, determined to advance farther. Blucher himself was in Brienne castle, when a French officer captured by the Cossacks was brought before him, with dispatches to Mortier, ordering the latter to keep on moving forward as the right wing of the main French army; and thus made aware of the dangerous situation he was in, he hurried orders to Sacken to destroy the bridge at Lesmont, and to retire at once, he himself intending to move back to Trannes, so as to lean on Schwartzberg. At the same time Pahlen, who with his cavalry had been moving from Dienville on Piney and Troyes, was withdrawn and ordered to protect Sacken's retreat from the forces coming across country from Vitry. These orders concentrated Blucher's very superior cavalry, and not only protected Sacken, but also happened to interfere with

a projected movement of Napoleon towards Bar-sur-Aube (Arçonval) on Blucher's communications.

While Blucher was waiting for Sacken, in Brienne le Chateau, Napoleon, about 2 P. M., January 29, reached Maizières with only his vanguard, and struck Pahlen, who had just arrived. For a moment Napoleon was in extreme danger of capture by Pahlen's cavalry, was in fact almost surrounded, when one of Meunier's brigades came up and cut him out. Meanwhile Sacken retired through old Brienne, drew up in battle order and opened upon the French; Pahlen, after a lively fight, fell back slowly, leaving the artillery to carry forward the fight. Napoleon followed on with his foot, and inclosing the town, about four o'clock, attacked Blucher's much superior force. The French took Brienne le Chateau, but old Brienne, in which stood Olsuviev, long held firm, though the French artillery was well served and set the town afire. The fighting, which was quite severe, lasted in a desultory way until near midnight, when Blucher withdrew towards Trannes in the direction of the Army of the Sovereigns approaching Bar; and the loss on each side was not far from three thousand men. This action was really the battle of Brienne, and the one fought three days later the battle of La Rothière. The names are often changed.

As an offset to the danger run by Napoleon, Blucher also had had a narrow escape. When the first fire near Maizières died down, he retired to the castle of Brienne, which, situated on a height, affords an excellent view. While eating his supper, he was watching from a window the lines of the French camp-fires. Staff officers were going in and out and looking for a place to pass the night. Suddenly shots fell in the castle square, and a swarm of French skirmishers made their way into it, despite hearty resistance by Blucher's Guard. The marshal had scarcely time to rush downstairs and mount

his horse. He and Gneisenau rode out of the trap together. Napoleon well knew this country, as he had been brought up in the military school here, and, desiring to seize the castle, had sent two battalions of grenadiers to capture it, — not, however, expecting to net the Prussian marshal.

With reference to this battle, the emperor wrote, January 31, to Clarke : “ I had a very hot affair the 29th at Brienne. I attacked the whole army of Blucher and Sacken, thirty thousand strong in foot, and with much cavalry. I attacked them with ten thousand men, at the moment when I had just made a heavy march. I had the luck to seize, from the commencement of the affair, the chateau, which dominates everything. As the attack did not commence till an hour before nightfall, the fight went on all night. Blucher was beaten. We took five or six hundred prisoners, killed or wounded three or four thousand men, and he has been obliged to recall all his parties which were advancing in the direction of Paris, to fall back on Bar-sur-Aube. Yesterday I followed him up in this direction for two leagues, accompanying him by salvos from forty guns. Our loss is estimated at two thousand men. . . . If Brienne could have been occupied earlier, everything would be in our power, but in the actual circumstances, and with the kind of troops that one must spare, we must consider ourselves happy with what has happened.

“ We have taken position two leagues in front of Brienne, the right on the Aube, the left at the forest, holding ourselves between the Aube and the Marne. Mortier is at Troyes and Macdonald on the Marne. I take for pivot Arcis-sur-Aube. My headquarters will continue for the moment at Brienne.”

On the same day he wrote Joseph : “ The affair of Brienne was very hot. I lost three thousand men there. The enemy lost four or five thousand men. I pursued the enemy half-way to Bar-sur-Aube. I have had repaired the bridges on the Aube which had been burned. A moment more and General Blucher and all his staff would have been taken. . . . They were afoot, and did not know that I was with the army. Since this combat of Brienne our armies are in great reputation with the allies. They no longer believed in their existence.” And “ I have reason to believe, though I am not certain,” he also wrote Joseph, “ that Caulaincourt has arrived at the headquarters of the emperors at Chaumont. This affair of Brienne, the position of our armies, and the opinion that

they have of them, might accelerate the conclusion of peace. It is proper that the journals should exhibit Paris as having the intention to defend itself, and that many troops are arriving from all sides."

The probable change in the strategic situation now led the emperor to alter his logistic status. Early on February 1 he wrote to the Intendant-General of the army:—

"My intention is that the centre of administration shall be established at Sezanne. The route of the army is to be from Brienne and Arcis-sur-Aube along the right bank by way of Dommartin, Ramerupt and Sezanne, La Ferté sous Jouarre, Meaux and Paris. . . . The line of magazines is to be henceforward thus established: Sezanne the central magazine, La Ferté sous Jouarre and Meaux the magazines in the rear, Arcis-sur-Aube the magazine in the front. . . . All the administrations are to remain at Sezanne. The magazines of clothing which might come for the army are to be sent to Sezanne, as also the depots of military equipage and everything that belongs to the army." He had no doubt he could maintain his general position, and drive the enemy back to the Rhine.

When Schwartzberg in Chaumont heard of Napoleon's offensive, he recognized Blucher's danger and, spurred thereto by Alexander, who was really the clearest-headed man in the allied camp, sent couriers in every direction to order the several corps to head for Bar-sur-Aube; and soon the columns of Wurtemberg and Giulay, the reserves of Barclay, and Colloredo's corps were nearing that point. As Schwartzberg did not know what Napoleon's objective might be, Wrede and Wittgenstein were ordered towards Joinville and Vassy to hold the road to Chaumont. Yorck, for fear of meeting troops on the Ornain, had already moved up the Meuse, so as by a circuit to reach St. Dizier, whence he had driven out Marmont's rearguard, and was placed where he might operate on the French communications. For fear of this, Napoleon ordered Vitry to be fortified as speedily as possible.

Early the 30th Napoleon followed Blucher towards Trannes,

where the enemy had taken up a strong position on the heights, covered by woods and leaning on the Aube. Artillery fire was opened; but as it was late, though Gérard had come up, Napoleon did not attack, but deployed on the line from Chaumesnil through La Rothière to Dienville, holding the Lesmont bridge. He had Ney, Victor and Gérard, while Marmont was at Montierender, and Mortier was again ordered to come on. Schwartzenberg



Gérard.

reached Bar-sur-Aube with the allied head of column. From Brienne, January 30, at 9.30 P.M., Berthier was ordered to send during the night to Troyes "a postilion who has the Legion of Honor" with a letter to Mortier to this effect:—

"Headquarters is at Brienne. We are occupying the bridge of Dienville, old Brienne and Lesmont. Yesterday, the 29th, we beat the enemy. We took some prisoners. We chased him out of Brienne and are pursuing him on Bar-sur-Aube. Give us some news of yourself. We have none since the 28th. Push parties out to communicate with us, so as to be able to act together and in concert. Send us a morning report of the troops, and of the National Guards which have arrived in Troyes."

The postilion was told "that it is necessary that he should be back at the earliest possible to-morrow, 31st, to bring us news of what has passed and is passing at Troyes."

According to reports coming in, Napoleon had some reason to believe Schwartzenberg to be marching on Auxerre, which gave

him hope of fighting Blucher here alone ; and yet, not knowing but what he had the bulk of both allied armies in his front, he was in doubt whether to manœuvre for battle or not. Lest he should give a bad turn to the political situation, he did not want to retreat ; and yet he was really in an ultra-dangerous position, in a way inseparable from the offensive which he had undertaken too late with slender forces ; at any moment he might push on into the midst of an overwhelming force. But as emperor he could not well play the safe military game of a retreat on Paris, so as to have in hand his entire force present, and if pressed from thence make a march to the south, where he could pick up Augereau and his Spanish and Italian forces, and with a substantial army resume a bold front. He must defend his capital to the last, and he did it ably ; but it was a gambler's rather than a strategist's boldness ; he was risking his all. Marmont tells us that when he reached Vitry and was asked what reinforcements he had brought, he replied, "None ; there was not a man in Châlons ;" and when asked what he proposed to fight with, he replied, "We will seek fortune with what we have got ; perhaps it will be favorable to us." His subordinates thought they were dreaming when he uttered these words.

What Napoleon really wanted to do was to delay a battle until he could draw in both Mortier and Macdonald. This was well, but the gain in strength would be more than offset by the junction of the allies. Sacken had broken the Lesmont bridge ; there is no direct road between Arcis and Lesmont on the right bank, and Mortier was cut off until the Lesmont bridge could be repaired. Napoleon hoped to win a day or two, march to Troyes, pick up Mortier, draw in Macdonald, and then manœuvre for the protection of Paris. Everything looked like a heavy force in his front, and he was loth to attack Blucher in earnest lest he should run into Schwartz-

berg. But his action was indecisive, and every day lost put him in worse case, for the sovereigns had determined to concentrate and deliver battle as soon as they could, their purpose being to allow Napoleon no breathing-spell. He should months ago have divined their plans, and have stood two weeks sooner, — as he well might have done, — with double his present force, where he could alternately fall on Blucher and Schwartzberg, while they were still far apart.



Coat worn by Napoleon.

LXVII.

LA ROTHÈRE AND MONTMIRAIL. FEBRUARY, 1814.

NAPOLEON should have guessed that after Brienne Blucher would retire on the main force : his desire was to fight, and he slowly followed on. On February 1 he saw that Blucher was too strong, and set out to retire towards Mortier at Troyes, but as Blucher attacked, he could not avoid the battle. This was stoutly contended for many hours, but Blucher was in greater force, and at 9 P. M. Napoleon retired with his army much broken. Had Schwartzberg supported Blucher and pursuit been made, the French could have been definitely crushed. Marmont gallantly protected the retreat. Strategically and politically things looked badly : Murat had joined the allies, Holland was overrun, heavy forces were collecting in Belgium, the Congress of Chatillon would not listen to the Frankfort basis. Blucher now moved down the Marne, while Schwartzberg advanced through Troyes. Napoleon had devised a manœuvre on the enemy's rear, but on learning Blucher's operation, he changed it to one against Blucher. While Schwartzberg entered Troyes, Napoleon left a suitable force at Nogent and himself marched to head off Blucher, who had been loosely advancing towards Meaux, or to attack him in flank. On February 10 Napoleon struck Olsuviev and destroyed his division. From there he turned towards Montmirail, and while Blucher was making a thrust in the wrong direction, on February 11 he badly defeated Sacken, whom Yorck came up too late to save. On February 12 he followed Yorck and Sacken towards Chateau Thierry, while Macdonald was sent to aid the forces opposite Schwartzberg. Blucher advanced upon Marmont, who was containing him, and drove him in ; Napoleon turned from his pursuit, and on February 24 defeated Blucher at Vauxchamps and forced him back on Châlons, with a total loss, on the several days, of twenty thousand men. This entire manœuvre is like Napoleon in the old days. Meanwhile Schwartzberg slowly advanced, but as soon as he heard of Blucher's defeat, determined on retreat. Between the political and strategic possibilities, uncertainty reigned at the allied headquarters ; and of this Napoleon should have taken advantage to secure peace.

THE victory of Brienne on January 29 had not produced as good an effect as Napoleon desired or asserted, for Blucher's retiring on the Army of the Sovereigns was merely a

concentration; and had the marshal been reinforced and attacked next day, the French, with the broken bridge of Lesmont in their rear and heavy country roads behind them, would have been in parlous case; but surprised to find that Blucher had retired, the emperor had for this reason deemed him weak, and decided to follow him. In the forenoon of January 30 Grouchy and Victor left Brienne in a thick fog; and when this broke up about noon, there were some exchanges with the Russian cavalry, which was protecting Blucher's retreat. This day and the next were consumed by minor operations savoring of indecision. The situation was blind. If Napoleon was to fight at all, he should have pressed on and fought with the men he had, in which case Blucher would have retired on Schwartzberg, and in any event have given the French a chance to claim victory, or gain time for fresh manœuvring; but at Trannes Blucher found out that he was sustained by practically Schwartzberg's entire army, and received orders from the sovereigns to deliver battle in front of Trannes, where the ground was good.

On the whole field there was no change on January 31, except that Marmont reached Morvilliers, and prolonged Napoleon's left; that Mortier was ordered to reoccupy Troyes, and Macdonald came on to Châlons. As Schwartzberg was approaching every hour, Blucher did nothing to provoke battle: he was not only courageous, but discreet. Giulay and Wurtemberg, Wrede and Wittgenstein, were all coming on in concentric order, while Schwartzberg's main body was near Bar-sur-Aube. Next day, February 1, Napoleon got his forces together: Gérard was at Dienville, Victor at La Rothière, Ney and Oudinot in reserve in front of Brienne; at Vassy, Marmont, coming up from St. Dizier, had met the Bavarians, with whom he had a fight, and then moving by way of Montierender on Soulaines, met Wittgenstein's van cavalry, and


fling to the right away from it, finally reached Morvilliers and Chaumesnil. Blucher was also in force, and, now that the main army was at hand, glad to attack. Napoleon gradually recognized that he had more than Blucher's army in his front, and debated retiring to another battle-ground; but he remained where he was to learn enough as to the enemy's purpose to move in the proper direction. What he did to solve the question does not appear; but as Blucher remained sturdily in place, Napoleon was confirmed in his view that Schwartzberg was moving on Troyes, while Blucher held the French in place; and finally concluding to fall back across the Aube by the now repaired Lesmont bridge, and move towards Mortier, he set Ney in motion thither.

In pursuance of his fighting orders, Blucher sent his cavalry forward in the plain of La Rothière, and drew up his infantry between Trannes and Eclance, Schwartzberg being ready to sustain him. One hundred guns stood on the heights of Trannes; Wurtemberg marched towards the heights of Maisons and occupied Fresnay; Giulay moved up on the Bar-sur-Aube road to sustain Blucher; Wittgenstein was still between Joinville and Mussey, Wrede at Joinville, and the reserve near Colombes. About noon Grouchy reported that Blucher was apparently manœuvring for battle, and Napoleon rode to the outposts. It was a damp, chilly winter day, interrupted by sharp bursts of snow, driven by a cold wind. Little could be seen. The French troops had already begun to evacuate their positions so as to move to the rear. As the Russian Guard came up into line, Blucher opened the attack. Napoleon then neither would, nor could he well, avoid the conflict thus forced upon him; the troops were again sent into line; but contrary to his usage, the emperor fought on the defensive, leaving the momentum of the onset to Blucher. The divine fury of the days of Montenotte was no longer present.

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MARNE-SEINE



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Gérard was on the right, with orders to hold the bridge at Unienville as well as that at Dienville and the town of La Rothière; Victor was in the centre from La Rothière to Chaumesnil, with an outpost in La Giberie; Marmont on the left was in Morvilliers with outposts in La Chaise; Ney and Oudinot were still in reserve in front of Brienne, holding the farm buildings of Beugne. The French position was well covered by the Aube on the right and a series of ponds on the left.

Napoleon was still in doubt whether he had Blucher alone in front of him; but within a couple of hours, as more and more troops came up into line, he saw that he was vastly outnumbered, and as on the second day at Essling, fought only to hold himself until nightfall, when he might retire.


The battle opened with a cannonade of La Rothière by the allies, to which, when it became unbearable, Victor replied by throwing his horse upon the batteries, a charge which was a fit precursor of the bold ride of the Six Hundred. The cavalry was thrown back, decimated by the fire at close range, but not disordered; and as the allied foot under Sacken advanced, the squadrons again turned upon this, but were themselves met and hurled back by a timely charge of the Russian horse, bodies of which, with the guns, appear to have been placed in the intervals between the allied columns. The ground was so deep that artillery could not be easily handled, and at least half of the pieces were left in the rear, so as to double teams. The allied foot kept bravely on its way to La Rothière, and here ensued a lusty struggle with Duhesme and the Young Guard for possession of the



Prussian Mounted
Artilleryman.

village. The French cavalry under Colbert, Piré and Guyot again made some handsome charges on the Russian foot, but these were met and checked by the Russian horse under Wasilchikov, though Nansouty and Grouchy attacked the latter in flank. The Russian infantry kept on with its usual dogged persistence, and La Rothière fell, with twenty-four of the Young Guard guns. Nor was this the only allied line of advance. On the left bank of the Aube a heavy column under Giulay pushed forward on Dienville bridge, where leaned the French right; and that part of the village which lay on that bank went lost. If the allies could force the river, Brienne would be in danger, and the French fought hard to defend the bridge. With their far greater forces at disposal, the enemy also pushed a column through the Beaulieu woods on La Giberie, which lay in front of the French left wing, and after some hearty exchanges, captured the hamlet, and Marmont's outpost was forced back on Chaumesnil. Meanwhile Wrede's Bavarians were approaching from Doulevant, and, debouching from the Soulaines wood, formed line at La Chaise opposite the French left flank; this was the most dangerous blow of the day, directed against the weakest part of the French line; and it was not long before Marmont's too extended front between Morvilliers and Chaumesnil was ruptured by superior numbers and the rapid Bavarian onset; and lacking time to concentrate, although he threw his infantry into squares to protect his batteries, he was soon obliged to retire to the protection of the Ajou wood.

But it was not to go all one way. These allied successes were for a while balanced by Victor's gallant advance towards the left of his own front, recapturing La Giberie by a rapid rush with Grouchy in support, to hold it for a while; but he was not in force to keep it, and shortly before five it went lost again to Wurtemberg, reinforced by two Russian divi-



Battle of La Rothière.

sions. This enabled Wurtemberg to join hands with Wrede by edging to the right towards the Soulaines road. Thus flanked, the fate of Chaumesnil was sealed, though Marmont strove hard to hold it and Napoleon came up in person to aid in its defense. The allies, despite the oncoming darkness, were also pushing hard on Morvilliers, and Marmont was

compelled to loosen his grasp on that village. Even La Rothière could not be held. Everything seemed now to be going against the French, though they had made a stubborn fight. Once more, after dark, Napoleon led forward on La Rothière and Chaumesnil a column of reserve consisting of a division of the Young Guard under Oudinot, and Rothenburg's foot, but nothing could be gained, though for half an hour the fighting in La Rothière was furious and costly. Blucher and Sacken were here in person, and Rothenburg was almost surrounded and captured. By 8 P. M. the place was definitely yielded to the enemy, but Napoleon set it on fire by shells so as to secure his retreat, and some fighting went on until midnight. Perceiving that the French were on the point of retiring, the allied cavalry was hurled upon them; but despite many casualties, the victory was no more decisive. At 9 P. M. orders were issued "to evacuate all the sick" (wounded) "during the night. The caissons and the military equipages will be loaded with them, all the empty country wagons which have brought food, and finally, all the wagons or carts that can be procured . . . to distribute bread and brandy for two days to every one, . . . to evacuate at once behind Brienne all caissons, artillery, useless baggage, to keep only the artillery necessary to defend and hold the positions." Dienville was also fought for until after midnight, when Gérard gave up the town, which then had no further value. The French had been fully pushed back on old Brienne. To protect the retreat across the Aube, Victor and Marmont took up a position between old Brienne and the Ajou wood. Beyond the cavalry attack, there was no pursuit. This seems to have been a grave mistake, as the allies had a big corps on the left bank, and the French were so badly disorganized that the young levies might have been seized by panic had the pursuit been sharp. Out of forty thousand men, the

French loss had been four thousand killed and wounded, three thousand prisoners and fifty-four guns. Out of double the number put in, the enemy's was scarcely less than six thousand men.

In letting Blucher alone fight the battle of La Rothière, Schwartzenberg lost his best chance of crushing the French.

Napoleon assembled his corps on the road to Lesmont, ready to cross the Aube and march on Troyes, and personally remained in Brienne until 4 A. M. of February 2, restlessly watching for signs of pursuit; then he hurried forward to Lesmont, and directed the placing of batteries to protect the bridge. Marmont, ordered towards Ramerupt to draw the allied attention away from the crossing, while the French army was putting the Aube between itself and the enemy, was attacked by Wrede's Bavarians, who surrounded him on all sides. His situation was critical, but he gallantly took the initiative, fell fiercely on the enemy, and drove him back in utter surprise at his audacity; after which he defiantly retired behind the Voire on Rosnay, and made his way along the right-bank country roads to Arcis, which he reached next day. Ney was the last to cross at Lesmont, and then burned the repaired bridge. For several days the allies lost sight of the French movements. They expected Napoleon to move on Arcis-sur-Aube, instead of which he moved to Troyes, and on February 2 joined Mortier, during the afternoon.

With reference to the battle of La Rothière, Napoleon thus wrote Caulaincourt, February 4: "The report of Schwartzenberg is a folly. There was no battle. The Old Guard was not there. The Young Guard was not engaged. There were a few guns which were taken from us by cavalry charges. But the army was on the march to pass the bridge of Lesmont when this event happened, and two hours later the enemy would not have found us. It seems that the whole army of the enemy was there, and that they look upon that as a battle: in such case those people have

very little ability. They did not have an affair with more than fifteen thousand of our people, and we held the battlefield the whole day."

Though the army was in bad shape through its defeat and hurried retreat, it was safer at Troyes than at Brienne, where the danger on the evening of February 1 had been extreme. Had the allies kept up their push with any kind of vigor, the French campaign might have been ended then and there, for the defeat had much disheartened the army, says Marmont. "I shall be at Troyes to-morrow," Napoleon wrote Clarke February 2. "It is possible that Blucher's army may move between the Marne and Aube, towards Vitry and Chalons. From Troyes, according to circumstances, I will operate to retard the movement of the column which they assure me is advancing by way of Sens on Paris, or to return and manœuvre on Blucher and retard his march."

This defeat was a sorry backset. If Napoleon could not win a victory over part of the enemy, how could he succeed against Blucher and Schwartzberg combined? He had now nothing to hope for except a few troops from Spain, and perhaps the belated arrival of Eugene from Italy to make a diversion in the allied rear; and as these could scarcely get up to join in the defense of Paris, he would have to abandon his capital and join them in the south of France, if he desired to put them to use.

In Italy Murat had declared against Napoleon. On February 13 the emperor wrote Fouché: "The conduct of Murat is infamous, and that of the queen has no name. I hope to live long enough to revenge myself and France for such outrage and so frightful an ingratitude." Antwerp was about to be besieged by Bülow, aided by Graham's English division; the Duke of Weimar was approaching Belgium with twenty-five thousand men, which would enable Bülow to leave matters with the other forces and to enter France from the north.

Strategically, everything looked at its worst. At the Congress at Chatillon, to which Caulaincourt had been sent by Napoleon on a basis of the terms suggested at Frankfort, the demand of the allies, as the result of the defeat of Brienne, now was to limit the Rhine frontier, so as to take from France the bulk of Belgium and Holland. To gain time Napoleon ordered Caulaincourt to subscribe to almost any terms, feeling justified under the circumstances, as some authorities allege, in playing a fast and loose game, if by that means he could increase his forces to the point of coping with the superior numbers of the enemy.

“The letter Metternich wrote you is quite ridiculous,” his dispatch of February 4 says to Caulaincourt, “but I recognize what I have long seen, that he thinks he is leading Europe, and that all the world is leading him. . . . You are constantly asking me for power to act, and instructions, when it is yet doubtful whether the enemy will negotiate. The conditions it seems have been decided upon among the allies in advance.” And again next day: “I have stayed to-day at Troyes expecting news from the Congress. . . . If they wish peace . . . they must make a prompt end, and from the beginning of the Conference, they ought to be able to stop things, for after all, within a few days there will be a general battle which will decide everything. I am going to Nogent to meet twenty thousand men of the army of Spain, who arrive to-morrow and day after to-morrow. It will become necessary afterwards to have an affair to cover Paris. Matters should then be settled at once. As the allies have already decided all the bases, you must already have them: accept them if they are acceptable, and in the contrary case we will run the chance of a battle, and even of the loss of Paris, and of all that would follow that.”

On the same day a second courier was sent, by whom Maret wrote: “His Majesty gives you *carte blanche* to conduct negotiations to a happy end, to save the capital and avoid a battle, in which would be the last hopes of the nation. . . . The intention of the emperor is that you should look upon yourself as invested with the necessary power in these important circumstances, to take the most proper step, so as to arrest the progress of the enemy and to save the capital.”

On February 2 to Joseph, speaking of the meeting of the Congress at Chatillon, the emperor wrote : " It seems that the allies have feared that the arrival of Caulaincourt at their headquarters might give rise to . . . a fomentation of the germs of disunion which exist between them." And, to influence, if he might, the allied discussion, he had written to Caulaincourt, February 2 : " The enemy's troops everywhere are behaving horribly. All the inhabitants are taking refuge in the woods. No more peasants are found in the villages. The enemy eats up everything, takes all the horses, all the cattle, all the clothing, all the rags of the peasants. They beat every one, men and women, and commit a great number of rapes. This picture, that I have seen with my own eyes, must easily make you understand how much I desire promptly to withdraw my peoples from this state of misery and suffering, which is veritably horrible. This must also give much food for thought to the enemy, for the Frenchman is not patient. He is naturally brave, and I expect to see them organize themselves into bands. You are to make a very energetic picture of these excesses. Burgs of two thousand souls like Brienne have nobody left."

On the soil of La Belle France these outrages were unpardonable: the emperor had scarcely realized such atrocities when committed in other lands by his own armies.

But this was the political side. On the purely military side, we shall view, in the coming few days, among the most interesting features of the life of this great captain, the contrast he presents between his keen perception and his skill when aroused by danger of the situation, or the excitement of battle, and the indifference of his attitude in the late campaign, when military success, or peace with honor, were several times within his grasp.

Napoleon was correct in his guess as to the future operations of the allies. They had been reunited in the Brienne-Bar country; they now again divided. It was a grave mistake for them not to follow up Napoleon after their victory at La Rothière. " As a principle, the most simple and efficacious thing is to pursue an advantage at the point where one has

obtained it, because in this case one does not lose time, and one beats the iron while it is hot," says Clausewitz. And "he was content," he further says, with reference to Schwartzberg, "to have a river between himself and Napoleon, and was afraid to be face to face with him in open country. . . . He was unwilling to pursue the wounded lion, but wished to win a line of defense on the Seine." They needed to do nothing but advance in one solid body on Paris, crushing as they went Napoleon's inferior forces in their front, and this indeed was the purpose of the Emperor Alexander; but Blucher had set his heart on a separate march down the Marne, and he and Schwartzberg, sustained by the council, who remembered his notable march to the Saale in 1813, adopted a double plan. While the sovereigns should follow down the Seine, Blucher was to move down the valley of the Marne; and each hoped for the honor of first entering the French capital.

With the idea, however, that the enemy would probably advance on Troyes to complete the work so smartly inaugurated, Napoleon stood there on February 4; but Schwartzberg strove to avoid the place by a circuit to either flank, while Blucher reached Fère Champenoise and Yorck entered Châlons. This division of forces was early reported by Macdonald, and Napoleon determined to utilize his central position by turning on Blucher, while holding the crossing of the Seine at Nogent, so as at any time to be able to return and debouch upon the rear of the Army of the Sovereigns. The Prussian general was in by far the more threatening position by his greater proximity to the capital, and was moreover the boldest and most persistent of his enemies; Napoleon could better risk danger from slowly thinking Schwartzberg. With fewer men, Blucher was more liable to be beaten; and for Napoleon to appear in his front suddenly, after his defeat at La Rothière, would have a strong moral effect. Blucher's

thrust at Paris compelled Napoleon to give up another projected movement on Schwartzberg's communications, to constrain at least his temporary retreat. In writing, February 6, to Joseph about the latter's orders for the movement of reinforcements, "I am much annoyed by these dispositions," he said, "for I was about to attack to-morrow towards Bar-sur-Seine, to beat the Emperor Alexander, who seems to me to have made false dispositions, but I sacrifice everything to the necessity of covering Paris." We here again see at its best Napoleon's offensive-defensive. Strictly as a defensive measure, he was about to put to use a sharp offensive operation, when Blucher's advance on Paris prevented it, for the allies were in sufficient force to make it prudent to divide. But although giving up the Bar-sur-Seine operation against the Army of the Sovereigns, he yet believed that the lay of the land west of Troyes would enable a small force to arrest that army for some days, and give him time to turn on the Army of Silesia.

Offensive and defensive manœuvres each have their limitations. While the offensive has manifest advantages, it can be carried too far, as by the Austrians in 1805 in their headlong advance to the Iller, or by the Prussians in 1806 in their blindly pushing on to the Thuringian Forest without paying heed to, or indeed understanding, the great strategic theatre. On the other hand, Napoleon's defense on the Passarge in 1807, on the Lech in 1809, and in this campaign was limited by the operations of the enemy, and his offensive thrusts were well timed and efficient. His defensive scheme in 1813 was well conceived but ill executed.

While Blucher moved towards the Marne, intending to draw in Yorck, part of Langeron and Kleist, and leaning on the Army of the North overwhelm Macdonald, Schwartzberg, having learned on February 4 that Napoleon was in Troyes,

continued his advance in that direction. Wittgenstein took up the right of Schwartzberg's army, following the Aube, his cavalry van forcing Marmont from Arcis. Giulay reached Geraudot, Wittgenstein Charmont, Wrede and Wurtemberg moved through Vendeuvre, Colloredo and the reserves came up along the Bar-sur-Aube road. Thus the allies from their central position were now pushing out their main force fan-shaped on the Aube, the Marne and the Yonne, by way of Sens, Troyes, Arcis and Chalons. When the van got near Troyes, the French army was found cantoned in that town and in the numerous villages about it. Schwartzberg was uncertain whether Napoleon would continue to operate on the Seine or would move to the Marne, and did not wish to provoke a general battle with Blucher at a distance. His idea was to move around Troyes and attack it from both banks.

Napoleon keenly watched these operations, but what interested him most was the fact that Blucher had moved towards Chalons. He believed that Schwartzberg's object was to hold him in Troyes while Blucher should turn the French left and make a dash for the capital. Finally, when late February 5 he learned that Macdonald, retiring from overwhelming allied forces, had broken the Chalons bridge, and that Yorck had entered the city, his mind was quickly made up to move to the Marne and attack Blucher. Mortier, left in Troyes, with instructions to maintain a show of activity as if the emperor were still there, did his work well, sending out cavalry parties in every direction, attacking the Austrian outposts and keeping up constant movement. Schwartzberg advanced slowly.

Nogent being a central position from which Napoleon could fall on Blucher's left flank if he should advance farther towards Meaux, while not losing sight of the Army of the Sovereigns, Marmont was ordered from Arcis on to the town,

and joined hands with the emperor that night at Méry. The army reached Nogent February 7; and Mortier having been compelled by the allied turning manœuvres to vacate Troyes the preceding night, Schwartzberg filed in next day.

In order to prevent Schwartzberg from ascertaining his advance on the Marne and starting by way of Sens and Fontainebleau for Paris, Victor was left in Nogent with Gérard



Officers of Cossacks.

and Milhaud, while Oudinot stood in Nangis and Provins to threaten the flank of such an advance. Pacthod was in Montereau, Allix in Sens, and Pajol was collecting troops in Melun. This whole force, intended to contain Schwartzberg's one hundred thousand men, amounted to less than thirty thousand, and the generals were to report to Clarke in Paris, who was

charged with the protection of the bridges of Melun, Corbeil and others over the Seine. Napoleon was to take with him Marmont, Ney, Mortier and Gérard.

Schwartzenberg slowly extended his troops: Wittgenstein moved into the angle of the Seine and Aube, Wrede followed the road to Nogent, Wurtemberg headed for Sens. In second line came Giulay, Colloredo and the reserve.

Meanwhile Yorck had passed St. Dizier, driven the French out of Vitry, the attempt to fortify which had not arrested him a minute, and had advanced on Chalons February 3, Macdonald retiring on Epernay by the main road. Blucher advanced by the southerly road through Vertus, with cavalry feeling out towards Meaux, Sacken in support and Olsuviev in reserve. Macdonald through Epernay fell back to Dormans, and sent parties to take possession of the Marne crossing at Chateau Thierry and La Ferté sous Jouarre. Yorck followed to Epernay; Sacken on the southerly road reached Etoges; Blucher's headquarters, with Olsuviev's division, was in Vertus; two days' march to the rear were Kleist and Kapzevich. Blucher's objective was Meaux, the capture of which place would bring him fairly to the gates of Paris. He felt that he had a free hand, with only Macdonald in his front, and hoped to anticipate him at La Ferté sous Jouarre, or at least capture part of his reserve artillery, which was being hauled away from Chalons by country horses. The roads were bad, and although Blucher had unwisely separated his marching columns, yet as his left was, he thought, protected by a country much cut up with streams and ponds, and the main French army was no doubt being held at Troyes by Schwartzenberg, he feared little. Moreover, he believed that a large body of Schwartzenberg's cavalry was between him and Napoleon. It had been, but had just been withdrawn.

Exaggerated reports of the allied advance continually came

to Napoleon's ears, but he treated them as such, knowing about how fast at this season the allied armies could march. He was continually worried by the absurd reports from the capital, where, as is usual in war, there was more panic than at any place in the front.

He wrote Joseph, February 7: "I do not believe that the enemy has been at La Ferté sous Jouarre. I do not believe any more that he has been at Meaux. These are vain alarms." Then, speaking of the royal household and possessions: "In six hours' time, everything that there is can be loaded on fifteen wagons with horses my stables would furnish, to transport them first to Rambouillet, but I do not think that matters have reached that point. I do not fear the enemy. I am full of hope for the event."

Indeed, the authorities in the capital appear to have acted with small discretion, which led Napoleon to write to Cambacérès, February 7: "I see that instead of sustaining the empress, you discourage her. Why thus lose your head? What are these Misereres and these prayers of forty hours in the chapel? Are people going crazy in Paris?" And on the same day to Joseph: "The situation of affairs is nowhere near the alarm made. . . . People lose their heads, and that leads to no good. . . . The empress had got the idea of going to Ste. Geneviève. I fear that would have a bad effect, and no other result. Stop those prayers of forty hours and those Misereres. If people should do such monkey-tricks to us, we should all be afraid of death. Long ago it was said that priests and doctors made death painful. The moment is no doubt difficult, but since I left, I have had up to this hour nothing but advantages. The bad spirit of the Talleyrands, and of the men who have wanted to put the nation to sleep, has prevented my making it fly to arms, and this is the result. In this situation of things we must show confidence, and take daring measures. . . . Keep the empress gay; she is eating her heart out."

Still, there was a serious side to the matter, and the emperor frankly discussed it with Joseph. On February 8, speaking of Paris being taken, he wrote:—

"That end applies to more people than ourselves. When that arrives, I shall no longer exist, consequently it is not for myself that I speak. I

have ordered you, for the empress, and the King of Rome, and our family to do what the circumstances indicate. . . . I repeat to you, then, in two words, that Paris will never be occupied while I am alive. . . . If by circumstances which I cannot foresee I should move on the Loire, I should not leave the empress and my son far from me, because in every case it would happen that both would be seized and taken to Vienna. . . . If Talleyrand has to do with this opinion of leaving the empress in Paris in case our forces evacuate it, it is treason they are plotting. I repeat, have a care of that man. I have been working with him sixteen years. . . . He is surely the greatest enemy of our house. . . . If a battle were lost and the news of my death came, you would learn it before my ministers. Have the empress and the King of Rome leave for Rambouillet. Order the Senate, the Council of State and all the troops to assemble on the Loire. . . . If I live, I am to be obeyed. . . . If I die, my reigning son and the empress as regent, for the honor of the French, are not to let themselves be taken, but to retire to the last village with their last soldiers. . . . I should prefer that my son should be murdered rather than to see him brought up in Vienna as an Austrian prince ; and I have so good an opinion of the empress as to be persuaded that she also is of this opinion, as much as a woman and a mother can be." Marie Louise scarcely lived up to this opinion of her. He had also written, February 6: "Have taken away from Fontainebleau all precious furniture, and whatever could be called a trophy, without, however, too much unfurnishing of the castle ; but it is useless to leave there the silver-ware and all that can be easily transported."

Informed by the country people of the loose order in which the allied corps were advancing, Marmont suggested a rapid thrust in the direction of the great road between Vitry and Meaux ; and this being quite in accord with Napoleon's main plan, he adopted the idea, broadened it into an operation by a large force, and wrote Joseph, February 7, from Nogent : —

"I am at the very moment sending twenty thousand men to occupy Sezanne. I will move there to-night, with whatever is necessary to beat and overwhelm what may be on that communication. I will then turn rapidly towards the communications of Meaux. I believe by my manœuvres to have obliged the Grand Army to move from in front of Troyes to Bar-sur-Aube, and to have gained at least three marches on it."

He then ordered Marmont on Sezanne, from whence he was to reconnoitre in his front towards Montmirail, and on the Vitry-Meaux road; and should what he ascertained accord with the existing reports, Napoleon would speedily follow him on Sezanne.

Though keenly intent on his present object, the emperor did not lose sight of the general theatre of war; he wrote, February 8, to Clarke:—

“I have ordered the viceroy, so soon as Murat shall have declared war, to move to the Alps. Repeat this order to him by telegraph, by a courier, and a triplicate by an officer. He is to leave no garrison in the fortresses in Italy except Italian troops, and that all that he has which is French he is to move on Turin and Lyons, either by Fenestrelle or by Mont Cenis. That as soon as he gets to Savoy, he is to be joined by all that we have in Lyons.”

While, then, the emperor waited in Nogent with Ney, Victor, Mortier and Gérard, Marmont started, and reaching the vicinity of Sezanne February 7, he sent back word, which Napoleon received during the night, that a large body of cavalry, but no foot, had passed Sezanne on the 6th; that only a few allied troops were at the time there; and that firing could be heard in the direction of Epernay. This settled the matter in Napoleon's mind: Ney was started out early on the 8th, and reached Villenauxe, followed by Gérard. With the other corps Napoleon remained in Nogent until he could ascertain whether Blucher was advancing via Sezanne, via Montmirail, or down the Marne road, and how far he had got, as upon these facts depended the value of the direction he might give to his manœuvre. The Montmirail route was the one Napoleon believed he would take; but soon Marmont reported from Sezanne, out of which he had driven a body of Cossacks, that Blucher had probably followed along the Marne. Both routes were in fact utilized. On the 7th

Sacken was at Montmirail, Olsuviev at Etoges, Kleist and Kapzevich at Chalons, Yorck following Macdonald to Dormans, the latter crossing the Marne at Chateau Thierry and destroying the bridge. Pushing out a reconnoitring party north to St. Prix, Marmont followed shortly with his corps, and later reported that Sacken was probably on the march to Montmirail, a fact that determined Napoleon to advance sharply on Blucher's ill-concentrated forces, which if he could beat in detail, he would then turn back to Nogent and operate against Schwartzberg.

Although they marched cheerfully along, yet the condition of the brave young conscripts was really pitiable. The emperor wrote, February 8, to the Chief Commissary: "The army is dying of hunger. All the reports that you make that it is nourished are proved false. Twelve men have died of hunger, although blood and fire have been used on the road to get subsistence. . . . Victor has nothing, Gérard has nothing, the cavalry of the Guard is dying of hunger. This is a double evil, but which becomes without remedy when one makes illusions for himself and deceives the authorities." For all that, the patient men marched and fought like veterans.

Napoleon made use of his limited forces to the best advantage. A respectable body had been left to defend the valley of the Seine and the roads from Troyes to Paris: Oudinot on the line Sens-Montereau and Victor at Nogent were to contain Schwartzberg as long as possible, and if attacked, or if Schwartzberg should show signs of moving on Paris via Sens, they were to unite at Montereau. All this, in Napo-



Prussian Rifle
Officer.

leon's judgment, would delay the Army of the Sovereigns some days, while he with his main body could deal Blucher a heavy blow. In a letter to Joseph of February 9, from Nogent, he states the case more accurately than usual:—

“I am leaving for Sezanne, and I hope to-morrow to attack the Army of Silesia. . . . If this operation has a complete success, the campaign may be decided. . . . If I succeed, in two or three days, in crushing the Army of Silesia, I will debouch on Nogent or on Montereau. With your reserves I can have eighty thousand men, and give an unexpected turn to affairs. My army, then, is divided into three corps:” that under my orders, twenty thousand foot, ten thousand horse and one hundred and twenty guns. “Yorck, Blucher and Sacken are estimated at forty to forty-five thousand men. But Macdonald ought to occupy at least five thousand men. I shall then be thirty thousand against forty thousand, a proportion which makes me hope success.” Corps of the centre, Victor with fourteen thousand men; corps of the right, Oudinot with twenty-five thousand men. “The totality of my force is thus sixty or seventy thousand men of all arms. . . . I count that I have to do with forty-five thousand men of the Army of Silesia, and one hundred and fifty thousand men of Schwartzberg, . . . so that if I have a success over the Army of Silesia, . . . I can return on Schwartzberg with seventy or eighty thousand men, . . . and I do not think he can oppose me with more than one hundred and ten or one hundred and twenty thousand men. If I am not strong enough to attack him, at least I shall be strong enough to contain him perfectly for fifteen or twenty days, which will lead up to new combinations.”

And he also wrote Berthier, February 9: “Either Schwartzberg will move on Nogent, or he will move decisively on Sens to penetrate to Paris by passing the Yonne, the canal de Loing and the forest of Fontainebleau. . . .

“My intention, if I succeed against the Army of Silesia, is to move back to Nogent, to centralize my troops there and to debouch on the enemy.”

While very well as a minor strategic measure, these calculations were all limited to gaining time, and to waiting for some *deus ex machina*, which might indeed come from the Congress of Chatillon, but could scarcely result from the

military situation, provided the allies held firm. Napoleon was counting on more than he could now reasonably hope to accomplish.

The young French conscripts marched by night through the big forest between Villenauxe and Barbonne with grave hardship. It was thawing again, and all the horses in the vicinity were collected to drag the guns through the heavy country roads. On February 9 the emperor was with his marshals in Sezanne, scarcely knowing whether to turn to the left on Montmirail or to the right on Champaubert, until spies brought him in fairly reliable information. Macdonald, he learned, followed step by step by Yorek, had withdrawn from Epernay to Chateau Thierry, and here he ran danger of having his left turned by Sacken, who had been making forced marches along the main road to reach La Ferté sous Jouarre ahead of him; and as a fact was but a few hours late, reaching the place only to see Macdonald's rear cross the Marne, break the bridges, and disappear towards Meaux under the fire of the light guns accompanying the Russian van. Sacken was at Montmirail with his van at La Ferté sous Jouarre, and Yorek was already in Dormans, van in Chateau Thierry; Olsuviev had been ordered by Blucher to remain in Champaubert to rest his troops, and to serve as connection between the several corps, now far apart, for Blucher himself, with Kapzevich and Kleist, had not advanced beyond Vertus. The Prussian general had tried to do two things that did not agree,—bring forward Kleist and Kapzevich and cut off Macdonald; he had extended himself too much, and could not have prepared a better situation for Napoleon to take advantage of.

The emperor gave his troops scant rest, using for his advance roads which one would usually call impassable, on which the guns could scarcely be got forward. Finally, late at night, the troops reached St. Prix, where a few hours' rest

was afforded them. Next morning at nine, Marmont, who had been out on a reconnoissance, reported a Russian detachment at no great distance. It was Olsuviev cantoning his men in and about Champaubert.

Having made up his mind on good strategical reasons to act, Napoleon was ready to carry out his plan to its ultimate conclusion; but Marmont conceived the idea that it was too late to fall on the flank of the Army of Silesia, because the enemy, aware of the French manœuvre, would concentrate to meet it, and that a march in mass on Meaux to block the enemy in front was preferable; and in this view he fell back on Sezanne. Here he met Ney and orders to advance again, and by evening of the 9th Napoleon came up with the balance of the army. On the 10th, Marmont leading, the French army moved forward. Napoleon wrote Joseph: "I am just getting into the saddle to move to Champaubert. I am a little annoyed by the roads. They are horrible. There are six feet of mud."

At Baye Marmont met Olsuviev's van; Napoleon came up in support, and Marmont drove this force in on the main body. Following up this success, the French moved rapidly on the corps and surrounded it. Olsuviev, whose men were preparing food, was attacked by 9 A. M., and though surprised and outnumbered many times, he defended himself all day with wonderful valor. But there was absolutely no chance for him: hedged in on all sides and crushed by mere weight, his division disappeared in the combat, fifteen hundred men being killed and three thousand captured, with twenty guns. Its constancy was above all praise.

The emperor wrote Joseph: "To-day I attacked the enemy at Champaubert. . . . Olsuviev was taken with all his officers, guns and baggage. . . . The rest were thrown into a pond or killed on the field of battle. This corps is entirely destroyed. . . . I have the most flattering

hopes that Sacken is lost, and if fortune seconds us as it has to-day, affairs will be changed in the wink of an eye. . . . Blucher is cut off from Sacken."

That same evening Nansouty was sent out towards Montmirail, to be followed at daylight next morning by the whole army. Napoleon's spirits had risen to a height at this apparently small success, for it meant that he had cut the Army of Silesia in two, and could attack its parts in detail; and no one could measure the results which might flow from this initial gain. Indeed, at an earlier day these might have been vast; but the allies had been learning the methods of the great captain; and no partial victory could now more than temporarily arrest the tide of invasion.


Blucher was not doing himself the credit he had fairly earned in Silesia. He had received word that a French army was moving north from Sezanne, and Olsuviev had given him similar news; but while sharp in action when once started, Blucher was not easy to convince, and he still trusted that Schwartzenberg was holding the emperor opposite Troyes. For his excuse it must be said that even Gneisenau considered this a detachment of partisans of no great moment; and thinking to capture a body of the enemy, Blucher ordered Yorck and Sacken to join at Montmirail so as to come in to the centre point at Champaubert, and with Kleist and Kapzevich moved towards Fère Champenoise, to get in rear of and corral the supposed column at Sezanne, or at least to draw it away from Montmirail. In moving as he did, says Clausewitz, "Blucher tried to apply a blister where a bleeding was necessary." On the way Blucher's van was met by some cavalry of Mortier, and at the same time the fighting at Champaubert became more audible, which convinced even Blucher that the emperor was upon him with an army; and he found himself cut in two. Sacken and Yorck were far

down the Marne, Olsuviev in his centre was being destroyed, and he had been moving away from the main line of communications with all troops he had with him. Surprised at this unexpected onset, and uncertain how much farther it might develop, failing, in fact, to grasp the meaning of it all, he drew back, during the night of February 10–11, with the corps of Kleist and Kapzevich on Vertus and Bergères, and reiterated his orders to Yorck at Chateau Thierry and Sacken opposite La Ferté to fall back on Montmirail. Sacken was badly compromised, and during the same night, hearing of the trouble in his rear, he moved back in accordance with orders; but as it happened, he ran against Nansouty, who had reached Montmirail by midnight. When, at Vieux Maisons, he discovered the French in his rear, he made preparations to meet them, though Yorck sent him word that, being delayed by the bad roads, he could not get up until late that day. Sacken would have been wiser to file by his left towards the Chateau Thierry road to join his comrade; but he did not appreciate the extent of his danger, and his orders were explicit to move back to Montmirail.

No sooner had Napoleon seized the fact that here was the opportunity of unusual success, than he sent a courier to Macdonald to return towards him, and moved on Montmirail, to drive Sacken and Yorck out of the theatre of the immediate operations, so that he might then turn back on Blucher. By daylight, February 11, the emperor headed the infantry from Champaubert to the west, Mortier was to follow, and Marmont and Doumerc's cavalry were thrown out to Etoges to contain Blucher.

At ten o'clock, February 11, Napoleon reached Montmirail. Nansouty was already out in front striving to hold back Sacken, who was within a mile of Haute Epine, while with forced marches Yorck was coming on from Chateau Thierry.

The thing for the French to do was to hold the junction of the roads from La Ferté and Chateau Thierry, northwest of Montmirail, so as to prevent Yorck and Sacken from joining hands, and this the emperor had seen to. The battlefield was a fine open country, with many farms, plantations and small woods; the Petit Morin formed the southern boundary; Epine-au-Bois was in the centre of it. After reconnoitring, Napoleon sent Ricard to occupy and push out well beyond Pomessone, through which the Russians appeared to be thrusting a head of column, while Ney held Marchaix, Nansouty occupied the



Battle of Montmirail.

space between the two roads, Bailly or Rouge Terre woods was occupied by the Guard, and Friant was echeloned on the La Ferté road. When the Russian officers saw that the road was cut off, they had advised at once to move by the left towards Yorck; but under Blucher's orders, Sacken had decided to cut his way through, for he knew not what straits his chief might be in. To do this, he proposed to turn the French

left, and as he thought to push them where Yorck, when he got up, could attack them on the right; and in this view he took Le Bois Jean and Courmont. This manœuvre exactly suited Napoleon's ideas, because he wished to keep the two corps apart, and he held back the fight by lively artillery work until Mortier arrived about 2 P. M. The key of the position was Haute Epine, and Napoleon ordered Ricard slowly to fall back, so as to allow Sacken to imagine that he was gaining an advantage, and meanwhile he threw Nansouty forward so as fully to hold Yorck and Sacken apart, as well as to strengthen his right wing. Sacken thought his own right, which finally reached Marchaix, was winning the fight, but saw that his left was threatened by Nansouty, and drew heavily on his centre to strengthen both. This was the moment Napoleon had chosen for his blow. The Guard was brought in and, advancing on Haute Epine with Ney at its head, at the point of the bayonet drove the Russians out of the place. During this success Marchaix had been taken and retaken three times, but in proper season Napoleon sent two battalions of the Old Guard to help Ricard, at their head Lefebvre and Bertrand. The Russians were thrown out of the place for good and retired to Vieux Maisons.

Recognizing his error, Sacken now strove to reach Yorck across country, protected by the cavalry which had been opposing Nansouty, but in this attempt he was not lucky. Napoleon ordered out the *élite* squadrons of mounted grenadiers, dragoons, chasseurs and lancers, which he had kept near his own person, to fall upon their flank; and this fine body broke up almost the last of the Russian squares. Vieux Maisons was reached in much disorder. Napoleon's work was telling: Olsuviev had been destroyed, Sacken had been for some time neutralized.

Practically all was over when Yorck reached the spot. He

had left five thousand men to guard the Chateau Thierry bridge, and his artillery had been delayed by the bad roads. He did his best to help his comrade out, but Mortier and Friant had been ordered out along the road to meet him, and with their fresh troops drove him back on Fontenelles, capturing many guns. Night fell and the battle ended. Yorck's Prussians camped behind Fontenelles, Sacken's Russians near Vieux Maisons; the French bivouacked in their front.

The loss was some three thousand men on the French, four thousand on the allied side. On February 11 and 12 Blucher with Kapzevich and Kleist remained stationary in Bergères.

On February 11, at 8 P. M., the emperor wrote to Joseph: "To-day has been a decisive one. The Army of Silesia no longer exists. I have completely routed it. . . . These two days entirely change the situation of affairs. . . . I write to the empress to have a salute of sixty guns fired." And next day: "For such great results, I engaged very few troops." Berthier was ordered to "have proclamations printed . . . which announce that sixty Russian regiments have been destroyed and one hundred and twenty guns taken. . . . That it is time that the French people should rise to fall upon the enemy; that the emperor is pursuing them. Let all Cossacks be halted and all the detachments stopped. Let the bridges be cut in front of them and the trains be stopped. Let no food be given them." And he wrote Savary: "The best army of Russia is destroyed. My old foot Guard and my horse Guard did miracles. The dragoons distinguished themselves." And to Clarke: "I fought the combat of Champaubert, the battle of Montmirail and the combat of Chateau Thierry by engaging a few battalions of my Guard and its cavalry; the dragoons covered themselves with glory. The Old Guard much surpassed all that I could expect from troops *d'élite*."


Early February 12 Napoleon, headed by his cavalry, followed on towards Chateau Thierry in pursuit, hoping Macdonald would reach the Marne crossing there, and do his part in making the pursuit decisive. In this he was disappointed, as dispatches had been delayed; but the French caught up with the two corps half-way to Chateau Thierry, where

Yorck's rearguard, ill deployed across the road, was broken by Nansouty's cavalry. The enemy was still further pursued with the old Bonaparte vigor, and losses of three thousand men more were inflicted on these corps before they could get across the river.

On the 13th Napoleon began to rebuild the bridges the enemy had burned, and by night he had put the army over to the right bank, pushing Mortier with five thousand men out to Rocourt to follow up the enemy retiring on Soissons. He was beginning to think he would have to content himself with what he had already accomplished, and turn back against Schwartzemberg, though he did not give the latter credit for daring to advance on Paris so long as he himself had beaten Blucher and might fall on the allied rear; or indeed so long as he held the bridge at Nogent.

In the "General Dispositions" of February 13 it was accordingly ordered that "Victor will continue to guard Nogent, and will place his troops to protect the whole right bank from Nogent to Montereau. If he has left Nogent, or if the movement of the enemy is much more marked on the Yonne, he will move to Montereau, will cut the Nogent bridge, in leaving on the right bank what is necessary to oppose the reëstablishment of the bridge of Nogent." And he wrote this day to Joseph: "It is probable that the news of the disaster to Sacken and Yorck will stop the movements of the enemy. The police and the war office should send agents to learn the effect it has produced on them."

During these movements Macdonald had been neutralized and useless. He was now reinforced up to twelve thousand men, and, no longer having Blucher to fear, received orders to march to Montereau, to lend a hand to Oudinot and Victor, who were facing such large odds. Meanwhile Blucher had been consistently playing Napoleon's game, by retiring



Montmirail-Etoges Country.

to Vertus to enable Napoleon to beat his two advanced corps, and then, by coming up, to try his own chances against the captain with whom he had never yet singly measured swords. At Bergères and Vertus, on the 11th and 12th, he was unaware of what was happening to his lieutenants, and puzzled by manœuvres he failed to comprehend; but on February 13, though he had heard from spies that there were thirty thousand men in his front, he advanced — as if to win his revenge battle — against Marmont and forced him back to Fromentières and Vauxchamps. This was just what Napoleon desired: he could not now afford to run after Blucher, as he had done in Silesia, and was pleased to be saved the trouble. Hearing of his oncoming at Chateau Thierry, while he was rebuilding the bridge, Napoleon immediately seized the chance of falling on the old marshal before he moved the French army back to the Seine, writing Joseph, February 14: “At Montereau are then . . . forces of fifty or sixty thousand men, without including the reserves of Paris. If to-day is happy, as I hope, and if I manage to get rid of this corps, . . . I can go at once personally to Montereau, unless the enemy shall have ceased his offensive movements.” Without delay he started out towards Blucher. “I hope to be in Montmirail before seven this morning, and before noon to attack the enemy and teach him a good lesson,” he wrote at 3 A. M., February 14, from Chateau Thierry to Marmont, who had retired towards Montmirail with Blucher upon his heels; and accordingly, having left Mortier to follow up Yorek and Sacken, about eight Napoleon reached the town, ordered Marmont to the right about, and on to the attack on Blucher's van, just coming up at Vauxchamps.

The emperor was full of the spirit of 1796.

“We shall fight to-day between Montmirail and Champaubert,” he wrote Kellermann; “I suppose this column is Wittgenstein's, who was

blockading the places of Alsatia, and who is announced as coming hither in support. There will then be to-day an affair, and I am full of confidence of destroying this column also." And to Mortier: "I hope, then, to have to-day a very happy event, for I shall have assembled at nine o'clock this morning thirty thousand men." And to Joseph: "I am just leaving. I shall be at Fromentières at eight o'clock this morning. I shall attack the enemy. I hope to beat him well during the day, and to destroy that corps, too."

Napoleon's approach heartened the troops. "It is hard," says Danielevski, "to give an idea to what a degree Napoleon's presence and his personal orders changed the battlefield. The cavalry attacks were fiercer, the fire of the guns was heavier." It was this very thing by which Blucher divined that he had Napoleon in front of him; he was astonished at being attacked with such vigor when he thought he was himself pursuing the enemy, and he had not really fathomed the scheme on which Napoleon was acting with such brilliant rapidity; but now he failed not to recognize his plight, and guessing that Sacken and Yorek had been beaten, he himself made up his mind to retire. He was not well supplied with cavalry, most of which he had sent with his lieutenants, and his troops withdrew in battalion squares on either side the road, checkerwise, with their few guns in the intervals, a large part of the artillery having been hurried out of danger back to Vertus. What cavalry he had was kept actively out in front, and the many woods on either side of the road were held by his skirmishers. Thus Blucher retired bravely and in good order, as far as Janvilliers, which was reached about two o'clock; but no sooner had he passed the village than Grouchy, coming from near Echelle, attacked him in flank, and by a rapid dash broke through many squares. Napoleon was following hard upon, and threw himself at once upon the disordered enemy, while Drouot brought up all the guns of the Guard he could gather and kept up a

steady fire on the retiring squares, which inflicted great loss on Blucher, who had not artillery enough to answer it properly. But this was not all. Grouchy, after his charge at Janvilliers, had continued his way over farm roads and all kinds of



Prussian Hussar.

bad country, and threw himself across the road near Champaubert. Luckily for the enemy, Grouchy could not be followed by any guns. After passing through Champaubert, Blucher ran across this unexpected resistance; his force fell into grave disorder, and he himself came near serious injury in the crowd. It was wonderful that the troops held together. Every one recognized that to regain control of this road was the only salvation, and the very momentum of the masses of men pushing on broke through the net, and Grouchy retired. It was now dark, the French themselves had lost much

order, and a pause ensued on both sides. This was interrupted by a fresh attack from Marmont, which carried off Blucher's rearguard of Russians; but this was the end of the battle.

Napoleon returned to Montmirail, Nansouty remained near Etoges. Blucher, whose personal efforts had saved his army, stopped awhile in Champaubert, and then moved back on Bergères. He was happy to learn next day that Yorck and Sacken had reached Epernay via Rheims, and on February 16 the Army of Silesia was rallied on Chalons.

The emperor was not slow to give the world notice of his victory. At 9 P. M., February 14, he wrote to Joseph:—

“I write you a word to have you understand the happy issue of the battle of Vauxchamps. Blucher, who had separated himself from his army, and whose headquarters was at Vertus, had been rejoined by Kleist coming from Germany . . . and by a new Russian corps, . . . in all twenty thousand men. On the 13th he moved on Etoges and Champaubert. Marmont . . . beat in retreat without engaging. I left Chateau Thierry at three o'clock this morning, and arrived at Montmirail when the enemy was almost at the gates. I marched on the enemy, who had taken position at the village of Vauxchamps. I beat him, made three thousand prisoners, took three guns and ten flags, and followed him up fighting to the gates of Etoges. His loss must be more than four thousand men. I have not lost three hundred men killed or wounded. This great result comes from the enemy's not having cavalry, and my having six or eight thousand very good, with which I constantly had him enveloped and turned.” On February 11 he had written Marmont about more practical matters: “All the guns or caissons taken from the enemy are to be thrown into a neighboring pond, or into wells, and a list kept of them by an artillery officer, so that they can be got out after a few days. By this means we shall have this annoyance the less, and more teams.” And to Berthier: “Have the caissons and gun carriages of the enemy burned and bury the guns. That should be done on all the battlefields these days, and a note made of the places.” And to Daru in the war office, February 15: “I am told that the wounded and the sick are wandering about Paris without an asylum. There must be places in the civil hospitals where they should be put, and finally, if it is necessary, you could easily organize hospitals for six or seven thousand sick in taking the beds from the barracks, and even the furnishings of the Guard. By this means the capital will not have under its eyes the spectacle of this negligence towards wounded and sick.”

Looking forward to still another diversion, Napoleon wrote, February 15, to Clarke: “Write to Angereau that he is now well armed, that I order him in the existing circumstances to open the campaign, to beat Bubna and disquiet the flank of the enemy.”

On the same day to Berthier: “Notify Marmont that I have destroyed and put *hors de combat* the best army of the enemy, which I estimate to have been nearly eighty thousand men; that I am going to undertake

immediately the army of Schwartzberg, which is of one hundred and twenty thousand men ; that had they not taken in too lively a manner the offensive on Paris, I should have moved on Chalons and Vitry ; that just as soon as I shall have reassured myself as to the latter's dispositions, at the least movement of retreat made by them, my intention is to march at once to Vitry and Alsatia, and as it is possible that they may have decided on a retrograde movement by the major events which have happened, and by the moral effect they will have on France and Paris, as soon as I shall have knowledge of it, I should wish to find Marmont at Etoges or at Montmirail ; that I shall then move towards him with rapid steps to oblige the enemy to make big marches and to commence his rout."

To Joseph : "The Yères is an overflowed river which is not fordable. It can cover the army at least three days. On the 17th I shall be ready to attack." And to Clarke : "It seems that Bülow is leaving Belgium and the north to move towards Paris. Maison is following a false direction by making the whole army useless, and shutting it up in towns. He should move forward and pick up all his garrisons. This will recall Bülow to the defense of Holland."

That the separation of the allies had been a mistake was shown by their being so thoroughly beaten. All told, the Army of Silesia had lost twenty thousand men, but it now received ten thousand reinforcements. Had Napoleon been able to pursue Blucher, he might have forced him still farther back and completely demoralized his troops ; and relying on the effect of the disaster when it should be reported to Schwartzberg, he might have been wise to do so ; but he committed the same error he had in the Bautzen country ; for the news which ran in from the Seine determined him to leave half completed the operation on the Marne and go to the succor of Oudinot and Victor, who were being pressed back.

However brilliant Napoleon's success in this short series of fights, it could have no lasting result. It was not obtained against an enemy who, like the Piedmontese in 1796,

would at once make peace, but against the stoutest of his opponents, who was thereby taught prudence, without being in any sense checked in his intention to carry through the struggle. Moreover, Blucher fell back upon approaching reserves. Had the entire Army of Silesia been destroyed, it would have scarcely altered the eventual result, and whereas in 1796 Napoleon had quite finished affairs with Piedmont before he turned against the Austrians, here he left Blucher to regain new strength, while he was obliged to turn against Schwartzemberg, to save his capital from capture. While the splendid conception and wonderful execution with raw troops in this short campaign on the Marne has often been compared to the early days of 1796, yet that was the first effort of this wonderful military genius, and was decisive in the highest degree, whereas these days were almost the last piece of brilliant manœuvring done by the emperor, and instead of being decisive in his favor, they merely caused him to lose much that he could not spare, and demonstrated to the allies how patiently and carefully they must work together in order to accomplish their end. For all which difference, 1796 and 1814 may well be compared in the marvelous *coup d'œil*, insight into



Trumpeter of Imperial Guard.

the situation, and capacity to make even raw troops march and fight. History presents few parallels to these two campaigns.

In order further to provide for holding Blucher where he had left him, the emperor wrote Joseph, February 13: —

“Send a courier to Soissons to have news of the enemy, and let the commandant of that town hold it until extinction, for if the enemy cannot enter Soissons, he is going to be much embarrassed.

“I do not think that Schwartzberg will run his head into Fontainebleau as long as we are masters of the Nogent bridge. The Austrians know too well my manner of working, and have too long time carried its marks, and they are well aware that if they leave us masters of the Nogent bridge, I will debouch on their rear as I have done here. . . . I have not decided on the plan of operation that I shall follow to-day, but with Victor, Oudinot and the reserve . . . I shall personally move . . . on Montereau, and shall have enough forces to contain Schwartzberg. I tremble lest those Russian rogues should set fire to Fontainebleau as a matter of reprisal.”

During the three days Schwartzberg was in Troyes he got early news from the Army of Silesia, and at the same time heard that Augereau in Lyons had collected an army, stated to him as forty thousand men, which was to move forward against Bubna, whom he had left in Geneva. This circumstance seemed to Schwartzberg highly threatening, in that it might rob the allies of the possession of Switzerland, and open the way from Italy to Eugene; and in order to meet this event, he made out of his abundant spare troops a detail of fifty thousand men to march back into Switzerland.

Meanwhile Wittgenstein and Wrede were ordered to follow Napoleon towards Sezanne, but they were held back February 10 to 12 by Bourmont's gallant defense of Nogent, which gained time enough for Napoleon to carry through his operations against Blucher. In any case, it would only have exposed them to being beaten by Napoleon on his way back. Wittgenstein remained in front of Nogent, and Wrede moved down river on Bray, which the French National Guard gave up without firing a gun, and thus obliged Bourmont to evacuate Nogent the 12th. The allies then crossed the Seine.

Napoleon wrote to Joseph, February 13: "This Bourmont is the famous chief of Chouans, with whom I am extremely satisfied. The enemy tried to enter in close column. They fusilladed him from the houses and the barricades. In brief, he was repulsed in three consecutive assaults and lost . . . two or three thousand men." Wurtemberg had been sent to Sens, and here on February 11, against a handsome defense by Allix, his divisions stormed the town and captured it at a loss of three hundred men. Allix retired to Pont-sur-Yonne and from there on Montereau, while an allied column marched on Auxerre, for what reason is not plain.

Oudinot and Victor, not having been strong enough to prevent the allies from crossing the Seine, withdrew by way of Nangis to Guignes and behind the Yères, where they received a small reinforcement from Spain, and where Macdonald came up to join them. The Army of the Sovereigns was thus making its way on Paris slowly, governed largely by the discussions of the Congress of Chatillon. But when, on February 15, Schwartzberg heard how heavy Blucher's disaster was, a council of war was at once held in Nogent; and lest Napoleon should be able, by the destruction of the Army of Silesia, to reach his fortresses in the rear of the allied army, and thus cut their communications, it was determined to retire from the advanced position which had been gained; and Napoleon's arrival quickened the movement.

This fact proves how wise Napoleon would have been to continue his operation against the Army of Silesia. In the early days he would surely have run the risk, relying upon the natural panic of the allies for their communications; but he was now more monarch than captain, and had received so many anxious messages from Paris, that when he learned that a raid under Bianchi had reached Fontainebleau, he determined to operate against Schwartzberg. This was quite a

natural thing to do, but it was perhaps the turning-point of the campaign. Had he moved on against Blucher, completed his overthrow and forced him farther back, he would have rid Paris from danger for some weeks, and perhaps have brought the Congress of Chatillon to offer acceptable terms. But his decision not to pursue Blucher to the bitter end and put him out of the possibility of resistance for some weeks, left matters substantially as they were. He had been unable to resist the threat to Paris by the Army of the Sovereigns. His dignity as emperor had led him to listen to the panic appeals of the Paris public, when his acumen as a soldier should have taught him that the Army of the Sovereigns would retire when they found the Army of Silesia destroyed.

Having determined to move back against Schwartzemberg, and having, as we have seen, ordered Macdonald to join Victor and Oudinot in the position they had taken up behind the Yères, on February 15 Napoleon started from Montmirail by way of La Ferté sous Jouarre towards the same point. On this march the infantry was carried in wagons, and the gun teams were supplemented by post-horses. By February 16 Napoleon stood at the head of fifty thousand men behind the Yères, and next day he could open the offensive stroke against Schwartzemberg.

On February 16 the allied armies were not well placed: the Army of Silesia was out of condition to act for the moment, but was repairing its damages at Chalons; Schwartzemberg was in the triangle Nogent-Montereau-Sens, with Wittgenstein at Nangis, Wrede at Donnemarie, Wurtemberg at Montereau, Barclay in reserve at Nogent; to his order for retreat a counter order was issued on this day, yet the withdrawal continued, and on February 17 Wittgenstein's vanguard under Pahlen, which had advanced as far as Mormant, was attacked by the French cavalry van before daylight, and so badly beaten that

several regiments were almost destroyed. Uncertainty reigned at the allied headquarters.

Napoleon was indeed doing work which reminds one of Montenotte and Dego; but while the elation of successful action took strong hold of him and he was for a brief period himself again, there is nothing given us to show that he appreciated how futile must be any triumphs on this smaller theatre of operations, in view of the overwhelming forces which all Europe in arms was concentrating upon the larger theatre of operations to crush him. While the first elements of Napoleon's downward career may be seen as early as 1809, yet even the disaster in Russia cannot be said to have fatally injured his career as monarch. It was not until the days of the armistice in 1813, when Napoleon refused the olive branch which united Europe tendered him, and drew his sword instead, that his actual downfall began. At that moment he could have had a great and powerful France, with European guaranties for his house. Since then all had changed. The offers of the allies had become less and less as they had advanced towards and into the bowels of the land, and now the emperor could expect no such terms as he then could have had.

The change in Napoleon's ideas in regard to what troops should be is shown in his letter of February 5 to Clarke, speaking of the National Guards.

"These troops are no longer National Guards, but veritable line troops, because they are composed of men who have already made two hundred leagues to come and cover the capital. . . . It is essential that these National Guards, whenever they arrive, should be given guns, cartridges and haversacks. Charge some one with following up the organization of these twenty thousand men, who left their homes voluntarily, and who will desert if they find themselves looked down upon."

To Joseph, February 7, he wrote: "It is better to have little battalions, so as to use all the cadres. I have here in the army very little battal-

ions, which render me every day service which bigger battalions would render me. Generally it is enough to have one hundred and forty men in a company; if they are conscripts, this is twice too many." And the next week: "It is better that conscripts should have battalions of only three hundred men than to have them more numerous." And again, February 9: "You must accustom the National Guard to make the service of the barriers" (gates) "alone, because when the line troops are taken from Paris to move to the front, the National Guard will deem itself lost. You can put much smaller guards at the barriers which are not menaced."



Chair of Imperial Throne.
(Garde Meuble.)

LXVIII.

CRAONNE, LAON. FEBRUARY 15 TO MARCH 13, 1814.

NAPOLEON should have pursued Blucher and put him beyond use, but lest Schwartzenberg should march on Paris, he left Marmont to contain him and made a forced march to join his lieutenants. On February 17 he debouched from the Yères, defeating the enemy at several points. At Montereau, February 18, the allies were driven from the river, and retired to Troyes. Nothing better than these ten days can be found in Napoleon's campaigns. With only two to five of the enemy, he had upset their plans. But he overrated his success, and refused to accept reasonable terms at Chatillon, or even an armistice, believing that he could drive the enemy back to the Rhine. By February 19 Blucher had rejoined; Napoleon faced Troyes; Marmont and Mortier defended the Meaux country. Efforts were made to rouse the population against the invader. In Italy Eugene held himself, but could not join Augereau at Lyons. Blucher obtained leave to join the forces coming from Belgium, and broke up February 24 to move on Paris. Marmont and Mortier retired through Meaux. Napoleon again followed, leaving Macdonald at Troyes. He would have done better to force the fighting against the main army: its retreat would have necessitated Blucher's. Blucher came close to capturing Meaux, but was headed off and moved back to Soissons, which place the allied troops coming on from the north captured. Napoleon thought he could follow and defeat Blucher in season to turn back on Schwartzenberg, who had retired to Chaumont, but the latter began another slow advance on Paris, forcing back Macdonald. Blucher took up position on the Aisne; Napoleon strove to cut him off from Laon, and at Craonne, March 7, a heavy battle was fought; the French claimed the victory, but Blucher reached Laon. Thither Napoleon followed, and on March 9 and 10 desperately strove to drive double his numbers out of the place; but instead of working in one body, he sent Marmont off on the right, and was defeated. It was only Blucher's unwillingness to fight Napoleon *au fond* that prevented the French being overwhelmed. Napoleon retired, and on hearing of Schwartzenberg's advance, moved against him, leaving Mortier and Marmont to contain Blucher, and capturing Rheims March 13.

HIGH as he gauged the importance of pursuing Blucher, when the Army of the Sovereigns had gained control of the

Seine valley, Napoleon decided to retire to the defense of the capital, which overwhelming forces were dangerously near. Extreme activity alone could supply the want of troops. Paris was full of alarms, and Joseph the timorous sent courier upon courier to recall the army to its defense. Blucher being thrown back on Chalons, although by no means out of the game, Napoleon could more readily respond to this call; but almost the only point which he might still reach to oppose Schwartzenberg's further progress he decided to be Guignes, the cross-roads of the Paris-Nogent and Melun-Meaux post-routes. It would have been a shorter route, as well as perhaps a more effectual method, to march via Sezanne to threaten the right flank of Schwartzenberg; but there might have been difficulty in seasonably bringing up to the threatened point the corps of Victor, Macdonald and Oudinot; and as Napoleon was to take with him only the Guard under Ney's orders, he could not adopt a line of operations which might by an accident separate him from these marshals, who had just rallied on the Yères. Nor was he quite certain of what Schwartzenberg might undertake. Orders were issued at dawn, February 15, for Ney to move from Montmirail towards La Ferté sous Jouarre, on the way to Meaux and Guignes. Napoleon had no time to lose. The cavalry marched all day and part of the night; the foot was carried in wagons, and thus Napoleon and his small force reached Meaux during the afternoon. From his then point of view, if, on his appearance at Guignes, Schwartzenberg hesitated or retired, he proposed to return to the Vitry or Chalons road, and continue his operations on the allied communications; and meanwhile Marmont, with Grouchy in support, was left to face Blucher at Etoges, with orders, if possible, to push him back somewhat farther; but if Blucher should advance upon him, he was to fight for every inch, and yield only from place to place along the Montmirail-La Ferté road.

While on this 15th of February the emperor was at Meaux on the march to their rescue, Oudinot, Victor and Macdonald had taken up their position on the Yères, to face the Army of the Sovereigns, which now occupied a considerable space on both sides of the Seine. Schwartzenberg, who had been somewhat disconcerted by the repeated defeats of Blucher, had not ventured to cross the river with the whole Army of the Sovereigns; but he had put over Wurtemberg, Wrede and Wittgenstein, and these generals took post at Montereau, Donnemarie and Provins, while Pahlen, commanding Wittgenstein's van, moved onward to Mormant. Next day by three Napoleon reached Guignes; the troops which had come from Montmirail had covered some sixty miles in thirty-six hours. He now had in line the Old Guard under Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, Victor, Gérard, and the cavalry of Nansouty, Milhaud, Excelmans and Kellermann, some thirty-five thousand men all told; though, as reinforcements were coming up from day to day in smaller or greater numbers, between these and the natural attrition of the long marches and constant combats, it is impossible to approach correctness in the numbers given at this point or elsewhere.

This force Napoleon drew up astride the Nangis post-road at Guignes, purposing to try on Schwartzenberg the same methods that had succeeded so well against Blucher. Accordingly, on the 17th, the emperor debouched from the line of the Yères and advanced on Mormant. Pahlen was quickly disposed of; but as the French moved on the Army of the Sovereigns, as had been agreed on and ordered the 15th, fell back at all points towards the line of the Seine. From Nangis Napoleon might well have advanced all his forces on a line which should envelop one of the enemy's flanks, say to Provins; but not being quite sure of the allied enterprise, and handicapped by the notion that he must cover Paris, he chose

to send his several corps in pursuit in eccentric directions, viz.: Victor on Montereau, Oudinot on Provins and Macdonald on Donnemarie. As a matter of fact, he needed to have small fear of Schwartzenberg's constancy; the watchword at the allied headquarters was to venture little, and rely upon mere weight. A flank movement by the French would have hastened his withdrawal.

Yet it had to be considered that Schwartzenberg might hold the Seine, and throw a heavy column around Napoleon's right on Fontainebleau and thus reach his rear and the road to Paris, — a simple and legitimate operation; and in order to afford no time for such a manœuvre, and to secure the crossing of the Seine without delay, Napoleon intended that Victor should seize Montereau the same evening, and had definitely so ordered. For the moment he would undertake nothing which should leave the capital with a big army at its very gates. But Victor, meeting La Motte's Bavarian division on the road at Villeneuve, was delayed by the necessity of brushing it aside, which he did with a loss to it of three thousand men and fourteen guns; but this affair stopped him short of Montereau. Napoleon was unreasonably angry at this delay, which was not so much Victor's fault as it was that the tasks were hard, and that Napoleon no longer cut out the work or personally pushed his lieutenants, as years before. In these days he was full of fault-finding and punishments. Nothing was done right; no one satisfied him; and he forgot that it was he who had worn out all his divisions and his generals by ceaseless labor. He looked back longingly to the time when his marshals were young and active. He forgot that they, as well as he, had grown old and fond of the ease they had fairly earned; and he had never taken means to produce their legitimate successors in command.

On February 18, 3 A. M., he wrote to Berthier: "Convey my discontent to Victor that I receive no report from him . . . and my discontent at the little vigor of the attack of Villeneuve, and that he did not execute my orders, which prescribed to him to reach Montereau. . . . Write him a very sharp letter. Add that his troops complain that they could not find him, and that they never had orders during the affair." And two hours later: "Send to Victor one of your aides to carry quickly the order to move at once to Montereau. . . . That I am extremely discontented that he did not arrive there yesterday evening, because I hoped to have my bridge reestablished during the night. It is, however, important that he should personally be there with his infantry before six o'clock."

And yet it should be noted that he was reasonable at times. Clarke, having complained that although Minister of War he did not receive news as early as some others in Paris, was most kindly answered by Napoleon that he was right in his position, and that everything should thereafter go through his channel.

On this day, February 17, Oudinot reached Maison Rouge, Macdonald got half-way from Nangis to Donnemarie, Pajol followed in the track of the Wurtembergers back to Valence, Allix took Fontainebleau, and Marmont, to keep an eye on Blucher, reached out to the right to the Grand Morin at Reveillon. At night the extreme right of the Army of the Sovereigns was in Sezanne, Wittgenstein took Sordun, and later fell back to Nogent, Wrede retired to the bridge at Bray, Bianchi withdrew to Pont-sur-Yonne, Wurtemberg was preparing to defend the salient at Montereau.


The emperor was in high spirits at the prospect. "The whole great army of the enemy, Austrian and Russian, Bavarian and Wurtemberg," he wrote, February 17, to Joseph, "are recrossing the Seine in every direction, and with the greatest precipitation. It is probable that this night there will not be a single man on this side; but I shall lose very

important time; much will be necessary to reëstablish the bridge at Montereau." Not only Victor had been ordered sharply up, but Pajol was to gather all the troops he could, so as, with the 2d Corps and Gérard's reserve, to move upon the town.

Wurtemberg had orders to hold Montereau until the evening of the 18th, to allow the allied troops who were filing to the rear to pass beyond it, but the town with its French population lay badly for his defense. The faubourgs were connected with the town by bridges. On the right bank of the Seine lies a plateau, holding the castle of Surville; and from this plateau, should it be seized by the French, the whole country on the other side of the Seine could be swept by guns. In order to hold Montereau, Wurtemberg had no other course than to take position on the plateau with the defile in his rear, which he knew he would have to cross fighting; but with commendable bravery he drew up his troops, some twelve thousand men and fifty guns. Snow was falling and the day was bitter. The French attacked early, but Pajol, who first opened fire, had difficulty in meeting the enemy's stubborn resistance, and the fighting was heartily kept up. No gain was made by the French until early in the afternoon Gérard came up and put his peasant troops into line. He had received orders from Napoleon to take command of all the troops assembled in front of the place, and Victor was to head two divisions of the Guard under Ney. Napoleon reached the place about three o'clock, and shortly organized four columns of attack, which after still heavier pushing managed to seize the plateau. Wurtemberg, with but a third of the French force, having carried out his orders with great gallantry, fell back on Marolles with the loss of three thousand men killed, wounded and prisoners, to a French loss of five hundred less. Macdonald and Oudinot

reached Bray and Nogent, but could not take the crossing-places. The emperor was annoyed at this opposition. "It took us all day to pass that horrible defile of Montereau," he wrote Joseph. "But what is extremely precious is that I had the fortune to seize the bridge without giving them time to cut it."

It was not only Victor who came in for fault-finding, for on February 19 the emperor told Berthier to "write to X. . . that I am extremely dissatisfied with the manner that he commands artillery; that yesterday



Battle of Montereau.

at 3 P. M. every piece was out of ammunition, not because it had been used up, but because he had kept his park too far off. . . . Tell him that an officer of artillery, who is wanting in ammunition in the middle of a battle, deserves death."

Napoleon had left Montmirail February 15; on the 16th he was at Guignes, on the 17th he attacked Wittgenstein and Wrede, and the 18th Wurtemberg. With regard to this rapidity, Clausewitz says: "We do not believe that there is anything like this in history." The march has several parallels, from that of the Consul Nero down, but no compar-

ison need be instituted. The conduct of the raw troops was admirable.

Schwartzenberg had assembled his corps in rear of Nogent, but on hearing that Napoleon had got possession of the Montereau bridge, he made arrangements to retire back to Troyes, so as again to get on a level with Blucher, and start afresh; the scheme for a two-column advance on Paris had failed. It is not to be wondered at that the contact of the allied commanders with this great captain, who for nearly twenty years had discounted all comers at the game of war, should have been characterized by weakness. It was only by repeated attempts that they could learn to disregard the rapidity and skill of his manœuvres, and go on with their own scheme, relying on mere weight. They had nothing to gain and all to lose by risk; and, moreover, the political situation and the Chatillon negotiations counted for much in the allied attitude. The Army of Silesia had been refreshed at Chalons, and as the sovereigns determined to have the two armies again coöperate, it was now ordered by its left on Arcis-sur-Aube, and the Army of the Sovereigns was preparing to join it.

Winzingerode had been coming up the Meuse, and had reached Rheims, and Blucher left him to face Mortier, and himself moved towards Schwartzenberg, Marmont taking position at Sezanne to watch him.

For several days Napoleon, while still moving forward, devoted himself to reorganizing his troops, for during the last two weeks, full of operations of the highest skill and interest, the men had undergone serious trials. By the extraordinary boldness of his offensive-defensive he had replaced the military situation where it had been three weeks before, and this in front of an enemy who outnumbered him in the ratio of five to two. But to what use was it all? The ancient vigor,

the ancient keen estimate of the enemy's weak point, was there once more in full measure, but Napoleon seemed to have lost his power of gauging the eventual outcome of all these efforts. To what could they lead? He now appeared, in governing the details, to be forgetful of the general trend of events, when he used to be in a way careless of the detail and scrupulous as to the eventual result. After Champaubert he is quoted as saying to those about him that he would yet again stand on the Vistula; and now, after Schwartzberg had fallen back merely to assemble for a fresh stroke, Napoleon lost all power of weighing probabilities, and brushed aside any advances made towards an armistice by the allies. He could not see that solely by political means could come his rescue from downfall; that as a military problem alone he must lose. As at Smolensk, he failed to gauge the conditions aright. France could not cope with all Europe in arms, especially now that she was denuded of men and exhausted by her former efforts. And worse still, Napoleon did not recognize that his own hold on the people was weakening.

Nothing could conserve his empire except a favorable peace; and he had rejected each and every successive proposal looking to this end; and so he continued to do. His mind was obscured by the one idea, that his present successes were decisive, and would suffice to change the negotiations at Chatillon to the point of yielding him again the Frankfort basis; and he staked his all on it. He could not see that, on his own theory of the equality of thousands, he must eventually fail; and that his one chance now lay in accepting lesser



French Grenadier.

terms, even if he mentally reserved the right at a future moment to fight for the larger frontiers.

Too much elated by his partial successes, and oblivious of the true perspective of the situation, Napoleon wrote Caulaincourt, February 17: —

“I gave you *carte blanche* to avoid a battle which was the last hope of the nation. The battle has taken place: Providence has blessed our arms. I have made thirty to forty thousand prisoners. I have taken two hundred guns, a great number of generals, and destroyed several armies with scarcely a blow. I yesterday defeated the army of Schwartzberg, which I hope to destroy before it shall have crossed the frontier. Your attitude is to be the same. You are to do everything for peace, but my intention is that you should sign nothing without my order, because I alone understand my position. In general, I desire nothing but a peace, solid and honorable, and it can be only such if made on the basis proposed at Frankfort. If the allies had accepted your propositions on the 9th, there would have been no battle. I should not have run the chance of fortune in a moment when the least failure would lose France. I should not have known the secret of their weakness. It is just that in return I should have the advantage of the chances which have turned towards me. I wish peace, but it would not be one which should impose on France conditions more humiliating than the basis of Frankfort. My position is certainly more advantageous than at the time the allies were in Frankfort. . . . To-day it is different. I have gained immense advantages over them, such advantages that a military career of twenty years and some repute does not present a parallel. I am ready to stop hostilities and let the enemy quietly return home, if they sign preliminaries based on the proposition of Frankfort.”

How much the emperor believed in this exaggerated view, and how much was intended for bluff, it is unfortunately not permitted us to know.

To Joseph he wrote, February 18: —

“Schwartzberg has finally given sign of life. He has sent a parliamentary to ask for a suspension of arms. It is difficult to be cowardly to this point. He had constantly refused . . . every species of suspension of arms. . . . These miserable creatures at the first check fall on their

knees. Luckily, Schwartzberg's aide was not allowed to enter. I have only received his letter. . . . I will accord no armistice until they are out of my territory." He then goes on to say that he learned that Alexander wished again to open negotiations, but that he, Napoleon, would listen to nothing except the basis of Frankfort . . . as a minimum, that he had offered to accept these terms if they at once stopped, which they refused to do, and now they asked an armistice ; that had they agreed to an armistice, he would have made almost any terms to save the capital, but as they refused, he now deems it essential to accept none but honorable terms. That the enemy was not likely to retire across the frontier with many men left. "His cavalry is excessively fatigued and discouraged. His infantry is tired of these movements and counter movements. He is entirely discouraged."

"I destroyed the Army of Silesia," . . . he wrote, February 18, to Eugene ; "I commenced yesterday to beat Schwartzberg. Within four days I have made thirty to forty thousand prisoners, taken twenty generals, five or six hundred officers, one hundred and fifty to two hundred guns, an immense quantity of baggage. I have lost scarcely any men. . . . If fortune continues to serve us, it is then possible that the enemy will be in great disorder outside our frontier, and that we can then conserve Italy."

To Savary, now Minister of Police, he wrote, February 19 : "Is it suitable at the present moment to say that I had few troops, that I vanquished only because I surprised the enemy, and that we were one against three ? You must in truth have lost your heads in Paris to say such things, when I say everywhere that I have three hundred thousand men, and when the enemy believes it." And again to Caulaincourt, February 19 : "You are in a position . . . which prevents your knowing the true position of my affairs. Everything they tell you is false. The Austrians have been beaten in Italy, and far from their being at Meaux, I shall soon be in Chatillon. In this situation I must renew orders to you to do nothing without reporting to me, and my having made known to you my intentions. . . . I am so affected by the infamous proposition you send me that I believe myself dishonored for even having put myself in the case of allowing them to propose it to you. . . . You speak always of the Bourbons. I should prefer to see the Bourbons in France with reasonable conditions, than" to accept "the infamous proposition that you send me."

This "infamous proposition" the emperor would not heed was a frontier of Pyrenees, Alps and Rhine, but excluding Italy and the Netherlands. Napoleon indeed was playing a gambler's game.

Yet, as if desirous to sow by all waters, Napoleon wrote, February 21, to the Emperor Francis:—

"Monsieur my Brother and very dear Father-in-Law, I have done everything to avoid the battle which has taken place. Fortune smiled upon me. I have destroyed the Russian and Prussian army commanded by Blucher, and since then the Prussian army commanded by Kleist. . . . My army is more numerous . . . than the army of Your Majesty. . . . I have no difficulty in proving this to any man of sane judgment. . . . I propose to Your Majesty to sign peace without delay on the basis which you yourself drew up at Frankfort, and that I and the French nation have adopted as our ultimatum. . . . There is not a Frenchman who would not prefer death rather than submit to the conditions which would render us slaves of England, and would erase France from the list of the powers. . . . Never will I cede Antwerp and Belgium. . . . The Emperor Alexander's thirst of vengeance has no cause. Before entering Moscow I offered him peace. At Moscow I did everything to put out the fire his orders had lighted. . . . I ask of Your Majesty to avoid the chance of a battle, I ask of you peace, a prompt peace, founded on . . . the declaration of the allied powers of December 1, . . . a basis that I have accepted and accept yet, although . . . the chances are in my favor. . . . Your Majesty can stop the war by a word. . . . I cannot turn to the English, whose policy is to destroy my navy, . . . nor to the Emperor Alexander, because passion and vengeance animate all his sentiments. I can only address Your Majesty, . . . the principal power in the Coalition, . . . for whatever may be your sentiments of the moment, you have in your veins some French blood."

This letter was to be kept as a *pièce secrète*; but Berthier wrote to Schwartzemberg, February 22, one much to the same effect, which was to be considered a *pièce ministérielle*.

The emperor was relying altogether too much on his recent gains. His judgment of a dozen years before would have led him to the conclusion that he had best make a speedy

peace; we saw this as late as 1809; but he believed he had almost demoralized the allies, and he placed great stress on what could be accomplished by the force at Lyons working in concert with his own advance. To spur up his old lieutenant, he wrote to Augereau, February 21:—

“My Cousin, the Minister of War has put under my eyes the letter you wrote the 16th. This letter has pained me much. What? Six hours after having received the first troops coming from Spain, you are not already in campaign? Six hours of rest was enough for them. I won the combat of Nangis with a brigade of dragoons coming from Spain, which from Bayonne had not yet unbridled. The six battalions of the Nismes division are lacking, you say, in clothing and equipments, and are without instruction. What poor reasons are you giving me there, Augereau? I have destroyed eighty thousand enemies with battalions composed of conscripts, having no cartridge-boxes and ill-clothed. You say the National Guards are pitiable. I have four thousand here coming from Angers and Brittany, in round hats, without cartridge-boxes, with sabots, but having good guns. I have made them serve well. There is no money, you continue; and whence do you expect to get money? You cannot have any until we shall have torn our receipts out of the hands of the enemy. You are wanting in teams: take them everywhere. You have no magazines: this is altogether ridiculous. I order you, in twelve hours after receipt of the present letter, to start in campaign. If you are still the Augereau of Castiglione, keep the command; if your sixty years weigh upon you, quit it and put it in the hands of the most ancient of your general officers. The country is menaced, and in danger, it can be saved only by audacity and good-will, and not by vain temporizations. You must have a kernel of more than six thousand men of troops *d'élite*. I have not so many, and yet I have destroyed three armies, made forty thousand prisoners, taken two hundred guns, and thrice saved the capital. The enemy is flying on all sides towards Troyes. Be the first among the bullets. It is not a question of acting as in the last years, but one must again put on his boots and his resolution of 1793! When the French shall see your plumes at the outposts, and shall have seen you expose yourself the first to fire, you will do with them what you will.”

And again he ordered Clarke, February 22, to “write to Augereau that I see with pain that he has scattered his troops. On the contrary, he

should assemble them to march to the front and overwhelm that ridiculous Bubna." And on February 26 to "write to Augereau that it is ridiculous for him to think that he cannot count on the troops of Nismes for this campaign. Make him understand that I have in my army many soldiers in peasants' dress, and many line troops who have only been under the colors seventy-three days; that however young the French infantry, it is always braver than the Wurtemberg, Austrian and Bavarian foot."

The crossing of the Seine was begun during the morning of February 19, and the French army assembled at Nogent. Slowly retiring, Schwartzenberg concentrated at Troyes, and Blucher coming from Chalons via Arcis got to Méry February 21, where he stood in direct communication with the Army of the Sovereigns. Had Napoleon three days before marched around the right flank of Schwartzenberg, he would now have been in better case, as he could have prevented this junction, except by a retreat to some point much farther in the rear, — yet he can hardly be held to have foreseen this. His purpose now was to march against the Army of the Sovereigns while his own army was in good heart; but as Blucher's position at Méry was directly on his flank in such an advance, he threw Oudinot with ten thousand men against this place on February 22. Oudinot managed to take that small part of Méry which lay on the left bank, but with sixty thousand men on the other side, could not be expected to force the crossing. Meanwhile Napoleon with his fifty thousand men marched on Troyes, where he found Schwartzenberg in line with eighty thousand effective and holding firmly to both banks of the Seine. Against so great a superiority and on such awkward ground even Napoleon deemed it best to decline a battle. He had come on determined to accept one; and had the enemy lain so as to open the way to effective grand-tactics, the emperor was in a mood to risk his all on a general engagement here and now. It was as well for him that prudence won the day.

Meanwhile Mortier, who had been left to pursue Yorck and Sacken, feeling that he was too far advanced, was now leaving Soissons to retire on Chateau Thierry, and Marmont had orders to protect Paris from Blucher along the Chalons and Vitry roads; but if Blucher joined the Army of the Sovereigns, Marmont was at the same time to move by his right to join the emperor.

Though it is not to be wondered at that Napoleon's opponents were loth to meet the French army when he was personally in command, it shows no great enterprise in Schwartzenberg to withdraw from the emperor's front when he so vastly outnumbered him, for he had called in Blucher so as to deliver a battle with all forces; yet after a battle offered him at Troyes under conditions which practically made it impossible, as

Napoleon neither accepted it nor immediately manœuvred for a better position, the Army of the Sovereigns did continue its retreat to behind the Aube. Especially with news of Augereau's probable advance, its leaders were playing an entirely safe game, and it was evident to them, if not to him, that Napoleon was merely thrashing himself to pieces by his constant operations during these winter months. To Napoleon, on the contrary, this success was most encouraging. He hoped that the entire nation would now rise to help him force the enemy from the soil of France. Could he but have fifty thousand more men, electrified by the spirit which ani-



Westphalian Mounted
Artilleryman.

mated the French people in 1792, he felt convinced that he could accomplish anything. There had been a great deal of lukewarmness shown of late in resisting the enemy's advance, especially the raids of the Cossacks; and the emperor suggested to Joseph, February 21, that the queen regent should write encouragement to the several provinces, as *e. g.* : —

“I learn that the town of Orleans is threatened by fifteen hundred raiders of the enemy's army. What! the town of Orleans, which contains forty thousand inhabitants, can be afraid of fifteen hundred raiders. Where, then, is French energy? Form your National Guard, organize a company of cannoneers, take horses from your stables; I have ordered the Minister of War to furnish you guns. . . . The enemy . . . is implacable, he is ravaging our country and pillaging our towns. He keeps none of his promises. To arms then, inhabitants of Orleans, and by your conduct let me recognize the opinion that I have of you and the energy of the French nation.”

The emperor suggested other means of stimulating the population against the invader. He wrote, February 21, to Savary, ordering him to glean news of the ill-conduct of the Cossacks for publication in the *Moniteur*, to arouse the indignation of the people, and bring them up to the point of defending the land. To the Minister of the Interior he wrote : —

“It is hard to be more displeased than I am with your prefects. They run away at will without need. . . . Prescribe to every prefect to remain in the last village of his department which is occupied by our troops, and to follow the troops as soon as they enter a department.” And on March 5 a decree was issued that all public functionaries who, “instead of exciting the patriotic fervor of the people, chilled them or dissuaded citizens from legitimate defense, should be considered as traitors and treated accordingly.”

He also directed the minister, February 26, to collect from every available source accounts of the atrocities of the war, and distribute these to rouse the population.

But the French people did not rise. It had been crushed by its awful sacrifices, and was no longer willing to abet a continuance of the never-ending wars. Up to a certain point Napoleon's wars had been justifiable; but of late years they had been a drain to France and a menace to Europe. His breaking up of nationalities ran counter to all the tendencies of the age, and this was being recognized as much at home as abroad. Still, Napoleon would neither heed French apathy, nor could he believe that the allies would hold long together; the alliance did not appear to him to have sufficient cause for cohesion. He had no conception of the depth of the feeling that he was the arch-disturber of European peace and must be put an end to, and it was in this utter blindness to the real conditions that he had withdrawn from Caulaincourt the authority he had given him to make terms at Chatillon. While every soldier wonders at his audacity and skill, the student of character must equally wonder at the emperor's utter cecity.

On the morning of February 23 Wittgenstein brought from the Emperor Francis a proposal for an armistice, to which two weeks before the allies had not been willing to agree, when Napoleon had asked it. Owing to news from the south, and the attrition of the winter campaign, the peace party among the allies, in a conference at Troyes, had gained the upper hand.

Augereau had pushed Bubna back into Switzerland, which to the Austrians appeared a most dangerous status; the allied forces on the Rhone were increased up to forty thousand men, and eventually Augereau had to retire through Lyons on Valence.

The negotiations for the truce were held in Lusigny, near Troyes, which latter place Napoleon reached the 24th; and here was one more chance for the French Empire, but Napo-

leon would not embrace it. He wrote, February 24, to General Flahault, Aide-de-Camp to the emperor: "Flahault will go to Lusigny with powers from the major-general to negotiate, conclude and sign an armistice between the two armies." But Flahault was confined to "treat for peace on the basis proposed at Frankfort," and he was to say that "without this article there is nothing to be done;" and he "will enter into no discussion until this article is first agreed on," and "will not even open his mouth until this is done." He was to "speak frankly but firmly, and say that we know the forces of the enemy, but he does not know ours. Every day we receive from Paris ten thousand men clothed and armed, of whom two thousand cavalry. Our army is three hundred thousand strong. . . . The Guard has been increased to thirty thousand men. . . . Finally, the horrors committed by the Cossacks, for which there is no name, have excited to the last degree the whole population of France, and the whole country is under arms." In a letter to Caulaincourt, February 26, tendering every safe conduct to Lord Castelreagh, and offering to respect Chatillon, the emperor tells him that the "basis of Frankfort, that is what I have accepted, and what the nation has approved. In speaking to Lord Aberdeen, say that in no case will we cede Antwerp or Belgium."

Yet he appeared to want to know how his purpose was regarded in Paris; and he wrote, March 2, to Joseph, ordering him to assemble, under the presidency of the regent, the grand dignitaries, ministers and president of the council, to submit to them his note sent to Caulaincourt, insisting upon the basis of Frankfort, and to ask their opinion. "I do not ask formal advice, but I am glad to understand the different ideas of the individuals."

On February 24 he wrote Joseph: "My Brother, I have entered Troyes. The enemy's army is besieging me with parliamentaries to demand a

suspension of arms. Perhaps one will be negotiated this morning, but it can be so only if the negotiations of Chatillon are followed on the basis of Frankfort." Meanwhile he strove to bring back some of his old adherents, writing, February 25, to Joseph: "They say that Bernadotte is in Cologne. Could you not send some one to him who would make him feel the folly of his conduct, and lead him to change? Try it, but without my appearing for anything in it."

And next day he wrote Joseph to send some one to Murat to strive to bring him back to duty: "He yet has the chance to save Italy, and to replace the viceroy on the Adige."

There is no apparent change in the accuracy or directness of the orders issued by the emperor at this time, when compared with those in other campaigns: as a rule, the Correspondence is full of matter, and shows that the emperor held everything well in hand. At intervals during 1813, the reins seemed to drop from his grasp for a day or two, as from lassitude, but during the campaign of this year, until the very close, the Correspondence shows the same activity and incisiveness as of old. The mistake he made this year was in ill-gauging the actual situation and what he could accomplish.

That the emperor should complain of his lieutenants is natural, — to place the blame on others had become a habit; failure was always traceable to the carelessness of servants. Thus to Clarke, February 26, he wrote: "If I had had a bridge equipage of ten pontoons, the war would be finished, and Schwartzberg's army would no longer exist. I should have . . . taken his army in detail; but wanting boats I could not cross the Seine, when I ought to have been able to cross at will. It is ridiculous to tell me that Paris did not contain the necessary boats. . . . They might have left the day after my letter was received. All this is foolishness." And after a similar fashion to others.

To turn for a moment to Italy, although Murat's defection

had raised the hopes of Austria with regard to her war there, the king of Naples was slow in coming to the aid of Bellegarde on the Po: he appeared to be waiting to see who should prove victorious in France, so as to embrace the cause of the victors. From Geneva the Austrians had pushed forward towards the Simplon, and the English were preparing to make a descent on Leghorn to aid Murat. But surrounded on all sides, Eugene did not lose heart; he withdrew from the Adige to the Mincio, and leaned his right on Mantua. Early in February Bellegarde made preparations to cross the Mincio at Pozzolo; but on turning his left by debouching from Mantua, Eugene threw the Austrians back on Valeggio, a defeat that held Bellegarde in check, even though Eugene was compelled to detach a large force to Parma to meet Murat. As we have seen, it was a part of Napoleon's early plan that Augereau, at Lyons, should march on Geneva, open the Simplon route, draw in a number of Eugene's divisions from Italy, and operate in the upper Jura mountain country, in concert with the main French army in Champagne. But Augereau was slow. The Austrians had detached a force against him under Bubna; this had practically held him in check, and no good came of the general operation because Eugene could not send Augereau reinforcements, and at the same time hold Italy against Bellegarde and Murat.

Blucher had never been an admirer of Schwartzberg's management, and galled at being called back from Chalons to witness a retreat less compulsory than his own, when he expected battle, he turned to Alexander, who himself was somewhat of the same mind, and asked that Winzingerode and Bülow, coming up from Belgium, might be allowed to join him in a renewed march on Paris. At the czar's instance this was granted, although the allied monarchs at Bar-sur-Aube had decided that the main army should move

back to Langres upon the Austrian reserves. Blucher thus once more gained a free hand, with one hundred thousand men, including his own, to work with. He was the only general in the allied ranks who seemed to be willing to face the emperor, but he could do so only in a simple operation of which he could understand the details; and now, with orders to work on his own plan, but not to forget discretion, Blucher broke up February 24, and crossed the Aube at Anglure, and Baudemont and Granges, near by, intent on another thrust at the man who had so cruelly oppressed his Fatherland. That the first separation of Blucher and Schwartzberg was a mistake in front of Napoleon was shown by both being beaten, and having to reunite. On the second separation Blucher was more nearly right, because he could expect to assemble on the Marne or Aisne a hundred thousand men.

On the same day Schwartzberg moved with his right from Troyes to Bar-sur-Aube, with his left from Bar-sur-Seine to Ferté-sur-Aube, and sent his reserves to Langres, while Napoleon entered Troyes. When the enemy showed a manifest purpose of continuing his retreat to Langres, and Napoleon learned of Blucher's absence, he saw that he could not follow up Schwartzberg, lest he move too far away from Paris, and conceived the idea of a secret march to the north to fall on the Prussian general's rear, in the belief that he could again outmanœuvre him. With this intention he set apart Ney and Victor to keep touch with Blucher, while Macdonald, Oudinot and Gérard, Milhaud and Kellermann, thirty-five thousand strong, should essay to push back Schwartzberg still farther. He himself with the Old Guard, the Guard cavalry and Excelmans, remained in Troyes, ready to throw this reserve force in either direction where it might prove to be most needed. On February 25 there was only an allied rearguard left in Bar; and next day the

entire allied army was behind the Aube. Oudinot and Gérard in pursuit followed the direct road to Bar, while Macdonald marched via Bar-sur-Seine on La Ferté-sur-Aube, as a threat to the allied flank. A new conference at Vendeuvre, February 25, decided that the main army should retire to Langres and remain on the defensive, while the two armies of the wings, that is Blucher and Hesse-Homburg, should keep up the offensive against Marmont and Mortier, and against Augereau, the line of Blucher running back to the Netherlands and Hesse-Homburg's to Switzerland.

Having crossed the Aube, and aiming for Soissons, Blucher had advanced against Marmont, who stood at Sezanne, had forced him back on February 25, and on the 26th was marching on La Ferté Gaucher, whither Marmont had retired; Mortier, who had been actively manœuvring between Soissons and Chateau Thierry to hold back the new corps which, with orders to join Blucher, was invading France from the north, of which corps Winzingerode was at Rheims and Bülow at Laon, also fell back from Chateau Thierry on La Ferté sous Jouarre, leaving a good garrison in Soissons. The two French marshals had only about twelve thousand men left, while a body from Erfurt, and St. Priest, whom Coburg had relieved at Mainz, were also coming along to swell the enemy's ranks. It was February 26 that Napoleon definitely learned Blucher's manœuvre, and he at once pushed Ney forward with Victor and Arrighi to strike Blucher's rear. Ney was to cross the Aube at Arcis, Victor at Anglure, while Arrighi should cross the Seine at Nogent and march to join the foot column. Ney's instructions were by no means to permit Blucher to set foot in Sezanne.

But during the night of February 26-27 fresh tidings came in showing that Blucher had made more progress than Napoleon had imagined, and that Marmont was at La Ferté Gaucher.

The Prussian general was justified in expecting to pin Marmont up against the Marne and to advance on Paris by its right bank; and by the morning of February 27 Napoleon had determined to undertake Ney's task himself. He had been staying in Troyes, hoping that an armistice would come about,—but the allies would none of his terms. Ney was spurred on, Marmont and Mortier were to join hands and stave off Blucher until Napoleon could come up; but these marshals had already joined forces at La Ferté sous Jouarre, and had retired on Meaux during the night of February 26–27, to counteract the very intelligent manœuvre of the Prussian commander, who in the effort to seize the Soissons-Meaux road had pushed on La Ferté sous Jouarre the corps of Yorck and Kleist to hold them in this town, while the Russian corps were to march around the French left on Meaux and cut them off from Paris.

Napoleon left Troyes at noon, February 27, and started in Blucher's tracks over country roads and in bad weather, to march by way of Herbisse and Sezanne on La Ferté Gaucher. At places the artillery stuck fast in the mud and delayed him much, and many broken bridges added to the difficulty. Macdonald was ordered so to operate as to lead Schwartzenberg to believe the emperor still in his front, giving out that he was at Bar-sur-Aube and Vendevre, for Napoleon hoped to get through with Blucher before his absence was guessed. By afternoon, with the Old Guard and the Guard Cavalry, he reached Arcis-sur-Aube, writing Joseph: "I shall sleep in Herbisse. To-morrow, at 9 A. M., I shall be at Fère Champeoise; from there, according to events, I shall march on Sezanne and La Ferté Gaucher. Thus I shall be in the rear of the entire enemy's army." Ney on February 27 had reached Sezanne, Marmont and Mortier remained in Meaux, and Kleist had crossed the Marne at La Ferté sous Jouarre, and moving

up to Lizy, also passed the Ourcq; the van of Sacken and Langeron had reached Trilport along the left bank, and had already seized the faubourg of Meaux on this bank, when Marmont and Mortier crossed over and drove it off.

On the 28th Napoleon hurried Ney's column, followed by his own, along from Sezanne towards La Ferté Gaucher. When Blucher found that the French marshals had seized Meaux, he withdrew Sacken and Langeron back to La Ferté sous Jouarre, there crossed to the right bank, and put a larger force across the Ourcq at Lizy so as to turn Meaux by the north, leaving Yorck on the left bank. But getting wind of the manœuvre, Marmont and Mortier debouched from Meaux in season to fall on his van under Kleist as it reached the Théroouanne, and as it was not supported, forced it back on the Ourcq, which it crossed, destroying the Lizy bridge. The Prussian general now got over all his forces to the right bank of the Marne, and broke the La Ferté sous Jouarre bridge. Napoleon reached the place in the afternoon of March 1, but it took all night for the column to close up, and curiously he had no news of Marmont and Mortier, although these marshals had managed to hold themselves on the Ourcq. On the same day Blucher made a renewed attempt to attack them, ordering Sacken to demonstrate at Lizy, while Yorck and Kapzevich could pass at Crouy to turn the French left; but as the French had destroyed the Crouy bridge, the plan failed, though the Russians tried to force the passage at Gèvres. A reinforcement of six thousand men now came from Paris for Marmont, which enabled him somewhat better to hold his own. It took all day of March 2 to mend the La Ferté bridge, but Victor and Arrighi marched up to Chateau Thierry to get in Blucher's rear; and Blucher, hearing of Napoleon's advent, hurried off to Oulchy le Chateau. As Napoleon was now so placed as to threaten the roads to Cha-

lons and Rheims, Blucher had no choice but to retire on Soissons, though it was held by a French garrison, and hither Blucher also ordered Bülow, and Winzingerode, who had been reinforced by Voronzov, while St. Priest was likewise coming up from the lower Rhine through the Ardennes. Marmont and Mortier followed up Blucher's march and took post at Mareuil, where they struck the enemy's rearguard.

From the inner position he had by such an able operation again won, Napoleon had the triple choice of turning on the left flank of Blucher, and cooping him up between Marne and Aisne, or of retiring to strike the right flank of Schwartzberg, from whom Macdonald had been unable to conceal his absence, or of marching over the road he had now opened via Chateau Thierry on Chalons, to draw in reinforcements from the fortresses of Lorraine, as he had all along had the idea of doing. Oudinot was ordered back to Arcis-sur-Aube, and Macdonald was held ready to march.

It seems that it would have been Napoleon's better policy to force operations against the Army of the Sovereigns, rather than tire out his men following Blucher, beyond the point of heading him off from Paris and forcing him back upon the Aisne. Schwartzberg was reduced in numbers by the detachments he had made, and was not far from demoralized. Napoleon might have driven him back to Switzerland. Though Blucher was allowed much scope of action, yet he was under command of the council sitting at the headquarters of the Army of the Sovereigns; and should this army be kept on the *qui vive*, it would almost certainly result in Blucher's being again called back, as he had been on a former occasion, or ordered to and up the Rhine to an assembly. The mere retreat of the main army from Napoleon's front, especially if caused by a thrust towards Chalons, entailed Blucher's falling back, whereas by dividing his army and moving against Blu-

cher, with less than half his forces he could not possibly win a battle. Moreover, the Army of the Sovereigns was at hand and could be rapidly attacked, while to reach Blucher's required much manœuvring. There was risk in both things, but there was less risk in attacking Schwartzenberg. Of course this did not mean that Napoleon could still save the empire. That was doomed, unless he made friends of his adversary quickly while in the way with him. But if he was really waiting for a machine god, he could gain more time for the mechanism to work by attending strictly to the Army of the Sovereigns.

The existing false military situation had been brought about by Napoleon the emperor, not by Napoleon the captain. It was the emperor who had insisted on holding Italy and the Spanish frontier, Hamburg, Danzig and dozens of other fortresses, in spite of the captain's knowledge that he would need in the field all the forces France controlled. It was the emperor who would not accept a reasonable basis of peace. Had the emperor, at an early enough moment, forgotten his desire to remain King of Italy, and ordered up Eugene, had he waived all his claims on Spain, made Ferdinand his friend, and drawn in the veterans who were now trapped in Spanish fortresses, had he not left Davout and St. Cyr in the lurch, he would not at present have found himself at the gates of Paris, facing over two hundred thousand allies with less than ninety thousand men. With the Italian and Spanish divisions which he could just as well have had, with the two able marshals abandoned on the Elbe, and with the activity he so pronouncedly exhibited in this memorable campaign, the allies would, so far as one can judge, have been violently thrown back across the Rhine, and France could surely have closed the war with the Rhine-Alps-Pyrenees frontier, the Frankfort basis, to which Napoleon held so firmly. His obstinate effort to hold everything resulted in his keeping

nothing. From 1809 his old sense of perspective, of the relative values of things on a grand scale, had begun to weaken; it was now still less sound; and the loss of this power of rightly gauging the values in a problem,—perhaps the greatest of all intellectual powers given to man,—cost him his empire, and France her millions of money and holocausts of men. Were not this change in the master mind so marked, were it not so positive a factor in his downward career, it would not be so constantly dwelt upon.

It is manifest that the emperor was beginning to recognize his error in confining so many men in strong places; for on March 2 he told Clarke to write to Maisons to assemble the garrisons of the towns, and to get into the field; to write by every means to Mainz for Morand to move out, “beat the poor stuff in front of him, join the garrison of Landau, and keep the field on the rear of the enemy;” to give the same order to the general at Strasburg; to order in the same fashion the governor of Metz to take two thirds of the garrisons of Metz, Verdun, Thionville, Longwy, “to fall successively on the blockading forces and thus threaten the communications of the enemy.” And on the same day he ordered him to send agents by several routes to Davout, “to make him understand how unfortunate it is that with an army like his own he lets himself be blockaded by inferior forces, and does nothing for the country.” This really goes to the root of the matter: Napoleon’s leaving these huge armies and the various garrisons all over Europe, instead of collecting them to fight in the field, was the cause of his eventual failure. Had he but soon enough foreseen events, had he but correctly gauged his own weakness against all Europe in arms, and done this, the basis of Frankfort, or even a better one, would have been easily maintained.

But it was too late. The emperor was now doing what he

should have done three months before; and there was no present means of making these huge forces available, however essential to the struggle on hand.

When, after manœuvring on the Ourcq against Marmont and Mortier, Blucher learned that Napoleon had reached La Ferté sous Jouarre March 1, he felt that his discreetest plan was to join Bülow and Winzingerode, who were striving to capture Soissons, cross the Aube and meet him in Oulchy; and when, on March 2, he retired from in front of the French army via Ancienville and Neuilly in the direction of Fismes, it was to take up the line of the Aisne, and await these reinforcements. He was tempted to turn back in Oulchy to receive battle, but as Bülow and Winzingerode had not got over the Aisne, he could not count on their aid. He apparently failed to notice that he was giving Napoleon an excellent chance of driving him down river into a *cul-de-sac*, and inflicting a bad defeat on him, for although the Aisne can be crossed on pontoons, he had, until Soissons was captured, no certain bridge over the river.

Napoleon had repaired the bridge at La Ferté during the afternoon of March 3, and the troops filed over towards Chateau Thierry and Fismes. He had recognized Blucher's dilemma, and his object was to reach an Aisne crossing before the Army of Silesia and cut off its connection with Rheims. Had he been able to do this, Blucher, with Marmont and Mortier to the south of him, Napoleon to the east of him, and Soissons holding the only crossing of the Aisne, would have had to fight a battle under poor conditions. Indeed, Napoleon felt confident he had surrounded his enemy, and had him on more of a numerical equality than he could have hoped, added to his being in a bad strategic position.

Luckily for the Prussian general, the fresh allied corps had actually come up, and attacked Soissons. Old and weak

General Moreau, in command, did not defend the place with the required vigor, and capitulated on March 3, when he had been ordered to hold on "to extinction," and should have held on with more tenacity, especially as he could hear the sound of distant guns, and might have guessed that it was approaching succor; and when Blucher heard that his colleagues had captured Soissons, and the truth began to dawn upon him, he changed his direction for that place and here crossed the Aisne. Mortier and Marmont followed him up the Ourcq via Oulchy on Hartennes; the van of the main French army reached Rocourt.

Without a pontoon bridge it was hard to manœuvre, and the emperor, March 2, wrote to Joseph: "I have asked them to send me by day and night marches the bridge equipment that they announce to me as having left Paris to-day. It is my greatest need, for the army of Schwartzenberg would have been destroyed if I had had the bridge equipage at Méry; and this morning I should have destroyed Blucher if I had had one. I am preparing to carry the war into Lorraine, where I will rally all the troops that are in my places on the Meuse and the Rhine."

Next day Napoleon headed his forces on a parallel line through Fère en Tardenois towards Fismes and Braine on the Vesle. By March 4 Blucher, now at the head of one hundred thousand men, had taken position on the right bank of the Aisne ready to receive the French, who must cross above Soissons, which Mortier and Marmont were approaching. Napoleon reached Fismes.

It seems curious that in his own land, within, indeed, a couple of marches of his own capital, Napoleon should not have been able to ascertain what his lieutenants were doing; but from Fismes, March 4, Berthier was instructed to write to Soissons for news of Mortier and Marmont, who were to

push in that direction. The Cossacks held every road, and kept the enemy better informed than were the French.

When the emperor learned of the fall of Soissons, he was bitterly angered by its slight resistance. Instead of being able, with his whole force, to fight Blucher, cut off from his colleagues by an impassable river, he would now, in order to reach him, be obliged to fight for his own passage against a force threefold his own. He had struggled with his brave little soldiers for weeks through every kind of winter misery, to find his plans upset by the weakness of one man. Moreau was tried by court-martial, and "he is to be shot in the middle of the square of Grève; and let them give much ceremony in this execution. . . . Have a care that finally an example shall be made," wrote the emperor. As a fact, however, Moreau was not shot: whirling events stood him in good stead.

Although, on March 5, Napoleon wrote Joseph to announce in the *Moniteur* that "the enemy's army, of Blucher, Sacken, Yorck, Winzingerode and Bülow, was in retreat, and without the treason of the commander at Soissons, who gave up its gates, it had been lost," his plans were quite deranged. To go back to the Seine would leave the road to Paris open to Blucher, and yet he feared that Schwartzenberg, plucking up heart of hope, would again advance to a point too near the capital. But he determined to keep on operating against the left of the Army of Silesia, for yet there might be time to turn it, and force it back into the angle of the Aisne and Oise; and he selected Béry au Bac, where there was a strong bridge, as the main place to cross the Aisne. By this operation, if he could not accomplish his full aim, he would at least crowd the Army of Silesia towards the north and away from Rheims, which was the key-point of connection between the two allied armies. On March 5 the French started, a detachment was sent to occupy Rheims, and Marmont and Mortier made a strong

demonstration against Soissons, now defended by eight thousand Russians, to call Blucher's attention away from his left flank.


When he should have disposed of Blucher, Napoleon proposed to fall back via Chalons on Arcis. He wrote, March 4, to Clarke: "Blucher appears extremely embarrassed, and changes direction every instant. I am hoping that that will lead us to a result. My intention then is to carry the war towards my strong places, in manœuvring on the rear of Schwartzberg, who will be obliged to come to the right about when he sees his hospitals, his magazines, his parks and his lines of operation menaced by me and by Augereau." Had he but concentrated his available forces two months before, to meet what then scarce seemed a possibility, but had become so fatal an actuality, had he made it possible to leave Paris well equipped for its own defense; and had he then manœuvred against the allies as he was now doing, the invasion of France would have been short-lived. To say that he did not foresee a winter campaign is no answer; a Napoleon should have reckoned on this possibility. The soldier who admires the wonderful work in 1814 cannot always look at the case with the impartial eye of the student of history, who alone aspires to the good of the nations; and he could wish to see this splendid strategy, this alert and gallant tactics, carried out to its legitimate conclusion.

The emperor heard bad news from the Seine. After vacating Troyes, Schwartzberg had retired to Chaumont with his headquarters and reserve, the rest of the Army of the Sovereigns remaining on the right bank of the Aube, facing Macdonald at La Ferté and Oudinot at Bar. But the allied Guard and reserves had barely reached the Langres plateau, and Napoleon turned his back, when, learning February 26 of the fact, Schwartzberg faced about, and Macdonald and

Oudinot were in no wise able to impose on the allied commander. On February 27 Wittgenstein and Wrede took Bar-sur-Aube; next day Wurtemberg and Giulay captured La Ferté, and Schwartzberg began another slow advance; Macdonald retired March 2 with a combat at Bar-sur-Seine, and Oudinot March 3 with another on the Barse, and crossed the Seine at Troyes. Having vacated Troyes, the allies took possession of the town on March 4; Macdonald saw fit to fall back towards Nogent and Bray March 5, and next day to Meriot and Montereau, sending the train to Provins. A large allied detachment crossed the Seine on the 6th at Méry and Nogent, and Macdonald still retiring, took up a position opposite Provins, which Macdonald held. Schwartzberg and headquarters remained ten days at Troyes. During these manœuvres there had been constant interchanges between van and rear of the armies, and the losses had run up to nearly three thousand men on each side. Wittgenstein was wounded and Rajevski took his place; Schwartzberg was also slightly wounded.

Although the allies had ceased their retreat, Schwartzberg none the less felt the need of caution, for rumors were afloat that Napoleon would move towards Dijon to cut the communications of the allies; and having reached the favorable ground between the Seine and Yonne, none too inclined to over speed, and still hoping for an armistice, he put his troops into cantonments and so remained from March 6 until March 13. This renewed although hesitating threat to the capital demanded immediate attention; but Napoleon was playing a bluffing game, and watching how far Schwartzberg would adventure himself, under pain of having the French return and fall upon his rear.

Meanwhile the emperor encouraged his lieutenants on the Seine to renewed efforts.



Rheims-Laon-Soissons Country.

“Send one of your officers to Troyes to Macdonald and Oudinot,” he wrote, March 4, to Joseph, “to let them understand that I shall manœuvre by way of Vitry, St. Dizier and Joinville on the rear of the enemy, which will make him disappear, and will oblige him to leave the Seine, and go diligently to guard his rear. This movement will have the advantage of raising the blockade of my places, from which I shall withdraw numerous garrisons and large reinforcements.” Two days later he instructed Berthier to notify Macdonald of the success obtained, “that I hope he will

hold on at Troyes, which is a good position ; that in no case is he to quit the Seine, where he is to hold himself at least until the 12th ; that I am going to-day to Laon to drive out the corps of Bernadotte and Blucher, to whom we are doing much harm every day ; that I am having two strong divisions of troops leave my places in the Ardennes and Moselle ; that the enemy is not blockading them, and that I count on throwing myself on the right flank of their big army by way of St. Dizier and Joinville, at the time that Augereau will fall on their left flank by way of Bourg, Lons and Besançon ; . . . that the enemy is nowhere as strong as he says ; . . . that it was a *coup de main* on Paris that he attempted and failed."

All this of course came too late, for Macdonald and Oudinot had forfeited the line of the Seine, as indeed he might have anticipated.

Having garrisoned Soissons, Blucher with his six corps chose a position between the Aisne and the Lette, on a high plateau lying between the roads from Soissons and Béry-au-Bac to Laon, to see what the French would undertake ; and to await operations, Sacken and Winzingerode stood from Vailly to Béry-au-Bac with an outpost at Braine ; the rest of the army stood in second line in the Crouy-Chavignon country. Meanwhile Napoleon had to feel his way. Corbineau was sent to Rheims, which he took with its small allied garrison ; Grouchy was sent forward towards Braine ; Marmont and Mortier were ordered to recapture Soissons, but in this they quite failed, despite a stout attack March 5.

In taking Rheims, Napoleon had the double purpose of standing on Schwartzenberg's right flank, should he advance towards Paris ; or if he stayed in place, he could manœuvre around Blucher's left wing, and go on with his plan of throwing him into the angle of the Aisne and Oise. In order to do the latter he must, however, seize the cross-roads at Laon ; and this was a far from easy task from Fismes, where the army now largely lay. There was but one permanent bridge over

the Aisne that he could use, at Béry-au-Bac, although he purposed to throw truss bridges at Mazy and Pont Arcis ; and it was almost impossible to march over the country roads : only desperate operations could be conducted along any but the *chaussées*. Yet Napoleon must beat Blucher before Schwartzberg became dangerous ; and in the belief that he might trust to a weak conduct of the Army of the Sovereigns, he ordered Nansouty forward to Béry-au-Bac to seize the bridge, which he was fortunate enough to do by a surprise, and Friant and Meunier moved thither during the night of March 5-6. Marmont and Mortier had been ordered to follow Blucher, if they could capture Soissons and pass there ; otherwise they were to follow via Béry.

Despite the superficial appearance of success, it is evident that the emperor felt that matters were not moving his way. He wrote, March 6, to Joseph that he had just heard that Troyes has been evacuated. "One cannot be worse seconded than I am. I left in Troyes a fine army, fine cavalry, but it wanted soul." And again, referring to the superfluity of troops in the fortresses, he wrote, March 6, to Clarke : "For God's sake, recommend Maison to get into the field. Have reiterated orders also reach Durutte at Metz, Morand at Mainz and the different generals," to do the same thing.


The capture of Braine had led Blucher to believe that Napoleon was heading for Vailly : he did not know that, despite many orders, the French pontoons had not joined the army, and indeed it is doubtful whether even the light bridge equipment could have made the marches which the emperor had forced upon his young soldiers. To defend Vailly, then, Blucher posted his left in battle order at Ostel, Bray and Cerny, and his right from Filain to Ange Gardien, and it was this error that enabled the French to seize Béry-au-Bac and its permanent bridge. But this was not enough : Napoleon must

hold Laon, so as to become master of Blucher's line of retreat from Soissons towards Belgium; and to accomplish this, all arms were hurried forward; but Blucher, who stood ready to fight between the Aisne and Lette, saw through the manœuvre shortly after the French head of column crossed the Aisne, and started his train to Laon, while to cover it he threw forward a force along the plateau towards Craonne, so as to threaten the left of the French column. Napoleon also had foreseen Blucher's possible operation, and before the allied van reached Craonne, they found the French in possession of Bouconville and Craonnelle, and of all the outlets from the woods.

The plateau not being wide enough for Blucher to manœuvre with his whole army, he chose rather to retire on Laon; and to safely carry out this operation, he sent Bülow and Yorck to that town, threw out Winzingerode's infantry under Voronzov with Sacken in support to hold back the French from the plateau, while Winzingerode himself with ten thousand men and sixty guns was to move across the Lette, and during the night of March 6-7 push on Fétieux, so as to fall on the flank and rear of the French should they attack the plateau. Kleist and Langeron followed Winzingerode.

Noticing a considerable allied force on the plateau, Napoleon sent forward detachments to ascertain its size, and slight combats ensued the evening of March 6. The Russians on the plateau offered a smart defense, and the emperor at first deemed the whole army of the enemy to be present. The position on the plateau was strong: on the left the Lette with steep banks, on the right deep ravines, the plain below the plateau cut up by numberless small ditches, while the slope was excellent for artillery and had a good road in the rear for retreat. Voronzov stood in front in three lines, with artil-

lery protecting the possible approaches from Craonne, and cavalry on the right and left; Sacken was in the rear. Early March 7 Napoleon reconnoitred the allied position from an adjoining height: to attack the position in front seemed impossible, and he determined to assault it from the valley of the Lette. Ney was selected for this purpose, and when Victor and Mortier, who were still distant, with Grouchy and



Battle of Craonne.

Nansouty, should arrive, they were to move up from the Foulon valley on the other side. Meanwhile, to gain time, the emperor would cannonade the allied position from the end of the plateau near Craonne. It was understood that Ney was to wait for Victor and Mortier; but again, as at Bautzen, there was some misunderstanding of orders, and Ney attacked Ailles too early. Although the ground covered Ney's advance, when he arrived in touch with the Russians, he was

far too weak. Luckily, Victor's van came up in time to save Ney from failure; he was thrown in by way of Heurlebise, and went forward in good style; but his being shortly wounded upset the emperor's calculations.

Blucher had harbored the idea of personally commanding a general battle at this point, and was waiting for Winzingerode to reach Fetieux; but this officer got into difficulties during the night over the country roads, and was far from his objective. Kleist was then during the forenoon hurried up towards Fetieux, Sacken was given command of the fighting on the plateau, and Blucher started out personally to conduct the operation around the French right.

Despite his wound, Victor's attack had attracted the attention of Voronzov to such a degree as to enable Ney, in the cover of the wooded slopes, to reassemble his two divisions of the Young Guard, which had failed in their first assault, and once more to attack the flank of the Russians. Nansouty also ascended the plateau from Vassogne to occupy the right of the Russians, but he was without artillery and suffered considerable losses. Anxious because no real progress was made, Napoleon put Grouchy with all his cavalry in to help Ney, but Grouchy too was wounded and his forces neutralized. Ney sent many messages back to the emperor that he could not hold himself unless supported, and Mortier and Charpentier were sent in through Heurlebise; but Voronzov at this moment himself undertook the offensive, drove back the columns which were attacking his left, and the French were thrown down the slope. It looked like a Russian victory, but having ascertained that his columns, which were to turn the French right, could not be got up in time, Blucher sent Sacken word to withdraw from the plateau and move back on Laon, which he shortly proceeded to do.

Napoleon's eye was quick, and perceiving that the enemy

was retiring, he sent forward all available troops to again seize the initiative. The advance was received by a murderous fire of the Russian artillery, but night was falling, Sacken had given Voronzov orders to retire, and the French shortly drove what was left of the allies back from the plateau.


For their numbers the Russians had suffered severely, there being over three thousand killed and wounded, including almost all their general officers; the French lost probably more, with several generals, men whom the emperor sadly needed.

The Russians retired towards the Soissons-Laon road, followed by Napoleon to the line Filain-Ostel, in their front, and Blucher slowly fell back to Laon. The French had won the day, but the army was suffering terribly by its constant movements. The emperor wrote, March 8, to Joseph: "Yesterday, the 7th, I beat Winzingerode, Langeron, Voronzov, assembled with the débris of Sacken. I took two thousand prisoners from them, some guns, and pushed them from Craonne to Ange Gardien. This battle was glorious. Victor and Grouchy were wounded. I had seven or eight hundred men killed or wounded; the loss of the enemy was five or six thousand men."

Blucher had gained his quiet retreat to Laon. "The battle of Craonne," says Clausewitz, "was a successful and brilliant rearguard fight."

During this battle Napoleon heard of the ill issue of the negotiations of Chatillon, the allied ultimatum being rejected by his orders to Caulaincourt. He could not see that these Pyrrhic victories of his really counted for nothing; that the event must go against him; and he looked upon the offer of the allies as trifling with a situation of which he still believed he held the key. Ever since the Dresden days, Napoleon had been playing at the game of war with the true gambler's

instinct; and he was now risking all on the Frankfort basis of peace. He was no longer conducting his operations on scientific principles. He was struggling with approaching certain overthrow, and he would not recognize that what he could now accomplish was merely a delay of the end which was sure




Battle of Laon.

to come. All that he now did, in fact, was from restless activity, rather than from sound military policy which could have a lasting effect. Like the man at the gaming-table, he continued to bluff a stronger hand than his own, and meanwhile strove for some temporary advantage which should lead the opponent to throw up his hand.

During the night of March 7-8 Blucher's columns were on the march to Laon. The garrison of Soissons evacuated the town, the French occupied it, and Ney, with Mortier and Charpentier, broke up during the forenoon of March 8 along the Soissons road, while Marmont and Arrighi moved along the road from Béry north. When Blucher assembled his forces at Laon, he had nearly one hundred thousand men, and

on March 8 made ready to receive battle. Napoleon did not believe that the entire Army of Silesia with its reinforcements was there, and marched boldly forward with his thirty-five thousand men, as he never would have undertaken to do in his better days. He no longer counted the numbers of the enemy; prudence, even the instinct of self-preservation, had been quite discarded. If he did not attack Blucher, Blucher would probably attack him, and for the moment the victory of Craonne lent the army its old fervor.

Napoleon had failed to take the army of Silesia unawares: he must now, he thought, attack it in front of Laon, and unless he could accomplish something of marked value, his whole operation would be fruitless. Ney was hurried forward with all the cavalry to reach the place before Blucher should be ready, and if possible to throw the moving troops into confusion; but at Etouville he ran across some Russian temporary defenses held by Chernishev across a defile between two villages and small marshes. This position Ney attacked, but was repeatedly thrown back, and the hope of getting possession of Laon without a battle was wrecked. Still, Napoleon would not change his plan. Some of the local authorities offered to lead troops by night over by-paths so as to take the enemy in



Prussian Train Officer.

flank, and believing in night attacks when the population was in his favor, a detachment of the Old Guard broke up at ten o'clock to reach Chivi in rear of the defile by a *détour*. At one o'clock this detachment fell upon the slumbering Russian right, and at the same moment Ney rushed the defile

at the point of the bayonet; the position was captured and the enemy fled towards Laon. The surprise of Chernishev's troops was complete, and their rapid flight led the French to believe that they might seize the heights of Laon out of hand. This they essayed, but batteries had been set up across the road at the foot of the hill, and the darkness prevented any community of action. The French fell back, and by daylight Blucher's entire force was in line about Laon, ready for battle. Bülow's corps was in the town and along the slopes, and at their foot plenty of artillery; Langeron, Sacken and Winzingerode formed the right flank of the army between Thierret and Neuville, the reserve in the rear; Kleist and Yorck were the left wing in two lines between Athies and Vaux. In front of the army strong outposts occupied Clacy, Semilly, Ardon and Athies, which four villages were like bastioned outworks.

On reconnoitring, Napoleon's attention was first attracted by the suburb of Vaux, at the northwesterly end of the Laon hill and at its foot, for through it ran the road from Rheims to Belgium. To Marmont was committed the task to make Blucher feel uncertain about this place and his communications by advancing smartly from Corbeny; and under cover of this diversion Napoleon would assault Laon. But Marmont was much belated. Blucher was ready, and occasional guns showed that he only awaited the lifting of the fog to open the battle. The emperor could not allow him the offensive, and the fog kept his movements covered. Impatient at the delay, and hoping every moment that Marmont would appear, Boyer was sent forward to take Semilly, and part of Mortier to attack Ardon, while the main French force drew up between Leully and Clacy, Mortier on the right, Ney on the left, Nansouty in reserve. After a sharp struggle these villages fell into the hands of the French, the allies only

answering by heavy artillery fire. This lasted until 10 A. M., when the fog began to rise, and Blucher, being able to see in front of him, undertook the offensive. Winzingerode was sent against Clacy, a convenient place from which to threaten the French left, and Cossacks were sent out towards Mons beyond it. In this vicinity the battle wavered to and fro for some time, the villages being taken and lost again and again, neither leader being willing to attempt anything decisive. Blucher had an idea that the attack on his right was only a demonstration, and that the main attack would come along the road from Béry; Napoleon, on the contrary, was holding back his forces until Marmont should impress just this idea of great strength upon his opponent. The emperor had sent towards Marmont several staff officers and couriers, all of whom were captured or lost their way, the Cossacks roving over the whole country; but one of the messages which reached Blucher showed him what the French leader's intention really was, and to meet this he prepared to attack Marmont before his arrival, and neutralize him for the day. Napoleon held off till nearly 4 P. M.; he could then wait no longer, as he heard nothing from Marmont, not even a gun; his last troops in the left wing were coming up, and he ordered a general attack, so as to secure the villages for the night. Charpentier, Boyer, Curial and Friant pressed in on Clacy and took it. Mons was also taken, but Ardon could not be captured, Poret's division being almost destroyed by Bülow. Night came on and the battle ended.

From soon after midday until four or five o'clock Marmont, who had been cleverly held back by the allied cavalry outposts, had fought his way forward to near Athies, taking position across the road upon a slight height. His troops were so tired that little could be attempted during the evening hours; yet although held back by the superior allied artillery,

Athies was attacked and the town set afire, the Prussians withdrew, the French marched in, and Marmont deemed his day's work finished. As he had had no word from the emperor, he sent a cavalry party with some guns off to the left to seek his chief and get orders. The fighting ended, and the French troops bivouacked in the neighboring villages.

This was the moment which energetic Blucher had chosen for executing his plan against Marmont. Langeron and Sacken, with all the Russian mounted artillery and a good deal of horse, were drawn from the allied right to reinforce Yorck and Kleist, and these forces, in close column and without firing a shot, were to move forward upon Marmont, while his right was turned by Prussian cavalry.

With little idea of what was in store for them, Marmont's men were quietly resting from their unusual exertions, when out of the dark the attack fell upon them. Prince William captured Athies, the cavalry under Ziethen turned their right. The French raw troops fell into panic; the officers did what they could, but a *saûve qui peut* was started, and the corps retired in considerable confusion. Marmont made every effort to arrest the flight, but nothing could really be accomplished until Fetioux was reached. Not only his field artillery but his reserve park was taken; few guns escaped. Three thousand French were captured, the enemy's losses being barely three hundred men.

Still in doubt as to Marmont's position or state, the emperor, although he must have heard the firing, about midnight issued orders for next day. Charpentier and Boyer, sustained by Ney, Friant, some cavalry and the reserve, were to break up at six o'clock from Clacy and push the allied right back to Neuville; Marmont was to keep the Silesian army off the road from Laon to Méry; Mortier in the centre was to take place behind Ardon and when necessary sustain the

general attack, which in effect was to turn Laon, by both right and left, and to contain it along the road to Soissons. This was a desperate matter to undertake with an army of thirty thousand men against thrice the number of good troops well posted in their front. But Napoleon was desperate.

The disaster of Marmont on the evening before, which it adds much to the credit of the Cossacks that Napoleon did not, though in his own country, yet know, rendered his orders futile; and after issuing them, he got the news from some of the fleeing troops, who, as runaways will do, had dispersed in all directions. Seemingly impossible, the disaster soon proved true, and he now saw that in order to accomplish what he had, Blucher must have disgarnished his centre and right; and from this he drew the conclusion that he had much less in his front than was actually the case.

Upon this slender assumption the emperor began the battle anew March 9. Blucher had felt certain that, after the disaster to Marmont, Napoleon would withdraw to Soissons; and in this view he had ordered Yorck and Kleist to follow Marmont to Béry-au-Bac, and St. Priest, who, coming up from the Meuse had surprised Rheims, was to take him in rear. Langeron and Sacken were to move down by way of Bruyères to the Lette, so as from there to act as opportunity offered on the French flank or rear. Winzingerode and Bülow meanwhile, in front of and in Laon, were to watch the emperor's movements, and so soon as he withdrew, to follow hard upon. The projected pursuit along the Rheims road had already been arrested during the night by a diversion by Fabvier, who had been moving on Ardon, and, hearing a tremendous firing on the Rheims road, moved back and threw himself on the flank of the pursuing Prussians. He was joined by some of the Marmont runaways, and this movement, aided by the dark-

ness, stopped the Prussians at a position not far from Aipples. At daylight, however, they continued their forward movement in pursuit.

Blucher was astonished that Napoleon did not show signs of moving to the rear. He could see from the walls of the town a small body, not exceeding twenty thousand men, surrounded by a swamp, with a defile in the rear, with sixty thousand Prussians off on their right, starting in to attack a strong place defended by forty thousand men. This singular sight, which he could understand only to mean something hidden, made the old marshal pause, and he sent orders to Langeron, Sacken, Yorck and Kleist to stop wherever they were, and to leave pursuing Marmont to the cavalry. Winzingerode at Clacy was ordered not to open the fight, but he had already done so before the order reached him.

The French during the night had arranged their lines well. Charpentier at Clacy held back his fire until the Russian battalions were at point-blank range, when he opened on them, and drove them back into the woods. By accident, Ney at Mons, supposing that the Russians were in Clacy, opened fire on the French troops which held the town, with regrettable loss. Blucher withdrew Sacken and Langeron to Neuville, and called the other corps back to the position of the day before. The whole morning was taken up by more or less severe fighting between Mons, Clacy and Semilly: the Russians were thrown back five times by Charpentier, yet nothing decisive was accomplished. About 2 P. M. Napoleon thought he perceived a movement of the Prussians on the heights of Laon, indicating that Blucher was evacuating the town, and he threw upon it Curial and Meunier; but these divisions, though they reached the first slopes of the hill, were met by such heavy artillery fire, followed by a bayonet attack, that they were fain to retire.

Still, Napoleon would not withdraw from Blucher's front. Indeed, he believed he might draw down upon him the whole Army of Silesia if he showed weakness. He sent Drouot and Belliard to see whether an attack could be made upon the enemy's left between Cerny and Neuville; but these officers brought back word that it was impossible, and Napoleon determined to retire to Soissons. Drawing up his artillery skillfully and opening with it, the army passed the defile at Etouville, and by midnight was well on the way to Soissons. Blucher undertook nothing. This looks like lack of enterprise; but there was no general of the day who willingly met this great soldier on the battlefield. Every one bore marks of his wonderful grand-tactics. Both Blucher and Schwartzenberg were wise in playing the waiting game: what they may have lost in access of reputation as fighting generals, they more than won in solid results.

Not counting Marmont, the French losses were nearly four thousand men in the battle of Laon; Blucher lost less. The movement from Troyes to Laon with its battles had cost Napoleon twelve thousand men, whom he could ill spare.

In the march on Laon there was no necessity for Napoleon to attack the Russians at Craonne, suggests Clausewitz, when he could have sent troops across the river to take them in reverse. This was, he thinks, a mistake, but it was a slight one; an undeniable error was in calculating to fight the battle of Laon in two separate bodies, and of this Napoleon ought not to have been guilty.

That Blucher did not pursue may have been due to the fact that under his seventy-two years the old commander was almost broken down by his winter campaign, had been sick for two or three days, and on the second day's fight at Laon was not able to keep in the saddle. His chief of staff, Gneisenau, carried forward his orders; but he did not yet feel

warranted in undertaking a work which the leader's eye had not seen ; and principally for this reason also the Army of Silesia remained nine days in place.

The Correspondence contains little about the battle of Laon.

The emperor wrote, March 10, to Joseph : "The position of Laon being extremely favorable" (for the enemy), "I was content yesterday to observe and reconnoitre him. This army is more dangerous than Schwartzberg's. Nevertheless, I shall draw near Soissons so as to be nearer Paris. . . . Marmont, who was marching from Béry-au-Bac on Laon, arrived near the town. He had constantly pushed back the enemy, but at night, as he was taking position, there was a sudden rush of the enemy, which put his infantry into disorder. The soldiers lost their heads, and he was obliged to fall back several leagues. . . . This is only an accident of war, but very annoying at a moment when I need good luck. This has determined me not to attack to-day, for I had already made my dispositions vigorously to engage the enemy whatever his superiority in numbers." He then orders thirty thousand men to be raised "in all that population which has taken refuge in Paris, and among all the workmen who are without work. This levy should be made under the title of Levy in Mass of the National Guards. Seeing that you have muskets, this ought to be easy." Next day he wrote to Joseph : "I reconnoitred the position of the enemy at Laon. It was too strong to be attacked without great losses. I then decided to return to Soissons. It is probable that the enemy would have evacuated Laon, for fear of being attacked there, but for the unfortunate disaster of Marmont, who behaved like a sub-lieutenant. . . . The Young Guard melts like snow, the Old Guard holds together. My horse Guard also melts. It is indispensable that Ornano should take all measures to remount all the dragoons and chasseurs, and first of all the old soldiers."

Poor Marmont had previously come in for a scoring in a letter to Clarke, March 4 : "You send me letters of Marmont which tell nothing. The excessive vanity of this marshal is to be seen in all his letters. He is always misunderstood by everybody. It is he who has done everything, counseled everything. It is annoying that, with some talent, he is unable to disembarass himself of this folly, or at least so to maintain himself that it should rarely escape him."

There was no change of position at Soissons on March 12; but hearing at eventide that St. Priest had surprised and taken Rheims, Napoleon, who here received some reinforcements, determined to recapture this place, the point of communication between the two allied armies. Some small success was demanded to counteract the failure at Laon. Mortier was left to hold Soissons, Ney was started for Fismes that evening, the emperor following with the Old Guard soon after midnight, and Marmont was ordered to head for Rheims early the 13th, while a detachment held the Béry bridge. Rheims was reached about four o'clock. St. Priest and Jagov stood in front of the town on the Fismes road. Attacking them smartly, Napoleon drove their forces across the Vesle; St. Priest was mortally wounded, and the army fell into disorder. Napoleon forced the Vesle. The resistance of the allied rearguard was spirited enough to hold the place till midnight; but the French superiority told, the enemy vacated the city, and retired in disorder. The rearguard dispersed. The enemy lost eleven guns, twenty-five hundred prisoners and over two thousand killed and wounded. The French lost one thousand in all. This operation was full of the old Bonaparte *élan*; but in view of all the circumstances, it was but one more bout in the duel, in which the weaker was determined to die game. In Rheims Napoleon received news of Schwartzberg's probable advance towards Paris.

To those who know the Frenchman's national dress, it will be interesting to learn that on March 5 it was ordered that the National Guard should be uniformed in the Gallic blue blouses, with helmets and cartridge-boxes in black leather.

"By this means every workman, every bourgeois, puts on his blouse and is at once in uniform. . . . This dress seems to me so convenient that perhaps some day I shall adopt it for the troops of the line." This was simpler than khaki.

On March 14 Napoleon wrote Clarke : "The bridge equipage that you have sent me is very precious, but it is heavy, and for little rivers like the Aisne, the Oise and the Marne, it is necessary to make one as light as possible. Little boats are needed, made partly with heavy water-tight canvas."

The emperor gave scant grace to war correspondents. On February 26 he wrote Berthier : "An individual has been sent by the minister of police to write up the campaign. Send him back to Paris. Write to the minister that I am surprised that he should send out agents without my permission, that I have need of other things than men to write up the events of the campaign, and that he could better employ his money than in follies such as this."

On March 12 he wrote Joseph, reproaching him for suggesting to the empress to solicit her father's protection : "I do not want to be protected by my wife ; that idea would spoil her and make us quarrel. . . . The Emperor of Austria can do nothing because he is feeble, and led by Metternich, who is bought by England. That is the secret of everything."



French Grenadier.

LXIX.

ARCIS-SUR-AUBE. MARCH 14 TO APRIL 11, 1814.

DURING the Laon campaign Macdonald had been gradually forced back, and on Napoleon's marching south, made ready to join him. Napoleon reached Epernay the 17th and headed for Arcis. Alexander had determined to stop the weak manœuvring and advance in one body on Paris, and Blucher was ordered in to the main army, while Schwartzberg was to fight if attacked. Napoleon did not believe the allies would stand, but that his appearance would drive them back. Instead of waiting for Macdonald and Oudinot to join him at Arcis, on March 20 he fought the enemy in front of the town in the belief that Schwartzberg was protecting his retreat. Next day, after careless reconnoitring, he made ready to attack afresh, and suddenly found that with a mere handful of men he was running against the whole allied army. The situation was desperate, but he cleverly withdrew across the Aube. Thereupon he opened a manœuvre towards his fortresses, to draw in the garrisons and move upon the enemy's communications, and ordered in Mortier and Marmont, believing that the allies would retire to the Rhine. But this was not to be. In moving down towards Schwartzberg, Blucher cut Marmont and Mortier off from Napoleon; and both allied armies marched towards Paris, defeating these marshals in several minor engagements, and, as they had a line of retreat through Belgium, entirely disregarding Napoleon's manœuvre. Napoleon awoke to the situation only March 27, when he found that Marmont and Mortier alone were between the allies and Paris, while the enemy was three marches ahead of him. He at once followed. Marmont and Mortier did their best to protect the capital, upon which the allied armies deliberately marched; but when Napoleon reached Fontainebleau, he found that Paris had capitulated March 30. Had the marshals of the army stood by him, he would still have endeavored to fight the enemy, but his credit was gone, no one now listened to him, and on April 4, and later April 11, he abdicated.

DURING March 14 Napoleon remained in Rheims. Marmont on the 11th and 12th was at Fismes, and on the 13th moved towards the emperor. Along the Seine and Aube things remained quiet. Schwartzberg, still in the Troyes-

Méry country, with Barclay in Chaumont, his right at Pont-sur-Seine, his left at Sens, and detachments out beyond the Seine, which were faced by Macdonald and Oudinot in front of Provins, between Nogent and Montereau, having heard on the 13th the result of the battle of Laon, collected his forces to advance on his opponent; but the news of Napoleon's being in Rheims again held him back; he called in Barclay and merely put over Wrede and Wittgenstein at Pont-sur-Seine, and until March 17 there was small change. Napoleon kept in mind his purpose of operating towards his fortresses and on the rear of the allies, writing from Rheims, March 16, to Berthier: "Order Ney to make a proclamation to the inhabitants of Lorraine, Alsatia and the Vosges. Let him speak of our successes, that the moment will soon arrive when I shall move towards them. Let them hold themselves in readiness. Let them ring the tocsin as soon as the guns tell them of our approach. Let them fall on the rear of the enemy, and show themselves worthy of what they have always been." The emperor was not only laboring under the delusion that he had got the allies on the run, but he was undertaking too much. He not only seriously needed to rest his young soldiers, wearied by poor food and cross-country marches, before again advancing on the Army of the Sovereigns, though this seemed about to renew operations; but he also needed reinforcements. Troops had to be got from whatever source, for the several levies furnished too few, and the daily losses were great. On March 15 he wrote to Clarke: "I am told that there are still many troops disseminated. They assure me there are six hundred men of the line at Moulins. What are they doing there? The Bureau of Movement should note all these detachments and pick them up." And on March 15 to Marmont: "Try to recruit some men in the villages. . . . Many peasants who

have been ruined ask nothing better to-day than to serve. . . . Anyhow, try."

On March 17 Macdonald, whose left was attacked by Wittgenstein, fell back to Maison Rouge, half-way to Nangis, and Schwartzberg spread out his forces so as to hold Troyes, Méry and Nogent on the Seine, and Arcis and Lesmont on the Aube, in the effort both to reach out towards Paris, and to protect himself from a turning operation by the emperor. Viewed critically, this delay on the part of Schwartzberg looks, as did Blucher's conduct, wanting in true military spirit; but notwithstanding its weak appearance, it was founded on political and strategic wisdom. The allied troops were kept in good condition, while Napoleon's army was wasting its strength like a wild animal dashing itself against the bars of its cage; and not only, despite Napoleon's insistence on the Frankfort basis, was there still some chance left of peace at Chatillon, but other aspects of the political situation dominated the allied headquarters; for although all were acting together against him they deemed the arch disturber of the peace of Europe, there were many points of difference between the allied monarchs themselves yet to be settled with regard to the future. It was not merely a question of curbing France and of taking away what they looked on as her ill-gotten gains, but the more serious one of how to divide the spoils. And the latter was not only hard to settle, but the question bred a tendency towards delay and consequent shiftless conduct of the campaign, which had not been so apparent in the earlier stages of allied work at Dresden and at Leipsic. Moreover, the Emperor of Austria had at times held back out of interest for his daughter.

After the battle of Laon, although matters had not gone his way, Napoleon rightly gauged the probability of Blucher's remaining quiet for some days; and much as he needed rein-

forcements, he deemed the time auspicious to try once more on Schwartzenberg the scheme which had succeeded so well before. He believed the enemy would spread over much territory and could be attacked in detail, and wrote, March 17, to Berthier to instruct Marmont "that he is to make all the movements possible with his cavalry to impose on Blucher and gain time. That if Blucher passes the Aisne, he is to dispute the ground and cover the road to Paris. That it is probable that my movements will oblige the enemy to recross the Seine, which will stop Blucher, and permit me to dispose of Macdonald, whom I will then send him. . . . Let him prepare everything needed to destroy the bridge at Béry-au-Bac in case anything happens." Then calling Mortier in to Rheims, and heading Ney on Chalons, he left for the Seine.

In a Note dictated at Rheims March 17, Napoleon has left a clear and detailed résumé of the several operations he could undertake, worked out with the hours' march each would require. The first was to move to Arcis, cross the Aube and be on the march towards Méry or Troyes on the 20th. Learning Napoleon's presence in Fère Champenoise the night of the 19th, the enemy would speedily fall back. Ney would reach Arcis at the same time; having got his pontoon bridge, Napoleon would cross where he pleased, and it was probable that this, the boldest of the plans, would much disconcert the enemy. The second plan would be to march via Sezanne to Provins. But by this route the roads were bad, though from Sezanne Meaux could be reached if desired, in lieu of Provins. The third plan would be to march directly on Meaux by the post-road. One could reach that place the 20th, and, should he have advanced so far, attack the enemy the 21st. The first plan carried with it a strong moral effect, but its results could not be foretold. The second would cut the enemy off from Paris by the right bank of the Seine; but the march on the

country cross-roads would unnecessarily fatigue the troops. The third was the safest because it most directly protected Paris; but in case it led to battle, it would have been preceded by no moral gain. Of these three plans the emperor chose the most enterprising, as liable to produce a decided effect on the Army of the Sovereigns.

It is interesting to gauge the manner of this great man, now fighting for existence against all Europe, by reading his own words:—

“Rheims, March 17, Note dictated by Napoleon: ‘There are three courses to take. The first is to go to Arcis-sur-Aube, thirteen leagues. One would be there to-morrow, 18th. One can cross the Aube the 19th, and be in the night of 19th–20th at Méry or at Troyes. It is probable that the enemy will know, day after to-morrow, that I pass the night to-morrow at Fère Champenoise. From this moment this diversion will have been made . . . in the day of the 19th. Ney will be at Arcis-sur-Aube at the same time as I shall; we will pass the Aube, and the 20th we will be at Troyes. . . . I believe the headquarters” (of the enemy) “are at Troyes. This project is the most daring, the results are incalculable.”

“Second. To move on Sezanne, and from Sezanne to Provins. To begin with, these are the worst roads. From here to Sezanne are nine leagues, from Sezanne to Provins nine leagues. . . . The cavalry could be to-morrow, 18th, at Sezanne, if there is no cavalry of the enemy. It would be obliged to wait for the artillery. On the 19th Ney could not be there, and would be obliged to come through this place. From Sezanne to Meaux, by way of Coulommiers and La Ferté Gaucher, fifteen leagues. Once at Sezanne, one could go to Meaux, one could reach it in two good marching days. There are, therefore, from here to Meaux, by way of Sezanne, twenty-four leagues. One would be master also to go there from here, through Fère Champenoise, seven leagues, from Fère Champenoise to Sezanne, four leagues, from Sezanne to Meaux, fifteen leagues. There would be from here to Meaux, passing through Fère Champenoise, twenty-seven leagues instead of twenty-four, that is, three leagues more.

“Third. Finally, the third project would be to go straight on Meaux by the high road. From here to Meaux there are twenty-one leagues; we could be there early the 20th . . . and attack the enemy the 21st.

“Each of these three projects has its character; the first is the most daring, gives great fright to the enemy and yields unexpected results. The second is an inconvenient move over cross-roads, but after all it cuts the enemy on the right bank of the Seine. The third is the surest because it leads by an air line on Paris; but it is also the one which, having no moral influence, leaves everything open to the chances of a great battle. Now, if the enemy has sixty thousand or seventy thousand men, this battle would be a furious chance, instead of which, by marching on Troyes, and reaching the enemy’s rear while Macdonald, marching in retreat, should dispute all the positions, there may be very great chances. NAPOLEON.”

In accordance with his choice, Napoleon reached Epernay March 17, purposing to start early next day and get to Arcis at noon the 19th, thence turning on Méry or Troyes, as might seem most expedient, and fall on the allied rear. He wrote, March 17, to Clarke: “Marmont is at Béry-au-Bac, Mortier at Rheims and Charpentier at Soissons. . . . Blucher, who has suffered much, cannot probably put himself in march for two days, and as then he will have the Aisne to cross, Marmont and Mortier will be there to dispute the ground. The movement that I am going to make ought to occasion great embarrassment in the rear of the enemy, and disquiet the headquarters, if it has remained in Troyes.” And to Joseph he wrote: “From to-morrow at ten in the evening the effect of my dispositions will be felt. For the enemy will know my movement, and from that moment it will influence all his operations.”

The manœuvre was a beautiful one; but it was founded on the belief that the allies must retire if their communications were threatened — and this belief proved unsound.

After thus leaving nearly twenty thousand men to hold head against a renewed march of Blucher on Paris, Napoleon started, even after a slight reinforcement had reached him, with what, considering the task, was a mere handful. Some five thousand foot and one thousand horse under Ney, the

cavalry of the Guard with but thirty-five hundred sabres under Sébastiani, Friant's division, and an extra division of cavalry, with some sappers and pontoons, made up what has been stated at ten thousand foot and six thousand horse. It did not exceed twenty thousand men. This seems a small command for a leader who had entered Russia with half a million men; but he was going towards Macdonald, and no one can doubt the boldness with which the force would be handled.

From Fère Champenoise, on the 18th, Napoleon drove a small party of Cossacks, and pushed a reconnoissance of light horse out towards Plancy, while Ney got to Sommesous. On hearing of Napoleon's oncoming, Schwarzenberg, fearing to be attacked in flank by the French, and unaware of how small a force



Austrian Infantryman.

Napoleon really had, drew in his left-wing corps from their cantonments and headed them back to Troyes, leaving those of the right wing on the Aube, in the Arcis-Lesmont country. The sovereigns were ready to retire, if need be, to protect their communications, or to fight for them if forced. On March 18 Wurtemberg, Wittgenstein and Giulay were at Troyes, Barclay at Brienne, Wrede at Pougny. Schwarzenberg set out to occupy Arcis-sur-Aube; but Napoleon anticipated him. When the latter reached Plancy, there were none but Cossacks in the place; Ney reconnoitred out towards Arcis but found no enemy, and then kept on to Plancy. From

here to Méry nothing was met, and Napoleon hurried forward from Méry to reach the road to Nogent, hoping to cut off some allied troops; but Schwartzenberg having got everything out of the way, only a belated pontoon equipment was captured. Macdonald echeloned his corps forward to join his master near Villenauxe, but finding his effort fruitless, and without waiting to join hands, the emperor moved back to and up the Aube on the right bank, hoping still to be able to attack the allies in flank, and take advantage of the disorder this might produce.

The Emperor Alexander had become weary of the negative rôle which the huge army, in which he was so large a factor, had been playing, partly from political reasons which he could understand, but largely also from strategic irresolution which he could not approve. It seemed to him humiliating that the allied sovereigns should so constantly retire before a handful of French raw levies, when a bold push ought quickly to win the capital; and accordingly, when the Chatillon terms were refused, Alexander demanded of the army council that a junction be made with Blucher, and that both armies march on Paris and there dictate peace. It was this vigorous method of thought on the part of the czar which brought the Army of the Sovereigns to the point of fighting.

Schwartzenberg guarded his flank well. Wrede had been in Arcis-sur-Aube, being later withdrawn to Pougy; and as the allied commander was now ordered to fight for his position, he stopped the retreat of his several corps, and watched what the emperor might do. His army stood between Troyes and Lesmont, facing towards Arcis and Plancy, and under fresh instructions Wrede on the right moved down the Aube, the left wing, Wurtemberg and Giulay, advanced on the road to Premierfait, with Rajevski with the Guard and reserve in the centre marching over country roads, in the same direction.

Joseph represented the emperor in Paris; and to him Napoleon, who, though busy with his preparations to attack the Army of the Sovereigns, still kept half his thoughts on the capital, and never forgot the possible danger of its capture, wrote, March 16:—

“My Brother, . . . you are in no case to permit the empress and the King of Rome to fall into the hands of the enemy. I am going to manœuvre so that possibly you might be several days without news from me. If the enemy should advance on Paris with such forces that all resistance becomes impossible, send in the direction of the Loire the regent, my son, the grand dignitaries, the ministers, the officers of the Senate, the president of the Council of State, the grand officers of the crown . . . and the treasury. Do not leave my son, and remember that I should prefer to know him in the Seine than in the hands of the enemies of France. The lot of Astyanax, prisoner of the Greeks, has always seemed to me the most unfortunate in history.”

The Senate and the high functionaries were the men most apt to be dangerous to the empire; it was they who proved to be Napoleon's worst enemies, and they would have been safer away from Paris. Remaining there, they kept up the semblance of a government with which the enemy could treat.

In addition to the reinforcements he had received at Rheims, six thousand men were coming on under Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and with these and Macdonald's forces Napoleon was ready to march through Brienne and towards his Lorraine fortresses. He believed, from his standpoint with some justice and yet erroneously, that the Army of the Sovereigns was falling back before him. From Plancy, March 20, he wrote to Joseph:—

“The Emperor Alexander had come the 18th to Arcis, but stayed there only an hour. We were almost face to face. . . . The enemy's army, which had passed the Seine at Pont and Nogent, having learned that the emperor, master of Rheims and Chalons, was marching on its rear, com-

menced its retreat the 17th, and the 19th had taken up the bridges thrown at Pont, Nogent and Arcis-sur-Aube. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia were with the column, which from Arcis was marching on Villenauxe. Little was wanting that that column had been cut off." And to Clarke: "My movement had succeeded perfectly. As soon as the enemy knew that I was in Chalons, he started his retreat. He beat in retreat the whole day of the 17th and the day of the 18th. . . . I have ordered Marmont and Mortier, whom I have left at Rheims and in front of it, to fall back on Chalons or on Epernay, if Blucher takes the offensive again, which to-day would seem absurd to me."

From the emperor's standpoint of having seen the enemy, in victory and defeat alike, retire from in front of his lesser but more active army, the above assumption — although in part set down for effect on Paris — was not an unfair one to make. It accorded with the true soldier's instinct; but so far from accurate was it all, that Schwartzenberg, under the spur of Alexander, was making preparations to attack the French army if it crossed the Aube.

Had Napoleon suspected that his opponent would fight him, he would have waited for Macdonald and the other reinforcements; as it was, he forged ahead, so as to keep the allies on the run. He got back to Plancy the evening of March 19, and early next morning sent Sébastiani and the cavalry of the Guard on Arcis, along the left bank, and along the right bank Ney; by ten the place was reached by the van, Napoleon and the Old Guard in the rear.

Sébastieni and Ney at once occupied Arcis, put it in position of defense, and began to repair the bridge which the Bavarians had partly destroyed. The inhabitants reported that the allies were scarce three hours distant, and this news was sent to the emperor. Ney with Janssen's division stood astride the road from Brienne, with Boyer in reserve, Sébastiani across the Troyes road; part of the troops at Méry had been left behind, and Letort alone came along with his dra-


goons. When Napoleon reached Arcis at one o'clock, both marshals insisted that the enemy was near at hand, but the emperor could not believe that deliberate Schwartzberg had really assumed the offensive: he looked on Arcis as a position from which to observe the enemy and probably pursue him.

Instead of riding out himself to see, if he would not trust his oldest lieutenants, Napoleon sent a staff officer, whose examination and report were crude and partial. As soon as the staff officer had made his report, Sébastiani, though unconvinced, rejoined his command; but no sooner had he reached it than he came back on the gallop with the news that the enemy was already drawn up in columns of attack.

This was true. Wrede had informed Schwartzberg that only cavalry was at Arcis, and the latter had concluded that Napoleon was about to move back up the Seine on Troyes, and had therefore sent Wurtemberg forward on Plancy to attack whatever he found in his way, and Wrede to Arcis. The former was moving in two columns along the two roads from Troyes to Plancy and to Arcis, with cavalry connecting him with Wrede, who was advancing downstream on Arcis.

About two o'clock, as the French infantry was gradually coming up, Wrede began his movement against Arcis. The fight opened by an attack of Kaiserov's cavalry, connecting the two armies, on Colbert, whom he drove back, and even threw Excelmans, in his rear, into confusion. Kaiserov was supported by Wrede, who pushed a column forward to take the village of Torcy, and attempted to seize the Arcis bridge, so as to cut off the troops on the south of the river from the troops arriving on the other side. This plan nearly succeeded. The young French horsemen began to retire, sundry runaways made for the bridge, and these were pursued by the enemy's horse. Had the latter been able to seize the bridge, that part

of the French army which was on the left bank would have been destroyed. In this critical moment Napoleon himself drew sword, stood across the entrance of the bridge, and by his presence stopped the panic and held the men to their work



Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, March 20.

long enough for Friant to come up, cross and restore order. Meanwhile Ney at Torcy had fought hard to fend off the allied advance; Wrede was determined to have the town, and many assaults were made upon it, with great loss on both sides, but Ney was not to be driven permanently out. Here Napoleon is said to have also taken a personal part, and to have been thought for a moment killed by an exploding shell. Finally, the fight at Torcy degenerated into a cannonade, which lasted until late at night, both this village and Arcis being set afire. Wrede retired to Chaudrey.

Meanwhile the cavalry fighting, in the plain south of Arcis, was undetermined even late at night; but Sébastiani, with the Young Guard, held head to the fierce attacks of the Austrian, Russian and Bavarian cavalry; the combat ceased from sheer exhaustion, and both sides bivouacked on either bank of the Barbuise brook.


During the day Wurtemberg had nearly reached Plancy, advancing over the flat country with a broad front. The first troops he struck, about five o'clock, were those which had been left behind in Méry, and were now marching on Arcis; they were thrown into confusion and largely captured, with the pontoon train taken the day before. Wurtemberg bivouacked in the vicinity of Premierfait.

On the whole, although Napoleon had held his own, the results of the day were unfavorable, for his troops had been cut down to not much over twenty thousand men all told; Macdonald with sixteen thousand men was still a full day's march away, and Napoleon could scarcely expect anything but utter defeat without him. Although immensely superior to the emperor, Schwartzberg was anxious to bring up all his other troops for the battle of the morrow; and he ordered Wurtemberg to file to the right so as to be by 5 A. M. of the 21st near St. Remy; and leaving some cavalry to hold the Barbuise brook on the Arcis-Méry road, all other available troops were also hurried up.

Napoleon continued to misconceive the results of the fight just concluded. He believed that Schwartzberg had merely fought to protect his retreat; he expected next day to pursue the allies; and this view was confirmed by the movement of Wurtemberg, which he had learned. What troops had come up during the night from Plancy, part of Oudinot and Lefebvre-Desnouettes, he threw over the bridge and into Arcis, so as to form a fresh line from Torcy to Moulin Neuf, and

Macdonald was approaching via Marcilly and Anglure, his van reaching the army early the 21st.

As soon as daylight broke, Napoleon was in the saddle, and reconnoitred out through Torcy on the road to Brienne. As Wrede had momentarily fallen back, he could see only cavalry parties in his immediate vicinity, and he was the



Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, March 21.

more confirmed in his judgment; he does not appear to have gone or sent towards Voué or Mesnil; and yet nearly all Schwartzberg's available forces were assembling in his front. This careless reconnoitring is almost incredible. It was the forerunner of that succeeding the battle of Ligny. By eight o'clock guns were opened from Nozay, where Pahlen was moving across the Barbuise brook; the French fell back to Moulin Neuf, and Rajeviski came up and occupied

the line of the brook, forming the left flank of the allied army. Wurtemberg moved over to Mesnil so as to occupy the centre, and his cavalry took position in the plains of St. Remy. The Guards and reserves were in the rear along the road to Ramerupt. The right leaned on the Aube at Chaudrey.

The King of Prussia and the czar were both with the army, and Schwartzemberg, though suffering from his slight wound, was able to remain in command. Convinced that Napoleon did not believe that he had the whole allied force in his front, and as his army was covered by the hills, he determined to await the attack the French would be apt to deliver. With his right on the Aube, "it is therefore necessary that in all movements the touch should be kept to the right, so as to allow no gap to be produced," he said in his morning orders; and masses of cavalry were to hold themselves ready under cover so as, should the French advance on the Mesnil height, to debouch on their flank.

After his amazingly superficial reconnoissance, Napoleon about ten o'clock ordered Sébastiani to move forward with the entire cavalry and fall on the enemy wherever he found him, Ney with the infantry to follow in support. In pursuance of these orders the marshals moved forward with rapidity towards Mesnil, and arriving at the top of the hill were astounded to see, in the plain beyond, the entire army of the allies. Here stood a handful of men, on an open battlefield, making ready to attack four times their number of better troops. Still, the marshals opened a scattering fire, sending aides back to the emperor to inform him of the facts. When Napoleon came up, he finally saw that his operation on the Aube was an absolute failure, and that by unpardonably bad judgment and slack work he had placed himself in the most dangerous situation he had ever yet faced. With less than an army corps, he was surrounded by the whole allied

force, and with no outlet except one bridge over a river in his rear, and beyond the river a defile and embankment between marshes. Yet at the view of this absolutely fatal situation, he lost not for a moment his presence of mind. He recognized his strategic error and saw that he was outmanœuvred; he saw how ill he had reconnoitred; he understood his peril; and just because it was against all the principles of the art to retire in face of such overwhelming odds, he at once gave orders to stop firing and to do so, believing, on the "theory of the impossible," that the enemy would not consider him capable of undertaking such a manœuvre. His judgment proved correct.

Clausewitz places Schwartzberg at eighty thousand men, Napoleon at twenty thousand, with Macdonald coming up with thirty thousand, and thinks that, if the emperor had waited for his lieutenant, there was still a fighting chance. So there was for a Frederick, with his wonderful fighting tactics, but not for a Napoleon on the theory of the equality of thousands.

Luckily, Schwartzberg held to his intention to await the French attack, and there ensued a pause rarely seen in war. An army of twenty thousand men, ready to attack its opponent numbering eighty thousand, batteries drawn up prepared to fire, and absolute silence resting upon the field. This extraordinary pause lasted nearly two hours. Schwartzberg had marshaled his troops to receive a shock, not to deliver one; it took some time for him to change his mind, and then still longer to issue his orders. Finally, he brought together the commanders of his several army corps on the Mesnil heights, held a short council of war and decided to move forward. A signal was to be given by three guns from Mesnil, and the attack was to be in three columns: one upon Torcy, the second to the left of Mesnil straight on Arcis, the

third on Arcis from the Barbuisse brook; cavalry to advance between the columns so as to prevent gaps and keep up connection, and the reserves to hold the heights of Mesnil.

Napoleon's preparations were as rapid as the enemy's were slow: Ney's infantry and the Guard quickly started over the bridge, so as to occupy the heights beyond, while Sébastiani masked this movement; and a large part of this manœuvre was executed while the allies were waiting, in a manner beyond praise. Oudinot, who had arrived the evening of the 20th, and three brigades of old troops were detailed to hold the debouches of Arcis as long as possible, and these he barricaded with wagons. He was supported by a reserve brigade in the town, and a division on the other side of the river was standing to receive him when he should retire.

At two o'clock the allied columns were formed, the three shots were fired, and the concentric columns moved towards Arcis. Pahlen first struck the French at Vilette, and strove to reach the bridge of boats Napoleon had ordered to be there thrown; the French were unable to stand the shock, fell back over the bridge and destroyed it. A strong line of skirmishers preceded each allied column, and the guns soon fired into the town of Arcis. There could be no doubt of the result: it was a mere question as to how much of his army Napoleon could save.

When, from the heights of Mesnil, Schwartzenberg saw the French troops beyond the Aube take the road towards Chalons and Vitry, he determined to throw Wrede across to strike the retiring French in flank; and at four o'clock he ordered him through Ramerupt, the train to follow by way of Pougy. Wurtemberg was left to attack Arcis, which he vigorously did. Oudinot had great difficulty in holding himself, but he saved the bulk of his force; at the last moment Wurtemberg attacked the town with the bayonet, the few

French left scrambled across, and the bridge already mined was blown up.

The French had lost five thousand men from the concentric fire of many batteries: the allies lost but three hundred men. Oudinot drew up at Chesne to defend the cross-roads, and falling night saved him from further attack. Macdonald came up late in the evening with his troops fagged out by their long march.

Napoleon and the Guard reached Sommesous at night, part of the army got to Mailly, Wurtemberg slept on the field opposite Arcis, Wrede seems to have crossed at Lesmont and marched to Chalette, the allied cavalry reached Luistre.

The Correspondence contains no mention of the battle of Arcis, save a word from Sezanne, March 22, to Clarke: "The whole army of the enemy is at Arcis; it is probable that it will march by way of Brienne."

At the opening of this battle the emperor had been convinced that he was fighting the rearguard of the Army of the Sovereigns, which he had driven into retreat by his threat to its communications; on the second day he was still far from believing that the orders for an allied advance on Paris had been issued, and he clung to his idea that, despite his check, a stout operation towards the Rhine would still lure the allies away from the capital; and although worsted at Arcis, he continued his general scheme to draw near his strong places for reinforcements and support, and as the best means of preventing the enemy from moving on the capital.

At the allied headquarters in Pougy there was much doubt for two or three days as to what Napoleon would do, and there was a pause until March 23.

Although Napoleon now stood between the Army of Silesia on the Aisne and the Army of the Sovereigns on the Aube, in the most favorable of positions, matters were day by day

growing worse. His enemies in the capital were more numerous and outspoken, and Wellington had invaded Gascony, forcing Soult toward Toulouse. None but extraordinary measures would avail to change the situation in his favor. If what he called victory and successful manœuvres in Champagne would not affect the enemy's purpose, was it not a safer policy to transfer the theatre of campaign to the Rhine? His own communications to be sure would go lost, but would not the allies be more frightened as to theirs? He might arouse Alsace and Lorraine to rise *en masse* on the enemy's rear. The terrain there was more favorable to Napoleon's lesser numbers and strategic operations, and he had his fortresses to retire to in case of a check. He had failed at the opening of the campaign to assemble all his available troops, and unless he was to abandon Paris, there were now only three things left from which to choose: to back up against the capital with his whole disposable force and risk his all on the turn of a battle; or to call in Mortier and Marmont and all the troops he could gather, and once more attack the sovereigns; or to manœuvre as proposed. At an earlier date the Rhine scheme would have been good strategy. Was it too late now?

This remains an open question. Had Napoleon succeeded in drawing the allies away from the capital by this manœuvre (as he might have done had not his dispatches been captured), it would have been lauded to the skies. But this is the way in war. Dame Fortune always has a hand in it. The margin between brilliant success and lamentable failure is often a



Westphalian Cuirassier Officer.

narrow one, and the emperor turned his face towards the Rhine with the purpose of cutting the enemy's line running back through Chaumont and Langres.

With the object he had in view, Vitry appeared to be a good first point to capture out of hand; it would indeed have been a strong threat to Blucher, should he advance far; and while Napoleon and the Guard marched to Somme puis, with the rest of the army echeloned behind him, Ney was sent out March 22 to essay the feat; but Vitry was stoutly held; and when this proved a failure, Napoleon determined to march on the enemy's communications at St. Dizier. Whether it was that he was convinced that he had neutralized Blucher and that Schwartzberg would retire if his rear was threatened, or that he had got to the point of risking his all on the turn-up of a card, cannot be known; but so as to operate in force, he now ordered Marmont and Mortier, whom he had left in the Rheims-Soissons-Méry country, with the duty of fending Blucher off from Paris, down via Chalons to join him, thus leaving nothing between the Army of Silesia and the capital. On the 22d he crossed the Marne at the ford of Frignicourt, and marched on to Farémont. Oudinot remained opposite Arcis, Macdonald and Gérard were at Dosnon, and as Napoleon marched, on the 23d, towards St. Dizier, these three officers came on behind.

On March 23, following was the situation: Napoleon at St. Dizier, his cavalry at Joinville and Doulevant; Ney leaving and Macdonald and Oudinot reaching Vitry; Marmont and Mortier at Bergères; Pauthod, Arme y and a convoy at Sezanne; a cavalry regiment from Paris, Simon with five hundred men at Coulommiers; another small body at La Ferté Gaucher, Ledru at Meaux, Souham with five hundred men at Nogent.

Langeron and Sacken at Rheims, Voronzov with Winzin-

gerode's foot at Chalons, Winzingerode with cavalry and Wrede at Vitry; Yorek and Kleist near Chateau Thierry; Wurtemberg and Rajevski near Sommepeuis, Barclay between Lesmont and Vitry, Giulay at Arcis.

Again, on March 23, at St. Dizier, Napoleon dictated a Note, giving a summary of the general strategic situation, and the several plans to adopt. First, to start early March 24 for Vitry and attack the town. Second, to march via Bar-le-Duc on St. Mihiel, seize the bridge, cross the Meuse, and base on Verdun; thence to Pont-à-Mousson, so as to base on Metz, draw in twelve thousand men from the fortresses, drive the allied corps at Nancy behind the Vosges mountains, and advance against the allied rear, to deliver battle with the line of operations running back on Metz. Third, to march on Joinville and Chaumont, and thence back on Bar-sur-Aube and Troyes. Fourth, to march on Brienne, or on Bar-sur-Aube via Vassy. It seemed to the emperor that the most sensible of these plans was the one which based on Metz and the French fortresses, and which would bring the theatre of operations nearer the border. The emperor's words are again quoted: —



Austrian Cavalry
Officer.

Note, St. Dizier, March 23: "There are four courses to choose from: First, move from here at 2 A. M., be at Vitry at 8 A. M., and attack the enemy.

"2. Leave to-morrow early and move by way of Bar-sur-Ornain on St. Mihiel, so as to gain to-morrow the bridge there. From this moment my communication will be assured on Verdun, and I shall have passed the Meuse. I would go from there to Pont-à-Mousson, which would give me my communication with Metz. I should be reinforced with twelve thou-

sand men that I can draw from the fortresses. I should have driven beyond the Vosges the corps at Nancy, and I would deliver a battle having Metz as a line of operation.

“3. Move to-morrow on Joinville and Chaumont, from whence I would take my line on Bar-sur-Aube and Troyes.

“4. Go to Brienne from Bar-sur-Aube. We should move by way of Vassy and be to-morrow very near Bar-sur-Aube.

“The most reasonable of these projects appears to be the one which leans on Metz and my fortresses, and which makes the war approach the frontiers. In effect, from St. Dizier to Metz via Bar-sur-Ornain and Pont-à-Mousson there are twenty-nine post leagues. From Nancy by the same road there are thirty leagues. By the direct road from St. Dizier to Nancy via Toul and Void there are only twenty-two leagues.”

But after laying down these several plans and indicating the best one, for some unknown reason Napoleon changed his mind (as he had done after the battle of Maloyaroslavez) and started March 24, by way of Vassy, to Doulevant, and to Joinville, while Macdonald and Oudinot came up to St. Dizier, and Gérard to Perthes. On the 25th Napoleon, with Ney and the Guard, remained in Doulevant, Macdonald and Oudinot reached Vassy, Gérard, St. Dizier. And so as to concentrate for one more blow in mass, Marmont and Mortier were again ordered to join the army via Vitry.

As the allies had been pretty constantly doing the wrong thing, perhaps Napoleon was justified in crediting them with further doing so. But now he had gauged them ill: all his calculations as to what his blow at the enemy's communications would accomplish were shattered. Paying small heed to what the French were doing, instead of again retiring on Chaumont, as Napoleon expected him to do, Schwartzberg, who had made no especial change in location since the battle of Arcis, except to send some troops across the Aube on the 22d to Ramerupt and Lesmont, merely accentuated this movement, and thus drew nearer to Blucher, who, after

remaining ten days behind the Aisne, was also approaching, with the purpose of joining forces, cutting Napoleon off from the Seine and marching straight on Paris. The allied headquarters March 23 was at Dampierre. After once or twice watching the effect of Napoleon's manœuvres, the allies had grown to recognize that the knot of the difficulty could be cut only in the capital.

Indeed, when Napoleon moved upon the allied communications with the Rhine, there was no alternative left: Schwartzberg was compelled to join Blucher and manœuvre between Napoleon and Paris, leaving the emperor to do his worst. On March 23 Schwartzberg reached Sommepeuis and met Blucher; on the 24th Alexander insisted on moving on Paris.

But there was a still more important reason for this sudden allied enterprise. Things had gone wrong for the French cause at more than one point, and couriers carrying dispatches had been captured by Chernishev's roving Cossacks March 22. One dispatch was from Savary to the emperor to the effect that France was quite unable longer to carry forward the war; another was a letter of Napoleon's to the empress, saying that, to lead the enemy away from Paris, he had determined to move to the Marne and approach the fortresses. The allied sovereigns thus learned Napoleon's plans, as Bennigsen had in 1807, and became acquainted with the state of feeling in Paris; and Alexander put the question plainly to those of his generals in whom he had most confidence, whether it were better to march straight on the capital, or to retire to the Rhine to check Napoleon's operations. He himself urged strongly the former plan; all his officers agreed with him, and the Austrian Cabinet being no longer present with the army, Schwartzberg felt much more independent.

The advance of the allies on Paris had heretofore been

governed by mixed political and military reasons, and it was in part to this circumstance, though more largely to his extraordinary activity and skill, that Napoleon had owed his success against such superior numbers. When, after Arcis, the Army of the Sovereigns saw him move towards Chalons, they had at first believed he was marching against Blucher, and they girded themselves to follow; but when they learned that he was moving to the Rhine as a diversion, it was plain that while he might possibly cut their line of communications with the upper Rhine, they could none the less join Blucher and take up a fresh one through the Netherlands. As to follow Napoleon would lead to nothing, it was decided to march on Paris, the Army of the Sovereigns on the road from Vitry by way of Sezanne and Coulommiers, the Army of Silesia on the road from Chalons by way of Montmirail and La Ferté sous Jouarre, both to unite in Meaux March 28, so as to reach Paris together. And in order that the emperor should not too early divine this intention, orders were given to Winzingerode, with eight thousand cavalry and forty guns, to follow Napoleon to St. Dizier, and to spread the rumor that this force was but the van of the main army.

The allies' plan led to still another result — to them unexpected. Let us turn back to the Aisne, and see what had been happening there.

The day before the battle of Arcis, Blucher, ordering Bülow on Soissons, and Yorck and Kleist towards Chateau Thierry, had started from Laon with Langeron, Sacken and Winzingerode to march by way of Rheims on Chalons. In an effort to surround Marmont, he sent Chernishev to cross at Neufchatel, and move around his flank; but Marmont, unaware of the emperor's new project, blew up the Béry bridge, already mined by orders, and moved on Fismes, where from Rheims Mortier joined him. The French marshals strove to hold

Fismes, which covered Chateau Thierry, as Rheims covered Chalons and Epernay, but they were not strong enough to do so, and fell back. Thus disembarrassed of Marmont and Mortier, Blucher threw bridges over the Aisne to secure his retreat, hurried Kleist and Yorck on after Marmont, and himself headed for Chalons, which he reached March 23, and next day was not far from the sovereigns. In this way, by accident as it were, the two allied armies were joining as the two French armies were separating, for when they retired westerly, the marshals had no orders but the general ones to protect the capital.

It was at this puzzling moment, late March 21, that Marmont received the orders for himself and Mortier to join the emperor by way of Chalons or Epernay to Vitry; and as they had just lost Rheims, which was the cross-roads by which they must pass, they decided to march over the country roads to Chateau Thierry, where they learned that Epernay had gone lost. This led Marmont to believe that the main road to Chalons was in the hands of Blucher, and he chose to force his way through to Vitry by the Montmirail road.

Here was a curious situation. From a position that separated Blucher and Schwartzberg, Napoleon had marched to the east, and allowed the two allied commanders to join hands, so to speak, between himself and his Aisne forces, which he needed so much; and the latter divisions were now heading straight into the enveloping wings of the two allied armies, while Napoleon was quite cut off from Paris. With their smaller forces, this was indeed perilous for the French. Had the allies brought about this result by their own manoeuvring, it would have been a distinguished piece of strategy; as it was, they had merely blundered into it by Napoleon's act.

Having marched east from Montmirail, Marmont had reached Sommesous March 24, at eventide, and there found

that he could no longer rejoin Napoleon, as between Chalons and Vitry his scouts announced the presence of a great army, on the march towards him. Indeed, Blucher had already reached Chalons, and his van was in motion westward. Mortier had marched a little farther north by way of Chain-trey. Thus surprised, Marmont retired on Fère Champenoise to await Mortier, whom in all haste he called in, and on March 25 the two allied armies, practically in one body, advanced on the small French force. In this advance Mortier's last brigade was caught by the allied cavalry, and though it gallantly held itself in squares some hours, it was forced, after great loss, to surrender. Nor was this all: Macdonald's two divisions, Pachtod and Armev, that had been farthest off, four thousand men, marching via Etoges, had learned that the road to Vitry was cut off and had filed on Sezanne, March 24, to join Marmont and Mortier; and six thousand men of the National Guard and provisional regiments that Compans was directing towards Napoleon's army along the Montmirail chaussée, with a convoy of artillery, and that had reached the Soude, also found their advance intercepted, and, heading on Fère Champenoise in the hope of joining Marmont and Mortier, were caught by Grand Duke Constantine, and after a lively fight were cut down or captured. Pachtod and Armev were cut off by Blucher's cavalry, and Schwartzberg captured the whole body. The French lost ten thousand killed, wounded and taken, among them nine generals, eighty guns, two hundred wagons, and the entire park. The allies lost about one thousand men.

Advancing on the two highways, Marmont and Mortier barely escaped. They were in evil case. They could no longer join the emperor. The allies had unwittingly stumbled into playing the emperor's pet game, and had interposed between his own two armies. The two marshals had no choice

except to retire on Paris, to help make head against the advancing enemy, and as matters then looked, it was as well they did so. They fell back at night as best they might, and luckily Kleist and Yorck, who had been ordered down from Montmirail March 26, were too slow to cut them off, though on the same road. In Sezanne they expected to find Compans, instead of whom they found Ziethen, who had driven Compans out; but they managed to open a way, bayonet in hand. Reaching La Ferté Gaucher in bad shape, they found that a Prussian detachment had also taken this town, and striving to force their way through, Pahlen came up in their rear, and they had to file off to the left towards Provins. Compans and Vincent were now alone guarding the main road; but they skillfully retired, broke the bridges, and defended the defiles in such fashion as to afford time to Marmont and Mortier, who marched to Nangis and reached Guignes the 27th, to get to Paris ahead of the enemy. The allies, who kept on in good order, in better weather and over better footing, the artillery on the road, the troops on either side, on this day entered Meaux, with van at Villeparisis. The fate of the capital was sealed.

Winzingerode, who had been sent out by the allies to keep in touch with Napoleon's army, reached Vitry March 25; and on the same day pushed on to St. Dizier and occupied it, spreading the rumor that the allied army was following on. His van was sent out to Eclaron, on the road to Montierender. Napoleon was meanwhile blinded by his belief that the allies were following him up and lay opposite him at Vitry, curtained by this cavalry corps. He is stated to have said to one of the officers who accompanied him to Elba, that he marched on St. Dizier "because from twenty years' experience I had learned that you always got into the greatest disorder if I only sent a few hussars to threaten your com-

munications. 'This time I moved upon them with my entire army, and you took no notice of me; *c'est que vous aviez le diable au corps.*' It was really because they knew his plans.

With this idea overriding all others, he turned in his tracks, and from Doulevant came back, March 26, to St. Dizier, driving out the allied horse which had followed thus far. Headquarters remained at Doulevant, but Napoleon personally accompanied the army; and ignorant of what the allies had been doing, he was anxiously awaiting the arrival of Marmont and Mortier. Meanwhile he dispatched Oudinot to Bar-le-Duc, because Lorraine was this general's birth-place, and he, better than any one, could rouse the population; and some French light horse moved via Joinville towards Chaumont and Bar-sur-Aube. At St. Dizier, March 26, Napoleon summarily attacked the enemy, thinking thus to open a path for Marmont and Mortier to join him, and Sébastiani and Milhaud drove back Winzingerode. When the prisoners captured reported this to be part of Blucher's army, the scales fell from the emperor's eyes; he could no longer blind himself to the truth, for he also learned that the two allied armies were on the march to Paris. Yet persisting in his determination, he next day made a reconnoissance in force on Vitry, hoping that the capture of a town on the direct allied line of operations would change their plans, and with a view also of having a strong place to base upon for a march towards Chalons on their rear. But on arrival he found that Vitry could not be seized out of hand; and here two peasants came in who had been witnesses of Marmont's and Mortier's defeat at Fère Champenoise, and of the march of the allied army. "Only a stroke of lightning can save us!" said the emperor.

This blow, we are told, appeared to rob Napoleon of his

self-possession, and of that power of sharp decision which during this campaign, though perhaps in a feverish, unnatural form, had been constantly uppermost. His nervous system had been overtaxed for two years, and now succumbed. He should have turned over the command to a lieutenant, and have himself gone post-haste to Paris to direct its defense, leaving the army to follow. "It almost seems," says Clausewitz, "that he had no desire to expose his person to the shame of a defeat under the walls of the capital." He turned for counsel to his military family, and Ney and Berthier urged with all their power of persuasion an immediate forced march on Paris, if perchance they might yet reach the capital before the less rapid allies. To this advice Napoleon listened, especially as without Marmont and Mortier he was scarcely strong enough in the better elements of the army to go on with his operations in Lorraine. He returned that night to St. Dizier.

The dispersed French army had to be collected. The main part was near Vitry; Oudinot had been sent towards Bar-le-Duc; some of the cavalry was at Chaumont. Troyes was assigned as a rendezvous, and next day, the 28th, a forced march was begun by way of that town. Napoleon personally reached Montierender, and here received dispatches that the royalists were beginning to show signs of disquiet in Paris. On the 29th, from Dolancourt on the Aube, on learning from Joseph that the allies had reached Meaux, he dispatched to Paris his aide, Dejean, to announce his arrival, and to instruct Marmont and Mortier to hold back the allies at any cost; and, in order to aid the matter, to inform Schwartzberg that Napoleon had sent to the sovereigns proposals for peace which would be entirely acceptable, and asking him to cease operations, as the war was concluded. This stratagem failed of success.

There was but scant hope that Paris would hold out long enough to enable Napoleon to come to its aid, though had the city chosen to resist, there were men and arms enough. In addition to Marmont and Mortier, twenty thousand National Guards and two hundred guns were available ; and the positions on the right bank of the Seine are excellent. With a defense properly organized, the city could easily hold out a day or two ; but everybody in France seemed tired of the present conditions ; all but the army were in a state of discontent, active or neutral ; and even among Napoleon's intimates, everlasting war was sapping the foundations of fealty.

The allies moved on in good order, and confident now of reaching Paris. Sacken and Wrede remained at Meaux to guard the communications towards Belgium. There were slight combats everywhere, but practically the small bodies of French were brushed aside with little trouble. The Marne was crossed March 28, the last attack before reaching Paris was at the forest of Bondy, and from Clichy the capital was seen on the evening of the 29th. On this day Marmont and Mortier reached Charenton, and early March 30 occupied the heights north of the city, while one hundred and twenty thousand allies stood in their front. The day before, the empress and the little King of Rome had started for Tours, followed by the archives, the treasure and valuables, and accompanied by many of the ministers and dignitaries of the empire. The government was to go to the Loire. Joseph stayed behind to defend Paris.

Late at night on the 29th Napoleon personally reached Troyes, rested a few hours, and then set out again, accompanied as far as Villeneuve l'Archévêque by the Guard, which then could no longer keep up with him ; and he proceeded with only the headquarters escort. This escort he left exhausted at Villeneuve la Guiyard, and with fresh relays drove

with Berthier, Caulaincourt, Gourgaud, Flahault, Drouot, and a few other officers to Fontainebleau.

Marmont and Mortier meanwhile strove so to place themselves as to hold the heights which should prevent the approach of the enemy to the gates of Paris. Mortier, with about ten thousand men, took up position on the left from St. Ouen to Pantin, Marmont with some twelve thousand men stretched from Pantin to Montreuil. On the right was the little fort of Vincennes, which was left to the scholars of the Polytechnic School with twenty-eight guns to defend, and the ill-fortified bridge of Charonton was held by the scholars of the Veterinary School, with one company of veterans. Skirmishers were out in front in suitable bodies, and Moncey had a force of sundry troops in front of the gate of Clichy.




Moncey.

The allies drew a circular line from the Seine in front of St. Denis to the Marne at the forest of Vincennes, and, occupying all the heights in the centre, opened the attack March 30 at daylight, Blucher moving towards Montmartre and the Army of the Sovereigns on Belleville. The two French marshals defended themselves better than could have been expected, and, backed by Moncey, staved off the adversary with honorable courage. Though this defense was not up to

Napoleon's ideas of what should have been done, it was far superior to the defense either of Vienna in 1805 or of Berlin in 1806. Joseph had taken up position on the height of Montmartre, and until nearly noon continued to give orders; but as the allied left crept nearer and nearer, and one position after another was seized, he was forced to the conclusion that the whole allied army stood in his front. This being the case, he left the command with Marmont and Mortier, gave the two marshals power if necessary to sign a capitulation, and himself started to join the government towards Orleans.

The allied line was tightening its grasp, and guns were being put in position to bombard the city, when Marmont



Battle at Paris Gates.

sent a parliamentary to Alexander to ask for a truce to arrange a capitulation, the marshals agreeing to give up the city next day against the right to move towards Fontainebleau with all their forces.

What might have happened had Napoleon been able to reach Paris so as to have fifty thousand line troops there, it is hard to say. His marching orders when he left the army at Troyes were such as to bring them to Paris by April 2, but this was three days late.

From Fontainebleau on the 30th, with Berthier and Caulaincourt, Napoleon drove towards Paris, reaching Iniwisy at 10 P. M., where he met Mortier's cavalry, under Belliard, retiring via Villejuif on Fontainebleau, followed by the infantry of the corps. Paris had surrendered.

Napoleon would have insisted on personally going to Paris, but his *entourage* convinced him that this was courting certain imprisonment. He spent the night at the post-house of Iniwisy, La Cour de France, and by 4 A. M. on the 31st, learning that the formal surrender of the capital had been signed two hours before, he drove back to Fontainebleau.

Marmont says that from this moment on Napoleon seemed robbed of his clearness of vision and power to decide. In the following few days he assembled his oncoming army at Fontainebleau, including Marmont and Mortier, some fifty thousand strong, and with these he determined once more to march on Paris and drive out the allies. He did not give up his cause for lost. There were still many things he could do by collecting all his forces in the centre and south of France. From Fontainebleau, March 31, he wrote Berthier: —

“My Cousin, Marmont will form the vanguard and assemble all the troops at Essonne. Instruct him to direct all powder by way of Orleans, and to send to Fontainebleau all the victual which is in the magazines at Corbeil. . . . The pivot point of the army will be Orleans.” Everything “will move towards that point. The ministry and government will assemble at Orleans. . . . Instruct the Minister of War that the whole court is to move on Orleans . . . to escort the empress. . . . Write to the prefect of Orleans to announce the unfortunate news of the enemy's occupation of Paris, which my arrival would have prevented, if they had

retarded it three hours. Instruct him of the assembly that is to take place at Orleans ; recommend him to gather and prepare victual for the troops. . . . Send a courier this evening to Tours to announce these different dispositions to King Joseph and the ministers, who will communicate them in circulars to all the departments."

To keep touch with the allied sovereigns, from La Cour de France, March 31, Napoleon wrote Caulaincourt : " We order the Duke of Vicenza, our Grand Master of the Horse and our Minister of Foreign Relations, to visit the allied sovereigns and the general-in-chief of their armies, to recommend to them our faithful subjects of the capital. We invest him by these presents with all power to negotiate and conclude peace, promising to ratify all that he will do for the good of our service. If need be, we invest him also with military power to be the administrator and the commissary of that good city near the general-in-chief of the allies. We order in consequence all authorities to recognize the Duke of Vicenza in the said quality, to second him in everything that he shall do, for the good of our service and of our people."

On April 1 Napoleon issued orders to Berthier to prepare for a review of all the troops ; and on the 3d, with the object of marching on Paris, he issued an Allocution to the Old Guard : —

" Officers, sub-officers and soldiers of the Old Guard : The enemy stole three marches on us. He has entered Paris. I have offered the Emperor Alexander peace bought by great sacrifice : France with its old limits, renouncing our conquests, losing everything that we have won since the Revolution. Not only has he refused, but he has done more. By the perfidious suggestions of those *émigrés* to whom I accorded life and whom I have showered with kindnesses, he authorizes them to wear the white cockade, and by and by will substitute it for our national cockade. In a few days I shall go to attack him at Paris. I count on you. . . . Am I right ?" (This was followed by a thunder of cries of "*Vive l'Empereur ! On to Paris !*") " We will go to prove to them that the French nation knows how to be mistress at home ; that if we have long been so abroad among others, we will always be so at home. And that finally we are capable of defending our cockade, our independence and the integrity of our territory."

But all his old subordinates, led by Berthier and Ney, and including Oudinot, Macdonald, Caulaincourt, Maret and Bertrand, entreated him to make an end of this insensate proceeding. News from the south was bad; the English were in Bordeaux, and the Austrians in Lyons; Bentinck, released in Catalonia, had sailed to attack Genoa; Wellington was near Toulouse. Worse still, Napoleon had lost the confidence of the Parisians: the citizens were apathetic, the salons breathed treason, the journalists and cheap orators joined in abuse of the empire. Once the defense was over, the population received the allied troops with acclaim; only the army remained faithful. Be it said to his credit, the Emperor Alexander behaved with calmness and generosity, when the recollection of the fate of the Kremlin might well have aroused a desire to retaliate. A large part of any population is always ready for a change: particularly is this true of the French, and Napoleon had enemies in abundance. On April 2 the Senate, under the lead of Talleyrand, declared that Napoleon had forfeited the crown, and created a provisional government. Napoleon's troops would still have stood by him, but especially as Wellington had driven Soult towards Toulouse, his marshals were not so ready to attempt the impossible. They determined to ask from Napoleon his cession of the throne, and Ney, the spokesman of the others, put the case with perfect plainness. These entreaties of Napoleon's faithful comrades drew from him his memorable Declaration of April 4, which was sent to the allied sovereigns: —

“The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the reëstablishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oaths, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to give up France and even life for the good of the country, inseparable from the rights of his son, of those of the regency, of the empress, and of the maintenance of the laws of the empire.

“Done in our palace of Fontainebleau April 4, 1814.”

Meanwhile Marmont and Schwartzberg had entered into independent negotiations, and thus Napoleon's last support, part if not all of his fifty thousand men, fell from him. It was this which led this wonderful egoist to exclaim: "If the emperor has despised men, as he has been reproached with doing, the world would to-day acknowledge that he had grounds on which to found this sentiment."

From Fontainebleau, April 5, the emperor issued a

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

The emperor thanks the army for the attachment it has shown him, and principally because it recognizes that France is in him, and not in the people of the capital. The soldier follows the fortune and misfortune of his general. Honor is his religion. Marmont has not inspired this sentiment to his companions in arms; he has passed over to the allies. The emperor cannot approve the condition under which he did this act, he cannot accept life and liberty at the mercy of a subject. The Senate has permitted itself to dispose of the French government. It has forgotten that it owes to the emperor the power it now abuses. . . . It does not blush to make reproaches to the emperor. . . . To-day, when fortune has decided against me, the wish of the nation alone could persuade me to remain longer on the throne. . . . The army may be certain that the honor of the emperor will never be in contradiction with the happiness of France.

The conditional abdication was rejected by the sovereigns, and Napoleon again considered the plan of withdrawing behind the Loire, even abandoning France and going personally to the rescue of Italy. But his strength was not only unequal to such a strain, his subordinates would not join him; the project never got beyond discussion. And when the Senate in Paris called back the old royal family, Napoleon gave his assent to all, in his full Act of Abdication.

“The allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the reëstablishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces for himself and his heirs the thrones of France and Italy, and that there is no personal sacrifice, even that of life, which he is not ready to make for the interest of France.

“Done at the palace of Fontainebleau, April 11, 1814.—NAPOLEON.”



Bavarian Cannoneer.

LXX.

TOULOUSE. JANUARY TO APRIL 10, 1814.

WHILE the allies were marching on Paris, Wellington was pushing Soult's force back in southern France. Why Napoleon had not ordered Suchet to join Soult is hard to explain. Wellington's manœuvring constantly improved, and after a series of clever operations he crossed the Adour February 22, and thus turned the position of Bayonne, meanwhile forcing the French left across the Gave d'Oleron. Soult assembled his forces at Orthez, and on February 27 stubbornly fought to maintain his position, but Wellington won the day, and Soult retired up the Adour early in March. Wellington was well received in France, as he conciliated the population and paid promptly for supplies. He seized Bordeaux March 12. On March 20 and 21 there was some fighting near Tarbes, whence Soult retired to Toulouse, followed by Wellington at the end of March. Soult determined to fight within the city works, and Wellington tried to cross the Garonne, so as to have him at a disadvantage, but failed. On April 10, however, he did cross, and attacked the city. It was an almost desperate chance, but the English troops did good work, and against stout opposition, and great difficulties, he drove Soult into the city proper. On April 11 he prepared for a fresh assault; but Soult, on hearing of Napoleon's abdication, deemed it wise to withdraw. In the Peninsula Wellington showed himself to be a sound rather than a brilliant general. He was always reliable if over-deliberate, and while not great as a strategist, was able in battle tactics, not, however, following up victories by pursuit. It took many years to advance from Lisbon to Toulouse, and yet at no time could he have been replaced by any one who would have done his work with more patience and skill. In Italy Eugene was finally overcome. The campaign of 1814 is one of the most brilliant that Napoleon ever conducted, although he combined with wonderful military capacity utter blindness as to eventual possibilities. A Convention was entered into April 11 under which Napoleon retained the island of Elba.

WE must now return to Wellington, who, during the allied march on Paris, was facing Soult and contributing his full share to the demolition of the Napoleonic structure. In the effort not to abandon Bayonne, as well as to extend far enough

up the Adour to prevent the allies from cutting him off from the Toulouse region, Soult was puzzled how to dispose his forces; for a line from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port was unduly long. Although he had established his big magazines at Dax and Peyrehorade and fortified these towns, when the allies reached the left bank of the lower Adour, they interfered with his water transportation. A bridge was built and a considerable force stationed at Port de Lande, and on the main-road crossings bridge-heads were erected. Clausel stood on the Bidouze, striving not to lose hold of St. Jean Pied de Port, from whence the line ran to Bayonne. Communication being insecure along this extended front, Soult occupied Helette as an outpost, so that Paris, who had come on from Saragossa with a flying corps, might connect with Clausel. Meanwhile, as if Bayonne were his sole objective, Wellington continued to hold the angle between the Nive and the ocean, with Hill on the right bank extending to Urt.

While Soult's forces were reduced by drafts, desertion and invalidism, Wellington's were kept in condition, the English marshal being always a good provider. Still, the difficulties in Portugal continued; and those in Spain increased to such an extent that Wellington advised the British government that it might anticipate a war with that country, and suggested that San Sebastian be seized, so that in case of such an event a nearby port would be available as a base, to protect or embark the troops. Yet the Cortes continued Wellington in command, and it is probable that Soult's difficulties were the greater. With equal skill in the commanding officers, there was no question that the allies would eventually win, and it can scarcely be denied that Soult was overmatched in all-round ability.

Friendly habits had been established between the rival lines at the outposts.

“The value of such a generous intercourse old soldiers well understand, and some illustrations of it at this period may be quoted,” says Napier. “On the 9th of December, the Forty-third was assembled on an open space within twenty yards of the enemy’s out-sentry; yet the latter continued to walk his beat for an hour, relying so confidently on the customary system that he placed his knapsack on the ground to ease his shoulders. When the order to advance was given, one of the soldiers, having told him to go away, helped him to replace his pack, and then firing commenced. Next morning, the French in like manner warned a Forty-third sentry to retire. A more remarkable instance happened, however, when Wellington, desirous of getting to the top of a hill occupied by the enemy near Bayonne, ordered some riflemen to drive the French away; seeing them stealing up too close, as he thought, he called out to fire; but with a loud voice one of those old soldiers replied, “No firing!” and holding up the butt of his rifle, tapped it in a peculiar way. At the well-understood signal, which meant “We must have the hill for a short time,” the French, who, though they could not maintain, would not have relinquished the post without a fight if they had been fired upon, quietly retired. And this signal would never have been made, if the post had been one capable of a permanent defense, so well do veterans understand war and its proprieties.”

The frequent amicable association of Federals and Confederates at the outposts, which many old American soldiers so pleasantly remember, has had its prototype not only in the Peninsular, but in many previous wars.

Owing to the necessities of the campaign on the Seine and Marne, Napoleon now began to withdraw troops from the armies at both ends of the Pyrenees. It is hard to conceive how the great soldier could have been so blind as not to consolidate the forces in Spain and thus oblige his lieutenants to work together, on the constant theory that, when you have beaten the main force of the enemy, other things will take care of themselves. This had through life been his strongest principle, and yet in Spain he “saw too many things at once,” and “striving to keep everything, he thereby lost everything,”

as Frederick says. Nothing, perhaps, more fully exhibits the emperor's growing unwillingness to face the inevitable than this. Had he himself been in Spain, he would have left nothing but a containing force on the eastern coast, and have united all his forces to march on and defeat Wellington on the Ebro. Soult could not have done as much, but with Suchet's army added to his own, he would have gone farther towards defending the frontiers of France than he did. Napoleon also expected marked results from sending Ferdinand back to Spain, but like many of his calculations at this time of his failing fortunes, he was misled. The new king availed the French naught.

The emperor notified Soult in January that he must draw troops from him to the extent of at least two divisions, and that he must do the best he could with what remained to him. Soult strove to do his task justice, but in addition to the loss of forces, he was troubled by the disaffection of the anti-Imperialists in France, who, under the leadership of the Bourbons, so heartily played into the hands of the allies that Wellington was led to believe that the whole of France was anti-Napoleon.

In answer to Napoleon's drafts of men, Soult suggested that he would be too weak both to hold Bayonne and face the heavy forces of the allies, and that perhaps the better plan to forestall invasion would be not to conserve a base upon the ocean, but to strengthen the army so as to enable it to move along the north foot-hills of the Pyrenees, base on the Mediterranean, and fall upon the rear of the allies in case they advanced into the interior. He suggested that Clausel, born in and familiar with that country, would do the work as well as he; and he himself asked for service near the emperor. From whatever motive, Napoleon neglected this suggestion, and Soult was left with not over forty thousand old troops.

There were additional conscripts of poor quality, but scarcely enough muskets to arm them.

Wellington's present question was how to compass the capture of Bayonne. He could not well cross above the city, because that meant first driving Soult from his holdings on the Nive. Below, the stream was wide, the ebb-tide ran seven miles an hour, and the French had a small river flotilla which might interrupt the passage; but just because Wellington guessed that the French would not expect him to cross in this difficult place, he resolved to do so; and he planned to demonstrate stoutly against the French left, and under cover of this to force the passage. He collected his material in the Bidart country, and gave the work to Hope, while Beresford was to contain the French centre and Hill should turn its left. In this view, on February 14, with twenty thousand men, Hill started to cross the Nive, dislodged Harispe, who was at Helette, cut Soult's communications with St. Jean Pied de Port and marched on Garris. Beresford, on Hill's left, advanced to Bastide Clerence.

Soult naturally imagined that his left was to be turned, while Bayonne was attacked; Paris was recalled from an expedition to Jacca, and Harispe strove to keep open the line from St. Jean Pied de Port to St. Palais on the Bidouze. On the Garris heights Hill attacked Paris, while Wellington sent some Spanish troops around his left; the hill was taken by a sharp assault in which five hundred men were lost, the French withdrew behind the Bidouze, and St. Jean was invested. Meanwhile Picton, on Hill's left, threatened Villatte at Orègue. At one moment these operations promised to bring on a general engagement.

Not having enough men properly to hold the line from Bayonne along the Bidouze to Mauleon, Soult determined to withdraw back of the Gave d'Oleron. Erlon was ordered to

Reille's troops fell into disorder, and Beresford's division broke into St. Boëz. Meanwhile the 3d and 6th divisions had seized a position from which they could enfilade the French left, and between these simultaneous attacks, Soult began to fear for his victory. This indeed was shortly settled, when Hill, who had been threatening Orthez, finding that he could not force the bridge, moved by his right to Souars, there forded the river, and advanced along a ridge towards the French line of retreat, through Salespice. Clausel threw forward some troops to arrest this dangerous manœuvre, but Hill pushed on, and Soult saw that the day was definitely lost. He was in considerable danger, having four streams to pass before he could reach the Adour, but he cleverly managed his retreat; and he was aided by Wellington's failure to pursue, owing in part to a slight wound the latter had received. Soult lost four thousand killed, wounded and missing; the conscripts in great part dispersed and threw away their weapons. The English loss was less.

In the battle of Orthez the forces were not far from equal, for while Soult's total was less, he had been able to put nearly forty thousand men into action, while Wellington, by detachments, had scarcely more at hand. Soult's battle was a defensive one, and his troops had not shown themselves the equals of the allied. Wellington's double attack without connection between his wings was scarcely justifiable except by his marked success. Next day he followed up the retreating French, who were obliged




Spanish Fusilier.

to abandon their magazines at Dax, Aire and St. Marsan, Soult having elected to move towards Toulouse. Wellington would have been glad to drive him towards Bordeaux, and definitely cut him off from Suchet, who he fancied would join Soult by the Mediterranean roads. Hill marched to Aire on the Adour to seize the magazines there, and a heavy combat ensued with Reille and Villatte. Wellington crossed March 1 at St. Sever. Soult retired by the Adour right bank.

Wellington paused. From February 14 to March 2, he had swung his right wing over eighty miles of distance, crossed five rivers and several streams, had captured a number of bridge-heads and small works, and had gained one battle and two combats in addition to seizing the French magazines. His work had been handsomely done, and against an able soldier.

In his defensive campaign, Soult did not sufficiently use the offensive, for on more than one occasion there was an opening which he might well have utilized.

Soult's position was getting more and more disheartening. Reduced by losses, and by desertion, not only of conscripts, but of straggling veterans tired of war, his magazines captured, his lieutenants cast down, and the civil authorities in his own country far from helpful, he had to face almost certain failure; yet he bore up well under the circumstances, and to the very end did his best, although with so strong a captain and so good a force in his front, he knew that the end could not be far off. On March 3 the French army retired up the Adour, Soult having selected Toulouse as a last stand, but proposing to march by way of Tarbes, and thence by the foot-hills road, rather than by the more direct road via Auch. At Maubourget he stopped. Here he received a note from the emperor telling him, as to Bayonne,



The March on Toulouse.



that fortresses were nothing if the enemy could collect sufficient guns and ammunition, and that his proper course was to assume the offensive; but Soult had already left a large garrison in Bayonne, and was now cut off from it. Soult replied that he would take the offensive when possible, but that ever since mid-February he had been constantly attacked by superior numbers; and that he had elected to march by way of Tarbes because the Pyrenees afforded him a safe place to lean on, and a better chance to attack the enemy, especially if they should march by way of Auch.

Soult now reorganized the army in six divisions under Harispe, Taupin, Villatte, Daricau, Maransin and Armagnac, though Reille, Erlon and Clausel were left in general command of the right, centre and left. He issued a proclamation to the people and the army which, while it would have been useless for English-speaking peoples, was of the sort which is apt to arouse the French.



English Dragoon
Officer.

We have seen that bad weather had prevented Wellington from pushing his late victory, and the French line of retreat was not now easy to follow. His desire to establish an allied party in Bordeaux required troops; but although he had orders from home not to play too far into the hands of the Bourbons, lest his action should check negotiations for peace, Bordeaux was seized March 12 with their aid by a column under Beresford. Wellington believed that a detachment of ten thousand men, known to have left Suchet, had joined Soult, and the twenty thousand men he had expected England and Portugal to send him were detained; yet

that fortresses were nothing if the enemy could collect sufficient guns and ammunition, and that his proper course was to assume the offensive; but Soult had already left a large garrison in Bayonne, and was now cut off from it. Soult replied that he would take the offensive when possible, but that ever since mid-February he had been constantly attacked by superior numbers; and that he had elected to march by way of Tarbes because the Pyrenees afforded him a safe place to lean on, and a better chance to attack the enemy, especially if they should march by way of Auch.

drawing in Freyre with two Galician divisions, he slowly pushed his outposts towards Vic Bigorre and Tarbes.

With his several detachments, Wellington had not had many more men than Soult, there being something over thirty thousand for duty in each army; but when on March 13 the Spaniards and some cavalry joined him, he recovered the superiority. He expected Beresford to rejoin before battle, and instructed him to be ready to move up the Garonne from Bordeaux, so as to follow Soult by way of Auch.

While Wellington was moving on Toulouse, Hope had invested Bayonne. Shortly after midnight of March 14 the French made a sally from the citadel, surprised the English outposts and brought about a sharp contest, in which Hope was wounded and taken prisoner.

Perceiving a chance of striking a blow at Wellington south of Aire, on March 13 Soult made a march on Conchez and Portet, protected by cavalry on the left; but Hill promptly seized the position near Aire which Soult aimed at, and Wellington brought forward troops to sustain him in any position he might take along the road to Pau. On March 14 Soult skirmished with Hill's outposts and endeavored to draw Wellington down from his position; but supposing Soult reinforced from Suchet, Wellington refused to meet him; and Soult had equally exaggerated notions of Wellington's strength. Unless he was to attack, Soult's position was untenable; when Wellington pushed cavalry up the Adour, his right was endangered, and on finding that Wellington was advancing, he left Erlon at Vic Bigorre, and marched Clausel and Reille to Tarbes. After a lively fight the English pushed on, turned Erlon out of his position, and Soult drew his whole army up at Oleac, leaving Clausel in Tarbes so as to retire towards Toulouse at will.

Hill and Wellington were advancing on either side of the

Adour. The commander-in-chief on March 20 sent the Light Division and some cavalry to fall on Oleac, and meanwhile threatened the French right through Dours. Hill, on the left bank, assailed Tarbes, where Clausel held his own with difficulty, and after a lively fight Hill forced the Adour. In front of the French was a plain much cut up, in which cav-



Spanish Sapper.

alry could not act, and Soult withdrew his troops in good order in two columns, guided at night by beacon fires in the rear; and after a march of thirty miles, he was next day at St. Gaudens with Erlon and Reille, Clausel at Monrejean. The allies cautiously followed by slow marches in three columns by way of Trie, Galan and the main road. Marching as he was where he feared his right flank might be attacked by partisans from the mountains, and with his left flank in the air, Wellington felt that it was better to advance slowly, keep his men well in hand, and rely upon their courage on the battlefield, where he always felt conscious of superiority; but his fifteen days' delay since the last battle enabled Soult to

put his army in better condition. He had repeatedly urged Suchet to come to his rescue, as the fighting would assuredly be in his front, and not on the east coast of Spain; but Suchet would march to no one's aid unless to that of his master, and curiously Napoleon gave no orders—barely suggestions—looking to coöperation. The emperor had quite enough in his own front to occupy his attention. These were the days of his wonderful manœuvring between Blucher and Schwartzenberg.

With fifty thousand inhabitants and commanding the Ga-

ronne, Toulouse was a centre of all the roads of southwest France along which the French could retire or receive accessions. Strategically, it was also the last French stronghold, and as of it effective use could be made as a battlefield, Soult withdrew thither; and recognizing that Wellington would have to leave a force opposite St. Cyprien to hold his communications, and cross the Garonne either above or below, he fortified this suburb, as well as the ridge of Mont Rave on the east of the city. The hills about Toulouse enabled Soult to see everything the allies would do, as well as afforded him positions to fall upon them while crossing the river. A passage above the town, he scarcely feared; if Wellington crossed below, it would cut him off from Montauban, in which case, should Soult lose the succeeding battle, he would have to retreat to Carcassonne, to join Suchet. His first plan, then, was to attack the allies, should they cross there, in the angle of the Garonne and Tarn. He was three days ahead of Wellington, and used his time to make his situation strong.

Arrived near Toulouse, Wellington first resolved to cross the Garonne at Portet, and attack the city between the river and the canal with his right, while his centre and left forced St. Cyprien. Indeed, driving the enemy from the Touch, he commenced to throw a bridge for this purpose, but found his equipment short. Thereupon, March 28, he drew in Hill to Pensaguel, and put him across the Garonne, intending him to pass the Arriège at Cintegabelle, and then to move to the attack of Toulouse, while Wellington pushed in on St. Cyprien. From adjoining heights Soult could observe a part of these manœuvres, but though he drew wrong conclusions from them, it mattered little; for Hill, finding that he could not utilize his artillery on the ground he had occupied, returned to Pensaguel and recrossed the Garonne. Soult now saw

that Wellington would cross below Toulouse; but instead of carrying out his original idea of attacking him during the passage, he determined to fight in his works at Toulouse, and set to work to strengthen Mont Rave.

The Garonne was too full for Wellington to pass until April 3. Thereupon the pontoons were sent down to Gragnade; a bridge was thrown there and Beresford crossed; but before the Light Division could follow, the river again rose and the pontoon bridge was taken up. Soult knew of the crossing, but he did not know the number of troops that had been put over; and having heard that the allies had entered Paris, which made him all the more determined to confine himself to the defense of Toulouse, he missed a rare opportunity of destroying Beresford. On April 8 the bridge over the Garonne was moved up to Seilh, the Light Division was able to cross, and Wellington headed his troops and marched up along both sides of the Ers. This small river could not be crossed without bridges, and the march was somewhat dangerous, until the bridge at Croix d'Orade was seized in a brilliant cavalry combat by Vivian.

In the fortnight he had gained by the allies' cautious advance, Soult had made his position strong. His left was in St. Cyprien, the sweep of the canal on the north was held by his centre, and his right ran along Mont Rave; his conscripts manned the walls of the city, and his wings were united by the big bridge of Toulouse, while Hill was separated from Wellington except by the circuit over the bridge at Seilh. Soult certainly had a fair chance of victory.


Wellington had wished to attack by the south, but to do this he would have to march along the Ers, the bridges of which were all mined or destroyed, and was thus limited to an attack from the north and east. At St. Cyprien a fortress confronted him, from the north the canal stood in his

way, and he saw no choice except to attack the Mont Rave heights.

This ridge has two distinct long summits, the Calvinet in the north, and St. Sypière in the south. Between, the two ran into Toulouse roads which were strongly defended by field-works, as were also the summits of the ridge. It was evident that the extreme right of the French line was the most easily assailable, but to reach it a column would have to cross the Ers, or else march between the stream and the heights, liable at any moment to be attacked in flank. Soult well knew that this was Wellington's difficulty. Reille held St. Cyprien, Daricau was behind the canal, Clausel on the right, Harispe in the works at Mont Rave, as an outpost to which ridge the smaller Pugade hill was fortified, but too slightly. Had its works been strong, it might have prevented Beresford from moving as he did. Wellington's plan for attack April 10 was that Hill should threaten St. Cyprien, the 3d and the Light Division advance on the canal under Picton, Freyre with the Spaniards to carry Pugade hill. To Beresford was confided the task of marching along the foot of the Mont Rave ridge, to attack Soult's right. If the other onslaughts were well timed and successful, he might accomplish his work, but worse is not often cut out for a corps commander.

Early on April 10 the allied forces advanced against Toulouse under fire of outposts and artillery. Hill manœuvred against St. Cyprien, Picton moved forward towards the canal, and Beresford started on his questionable task. On the other side of the Ers, Vivian's hussars were to sustain Beresford if they could seize a passage, and this they in fact did by gaining the bridge of the Montauban road, south of Mont Rave. Through excess of ambition, Freyre's Spaniards attacked too early, and though they moved up the northern end of the Cal-

vinet hill with some resolution, they were met by a heavy fire, their right was enfiladed from Mont Rave, and they were driven back into a hollow road half-way down the slope, where they suffered severely and largely dispersed, with a loss of fifteen



Battle of Toulouse.

hundred men. Picton also, upon whom Wellington counted as his reserve, made a real attack, instead of a feint, on the Jumeaux bridge; and he too was repulsed, with the loss of five hundred men. Thus two assaults had failed by indiscreet advances, and Wellington was called on to face the fact that

the battle was lost, unless Beresford should accomplish what seemed almost impossible ; for after the repulse of Picton and the Spaniards, Soult was enabled to draw Taupin from St. Cyprien over to Mont Rave, and to give him orders to fall upon Beresford before he could finish his march and form for attack, while Vial with the cavalry should descend between the two summits, and cut off Beresford's retreat. This Taupin did ; but he was slow in his movements, and being met by a stout line of skirmishers thrown out on Beresford's right, and some well-timed Congreve rockets, was driven back to the upper ground, he himself being killed. Vial was held in check by a British regiment in square. Immediately succeeding this French failure, Cole advanced sharply up the slope ; and so tremendous was his rush that he captured one of the main redoubts and established himself on the summit. So suddenly was this done that Soult feared that the allies would seize the Demoiselles bridge ; and he at once occupied the Sacarin works, where he stopped Cole's advance. The British attack had been a marvel of resolution, as the French defense had been wanting in tenacity. Beresford's divisions were now marshaled so as to sweep the Mont Rave heights, and the allied cavalry, riding down the Montauban road, threatened the Demoiselles bridge afresh. The French right having been quite demolished, their line now ran from the Sacarin works to the Calvignet ridge and around by the canal to the river.



Spanish Grenadier
Officer.

But this was not victory. Soult's defensive position was still strong, and Clausel was ready to defend the French

right vigorously. It was nearly three o'clock when Beresford organized a second onslaught, crossed the ridge, and threw a division in between the Mont Rave summits. A strong French effort was made to meet this onset, and at first they maintained their position, but the English bid for the Calvignet heights was too strong, and the French began to retire to the canal.

While Picton had so far failed, and the Spaniards had been defeated, yet they were still potentially factors in the battle; and by five o'clock Soult had quite given up his holding on Mont Rave. He had lost five generals and over three thousand men killed and wounded, to the allied four generals and forty-six hundred lost. During the succeeding night he made ready to fight behind the canal on the morrow, and wrote to Suchet, again calling upon him to join him here.



English Line
Officer.

As April 11 opened, Soult was ready; but preferring to change his plans and attack the city from the south, Wellington spent the day in making his preparations to this end; and fearing that he would be shut up in Toulouse, in the night of the 11th-12th Soult evacuated the city, marched twenty-two miles, cut the canal and Ers bridges as he marched, and established himself at Villefranche. On the 12th Wellington entered Toulouse, where he heard of Napoleon's abdication. On the next day Soult received the news. He had faithfully defended his emperor to the last moment.

At Toulouse Soult probably disposed of over thirty-five thousand men and eighty guns; the allies had near fifty thou-

sand. If it be fair to take from this number the troops not actually put in, the fighting was done by something like equal forces; but as reserves, even if not put in, must be counted among those in line of battle, the French may be said to have been considerably outnumbered. Toulouse has been called a drawn battle, but as its result was that Soult was driven into the city from the position he had assumed outside of it, and evacuated the city lest he should be besieged in it, the claim that it was an allied victory may be fairly maintained.

It is not necessary to absolve Soult of the charge of fighting the battle of Toulouse after he knew of Napoleon's abdication. He did know that the allies had entered Paris, but he did not know until after the battle that the government had passed into other hands.

The sending of Beresford on his difficult task has been a subject of reproach to Wellington, but this seems a narrow view to take of war. At all times risks must be, and they always have been, run by great soldiers. A risk is measured as well by the quality of the troops engaged as by any other one thing, and Wellington had reason to believe that Beresford could, as he did, carry the hill. Had he not done so, more importance would have been attached to the accusation than can now be done, but in any case Wellington was not running undue risk. His boldness rather redounds to his credit as a soldier.

Wellington had already been made Knight of the Garter. He was now made a duke, and granted four hundred thousand pounds wherewith to support his honors, — a just appreciation by his countrymen of his great services.

In the Peninsula Wellington had shown himself sound rather than brilliant: unquestionably a great soldier, he yet had marked limitations. The task he was given was not an easy one, and he carried it through to a successful issue in a

workmanlike manner, if slowly, from beginning to end. He was careful in his logistics. His commissariat was always well managed. Unlike Napoleon, he did not oblige his subordinates to live on the country, but always studied the food supply, which as a habit somewhat limited his movements. The French had a certain advantage in relying for food on the land they were in, so that they could advance or retire in any direction, while the English needed their magazines, and if defeated, could retire in only one direction. Hence Wellington paid great regard to his base; he manœuvred so as never to be cut off from the sea; for what was a menace to most European armies, the British fleet made useful to him. When, in 1812, he began to operate towards the Pyrenees, he transferred his supply-centre from Oporto and Lisbon, where it had been since 1809, to Santander and other ports on the Bay of Biscay; his line of advance was always so managed as to be short; his men were better armed, fed and clad than the French, and his losses from exposure were much less.

Wellington quickly recognized and ably utilized the value of Portugal as a base from which to debouch into Spain upon the French. He could make his preparations in the long and narrow sea-country, establish his magazines, and be ready to concentrate his troops at any point much earlier than the enemy. He retained his hold here with determination. He made excellent use of the friendliness of the Portuguese and of what he could argue out of the Spaniards, and showed marked diplomacy and self-control in his dealings with these latter allies, whose wrong-headed attitude frequently came near wrecking their own cause. This was all the more a credit to him in that he was by nature quick in temper. Once launched on an operation, Wellington was tenacious in his manœuvres as well as in his battles; but he never made the

latter decisive by pursuit. He speedily caught the alarm when a French operation was directed against a weak allied spot and promptly retired, rarely meeting manœuvre by manœuvre. With an eye to the possible lack of support of the home government, he ran no avoidable risk, nor advanced too boldly nor hastily. He was an excellent organizer and disciplinarian; his army was nearly always better than the French. Opposed to him were some of the best of Napoleon's marshals, but not one of them was his equal, for while Napoleon trained wonderful subordinates, he spoiled them as leaders. Wellington knew how to profit by the jealousies existing among them, which produced openings from which he could derive profit. He kept his army well concentrated, while the French in Spain never worked together, except when Napoleon was present. Wellington's strategy and tactics were alike sound but cautious; his combinations were true but rarely bold. His sieges were never great; and as his siege appliances were rarely of the best, he was wont to hasten the event by costly assaults. He either limited himself, or the home government limited him, to the defense of Portugal; and until it was plain, after the Russian disaster, that the game was a safe one to play, he did not indulge in a truly offensive policy. When he did undertake it, and moved on the Ebro, his work was deliberate but admirable.

If we bear in mind that Wellington was unable to do his best in the Peninsula lest a single disaster should ruin his chances of support by the British Ministry, and that his caution sprang from this source, we can after a fashion gauge what he might have done had he been untrammelled; but a captain must be measured by what he does, and not by what he might have done. He took many years to accomplish his task, but he accomplished it; and success always goes far towards making reputation. Yet success alone is not a stand-

ard, for Hannibal worked many years and failed, and perhaps, weighing all the conditions, he heads the list of great captains.

Wellington's field was small compared to that of Napoleon. He had his one object in view, to save Portugal first and then rescue Spain from the French dominion. On his field, according to his means, he did succeed, while the greatest soldier of modern times, on his enormous theatre of action, failed to accomplish the end he had in view.

All great soldiers have practically worked by the same means. They have had rare intelligence, great bodily endurance, strong characteristic powers and moral courage. In a sense, both Wellington and Napoleon are alike in this, but Napoleon in his life-work laid the basis of the system of war we follow to-day, and this is more than any of his contemporaries did. Napier likens the qualities of Napoleon and Wellington, but adds with truth that "in following up a victory the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins; the battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave before which the barrier yielded, and the roaring flood poured onwards, covering all."

Nearly all of Wellington's battles were indecisive. After a defensive victory, pursuit is less easy than if the initiative has been assumed at the beginning of or during the battle. Yet pursuit is essential to make a victory worth its cost of life and treasure. Without it all previous work is wasted. Campaigns and battles are not conducted for the sake of killing and wounding a certain number of the enemy; it is not even a question whether the enemy shall be made to suffer more casualties than yourself. The object of every act of war is to disorganize the enemy and make him believe himself

incapable of continuing the contest. The organization and logistics of an army should tend to bring upon the field of battle a better body of troops than, or one superior in numbers to, the enemy ; strategy has to do with giving these troops such a direction as shall place the enemy at a disadvantage ; the object of tactics is so to utilize the accidents of the battleground and other advantages as to demoralize the enemy, drive him from the field, and so to break up his organized army by pursuit that he cannot again assemble during the campaign. Only thus can successful peace be won.

Napoleon well understood and practiced this, but Wellington's campaigns and battles in the Peninsula do not possess all these requirements. To rehearse them clearly proves the fact. Such detailed examination is, however, by no means a fair test : we must take into consideration all the limitations and difficulties, which were many. While Wellington never reached the same military standard as Napoleon, and none of his contemporaries did, the fact remains that, having in view his object in the Peninsula, the great English leader did his part in an able and workmanlike manner, one safer than a more risky method, and he wrote himself on the pages of history as a great leader and a great man.

Although in private life Wellington had his kindly side, yet he cannot be said to have had a sympathetic nature ; and he was often ungenerous in criticising his subordinates. He complained that his officers were ignorant of their duties as well as careless in obeying orders, that the men were the scum of the earth, who enlisted for drink. And yet these officers and men did him noble service. This particular fault has been pointed out by Oman after a fashion which, indulged in by any one not his fellow countryman, would be apt to provoke resentment.

“His notions of discipline,” says Oman, “were worthy of one of the drill sergeants of Frederick the Great. ‘I have no idea of any great effect being produced on British soldiers,’ he once said before a Royal Commission, ‘by anything but the fear of immediate corporal punishment.’ Flogging was the one remedy for all evils, and he declared that it was absolutely impossible to manage the army without it. For any idea of appealing to the men’s better feeling, or moving them by sentiment, he had the greatest contempt.”

But how these men fought under the Iron Duke!

In this connection a word more may be permitted about this side of Wellington’s character. He is stated to have said, in 1808, that the first means by which to beat the French was not to be afraid of them, as everybody else seemed to be; and that all the Continental armies were more than half beaten before the battle began. And he is quoted as saying in 1811: “I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their columns *en masse* with our line.” If these utterances have reached us correctly, it would seem that they were better forgotten than repeated; they add naught to the reputation of the man or the soldier. No one could tax the great English general with being afraid of any enemy; no bolstering up of British courage is ever necessary; neither do the hundreds of thousands of brave men who fell in battle before Napoleon testify to the Continental nations being afraid of the French. The constancy of the English was never taxed like that of the Austrians or Russians. All men became cautious when meeting Napoleon’s wonderful strategy or tactics: the same caution, indeed, or greater, was exhibited by Wellington throughout the Peninsular war, even against Napoleon’s marshals, as well as markedly so when he met the great captain in the manœuvres leading up to Waterloo. It was indeed just this quality which won, when the reverse might have lost the game. As England’s most distinguished soldier of the present generation says: “Wellington was determined

not to run any great risk of disaster, generally to adopt a defensive attitude, and only to fight when he felt reasonably sure of success," — a policy partly due to the fact that he could not drain England to procure reinforcements, but also distinctly characteristic. Like neither, yet Wellington had in his make-up certainly more of the Fabius than the Hannibal. He was a hard worker; his genius was of this order rather than partaking of the divine spark. Equally great, his character was almost the reverse of that of Marlborough.

From the French standpoint, in the first campaign Madrid had been won at Medina del Rio Seco, and was lost at Baylen. In the second campaign Napoleon regained Madrid, but returned too soon to France. In the third Soult invaded Portugal, but was driven out of Oporto by Wellington, who then turned to the Tagus and defeated Victor at Talavera. In the fourth Victor conquered Andalusia, but failed at Cadiz, and Soult lazed his time away at Seville. In the fifth Massena again invaded Portugal, losing time at Ciudad, Almeida and Busaco, and remained inactive five months before Torres Vedras. When Soult failed to furnish aid, Massena retired, and the English, after the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, occupied all Portugal. In the sixth campaign Marmont was beaten at Salamanca, and Wellington briefly entered Madrid. Hence he moved on Burgos; but the allies lost all their gains again, and Wellington was wise to evade battle with the superior French. In the seventh the fatal defeat at Vittoria ruined the whole of the emperor's Spanish plan. Yet Spain was lost to France, not by what occurred in the Peninsula, but by Napoleon's failure in Russia, in Germany, and in the French campaign.

Both on the battlefield, in delivering sieges, and in defending towns, the French had shown as much courage as any troops could show. As Jomini says: "Glory and recompense

were reserved for other wars. from this followed a certain discouragement and a certain disfavor thrown upon the army of Spain, which yet surpassed all the others in courage and resignation." It is not to their discredit that they were beaten by the allied army. It is rather an additional credit mark to the score of the wonderful fighting capacity of the British soldier, and to the broad military intelligence, power to use men, and pertinacity of the Iron Duke.

General peace succeeded the return of the Bourbons. France kept the line of the Pyrenees and Alps, but the frontier on the Rhine was shortened by excluding Belgium from her sway.

By the Convention of April 11 Napoleon was given his choice of several retreats. When he chose the sovereignty of the island of Elba, his abdication was published. During these days Napoleon had remained in Fontainebleau in full seclusion, and exhibiting no part of his old forcefulness. In passing through the south of France, on his way to Elba, he was made on more than one occasion so markedly to recognize that he had become hated by a large part of the French people, as to cause him to exhibit dread. And yet these same people would have cheered him, had he been successful. Success means much to us all; more to the Celt than to most races.

Though Eugene resisted with courage the combined attack of Bellegarde from the Adige, Murat from the south, Bubna from the Simplon, and the English from Genoa, and had to make head against a revolution at Milan, Italy as a kingdom could not survive the French empire.

This 1814 campaign is a brilliant page in Napoleon's history, and is a yet more splendid tribute to the French common soldier. With seventy thousand men in the field, Napoleon stood off three hundred thousand men for three months, and

his men frequently marched twenty-five miles a day, and fought almost daily battles. But the higher officers cannot claim to have sustained their chief so well. At Napoleon's headquarters there had long been a cry for peace and quiet, and the final defection of Marmont and others was traceable to this feeling. They saw no end to warfare, no reward for their many years of hardship; and they too were as ready as was all France for any change which might enable them to rest upon their laurels.

Before leaving for Elba, the emperor took leave of his marshals, and in the following recorded scene said farewell to the Guard:—


Fontainebleau, April 20. "Soldiers of my Old Guard, I make you my farewell. For twenty years I have found you constantly on the road to honor and glory. In these last days, as in those of our prosperity, you have not ceased to be models of bravery and fidelity. With men such as you are my cause was not lost, but the war was interminable. It would have been a civil war, and France would have only become more unfortunate. I have therefore sacrificed all our interests to those of the country. I am leaving. You, my friends, continue to serve France. Its happiness is my only thought, it will always be the object of my vows. Do not pity my lot. If I have consented to survive myself, it is only yet to serve to your glory. I wish to write the great things that we have done together. Farewell, my children, I could wish to press you all to my heart. Let me at least embrace your flag." (At these words General Petit, seizing the eagle, advances. Napoleon receives the general in his arms and kisses the flag. The silence that this great scene inspires is interrupted only by the sobs of the soldiers. Napoleon, whose emotion is visible, makes an effort and begins again with a firm voice:) "Farewell then, once more, my old companions! Let this last embrace pass into your hearts."

The following letters have their pathetic side:—

Fontainebleau, April 19. To the Empress Marie Louise: "My good Louise, I have received thy letter. I see in it all thy pain, which increases mine. . . . Keep well, preserve thy health for" (gap) "and for

thy son, who has need of thy care. I am leaving for the island of Elba, from whence I shall write thee. I will do everything also to receive thee. . . . Farewell, my good Louise Marie."

Fontainebleau, April 20. To the Empress: "I am leaving. . . . I am well, and I hope thy health will keep up, and that thou wilt be able to rejoin me. . . . Farewell, my good Louise. Thou canst always count on the courage, calm and love of thy husband. A kiss to the little king. NAPOLEON."



Silver Washstand, St. Helena.

LXXI.

THE LAST STRATEGIC THRUST. MARCH TO JUNE, 1815.

THE Bourbons had not been wise, and the people were dissatisfied. Determined to reinstate the empire, Napoleon left Elba on March 1, 1815, with one thousand men, and landed in France, where, received with acclaim and joined by many garrisons, he reached Paris March 20, Louis XVIII. fleeing to Belgium. France received him because tired of the Bourbons rather than trusting him. He approached the allies with a desire for peace, but they voted him an outlaw, mobilized all their armies, most of which had gone back to home stations, and started them for the Rhine, or the French north frontier. Napoleon raised troops to meet them. As the allies could not be ready to invade France before July 15, he determined to attack by June 15 the two nearest armies, under Wellington and Blucher in Belgium; and with a skill which no one else could approach, he assembled behind the Sambre an army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, while leaving reasonable forces along the Rhine and in the interior. Wellington was in front of Brussels with ninety thousand men, Blucher near Namur with one hundred and twenty thousand. Napoleon determined to break through between the two and fight each singly, the Prussians preferably first. The manœuvre was beautifully planned. Wellington was looking for an attack on his right, Blucher was more ready. On June 15 Napoleon drove back Blucher's leading division at Charleroi and crossed the Sambre at three places. His first object was to seize Quatre Bras and Sombrefe, so as to keep the allied armies apart, but owing to certain delays, this was not done June 15, although he had anticipated the allies. Blucher concentrated near Sombrefe, Wellington was still much disseminated. Ney, in command of the French left wing, was slow in assembling it, and did not seize Quatre Bras. Still, June 15 had been a successful day.

ON its return to power in 1814, the Bourbon régime was not a wise one. Louis XVIII. fell under the influence of the returned *émigrés*, whose aim was to recover their ancient properties and rights. On the other hand, the peasants feared

for their tenure of the land acquired by the Revolution, and the soldier had lost none of his love for the emperor. Though to disband the army was as dangerous as to keep it up, it was practically starved into inefficiency. Discontent grew apace, and within a short period the country simmered with revolutionary schemes.

The allies had reduced France to her ancient limits, proposing to repay themselves for their sacrifices out of the spoils. Talleyrand powerfully represented France at the Congress of Vienna, and counteracted this grasping policy, opposing Prussia's claim to Saxony and Russia's to Poland, and striving to unite Austria, England and France against the northern powers; while the majority of Frenchmen, who saw their country's late enemies getting rich at her expense, deeply felt the national humiliation. England expected to receive Malta, the Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius; Russia large western provinces; Prussia to regain more than she had lost; Austria to get back Lombardy and Venice; and when finally her influence was abolished in Italy, France fell to the rank of a second-rate power, to which for years she had reduced Austria.

All these events were carefully noted by Napoleon in Elba. He had restfully begun by organizing his little kingdom, but this could not long satisfy his vast conceptions. If Napoleon broke faith with the allies, they equally broke faith with him. Moneys promised by the Bourbon government were not paid; his wife and son were kept from him by trickery; it had been already suggested in Vienna to banish him to some place like St. Helena; even his life is said to have been threatened. Early in 1815 he determined to return to France and reinstall the empire. He had been allowed to keep in Elba a little army, in which were many devoted members of his Old Guard; and with four hundred of these,

four hundred other foot members of his Old Guard, and one hundred Polish light horse, in several small ships he set out on what, in any other man, would have been a quixotic expedition.

After a five days' passage, flying the Bourbon lilies, the brig *P'Inconstant*, followed by the other craft, cast anchor in the Bay of Jouan, between Cannes and Antibes, where fifteen years before Bonaparte had landed from Egypt; and by the evening of March 1, 1815, the handful of men set foot on shore, and assumed the tricolor. There was no delay; the initial success of the march inland was marked; everywhere the little band was received with acclaim.

There is an "Official Relation of the March of Napoleon from the Island of Elba to Paris," with good reason attributed to the emperor. This tells us that on March 6 Cambonne, commanding the vanguard, met six thousand men from Grenoble, who, refusing to listen to him, retired to Laffrey. On going out to meet them, the emperor found a battalion of the 5th Line, with some sappers and miners, and sending forward his orderly



Grenadier of Elba.

officer, was told that they were forbidden to communicate with him. "The emperor dismounted and went straight to the battalion, followed by the Guard at a secure arms. He made himself known, and said that the first soldier who wished to kill his emperor could do so. The unanimous cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* was their reply. This brave regiment had been under the orders of the emperor in the first campaign in Italy. The Guard and the soldiers embraced each

other," whereupon the emperor addressed them, saying that Bourbonism meant the re-creation of feudal rights.

Avoiding the military stations, Napoleon pushed through the hills of the Dauphiné, where the traditions of the Revolution survived, and there were many imperialists. Before reaching Grenoble, the 7th Line came to join the column. The city, reached by a march of nearly two hundred miles in six days, one of the best on record, opened its gates and gave him munition and supplies. "From Grenoble to Lyons the march of the emperor was one triumph." Here were the Comte d'Artois, the Duke of Orleans and several marshals, but the sentiments of the city were friendly, and late March 10 the emperor entered it, and the troops as a body joined the growing army. Marshal Ney had hurried from his country-seat to Paris, to head a campaign against his former chief, but he too caught the enthusiasm of the troops, and on March 17, in Auxerre, he reported to the emperor for duty. When, late March 19, Napoleon drew rein at Fontainebleau, Louis XVIII. left Paris with some of his adherents, went to Ostend, and later took up his residence in Ghent. At 9 P. M., March 20, Napoleon entered the Tuileries, over which the tricolor was floating. The small army had made nearly six hundred miles in twenty days. Excelmans was sent to push the fleeing monarch and his suite out of France. "Thus was finished, without spilling a drop of blood, without finding a single obstacle, this legitimate enterprise, which reëstablished the nation in its rights. . . . Thus was verified the word of the emperor to his soldiers, that the eagle with the national colors would fly from steeple to steeple to the towers of Notre Dame."

On March 21 the emperor reviewed the army of Paris: "Soldiers," said he, "I came with six hundred men to France, because I count on the love of the people and on the memory

of the old soldiers. I have not been deceived in my expectation." The battalion from Elba then presented the old eagles of the Guard, and the whole army swore allegiance to the emperor. Thus far the Official Relation.

At Golfe Jouan, March 1, 1815, Napoleon had issued what, from his standpoint, was a reasonable if exaggerated proclamation

TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE.

Napoleon by the Grace of God and the Constitution of the State, Emperor of the French, etc. Frenchmen, the defection of Augereau delivered Lyons without defense to our enemies. . . . The victories . . . and the position that I had taken on the rear of the enemy . . . had placed him in a desperate situation. The French were never on the point of being more powerful, and the *élite* of the enemy's army would have been lost without resource . . . when the treason of Marmont delivered up the capital and disorganized the army. The unexpected conduct of these two generals . . . changed the destiny of the war. . . .

Raised to the throne by your choice, everything which has been done without you is illegitimate. . . . Frenchmen, in my exile I heard your complaints and your vows. You called for this government of your choice, which alone is legitimate. . . . I have crossed the seas in the midst of perils of every kind. Here am I among you again to reassume my rights, which are yours.

He had also issued a proclamation

TO THE ARMY.

Soldiers, we have not been vanquished. Two men who left our ranks betrayed our laurels, their country, their prince, their benefactor. . . . Soldiers, in my exile I have heard your voice. . . . Your general, called to the throne by the choice of the people, . . . has returned to you. Come and join him. . . . We must forget that we have been the masters of the nations, but we must not suffer any one to mix in our own affairs. . . . Seize again those eagles that you had at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Friedland, Tudela, Eggmühl, Essling, Wagram, Smolensk, Moskwa, Lützen, Wurschen, Montmirail. . . . Soldiers, come and rank yourselves under the flags of your chief. . . . In your old age . . . you will

be able to say with pride, "And I also was a part of that great army which entered twice into the gates of Vienna, into those of Rome, of Berlin, of Madrid, of Moscow, and which has delivered Paris from the stain which treason and the presence of the enemy have impressed upon it."

These were later distributed in great numbers all over France. From Lyons, on March 13, the emperor had issued a decree dissolving the Chambers, and convening the Electoral College of the Empire in Paris in May "to correct and modify our Constitution according to the interest and wish of the nation."

Some of the greater cities were slow in adopting the tricolor, but gradually Bordeaux, Toulouse and other centres did so, and in a month after he reached the Tuileries, Napoleon had put down all the little risings against his authority without bloodshed. It was a remarkable accomplishment, and from his standpoint proper.

On receipt, March 17, by the powers sitting at the Congress of Vienna of the news of Napoleon's landing and his reception by the army, the ministers of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia with one voice agreed to wage war against him to the end. Napoleon would have been glad of any peace by which he could retain the empire, and addressed to this effect

A CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE SOVEREIGNS.

Paris, April 4, 1815. Monsieur my Brother, you will have learned in the course of the last month my return . . . and the departure of the family of the Bourbons. The true nature of these events must now be known to Your Majesty. They are the work of an irresistible power, the work of the unanimous will of a great nation which knows its duties and its rights. . . . Its voice called a liberator. . . . I came, and from the place where I touched the shore, the love of my peoples has carried me to the heart of my capital.

The first need of my heart is to repay so much affection by the main-

tenance of an honorable tranquillity. The reëstablishment of the imperial throne was necessary to the happiness of the French. My sweetest thought is to make it at the same time useful to the strengthening of the repose of Europe. Enough glory has illustrated, turn by turn, the flags of the several nations. The vicissitudes of fate have sufficiently made great reverses succeed great successes. A finer arena is to-day open to the sovereigns, and I am the first to enter it. After having presented to the world the spectacle of great combats, it will be sweeter to know henceforth no other rivalry than that of the advantages of peace, no other struggle than the holy struggle for the felicity of the peoples. France is happy to proclaim frankly this noble aim of all its vows. Jealous of its independence, the invariable principle of its policy will be the most absolute respect of the independence of other nations.

If such are, as I have the happy confidence, the present sentiments of Your Majesty, general calm is assured for a long period, and Justice sitting on the boundaries of the several states will alone suffice to guard their frontiers.

I seize with eagerness this occasion to renew to you the sentiments of the sincere esteem, and of the perfect friendship with which I am, Monsieur my Brother, your good Brother,

NAPOLÉON.

This letter had no effect: the measures taken against Napoleon at the Congress of Vienna were quite unexampled. The coalition nations refused to treat with his new government. Although he was ready to accept the decision of the Congress on almost all points, the allies would not even receive his messages; his envoys were sent back at the frontier; and he was declared to be what was a new thing in international law, an outlaw in Europe. This was due as much to the fear of the powers that they would lose their spoils, as it was to a natural dread of the man.

A few days before, Napoleon had written the Emperor Francis: "At the moment that Providence brings me back to the capital of my state, the most lively of my vows is to see soon again the object of my most loving affection, my wife and my son. . . . I know too well the principles of Your Majesty, I know too well what value you attach to the affec-

tion of the family, not to have the happy confidence that, whatever may otherwise be the dispositions of your cabinet and your politics, you will be eager to accelerate the instant of the reunion of a wife with her husband and a son with his father." But this appeal was likewise ignored.

Perhaps Napoleon laid too much stress on the possibility of keeping the peace; yet while honestly desiring to regain his throne without war, he endeavored to strengthen his government by a resort to popular suffrage, by enlisting old opponents to accept office, and by creating a ministry containing men of the Revolutionary period. Maret was made Secretary of State, Carnot Minister of the Interior, Fouché of Police, Davout of War, Caulaincourt of Foreign Affairs, and Cambacérès of Justice; Bertrand was created Chief of Staff and Grand Marshal of the Palace, Decrès Minister of Marine, Gaudin of Finance, Mollien of the Public Treasury, Savary Inspector-General of Gendarmerie, Joseph President of the Council of Ministers. Still, Napoleon was unable to suppress the feeling of suspicion that existed: the majority feared that his coming meant renewed war. The soldier looked at him from one standpoint, the civilian from another; and apart from his old legions, Napoleon was accepted, not because France trusted him, but because it had grown to hate and fear the Bourbons. The capitalists and all conservative men were slow to support him, and Napoleon found a disunited France with which to oppose the whole of Europe. Despite his warm reception, when he was called on to take up arms, it had already been brought home to him that the nation was no longer his own, as it once had been.

He lost not a day in creating an army. The Bourbons had reduced the forces to one hundred and seventy thousand foot and horse, of which less than two thirds were available. The conscription of 1814 and 1815 was put in force. All sub-offi-

cers and soldiers who had left the army were called in, and the members of the Old and Young Guard were glad to report for duty. In each infantry regiment the first two battalions were completed by the third, in each cavalry regiment the first three squadrons by the fourth, the third battalions and fourth squadrons to be gradually filled up; and the excess of men went to make a fourth battalion and fifth squadron. All officers not called were to be in readiness; retired officers and men were invited to return to activity; and many old soldiers gladly came back. The St. Helena record narrates in detail what was done. "There was no need of coercive laws to constrain them to obey. They rushed in with songs: laborers, artisans, manufacturers, all left their work at the end of the week, put on their old uniforms and rejoined their old regiments."

There were organized, of National Guards, two hundred battalions of five hundred and sixty men each, of which, in the ninety strong places on the frontiers were one hundred and fifty-two, the rest being with the Observation Corps, and in reserve. The fortresses were armed, palisaded, provisioned and well commanded. Although this National Guard made good garrisons, "they were neither formed, instructed, nor clothed, and . . . would have only embarrassed the army," while in "guarding the frontiers they could finish their organization, be clothed and instructed, and on the 15th of July they could have entered into line."

"The most important matter was muskets, . . . but so much zeal and intelligence was put into the direction of the workshops, that from the month of May they furnished each day fifteen hundred muskets, in June three thousand, and beginning with the 1st of July, they were to furnish four thousand." The artillery and cavalry were carefully looked to; "some ten thousand horses used to the saddle . . . were

bought for cash from the gendarmes, and these purchased fresh horses for themselves." By June 1 forty-six thousand cavalry horses were in depots or in line. Yet as against all Europe, with more than a million men under arms, what was accomplished did not suffice; and steps were taken to raise another two hundred and fifty thousand men.

On April 3 Napoleon gave full direction for organizing the frontier populations to resist the invader. As the departments of France averaged three hundred thousand inhabitants, each was held to raise thirty thousand National Guards. . . . These were to be armed and equipped, the uniform being the simple blue blouse, with a black cartridge-box.

"On the 1st of June the effective of the French troops under arms was five hundred and fifty-nine thousand men." "On the 1st of October France would have a military state of eight to nine hundred thousand men, completely organized, armed and clothed. The problem of her independence consisted, then, in being able to keep hostilities distant until October 1. . . . At that time the frontiers of the empire would have been frontiers of brass, that no human power could have crossed unpunished."

Political measures were not neglected. Early in April secret agents were sent to Sweden, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, Saxony, and other countries, to strive for reconciliation. But the most essential thing was time for preparation, and the allied powers had no idea of affording Napoleon time. With the Congress of Vienna at work, their armies had not been sensibly decreased, although after the Peace of Paris these had all left France and reached home stations. They were now more rapid than ever before; they had wonderfully profited by Napoleon's teaching. Every allied army was at once mobilized and headed for the Rhine and the Meuse, on a plan of campaign not dissimilar to the last one, to be opened by mid-July. Four armies were to start towards Paris: from

the upper Rhine Schwartzberg with the Austrians, Bavarians and Wurtembergers; from the middle Rhine Barclay de Tolly with the Russians,—to accomplish which they marched from Poland in two months; from the lower Rhine and Belgium Blucher with the Prussians and Saxons, and Wellington with the English, German and Dutch troops; while from Italy two Austrian armies under Frimont and Bianchi were to threaten southern France. Although there was less force than was essential to meet an immediate operation by Napoleon, this strong purpose bore fruit. England, which had become one vast arsenal, covered the Channel with convoys to carry artillery and munitions to the Continent, which furnished the men; and by the end of May, France was surrounded along its entire frontier by allied troops; but the pass-word was to take no action until the Russian army came up into line.

There were two plans of action from which Napoleon might choose. One plan was to await near the frontier the attack of the powers, and avoid the onus of again provoking war. This would open part of France to the depredations of foreign armies; but it would give time to raise the maximum of forces, to complete preparations, and then meet the allies with their numbers lessened by corps they must leave opposite the French fortresses. It was 1814 over again, with its lessons learned. The other plan was without delay to move against the nearest allied forces—those standing in Belgium. This would save France from invasion to begin with; but in case of reverse, would bring it on earlier than it would naturally occur, and before the French levies were quite ready. Still, the offensive better suited the French idea; it lent the emperor a stronger hold of the situation; he remembered the failure of his defensive on the Elbe, and a victory over Wellington and Blucher might result in renewed negotiations or in dissolving the coa-

lition, or indeed induce a rising of the Netherlands and the old Confederation of the Rhine, where the French sentiment was still strong.

This plan "was conformable to the genius of the nation, to the spirit and to the principles of this war. . . . But could we, with one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, beat two armies . . . of two hundred and forty thousand men? . . . The allied armies were composed of troops more or less good; one Englishman could be counted for one Frenchman, two Dutchmen, Prussians or men from the Confederation for one Frenchman. They were under different generals and of nations diverse in interests and sentiments," say the St. Helena papers. After 1813 Napoleon showed narrow judgment in underrating the Prussians.

On the first plan, Napoleon would have time to raise a quarter million men for general operations, sixty thousand for the Rhine, over one hundred thousand new levies to defend Paris, and twenty-five thousand for Lyons, and it would afford time to fortify these two most important cities of France. On the second plan, he could barely reckon a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men with which to invade Belgium, and twenty-five thousand men to protect the outlets from Switzerland and the upper Rhine.

Although aware that in the eyes of Europe he was legally an usurper, Napoleon strove to base a new lease of sovereignty on the people: "Everything for the nation, and everything for France, that is my device," he said March 26, in a reply to the Address of the Ministers; and in answering the Council of State: "Sovereignty itself is hereditary only because the interest of the people demands it." Had he possessed the confidence of the people as he had won the heart of the army, it would have been wiser to wait. But as a military problem, and this alone could he consider, the sharp offensive was the only course which would not yield encouragement and time for preparation to the allies. The emperor had not forgotten

the title of the One Hundred Thousand Man which had been given him by his enemies, and he recognized that his old system of seizing and keeping the initiative — as he had sadly failed to do in 1813 — was by far the best. He believed that he could defeat the northern armies, and then take the others successively in detail. This second plan Napoleon himself spoke of as one to anticipate the allies, who could not be ready before July 15, and suddenly to open operations against Wellington and Blucher by June 15, leaving a sufficient curtain along the frontier, and garrisons in the fortresses. At Bordeaux, Toulouse, on the Var, at Chambéry, Belfort and Strasburg, little bodies were left, enough to retard but not cope with the enemy, while against the Vendée, where the royalists were again active, fifteen thousand men under Lamarque were dispatched, and the field army by so much diminished.

The emperor's plan had been early conceived, for on March 27 — a week after reaching Paris — he wrote Davout for the state of the 1st, 2d, 3d and 6th Corps. "It is with this army . . . that I shall act; I will there assemble my Guard, I will have in hand a mobile force of eighty thousand men. . . . The Army of the North will be the principal army. It is therefore to that one you are to give your attention." And next day Reille was ordered to Valenciennes, and Erlon to Lille, but notified not to place the troops in a hostile attitude. Still, "the emperor deliberated then whether, with the thirty-five thousand men" of Reille and Erlon, "he should commence hostilities April 1, by marching to Brussels and rallying the Belgian army under his flags. The English and Prussian armies were feeble, disseminated, without orders, without chiefs, and without plans; part of the officers were on leave; Wellington was in Vienna, Blucher in Berlin. The French army could be, April 2, in Brussels," says the *St. Helena*

record. On the other hand, were the hope of peace, the fact that these were nearly all the troops on hand, and the unsettled state of public opinion. The emperor decided to wait until he had a substantial army.

The opening with an offensive thrust on June 15 was no doubt a better policy than to wait longer. In their Vienna negotiations the allied powers had found many interests at variance; and the emperor recognized that so soon as the temporary bond of ending the Napoleonic régime had disappeared, they would have little in common. Upon this state of affairs a first decisive victory could not fail to produce a marked effect, and to this end he bent his energies. On April 24 he sent Dejean on an inspection tour of the northern frontier from Beauvais to Landau, to report the strength of the fortresses and citadels, the condition of the troops, artillery, and everything relating to the army. On April 27 Reille was ordered to locate his headquarters at Avesnes and a division in Maubeuge, his other divisions to canton behind the Sambre; Erlon to move headquarters to Valenciennes, assemble between that place and Condé, with a division at Lille, and withdraw from the coast towns. Each soldier was to have his cartridges, and two pairs of shoes in his knapsack, and the horses extra shoes. Vandamme was to assemble in second line between Rocroi and Mezières; Piré's cavalry, in reserve, to occupy Laon. In case anything happened, Reille and Erlon were to take position behind the Sambre, Vandamme to move up in support, and Piré forward to Guise. Magazines were created at Avesnes for one hundred thousand men and twenty thousand horses for ten days, and cartridges and munitions were distributed. And to show how early the emperor contemplated opening the operation, on April 27 Bertrand was ordered to send to Compiègne his military establishment, "containing a bed, a little silver campaign ser-

vice, two brigades of saddle-horses, a campaign carriage, a little tent, and finally everything that is necessary for warfare."

The actual division of the forces was published in the Decree of April 30; and the ancient and familiar organization was resumed; and "the numbers of the regiments, which they had borne since 1794, were restored; they had illustrated them in twenty-five campaigns and one thousand combats."

As usual with Napoleon, the commands given to prepare for the coming struggle were many. His eye was everywhere. All things were ordered with the ancient accuracy; it cannot be said that instructions were heeded with the same zeal. As a rule, orders were issued by Davout, upon instructions by the emperor. A few examples are quoted, as showing that, at the inception of this, his last campaign, his mind remained as alert and searching as it ever was. In the cabinet he was still supreme in his powers; but we shall see his physical strength fail him in the field, with a reflex effect on his morale: —

On May 9 Davout was instructed to have all line soldiers taken from the fortresses for use in the ranks, the fortresses being left to the charge of the National Guards. On May 12 to see that the lieutenant-generals commanding military divisions were not to shut themselves up in fortresses, but to stay outside, so as to organize proper resistance to invasion. "They are to remain until the last moment to have a care to the armament and clothing of the National Guards." On May 13 to see that of the eight companies of pontoons, one was to be left at Strasburg, one at Metz, and the six others to be sent to Douai, Paris and Laon. "These six companies, commanded by the best officer of pontoniers that you have, will be attached to the Army of the North."

On May 16 Napoleon sent Davout a report of Dejean on the service of rations in the north. "It seems that this service is very badly made, especially with regard to bread. War is going to break out, and the soldier cannot enter into campaign with four days' bread." On May 28

he called Davout's attention to the fact that fifty-four thousand men for the garrison of the fortresses in first line were too many, and that by June 5 they should be limited from six thousand in Lille, down to five hundred in small places, making all together thirty thousand men, plus the sedentary National Guards. On May 29 he sent him complaints about Bourcier for refusing horses nine or ten years old, of half an inch under measure : "A horse of ten years, well shaped, is better for us than a horse of five years." Two months before, he had written Davout : "Our cavalry does not seem to me in a satisfactory condition ;" and he now wrote : "I do not wish to mount this year any man who has not served in the cavalry." The surplus men thus got out of the cavalry were to be sent to the infantry.

On June 1 the Electoral College met on the Champ de Mai, and in his discourse to the deputies Napoleon said : —

"Emperor, Consul, Soldier, I hold everything from the people. In prosperity, in adversity, on the battlefield, in council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the sole and constant object of my thoughts and my actions. . . . We have had to prepare for war. . . . Frenchmen, my will is that of the people. My rights are its rights, my honor, my glory, my happiness, can be no other than the honor, the glory, and the happiness of France. . . . Soldiers of the National Guard of the Empire, Soldiers of the land and sea troops, . . . Soldiers of the National Guard of Paris, Soldiers of the Imperial Guard, I confide to you the imperial eagle with the national colors. You swear to perish if need be to defend it against the enemies of the country and the throne. . . . You, Soldiers of the National Guard of Paris, you swear never to suffer that the stranger shall again stain the capital of the Great Nation. . . . And you, Soldiers of the Imperial Guard, you swear to surpass yourselves in the campaign which is about to open, to die rather than to suffer that strangers should come to dictate law to the fatherland."

On May 30 the Guard had been ordered to be ready by June 5 at latest ; on June 3 Grouchy was to be prepared to open the campaign June 10 ; and orders went out for Gérard, with his Army of the Moselle, to move to Philippeville by the 12th. On June 7, along the frontier of the north, the Rhine and the Moselle, communication was stopped ; Soult was

ordered to Lille to see that the fortresses in first line were in order, and to rejoin the emperor the 12th at Laon; the Guard was to reach Laon the 9th or 10th.

Complaints were sent out to Drouot that "two regiments the emperor saw drilling had only one pair of shoes; they must have supplied to them two in their knapsacks and one on foot;" and the emperor wrote to Bertrand: "If something is wanting, let it be sent down; as I shall often camp, it is important that I should have my iron bedstead and my tents. Have an eye to my glasses being in good order. . . . Give orders that all my aides . . . shall send their horses to Soissons." On June 12 he wrote Davout: "I attach great importance to having the five hundred Poles in the saddle as soon as possible. . . . In placing them at the outposts, I hope to aid much the desertion of the Poles," meaning from the allied ranks.

The military situation was favorable, the enemy having but two immediately threatening armies in the field. One was based on Brussels and the British Channel, and stood under Wellington, whom in Spain we have seen defeat several of Napoleon's marshals, but who had as yet met no leader of his own rank, who was methodical to a fault, more apt to receive than to deliver battle, and had yet to measure himself with a giant in war. The other was based on Liège, Maestricht and the Rhine, and stood under Blucher, a general of the opposite type, audacious to a degree, who also had beaten Napoleon's marshals, and though always worsted by Napoleon under any conditions approaching equality, yet harbored the feeling that the emperor was by no means invincible. Here were two armies with eccentric bases, either one of which Napoleon could outnumber, commanded by men of different temperaments, whose ideas were apt to clash so as to afford him a good opening; and all other armies would be several weeks in arriving. Napoleon was justified in assuming that he could win his first battle. What better strategic proposition could he have?

The campaign of 1815 was planned with as exquisite skill as any of Napoleon's masterpieces; neither Ulm nor Jena was better. But its conduct, like that of the three previous campaigns, fell short of Napoleonic perfection, and, better than any other, it illustrates how, from the days of Wagram, the great captain had fallen from his high estate.

It was essential that not only Lyons but Paris should be placed beyond capture, except by a regular siege. Davout was to remain in the capital, charged with all the duties of Minister of War and with its defense.

"If," says the St. Helena record, "in 1805 Vienna had been fortified, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the issue of the war. The army corps commanded by Kutusov would have been able to wait for the other corps of the Russian army already at Olmütz, as well as the army of Prince Charles, coming on from Italy. In 1809 Prince Charles, who had been beaten at Eggmühl and obliged to retreat by the left bank of the Danube, would have had the time to reach Vienna, and there unite with the corps of Hiller and the army of Archduke John. If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army beaten at Jena would have rallied on it, and the Russian army would have rejoined it." The emperor then gives twelve instances in which Paris had owed its safety to its fortifications. "It is the greatest of contradictions and of inconsequences to leave so important a point without immediate defense."

On returning from the Austerlitz campaign the emperor frequently entertained the subject, and made several projects to fortify the heights of Paris, but "the fear and disquiet of the inhabitants, the events which succeeded each other with an incredible rapidity, prevented him from taking action on this project. . . . Paris and Lyons were the two important points, and as long as they were occupied in force, the country would not be lost, nor obliged to submit to the discretion of enemies."

In discussing the question of fortifying Paris, it was claimed that the garrison would consume too many soldiers, who might

old marshals were only in part present. St. Cyr, Oudinot, Macdonald, had not rejoined. Massena was ill. On April 10 Davout was ordered to strike from the list of marshals Berthier, Marmont, Victor, Pérignon, Augereau, Kellermann, but to some of those who had no fortune a pension was to be given; on April 18 Napoleon wrote Davout that he had cashiered Generals Souham, Dupont, Desolles, Maison and others, without further pension or activity. All this affected the morale of the army.

Napoleon erred in choosing Soult to replace Berthier. Several officers in the army would have done this work better, many as well, for a man who has been commander-in-chief is apt to be unfitted for the duties of chief of staff. Soult would have commanded one wing of the army better than he performed his unaccustomed duties, — vastly better than Grouchy.

Despite the suspicions of the rank and file, the field army possessed excellent corps and division commanders, among them Vandamme, Lobau, Erlon, Reille, Gérard, Grouchy and Drouot, although these generals were not equal to those Napoleon had formerly led; nor had they the same ambition. Napoleon's system of war did not breed up men as fast as the methods of the Revolution, where success was the main test. Some of his ancient lieutenants, as we have seen, he could not get; others were changed in command. He wrote, April 18, to Massena: "I thank you for having conserved Toulon and Antibes. . . . I desire much to see you, if the state of your health permits;" and on June 11 he wrote Davout: "Have Massena come. If he wishes to go to Metz, give him the government." Napoleon had invited Ney to join him: "I will receive you as I did the day after the battle of the Moskwa;" as we have seen, Ney reported March 17, and, ten days later, was sent along the frontier from Lille to Landau to report on its state and the character of the officers in com-

mand ; and as hostilities came nearer, Napoleon wrote, June 11, to Davout : “ My Cousin, have Ney called to me ; if he desires to be present at the first battles which will take place, tell him that he is to be, the 14th, at Avesnes, where my headquarters will be.” But Ney did not receive the command of Napoleon’s left wing until too late to get to know the troops he was to lead. From the reserve cavalry, Grouchy was changed to the command of the right wing. Approaches had been made to Murat, but events marched too rapidly to have them take effect. Perhaps the strongest man, and as firm, though not as brilliant a fighter as Ney, and a far broader soldier, was Davout. Although there was unending labor in the capital, he had begged hard for field-work ; but Napoleon insisted on his defending Paris, though Davout had sensibly pointed out to him that, victorious, he would keep Paris, and, defeated, no one could hold it for him. Perhaps the emperor feared internal trouble in the capital, and remembered how sternly Davout had mastered Hamburg ; perhaps he feared disagreement again, if, as in Russia, Ney and Davout should work together. Yet he knew that Soult and Ney were at odds. Speculations are useless, but it seems evident that, had Napoleon in season selected Davout and Soult to play the largest active rôles in the coming campaign, and kept Ney for action under his own eye in the centre, he would have had a stronger army.

We left Wellington after the battle of Toulouse, in April, 1814. When Napoleon abdicated, the Peninsular army was broken up, and after a diplomatic mission to Spain, Wellington was appointed ambassador to France ; but his position being personally unpleasant, he was recalled. Before entering upon his duties in Paris, he had been instructed to report on the defense of the Belgian frontier ; and from its strategic situation and tactical values, his eye fell on Mont St. Jean

way of Liège and Maestricht to Cologne, whence came the supplies ; the English drew their victual and munition by way of Ostend and Antwerp : in case of disaster, the lines of retreat would diverge. Napoleon knew generally that Wellington was cantoned south of Brussels and Blucher around Namur ; and from the beginning expected and hoped that the Prussians would be the ones he could first attack. If he could drive Blucher back to the Rhine and Wellington back to the sea, the enthusiastic French people would heartily support him, and he would gain a standpoint for treating with the allies. With his gigantic conceptions and self-confidence, — even after 1814, — he had small idea that this campaign was to be his last.

It was the position of the allied armies that led Napoleon to undertake the same form of strategic opening to which he had resorted in his first campaign in 1796, to wit, one line of operations, one mass, an assembly at a safe distance, the rupture of the enemy's centre, and the hurling of his mass upon each part separately, so that each might be thrown back along its own line of communications. Of such a divergent retreat there was apparently small doubt : the allied commanders had not only different bases, but different interests to subserve ; once separated, why should they hold together ? In 1794 the Austrians, operating in this country on the same lines and beaten at the battle of Fleurus, retired towards the Rhine, separating from York, who commanded the Anglo-Dutch.

From one standpoint Napoleon was justified in grounding his operation on this assumption. It was the natural thing to expect, — as was the allied eccentric retreat when he moved on their point of junction in 1796, — and all that it required to bring it about was the same discernment, energy and rapidity that Bonaparte exhibited in that surprising campaign. From another standpoint Napoleon had no right to base his

action on Blucher's standing for battle, because in 1813 he had learned that Blucher was capable of smart avoidance of it, nor on Blucher's moving away towards his own base, for he had also seen him throw up his communications to join Schwartzenberg. But war is a game of chances, he had to choose a risk, and the fact that he had stronger opponents than then, and men who had partly learned his methods, in no wise altered the value of the plan. The theatre on which the drama was to be enacted was not much more extensive than in 1796; there was the same danger he had then run, that the superior forces of the enemy, handled with speed and common purpose, would unite to fight, or would outflank and envelop him; his task was to prove that Napoleon, with all his experience, was now as much superior in military qualities to Wellington and Blucher, as Bonaparte, with none, had been to Beaulieu and Colli. His main error lay in underrating the fighting stanchness of Wellington and the strategic enterprise of Blucher. He no longer weighed facts at their worth.

Of course the emperor might have moved down the Meuse about the Prussian left, or down the Scheldt about the British right, which latter Wellington thought was his better scheme. But to turn the Prussian left would take him over the Ardennes country, not easy to subsist in, and would drive the allies together; to turn Wellington's right led him past fortresses he must either capture or observe, thus depleting his forces; and while it might cause the evacuation of Brussels, it would permit the Prussians to concentrate at their leisure, and move to the rear to join the English for battle. In the plan adopted, which was assuredly the soundest, Napoleon felt certain he could compel Blucher to fight, and the risk he assumed was warranted.

It was natural that Wellington, never having met Napoleon, should have misconceived his probable plan. Yet it

was manifestly of no use to turn either army and seize its communications, because that of itself would open fresh communications with the other army, and the very fact that Blucher and Wellington proposed to unite for battle ought to have suggested that Napoleon would try to prevent their so doing. Blucher had personally seen Napoleon's method in 1806; and in 1813 and 1814 had led large operations against him, and his ideas were sounder. He believed he might himself be first attacked, and he chose the position of Sombreffe for a defensive battle, relying on Wellington's aid.

The use of the phrase "breaking through the centre" is objected to by some critics, as is also the statement that Napoleon proposed to break through between Blucher's and Wellington's armies. Even Clausewitz says: "The interval between the two armies cannot be the objective of operations, and it would be very unfortunate if a captain like Bonaparte had had the idea of striking in the empty interval, and thus giving a sword-thrust in the water;" and he adds that such a proceeding lays one open to being attacked in the rear by one army, while fighting the other. It is manifest that when he wrote, Clausewitz had not carefully read the story of Montenotte, or that of Abensberg, or that of Champaubert. He was not, like Jomini, permeated with the Napoleonic idea. "It was not a question of throwing one's self into an empty interval which did not exist," says Grouard, "but to create one by a first success and to profit afterwards from the separation produced to successively combat the fractions of the enemy's army." It is a mere question of wording. The manœuvre remains intact. Providing what is meant by it is understood, the phrase is as good as any other, and it is of such ancient application (as are also many of the much-berated Maxims of War), that it remains a convenient one to use. What it means is not that Napoleon strove to advance on a geometric

line between the two armies, so as merely to stand between them and interrupt their communication, but that he proposed to advance upon one army from such a direction that he would prevent coöperation with the other army, and be able to attack and defeat the first army before the other could come up to its support. This direction implied a more or less central line between them. As it happened in this case, the Prussians were the ones to be attacked, and Napoleon did not exactly interpose between them and their allies, but he did do the thing which for generations has been strategically known as breaking through the centre between two armies; and the adoption of a new phrase will neither change the facts nor lead to their clearer understanding. There is no objection to the use of any other form of words to represent the same act, neither does it seem that this phrase, acceptable to so many able military critics, and so commonly used and understood by military men of all languages, need be discarded. It is constantly employed by foreign military men, who constitute the vast majority of those interested in military studies, and who are called on most frequently to put military theories into practice. Like many terms of the Common Law, even if old fashioned, it will serve. It may savor of originality to create a new term, but does it really enrich the science? To replace old Common Law words by new Code phrases has by no means always been successful: the new phrases themselves have to be construed. Similarly with this one.

To say that Napoleon interposed between the two armies implies his intention to fight one after the other. To turn the enemy's flank and to stop there would yield no result. Everything depends on the battle which must ensue upon a manœuvre; and just as Napoleon proposed, after turning Mack's right flank at Ulm, or that of the Prussians at Jena, or after cutting Charles in two at Abensberg, to fight and

destroy the enemy, so now, in interposing between the two armies, he intended to fight immediately after completing his manœuvre. Whoso limits Napoleon's idea to pushing between the two allied armies and marching on Brussels without a battle must have ill read the history of this great captain, to whom strategic marches were invariably preludes to general engagements.

The strategic scheme was perfect, and despite delays, it almost succeeded: the failure of the campaign does not prove the others to be better manœuvres. The allies outnumbered the French in the ratio of nine to five; why should Napoleon choose an operation that drove Blucher towards Wellington, or Wellington towards Blucher, so that he must tactically decide the event by fighting them both at the same time? Safety lay in thrusting them apart so as to fight them singly; and the Napoleon of any year from 1796 to 1808 would have won the game. It was lost in 1815 by but a few hours' delay.

That Wellington looked upon Napoleon's best manœuvre as one round his own right flank was in a way due to the natural feeling he harbored that his army was the important one of the campaign. This feeling was not partaken by Napoleon, who considered Blucher a more dangerous because more reckless opponent. From what he knew of the allied positions, he anticipated an early battle with the Prussians, and believed it would be some days before Wellington would be ready to meet him. Although scarcely appreciating how nervous Wellington was for his right flank, he none the less ordered some small diversions in the Mons region by the National Guards from the fortresses, and later a cavalry raid, to hide his real operation.

It was an error of the allied commanders to keep their troops spread in cantonments until Napoleon was actually upon them. At this season it would have been no hardship for the men to be in the open. It has been suggested that

Blucher might have made his headquarters at Genappe, cantoned his army between Louvain and Gosselies, and occupied the Sambre with cavalry parties, and that Wellington, with headquarters at Brussels, might have cantoned his army forward from there to Soignies. Both armies would then have practically been in one body; as it was, each stood alone and unready. Although by June 11 Wellington heard rumors of the movements of French masses behind the frontier, he did nothing to get his troops in hand, for his predominant feeling was that he ought to hold Brussels, and Ghent, the refuge of the sovereigns; and it was his way to be hypercautious as to his communications. His cantonments were chosen rather for concentration against a movement from Mons than against one from Charleroi; and the information he gathered until the last day led him to suspect that this operation was likely.

Wellington and Blucher had met at Tirlemont May 3, and had arranged upon a plan of coöperation in case they should move into France; but an invasion was deferred until the arrival of the Russians. No document has come to light providing for the case of an advance by the French; but whether, as Müffling asserts, because the junction of the two armies for a defensive battle was so distinctly prescribed by circumstances and the topography, it is hard to say. In this meeting, a French advance through Charleroi was discussed, Müffling tells us, and it was agreed that in such case the Prussians should concentrate between Sombreffe and Charleroi, and the English between Marchienne and Gosselies, where the two armies would be together. Siborne says that Quatre Bras and Sombreffe were to be the points. And there was a general understanding that whichever army was attacked should concentrate out towards its front, and the other should come to its aid. The two commanders intended and strove to act together. Blucher expected that Wellington would promptly

assemble in case the French advanced, and this Wellington would have done more effectively, had not his troops been so dangerously disseminated. Past coalitions had generally failed for want of coöperation on the larger scale; part of their failure was due to the skill of Napoleon; but with such leaders as the Archduke Charles and Suwarrov, there is small doubt that, had the allies held together, they would sooner have mastered the French. They finally did this in 1813 and 1814 by strict coöperation, backed up by patient and prudent, if not the ablest conduct. They reached Paris in 1814, after numberless errors, because they had acted with a common purpose. In the 1815 campaign their first purpose was broad coöperation: the sending in across the French frontier of sufficient concentrically moving armies to be able to crush all possible opposition. Here in Belgium also, the prime idea was coöperation between the two armies; and although detailed plans in case Napoleon advanced into Belgium are not of record, they must have been made; and at the same time each leader understood that, while he must look to his own safety, it was essential to work together, and moreover each understood that by coöperation alone could they win, or conserve the safety of either army.

The Franco-Belgian frontier has three topographically different regions. From the sea to the Scheldt, the first section, cut up by canals and ponds, affords excellent defensive country. The second, including the upper Scheldt and the Sambre country, is a plain which stretches into France as far as Cambray and St. Quentin, and northerly to Ath and Nivelles, and then becomes more accentuated; while on the right bank of the Sambre the ground is more cut up with forests, ravines and valleys. The third stretches from the Sambre to the Moselle, and although the ground is much more rugged, the roads are numerous and good, and a line

of operations towards Namur or Liège could be maintained. Although the Sambre is a small river, its banks and bed are marshy, and it is not always easy to cross. The first and third sections in a way prescribe an advance from France into Belgium by way of Charleroi towards Brussels; and during the wars of Louis XIV. and the early Revolution, the operations were mostly in this section, which affords breadth and ease of manœuvring.

The theatre of the 1815 campaign is bounded on the south by the Sambre from Maubeuge to Namur. Nearly midway between these towns lies Charleroi, an ancient crossing. Twenty miles or more to the west lies Mons; a little less to the east Namur. Somewhat over thirty miles north is Brussels, and from this city to Charleroi and to the towns of Champagne runs a good *chaussée*, while the main route from Brussels to Paris goes through Hal and Mons. Nine miles south of Brussels lies the village of Waterloo, and back of it the Forest of Soignes, through which runs the highway; and on either side of the road the woods are fairly open, so that if necessary, foot and horse in good order could march through them; but artillery would have to keep to the road, and the passage might be gorged by disordered troops, or accidents to a train. Over ten miles north of Charleroi the *chaussée* to Brussels is cut by the paved road which runs from Hal through Nivelles to Namur, and this cross-roads is known as *Quatre Bras*. Ligny lies a mile south of this road, northeast of Charleroi. Wavre is a short ten miles east of Waterloo. From Charleroi northeast runs a paved road through Fleurus to Sombrefe, beyond which place it crosses the Nivelles-Namur road, and goes on through Gembloux to Tirlemont. Two miles south of Waterloo lie the village and height known as *Mont St. Jean*, on the southern slopes of which the heaviest fighting of the battle of Waterloo took place. The

ground is rolling, mostly open, with patches of woods at intervals; there are no streams which in good weather seriously interfere with the operations of any arm, and an abundance of country roads run in every direction. Yet the Dyle and its affluents at times are hard to cross, and at St. Lambert and Lasne, form a sort of defile for the road from Wavre to Planchenoit. The soil is apt to be deep in case of rain. Within the irregular triangle whose base is the Mons-Charleroi-Namur line, and the apex Brussels, was conducted the strategic manœuvring which began with the crossing of the Sambre by Napoleon June 15, 1815, the tactical conflicts of Ligny and Quatre Bras on the 16th, the strategical manœuvres to a junction by Blucher and Wellington the 17th; the following of the allies to Waterloo by Napoleon on the same day; and the final tactical destruction of the French army on the 18th, by the two allied armies.

Looking at the field from Charleroi, it was along the road to Liège, and along that to Brussels, that ran the lines of advance and retreat of Napoleon's two powerful opponents. Wellington and Blucher were united by the Nivelles-Namur road, and the key-points on this road, the possession of which would cut the allied generals apart, were Quatre Bras and Sombreffe. To carry out his plan of breaking through the allied centre, these two points on the line by which the allies would sustain each other were the ones which Napoleon must first aim to seize; and this he could do only by speed superior to theirs.

Early in June Erlon left the neighborhood of Lille and Reille Valenciennes, to move towards Maubeuge and Avesnes. "The garrisons of all the strong places from Dunkirk on masked this movement, by occupying the debouches with strong detachments, so that at the moment when the cantonments on this frontier were assembling, the vanguards were

tripled, and the enemy, deceived, believed that the whole army was concentrating on its left. The 6th Corps left Laon and moved on Avesnes, the reserve cavalry concentrated on the Sambre," narrate the Memoirs.

The rendezvous of the several French corps for the opening of the operation was thus south of the Sambre opposite Charleroi, and the army from several points along the border assembled on a line from Maubeuge to Philippeville, with a force at Solre-sur-Sambre and the centre and headquarters at Beaumont. Wellington at Brussels and Blucher at Namur were ignorant of Napoleon's position and force, although Müffling says that on June 13 they knew that he was concentrating at Maubeuge; and sundry other rumors had run in; but so little did they expect the French advance in force at this moment, that on June 14 Blucher still had part of Ziethen's corps at Charleroi, Pirch's at Namur, Thielemann's between Huy and Dinant, and Bülow's at Liège, while Wellington was dangerously spread in his cantonments back of Nivelles and Ath.

The Order of the Day, Avesnes, June 13, gave the position of the French army the 14th:—

Guard infantry in front of Beaumont in three lines. The regiment of grenadiers at Beaumont, Guard cavalry behind Beaumont. Reille at Leers, within the frontier, his cavalry in front holding all the debouches, with fires hidden; Erlon at Solre; Vandamme a league in front of Beaumont; Lobau at a quarter league behind Vandamme; Milhaud between Beaumont and Walcourt, all with similar orders. Bridge equipage behind Lobau; artillery reserve behind Beaumont; Gérard in front of Philippeville; sappers at the head of each division. . . . "All the corps will march in the greatest order and closed up. In the movement on Charleroi, they will be so formed as to profit by all the debouches, so as to crush the enemy's corps who would wish to attack the army or manœuvre against it." The old regulations as to baggage and camp-followers to be in vigor. These orders to be kept secret by the generals.

So far the Order. "The camps were established behind high ground a league back from the frontier, in such manner that the fires were not perceived by the enemy," say the Memoirs.

"The army is fine and the weather very good. The country is perfectly suited," Napoleon wrote Joseph next day; and to Davout, in the morning: "I shall pass the Sambre to-morrow, the 15th. If the Prussians do not vacate it, I shall have a battle. As a last instruction, Suchet is to defend Lyons, the Saone and the Rhone. Rapp is to defend Alsatia as long as possible, then the Vosges, then the Meurthe, finally the Meuse, Marne, etc."

On June 14 the emperor issued a proclamation

TO THE ARMY.

Soldiers, to-day is the anniversary of Marengo and Friedland, which twice decided the destiny of Europe. Then, as after Austerlitz, as after Wagram, we were too generous. We believed the protestations and the oaths of the princes we left upon the throne. To-day, in coalition against us, they threaten the independence and the most sacred rights of France. . . . Soldiers, at Jena, against these same Prussians, so arrogant to-day, you were one against three, at Montmirail one against six. . . . For every Frenchman who has heart, the moment has arrived to vanquish or to perish.

Napoleon could feel satisfied with his operation: so well had he managed that his whole army by June 14 had been drawn in from along the frontier and assembled south of Charleroi, ready to cross the Sambre, Reille and Erlon on the left, Vandamme and Lobau with the Guard in the centre, and Gérard on the right. Charleroi was the main objective, but the right and left were to cross above or below. His opening had been exquisite. Four corps stationed on the Belgian frontier, and so masked as to be unperceived by the enemy, were drawn in from a front of twenty miles, assembled back of Charleroi on a front of six, a fifth corps came

up from the Aisne, the Guard moved from Paris; and under cover of a diversion towards Mons and Tournay by the National Guard, as if to turn the British right, one hundred and twenty-five thousand men gathered in front of the allies without their having any but remote news of the manœuvre. The emperor proposed to catch Ziethen unawares, and promptly to seize Quatre Bras and Sombreffe.

Orders were accordingly issued on the 14th for the French army to break up at 3 A. M. on the 15th: "the object of His Majesty is to have crossed the Sambre before noon:"—

Beaumont, June 14. Order of March. Vandamme's light cavalry was to move towards Charleroi at 2.30 A. M., to scout the country, in parties of not less than fifty men each, Pajol to follow them up. In each corps the reveillé to sound a half hour before the march. Vandamme to march at 3 A. M. on Charleroi. Lobau to march at 4 to sustain Vandamme. The Young Guard to march at 5 behind Lobau. The foot chasseurs of the Guard to march at 5.30 to follow the Young Guard. The foot grenadiers of the Guard to leave at 6. Grouchy's cavalry to start at 5.30, with the three corps an hour apart on lateral roads. Reille to march at 3 on Marchienne, so as to be there before 9. Erlon to march at 3 o'clock . . . following Reille, sustaining his left, to place a division in Thuin, and repair the bridge if broken. Gérard to move from Philippeville to Charleroi at 3 A. M., if his troops had been assembled. Reille, Vandamme, Gérard and Pajol to keep in constant communication. The cavalry of the Guard to leave at 8 A. M. towards Charleroi. The emperor at the vanguard. The pontoons in two sections, one in front and one with the reserve. The headquarters train to move at 10 A. M. The ambulances to be at the head of the general train. No wagons to be in the columns of troops, on pain of being burned.

Before daylight, June 15, Napoleon wrote to Joseph: "As the enemy has made movements to attack us, I am marching to meet him. Hostilities will begin to-day."

The emperor was at the head of the centre.

Owing to an accident to the courier, Vandamme's orders were delayed and his corps did not start until 7 A. M., — a most

regrettable delay. The order of march was broken, and Pajol's cavalry was followed by the Young Guard. Still, the enemy was pushed back, and the bridge having been only damaged by Ziethen, — curiously, he destroyed none of the important ones, — it was carried by the marines and sappers of the Guard, and Pajol entered Charleroi at noon. Here a halt was made to let Vandamme come up. This was the first loss of time in the campaign, and one result was that the work of the 15th was only partly accomplished. Pirch II. retired towards Gilly, followed by Pajol; here he stood and contained Vandamme and Grouchy, who lost three hours, from the idea that they had a large force in their front, until the emperor came up at 5 P. M. and pushed the Prussians back along the Gembloux road. Thus the centre sustained by the Guard was by evening echeloned along the road between Charleroi and Fleurus, which latter place Ziethen occupied. Had the French on the march to and across the Sambre bivouacked in order of battle rather than in order of march, they would have kept better in hand for the work of both the 15th and 16th. So much for the centre.

On the left Reille started early from Leers, moved up the river, and occupied all the bridges to Marchienne, where he crossed and obliqued forward to Jumet, Steinmetz, on Ziethen's right, retiring from Fontaine l'Evêque towards St. Amand through Gosselies, followed by Clary and Lefebvre. At Gosselies, at 5 P. M., Ney took command, and advancing with Bachelu, preceded by Piré, on Frasnès, drove from the place, late in the afternoon, some of Prince Bernard's outlying posts, which retired to Quatre Bras, already held by his brigade. Ziethen's right wing Prussians retired on Fleurus, followed by Girard. Jerome and Foy remained at Gosselies. Reille had done good work. Not so Erlon, who followed an hour late. As in the Pampeluna campaign, he lacked prompt-

ness. He had farther to go, but no fighting to do, and at night his headquarters was at Marchienne; but he had not completed his crossing, nor carried out his orders to sustain Reille. Gérard's crossing was changed to Chatelet, and was made later; but at night most of his forces were still on the right bank.

The emperor's purpose to throw his army over to the plateau at Fleurus and to seize Quatre Bras and Sombreffe had not been realized. The advance had been less rapid than of yore; the several parts of the army did not move without friction, as they had used to do. Soult's management was not Berthier's; only part of the day's task had been accomplished.

But worse than delay had happened. Late on June 14, at the opening of operations, Bourmont, who knew what the emperor's dispositions were to be in the coming few days, with two other superior officers of the 4th Corps, went over to the enemy. Being brought before Blücher, the latter learned the situation, and having already heard of a threatened movement from Dornberg, commanding an English cavalry brigade near Mons, and from Ziethen, who had had parties across the river to observe the French camp-fires, he was convinced of his danger, and ordered in Bülow from Liège, Thielemann from the right bank of the Meuse, to assemble at Namur, and Pirch from the Namur country to Sombreffe, hoping to sustain Ziethen in season to carry out the common project of defense. For if driven back from the right, Ziethen had orders to hold Fleurus, and the other corps to concentrate at Sombreffe in support. Blücher placed more importance on this point than Wellington did on Quatre Bras. Thus, early on the 15th, movements on the Prussian and French side began, while the Anglo-Dutch were quietly resting in their cantonments, Wellington's staff having managed to get no news of the advance of the French sent to headquarters.

“The character of the enemy’s generals-in-chief was different,” said Napoleon at St. Helena. “The hussar habits of Blücher, his activity and hazardous character contrast with the circumspect character and the slow marches of Wellington. If the Prusso-Saxon army was not first attacked, it would put more activity and good-will in running to the aid of the Anglo-Dutch army than this would put to aiding Blücher.”

All Napoleon’s measures which had for aim first to attack the Prussians were bearing fruit.

Although the work of the day had not been completed, yet Napoleon had won the first innings, and had, in the face of the enemy, crossed the Sambre. As, just north of Charleroi, the emperor had stood at the junction of the Brussels and Liège roads, he had been joined by Ney, and to his old combative comrade he had given the command of the left wing.

As we are told by the Duc d’Elchingen in his *Documents Inédits*, the emperor said to Ney: “You will take over the command of the 1st and 2d infantry corps. Reille is marching with three divisions on Gosselies; Erlon is to be by night at Marchienne-au-Pont; you will have with you Piré’s light cavalry division; I also give you the two regiments of hussars and lancers of my Guard, but do not use them. To-morrow the heavy cavalry reserve of Kellermann will reach you. Go and drive the enemy back.” This evidence is of the same value as that of the emperor at St. Helena. Each witness had a case to prove. “Ney had just arrived on the battlefield,” says the St. Helena record. “The emperor at once gave him orders to go to Gosselies and take command of all the left . . . and to fall headlong on all that he should meet on the road from Gosselies to Brussels, to take position astride this road beyond Quatre Bras, and to hold himself there in a military manner, having strong vanguards on the roads to Brussels, Namur and Nivelles.”

When, as Chesney says, Napoleon in his *Memoirs* does not contradict himself, is not contradicted by any other testimony, or has evidently no reason for distorting the facts, his evidence is of great weight. Here he is contradicted, and there exists no proof that any mention was made of Quatre Bras in the first verbal order to Ney; and as it was already

late, the marshal can scarcely be held responsible for not moving beyond Frasnés. He may not have understood the importance of Quatre Bras. Had he pushed on the couple of miles farther and occupied this cross-roads, Wellington could not have reached Blücher, the two allies would have been separated, and prevented from uniting except by a movement to the rear; but Ney heard firing in the direction of Fleurus, Girard reported large forces there, he feared for his right flank, and his young troops being tired by their first march in the presence of the enemy, he stopped his advance between Gosselies and Frasnés, where he bivouacked, merely throwing a few videttes out towards Quatre Bras, which was held by Prince Bernard. The firing he had heard came from Vandamme and Grouchy, who were following Ziethen towards Fleurus. At night Ney rode back to imperial headquarters at Charleroi to get further instructions. The day of the 15th, which would have been perfect had both Quatre Bras and Sombrefe been taken, ended without seizing either. It might be claimed that it was too far for the young troops to march. But a part of the foot did get within a mile or two of Quatre Bras, and Sombrefe was no farther. Had everything gone properly, Ziethen could well have been pushed back, and the troops have made the ten miles from Charleroi.

On the evening of June 15 Piré's cavalry and Bachelu occupied Frasnés, Jerome and Foy Gosselies, Girard had moved up to the right and was at Wangenies near Grouchy, Erlon had crossed the river. Vandamme and Lobau were on the Fleurus road, the Guard in Charleroi with some cavalry still on the right bank. Gérard had not yet crossed at Chatelet.

“The French army bivouacked in a square of four leagues each side. It was equally able to move against the Prusso-Saxon or the Anglo-Dutch army. It was already placed between them. The two armies were surprised, their communications much disturbed. All the manœuvres of

the emperor had succeeded properly. He was now master to attack in detail the enemy's armies. There remained to them, to avoid this disaster, which was the greatest of all, only to cede the ground and to rejoin at Brussels and beyond it." This claim is exaggerated, and fails to chime with other statements in the Memoirs.

What had the Anglo-Dutch been doing? Early June 15 the Prince of Orange, riding his outposts, had heard firing at Thuin, and with the information had returned to Brussels, where he was to attend the now famous Duchess of Richmond's ball. At headquarters information had run in from Blucher that a French advance was more likely by way of Charleroi than Mons, and during the afternoon Wellington had prepared orders for the troops to be grouped in their respective localities in readiness to march. These orders consumed much time for issue and delivery. About 10 P. M., upon further news from Blucher that the French had entered Charleroi and were moving on a broad front towards Brussels, Wellington ordered a general movement of assembly to the eastward, — on Nivelles, Braine and Enghien. The orders issued on the 15th and 16th look as if the original intention to concentrate at Quatre Bras had gone lost; Wellington now seemed to consider Nivelles the better place, as Napoleon asserts it had been his effort to impress upon him, by the diversions from the frontier fortresses.

But while, during the 15th, the British had remained quietly in place, Prince Bernard's brigade, cantoned in the Genappe-Frasnes region, had pushed parties out towards the Sambre. So soon as the first outpost shot fell, and before receiving orders to that effect, he judiciously assembled at Quatre Bras; and when at Frasnes his outlying party was attacked by Reille, the Prince of Orange's chief of staff, Rebecque, ordered Perponcher also forward to Quatre Bras. Wellington had already instructed Orange to assemble two

divisions at Nivelles, and a fresh order to Perponcher to move there followed the first; but aware that all the conditions would not be known at British headquarters, Orange took the responsibility of keeping this force at Quatre Bras; and early next morning Bylandt's brigade came up. It thus happened that Quatre Bras was occupied during the night of June 15-16 in contravention of Wellington's orders, who kept his eye on Nivelles, apparently deeming his own right more endangered than Blucher's army.

When Napoleon returned from the front, Baron Fain wrote from Charleroi, at 9 P. M., to Joseph: "Monseigneur, it is nine in the evening. The emperor, who has been in the saddle since three this morning, has come back quite tired out. He has thrown himself on his bed to repose a few hours. He is to mount again at midnight. As His Majesty could not write to Your Highness, he charged me to send you word as follows: The army forced the Sambre near Charleroi and placed the vanguard half-way from Charleroi to Namur, and from Charleroi to Brussels. . . . It is possible that to-morrow there will be a very important affair."

When Napoleon crossed the Sambre with his van, and sat down on the edge of Charleroi to see the troops file by, it is said he soon fell asleep. He was frequently noticed thus to doze. He had not been used to being so long in the saddle, and he had worked hard all the 15th. It is perhaps a little thing to do, but it is an indication that the emperor was no longer physically equal to the conduct of a very difficult military operation. At Ratisbon in 1809 he had failed to pursue; in 1812 he had shown signs of physical weakness; in 1813 he frequently made other things yield to his personal comfort; in 1814 he had borne up against the desperate conditions with wonderful vigor; but the life at Elba had not increased his power of continuous work. He had long had some kidney trouble; hemorrhoids now annoyed him, and since his stay in Fontainebleau after the French campaign, he had suffered

from still another disease, says Charras, making all physical exertion, and especially riding, difficult and painful.

“He no longer subdued, as formerly, distractions, sleep, fatigue. His power of application seemed to have reached its limit,” says Constant. As he himself said of Ney, he was not the same man. “In the latter years the emperor had grown fat,” we are told by Foy; “he ate more, slept longer, and rode less; but he retained all the vigor of his mind, and his passions had lost little of their strength.”


He no longer subordinated his bodily ailments to the demands of the occasion; many things had to yield to his own comfort. Unlike Frederick, whose activity during a severe attack of the gout and its accompanying fever, in October, 1759, was the same as ever, Napoleon was now guilty, at the very inception of the campaign, of little lapses in time, the sum of which during the coming four days made up a tale of neglect that ruined an operation which in conception and opening is equal to any he ever conducted. While in speed and conduct he was quite equal to his opponents, this did not suffice to win the campaign against such overwhelming odds. At St. Helena he acknowledged that he could not see as clearly or work as actively: “It is certain that I felt conscious that something had gone from me.” He was physically more able in 1814 than in 1815. Sir W. Napier reports Soult as saying: “The emperor seemed at times to be changed; there were moments when his genius and activity seemed as powerful and fresh as ever; at other moments he seemed apathetic. For example, he fought the battle of Waterloo without having himself examined the enemy’s position. He trusted to General Haxo’s report. In former days he would have examined and reëxamined it in person.” Such a method would not work against as prudent a general as Wellington, or as enterprising a leader as Blucher, both noteworthy fighters, especially as the army at his back was no longer the old

invincible body, but one that now had the sad traditions of the Beresina, of Leipsic, of a captured Paris.

In the Bulletin of the Army, Charleroi, June 15, evening, the positions of the 14th were recapitulated, and it goes on :

“The 15th, at 3 A. M., Reille attacked the enemy and moved to Marchienne. . . . Pajol entered Charleroi at noon. . . . At 3 P. M. Vandamme debouched at Gilly. Grouchy came up with Excelmans’ cavalry. The enemy occupied the left of the position of Fleurus. At 5 P. M. the emperor ordered the attack, the position was turned and carried. . . . Meanwhile Reille was crossing at Marchienne to move on Gosselies. . . . We thus became masters of the whole position of Fleurus. . . . The emperor has given the command of the left to Ney, who had his headquarters in the evening at Quatre Chemins” (Quatre Bras) “on the road to Brussels. . . . Nothing can paint the good spirit and ardor of the army.”

The two noteworthy things in the Bulletin, which was written before Ney reached Charleroi about midnight, — presumably by Soult, inspired by Napoleon, — are the statement that the marshal was at Quatre Bras — as if the emperor had so ordered and supposed the order obeyed — and the fact that the emperor was satisfied with the day’s work, assuming Quatre Bras to be in French hands and Wellington cut off, while he felt quite able to contain Blucher.



Napoleon's Engraving Rack.

LXXII.

LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS. JUNE 16, 1815.

NAPOLÉON had surprised the allies. Speed was needed to destroy each army singly. Wellington and Blücher had planned to assist each other, but could not assemble in season. Blücher stood at Sombrefe, expecting Wellington's aid, and by summary attack Napoleon was sure to defeat him decisively; but instead of moving at an early hour, it was noon before he got near the Prussian position. He was indefinite in his orders to Ney, who in consequence did not capture Quatre Bras. Napoleon's battle plan was to break through Blücher's centre, while drawing in Erlon from Ney to take him in reverse and destroy his right and centre; but owing to belated orders, this failed in part. In the battle, which began at 2.30 P. M., Blücher's centre was broken, but Erlon did not get put in, and the Prussians retired from the field, beaten but not broken up. Napoleon believed that he had thrown Blücher off towards the Rhine, but failed to pursue, or even to take means to ascertain the facts. The Prussians retired to a junction with the Anglo-Dutch. While Ligny was being fought, Ney had been slow in assembling his troops, and had not moved on Quatre Bras as early as Napoleon expected. At 2 P. M. he attacked the allies there, but Wellington soon came on the field, and managed his forces so well that Ney, who had in hand but half his infantry, was driven back, and Wellington kept the important position.

AFTER being driven back from the Sambre by the French advance, which at Gilly and Fleurus he delayed in an effective manner, Ziethen was recalled from the Fleurus plateau during the night, and early June 16 stood behind the "ravine" in which flows the brook of Ligny; and to this village gradually came up the bulk of Pirch's and Thielemann's corps, Bülow's from Liège being still upon the road.

For some weeks the allied commanders had had occasional consultations, and, although the records afford scant information, it is fair to assume, had considered all the probable directions of a French advance. As careful leaders they could

not have done less, and such records are apt to disappear. An attempt to break through the centre must have been discussed as one of the manœuvres; and should it be resorted to by Napoleon, Wellington and Blucher had agreed — as it is claimed by most of the German authorities, and as, indeed, unless they fell back, was the proper strategic manœuvre — to assemble respectively at Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, or in front of these places, from which points they could so cooperate as to make valid their superiority over the French. If the allied leaders left the method of assembly to the impulse of the moment, they can scarcely be said to have acted as prudent or intelligent strategists. Wellington deemed the allied cantonments as they stood to be near enough for the two armies to act together; and so they were, unless assailed by a master of war who should move with secrecy and speed greater than theirs. It was with the purpose of fighting together, and in accordance with the understanding had, that Blucher, on the advance of Napoleon across the Sambre, issued his orders to rendezvous at Sombreffe, and in front of this place drew up his forces as they successively arrived.

It is no doubt true, not only that Blucher and Wellington would have done better to select a point of joint assembly farther back, or else to have been cantoned much nearer the Nivelles-Namur road at this time, but also that Blucher, in selecting Sombreffe, under the existing dissemination of forces, as a point to assemble his own corps, violated that essential maxim of Napoleon's, to concentrate for approaching battle at a point out of possible reach of the enemy. While coöperation between the two armies must have been of the essence of all plans discussed, yet Blucher took up his position without any written assurance which has been found that Wellington would there sustain him, although he did receive a dispatch from Müffling stating that Wellington would be

at Nivelles at ten o'clock with a large body, as the English leader assumed that he would be able to do. Even if Wellington had told Blucher that he could not aid him, it is not certain that the Prussian marshal would have moved to the rear instead of fighting at Ligny, for Blucher's position in front of the chaussée was taken, not only that he might reach out his right to the Anglo-Dutch, but partly that Bülow might promptly come up from Liège to his aid. Yet this latter was not a vital point, for the many available roads would enable Bülow to march towards any place at which his chief might choose to concentrate. Blucher's action tends to prove his view of the understanding; and although Wellington's divisions in the event did not come up in season to aid the Prussian army to maintain itself, yet to do this was strategic common sense, and mistaken as he was as to what he could perform, Wellington expected and strove to accomplish this end. The helpful intention of both leaders is acknowledged in more than one way.

To be effective, coöperation between two armies must be not only strategical but tactical. Wellington's presence at Nivelles, and Blucher's at say Gembloux, would have been only a strategical coöperation; it might suffice to prevent any but a bold commander's attacking either, lest the other should meanwhile fall upon his flank or rear; but with Napoleon's well-known audacity, secrecy and speed, neither of those positions sufficed. Unless they proposed battle much farther in the rear, each commander should have been at the points indicated — Quatre Bras and Sombreffe — in force, and in season to enable him to put his divisions into the actually ensuing battle; and for this purpose, the English army was far too dispersed to get up in season. Wellington had been considering his right flank and his communications rather than the combinations of the campaign; the oncoming of the

French was so rapid that he could not assemble more than a handful beyond Nivelles; and this was a point quite out of the question if he was tactically to coöperate with the Prussians; because, if Blucher were contained, Napoleon by an advance in force on Quatre Bras could cut the two asunder. Wellington could scarcely have better forwarded Napoleon's plans than by assembling at Hal and Nivelles.

Although neither key-point had been seized by the French on the 15th, everything looked favorably for them. Blucher stood where, as he believed, he had agreed to stand, and was just where Napoleon could strike him single-handed, — unless, as the emperor feared, he should promptly retreat; Wellington was so much spread, and received his news so slowly, that he had not time fully to do his part. Blucher was destined, as Napoleon had rightly calculated, to bear the brunt of the first battle alone.

Had the allied commanders both been ready, there was no better place to fight a battle than in front of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, because between them they so largely outnumbered the French that each could easily lend the other a hand. Should Napoleon attack Blucher's right to cut him off from Wellington, the latter could fall on the French left; should he attack Blucher's left, he would drive the two allies together to fight in one body; should he turn Wellington's right, Blucher could either seize his communications or march to Wellington's assistance; should he attack Quatre Bras, he had Blucher upon his right rear. The time to fight the battle of the campaign was before either of the allies was injured by a single-handed action with the whole French army; but neither was quite ready, though the Prussians were far the more so.

To allege that Wellington remained near Nivelles and Hal out of nervousness for his right flank is not to state the whole

case. He had kept his eye out for an advance from Mons, which Napoleon had made diversions to simulate, and he was unquestionably late in bringing his forces to Quatre Bras; but this was rather from surprise at the sudden onset, his failure to divine Napoleon's project, and the dissemination of his troops, than from indifference as to the amount of help he was to afford Blucher; he exhibited in every way a desire to aid the Prussians, so far as he understood the problem, and could see his way clear to do so. Yet it is puzzling to find him order the first concentration on Nivelles, which could not possibly have aided Blucher in season, and which might have placed his own army in a situation where Blucher could not aid him; and the English needed Blucher quite as much as he did them. It might be suggested that Wellington chose Nivelles as a point of assembly out of reach of the enemy, so as thence to march to Quatre Bras; but he certainly was not as strategically resourceful as Blucher with Gneisenau at his side. Wellington knew before midnight of June 15 that Napoleon was advancing in front of the Prussians, and Quatre Bras was clearly the spot where he ought to assemble, even without a definite agreement; but his mind was set on Nivelles, and only Prince Bernard's alert intelligence and Ney's slowness saved Quatre Bras for the allies.

With regard to the broad strategical scheme of the allies, it was Napoleon's opinion that at this late moment neither should Blucher have assembled at Sombreffe, nor Wellington at Quatre Bras, but that in view of their dangerously spread cantonments, and of their knowledge of a French concentration south of the Sambre, they should have selected a point farther back, so as to gain time to prepare for his onset. This opens another question and one of much interest; but the one before us is merely what Wellington should have done, in view of the fact that Blucher, in accordance with his

view of the agreement, was assembling at Sombreffe; this being so, Quatre Bras was the only place for him, unless he was to leave Blucher to fight alone.

Indeed, Wellington himself was in grave danger on June 16; for had Napoleon decided to mask Blucher, and, relying upon his waiting for all his troops to come up, turned on Wellington, he would have caught the latter in poor condition for resisting the blow of a force equal to his own. The duke could scarcely have got sufficient troops assembled to the rear to prevent being disastrously beaten in detail.

It was early in the morning of the 16th that Wellington finally ordered a concentration forward on Quatre Bras, and he himself and many of his staff, after attending the Brussels ball, mounted and rode to Quatre Bras, reaching the place about 10 A. M. A "Disposition of the British Army at 7 A. M., 16th June," had been prepared for him by his staff, but it was full of errors, and stated the position of troops, and suggested by implication their direction and arrival, in a quite mistaken manner. With this in hand Wellington wrote Blucher:—

On the Heights behind FRASNES:

June 16, 1815, 10.30 A. M.

MY DEAR PRINCE:

My army is situated as follows:—

The Corps d'Armée of the Prince of Orange has a division here and at Quatre Bras, and the rest at Nivelles.

The Reserve is in march from Waterloo to Genappe, where it will arrive at noon.

The English Cavalry will be at the same hour at Nivelles.

The Corps of Lord Hill is at Braine-le-Comte.

I do not see any large force of the enemy in front of us, and I await news from Your Highness and the arrival of troops in order to determine my operation for the day.

Nothing has been seen on the side of Binche, nor on our right.

Your very obedient servant,

WELLINGTON.

This letter was evidently founded on the Disposition; Wellington had manifestly not kept in his mind, as Napoleon was wont closely to do, the location of his troops. About noon he rode to Brye to consult with Blucher. The latter urged him to march part of his forces towards his position, but Wellington was unwilling to uncover his communications by any large detachment; he proposed a diversion from Quatre Bras on Frasnes and Gosselies, so as to take the French in flank and rear and threaten their retreat on Charleroi, while Blucher sustained their attack in front; and he apparently expected many more of his troops to reach Quatre Bras than could possibly do so. Hamley asserts that "the duke proposed to concentrate a sufficient force as soon as possible at Quatre Bras, march it upon Frasnes and Gosselies, and from thence operate against the enemy's flank and rear. However, on calculating the time that must necessarily elapse before this sufficient force could be concentrated, and finding that Blucher might be defeated in the interval, it was agreed that, in order to save time, the duke should move this supporting force down the Namur road and thus come directly to the aid of his colleague." In his letter and interview Wellington must seriously, if unwittingly, have misled Blucher. If he agreed to come up along the Namur chaussée to Blucher's tactical aid, it was not long before he ascertained that it would not be possible for him to keep his promise. The facts, like hundreds of others of these days, are not clear.

It should be pointed out that not only was the British commander lacking in his knowledge of the whereabouts of his divisions, but information was sent to him far from promptly. He had not been notified of the early daylight attack of the 15th on the Prussian lines at Thuin until 3 P. M.; and although the French main army was in Charleroi at noon, the duke only learned at 10 P. M. that the enemy

was even threatening the place. He should have had news from both Mons and Charleroi during the afternoon, whereupon he could order his concentration at Quatre Bras. After Napoleon was known to be afield, if Wellington was to retain his headquarters at Brussels, with the purpose of fighting near the Namur road, it would seem as if he should have devised some means of getting information more quickly.

At the Prussian headquarters there was but one purpose, — to stand and fight the French. Blucher's own views did not cover every phase of the situation, but he had Gneisenau at his elbow ; and no one ever denied the fine old hero the readiness to meet his foe and cross swords with him, whether wisely or not. He was now prepared to stand, in the belief that help was at hand.

From Napoleon's standpoint, the situation was one which could not last long. He had created one of those combinations which must be seized at the instant and made the most of ; and a delay of a few hours might enable Wellington to gather his forces and come to Blucher's support, or Blucher might retire to seek it. In either case, the chance would go lost. It being his own conception, Napoleon saw the problem with the utmost clearness, and it is probable that neither Wellington nor Blucher did so. The 15th of June should have seen the emperor firmly planted at both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe : it would have seen the Consul Bonaparte at both places, just as in 1796 he had seized both Dego and Millesimo in season. Time was of the essence, and yet one little thing after another ate up the hours which should have been given to the immediate strategic operations. At St. Helena he reproached Ney with not having on the 15th established himself at Quatre Bras, but he forgot that he himself was equally bound to take Sombreffe, as by an immediate advance he could have done. Both points taken, and at once,

solved the manœuvre; to delay the advance was risking its success; to take one alone and afford any time to the allied armies enabled them to seize whatever was at the one point as in a vise between them.

All this is apart from the question whether, by seizing Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, the emperor would drive Wellington and Blucher into retreat to a point of assembly in the rear. This was one of the chances that had to be run, but his hope was that Blucher would stand and fight at Sombreffe, perhaps that he could force him to do so, if unwilling. In any case, the plan was such as to separate the allies, whatever might be the result.

If both these key-points were not taken on the 15th, at least all preparations should have been completed on that day, so that at break of day of the 16th the blow might be given at both. There is no doubt that by midnight Napoleon knew enough to authorize him, if he were in his old condition, to order the troops forward at daylight. He could have advanced Reille on Quatre Bras, Erlon beyond Gosselies, Gérard and the Guard on Fleurus, and Lobau to a centre point, say Wangenies. He would then have been ready for whatever happened. Yet the 16th came, and it was between eight and nine o'clock before Napoleon's orders went out, giving his subordinates their respective cues. The priceless morning hours had gone lost.

The delays of the 16th were due largely to those of the 15th; yet although Napoleon had to get his army across the Sambre and in hand before giving battle to Blucher, he had troops enough together to brush away anything in his front, and seize the two strategic points preparatory to battle. He had often snatched victory by moving forward with part of his troops. It is easy to excuse him by saying that he marched faster than either of his opponents would do, and that he

was justified in taking no action until all his forces were assembled; but this, as has been pointed out in previous cases, is to try Napoleon by the old fashioned habits of centuries before, where armies made a manœuvre and then sat down to smile upon it, as if it were a move on a chessboard, and would puzzle the opponent. Napoleon can be measured only by himself; we are striving to gauge his present ability as compared with that of years before; and according to his own standard, he was far from being as rapid in his manœuvres as the circumstances demanded.

From the orders issued at the time, it is clear that Napoleon had long purposed promptly to seize both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, — whether on the 15th or not might be disputed, — so as to throw Blucher back on Liège and Wellington back on Brussels; and for a moment his idea was that Blucher would retire and he himself turn on Wellington. These orders were not the conception of a moment. When, at St. Helena, he said that he was careful not to occupy Sombreffe, his recollection was accentuated by the same tactical influences that prevailed with him at the battle of Borodino. There he declined to push too strong a column round the Russians' left, lest it should induce them again to retreat, when he wished them to stand for battle. He now wanted Blucher to accept battle; but it was of higher importance to separate him from Wellington, and he would have been satisfied if he only drove him back on Liège, where a corps could contain him, and permit the main army to turn on the Anglo-Dutch. The probabilities were that a seizure of Sombreffe would accomplish this, as it also might induce Blucher to do battle to keep open his communications with his colleague; for Mar-schall Vorwärts never feared a fight. Napoleon prepared for either contingency.

It was getting towards 8 A. M. of June 16, when, from

Charleroi, the emperor wrote to Ney by his aide-de-camp, Flahault: —

“ You will receive the order of march of the day, but I wish to write to you about it in detail, because it is of the highest importance. I send Grouchy with the 3d and 4th infantry corps on Sombreffe. I move my Guard to Fleurus, and shall be there personally before midday. I will attack the enemy there if I meet him, and I will scout the road as far as Gembloux. There, according to what occurs, I will make up my mind, perhaps at three o'clock this afternoon, perhaps in the evening. My intention is that immediately after I shall have made up my mind, you shall be ready to march on Brussels. I will sustain you with the Guard, which will be at Fleurus or Sombreffe, and I should like to arrive in Brussels to-morrow morning. You would start on the march this evening, if I make up my mind early enough so that you could be informed of it by daylight, and could make this evening three or four leagues, and be to-morrow at seven o'clock in the morning at Brussels. You can therefore dispose your troops in the following manner: 1st division two leagues in front of Quatre Chemins, if there is no difficulty; six infantry divisions around Quatre Chemins and one division at Marbais, so that I can draw it in to myself at Sombreffe if I need it; it will, moreover, not retard your march; Kellermann's corps . . . at the intersection of the Roman road and the Brussels road, so that I can draw it in to myself if I need it. . . . I should like to have with me the Guard division under Lefebvre-Desnottes, and I send you Kellermann's two divisions to replace it; but with my actual project, I prefer to place Kellermann so as to recall him if I need him, and not to have Lefebvre make false marches, because it is probable that I shall decide this evening to march on Brussels with the Guard. Nevertheless, cover Lefebvre with Erlon's and Reille's cavalry, so as to spare the Guard. If there were any skirmishing with the English, it is preferable that it should fall on the line than on the Guard.

“ I have adopted as general principle during this campaign to divide my army into two wings and a reserve. Your wing will be composed of the four divisions of the 1st Corps, four divisions of the 2d Corps, and two divisions of light cavalry and the two divisions of Kellermann. That ought not to be far from forty-five to fifty thousand men.

“ Grouchy will have about the same force, and will command the right wing.

“The Guard will form the reserve, and I will move towards one or the other wing, according to circumstances.

“The major-general gives most precise orders, so that there shall be no difficulty as to the obedience of your orders when you are detached, the corps commandants having to take my orders directly when I am present.

“According to circumstances I will weaken one or the other wing and increase my reserve with it. You sufficiently feel the importance attached to the taking of Brussels. That could, moreover, give rise to incidents, for a movement so prompt and brisk will isolate the English army from Mous, Ostend, etc.

“I desire that your dispositions should be well made, so that on the first order your eight divisions may march rapidly and without obstacle on Brussels.”

At the same time he wrote by special aide to Grouchy:—

Charleroi, June 16: “As commandant of the right wing you are to take command of Vandamme’s corps, Gérard’s corps and the cavalry corps of Pajol, Milhaud and Excelmans, which must be not far from fifty thousand men. Move with this right wing to Sombreffe. Have march in consequence at once Pajol, Milhaud, Excelmans and Vandamme, and without stopping continue your movement on Sombreffe. The 4th Corps, which is at Chatelet, receives directly the order to move to Sombreffe without passing through Fleurus. This observation is important, because I am moving my headquarters to Fleurus, and we must find no encumbrances. Send at once an officer to Gérard to have him know your movement and let him execute his at once.

“My intention is that all the generals should take your orders directly. They will take mine only when I am present. Between ten and eleven I shall be at Fleurus. I will move to Sombreffe, leaving my Guard, foot and horse, at Fleurus. I shall not leave it at Sombreffe unless it should be necessary. If the enemy is at Sombreffe, I wish to attack him. I wish even to attack him at Gembloux and also seize this position, my intention being, after having learned these two positions, to leave to-night and to operate with my left wing under Ney against the English. Do not, then, lose a moment, because the quicker I make up my mind, the better it will be for the result of my operations. I suppose you are at Fleurus. Communicate constantly with Gérard, so that he may aid you

to attack Sombreffe, if necessary. Girard is within reach of Fleurus; do not use him without absolute necessity, because he is to march all night. Leave also my Young Guard and all its artillery at Fleurus: Kellermann with two divisions of cuirassiers is marching on the road to Brussels. He is connecting himself with Ney, so as to contribute to the operation of this evening in the left wing.

“As I have told you, I shall be at Fleurus between ten and eleven. Send me reports of what you shall have learned. Have a care that the Fleurus road is open. All the facts that I have are to the effect that the Prussians cannot oppose more than forty thousand men to us.”

These two orders and Soult's more formal later ones — not to mention the statement in the Bulletin of the 15th — indicate clearly the purpose of the emperor to seize both Sombreffe and Quatre Bras. It was no sudden conception. All that was said and written at the time implies that this should be done at once; and what he said years later at St. Helena cannot change the manifest purpose of these specific orders issued at the moment, especially as the Memoirs are full of contradictions. His order to Ney to be ready to march on Brussels was given on the assumption that both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe would be taken without any serious fighting, and that he himself would defeat or contain Blucher and immediately turn on Wellington.

Substantially, then, according to these orders, the right wing, under Grouchy, was to advance by way of Sombreffe on Gembloux, unless sooner arrested by the Prussian army; while the left wing, under Ney, was to push through Quatre Bras and take up a position beyond that place to head off the British army. What Napoleon wrote Ney was that he himself would attack the enemy if he met him; and having beaten him, — or in case he retired, contained him, — would then march in the afternoon or evening via Quatre Bras on Brussels. Long before that time Ney was to have taken Quatre Bras, and to be ready at a word to march rapidly on Brussels. Napoleon

with the Guard and Lobau was to be the reserve and stand in the centre, ready to march to aid the right or the left, as circumstances should dictate. He knew little about the immediate movements of the allied armies; but he knew their general position; and it was clear that if he would make his offensive effective, he must keep moving, as he always did in his days of success, and moving in the right direction. The orders were subject to change by any eventuality, such as the finding of substantially the entire Prussian army at Ligny; and as soon as this new factor came into the problem, they were in fact changed. But they well show what the emperor meant by his thrust between the two allied armies, his rupture of the allied centre.

Napoleon had no idea that Blucher was at Sombreffe with three quarters of his army. He was convinced that he had caught him too early for concentration, and that he should beat part of his forces at Sombreffe, take the place, and throw him back in the direction of Liège, so that he might himself speedily join Ney. But he could have learned the existing facts. He had done a big day's work on the 15th, but no greater than he did every day in 1796, than several he consecutively did in 1809, when his task was not to follow up a good strategical creation, but to turn a disastrous one into success. Had he been as able-bodied as of yore, he would have ridden to the outposts at daylight, have viewed things with his own eyes, have ordered a powerful reconnoissance to develop the enemy, and have ascertained that Blucher was there in force, and that, to prevent Wellington's getting up to his aid, he must be beaten at once. But Napoleon remained in Charle-roi, without any efficient reconnoissance; he had no faith in Blucher's hearty defense, believed that he could brush him away by a simple advance, and gave orders to this effect after eight o'clock in the morning. If he personally needed more

rest, he should have used the eyes of others, and put the troops on the march. It was not so much the exhaustion of bodily forces, as the effect this exhaustion had on the mental and moral qualities of the man, which lay at the root of the loss of time. It does not suffice to say that, aware that Ney had not reached *Quatre Bras* the day before, he was waiting to know that he had done so this morning before moving on *Sombreffe*. The old leader would have made certain that Ney had obeyed his orders. What was a gallop of a dozen or fifteen miles to him? In war all things do not come to him who waits; and Napoleon was waiting, from a species of lassitude; he was pausing on the threshold of the operation. He was no longer the leader who, in the days of *Castiglione*, rode to a standstill five of the best horses that could be found in Italy, or who called on his lieutenants for two days' work in one — and got it.

It was indeed after eleven when Napoleon reached *Fleurus*; and while the troops were coming up, he rode out to reconnoitre. He examined the Prussian position from the windmill at *Fleurus*, and then, as was not uncommon, he rode or walked forward alone to see what more he could discover. His trained eye gauged the factors on which to found his battle plan. He ascertained that *Blucher* had taken up a position back of the *Ligny* brook, — “ravine,” he calls it, — facing southerly on a line covering *Ligny* and *St. Amand*, with his left sweeping back towards and beyond *Sombreffe*; but though from the inspection he learned the position of the enemy, he did not discern that the Prussian army was almost all present. This may be another instance of the growing inaccuracy of Napoleon's work. We remember his carelessness preceding the battle of *Arcis-sur-Aube*. It cannot be presumed that his skill in gauging numbers had left him, though mistakes are easily made in so difficult a problem, and

we remember that he made a similar error even on the morning of Jena. He had probably not devoted as much attention to reconnoissance as he would formerly have done. Two facts should have been, but were not noted by him, — that Blucher here had as large a force as the French, and that his position indicated that he was ready to throw up his line of retreat on Liège, and if defeated, retire to the rear and towards the English army. The impression made on the emperor was apparently that Blucher was audaciously holding an advanced position with part of his army, “a body of troops,” he called it, to give time for the rest to come up, and for Wellington to assemble his widely cantoned divisions. As Blucher stood, his right flank was already turned by Ney, assuming, as the emperor must do, that this marshal had carried or would carry out his instructions; and on this impression he acted.

At the midnight interview, Napoleon had learned that Ney had not — as he had supposed and had stated in the Bulletin — occupied Quatre Bras. Indeed, Houssaye casts doubt upon there having been any midnight meeting; but there probably was one. While there is no evidence that the emperor even then ordered Ney to collect his forces and to move forward to Quatre Bras, from the tenor of the orders issued thereupon, and the previous Bulletin, it can fairly be assumed; and at St. Helena the emperor asserted as much. “Marshal Ney received anew the order during the night to move on the 16th at the point of day out beyond Quatre Bras, to occupy a good position astride the road to Brussels, and hold the chaussées of Nivelles and Namur by his flankers of right and left. Flahault, general aide-de-camp, was charged to reiterate this to him, and stayed with him all the day.”

This latter is not proof; but the statement fits into the other facts. About 5 A. M. the first written orders went off

to Ney, asking exactly where Reille and Erlon were, and to this he duly replied; upon receipt of which reply the letter and the formal order to the left wing were prepared and sent, about 8 A. M. Erlon was still considerably in the rear, and Ney had failed to bring him up. If Napoleon proposed not to advance upon Blucher until he was sure Wellington could not



Blucher.

come in upon his left, he needed to make sure what Ney was doing, and he took no steps to keep Ney up to his work. Even if he had not so ordered at the midnight interview, he would naturally expect Ney, with substantially all his forces, to be at Quatre Bras and overwhelm whatever was there, by 1 or 2 P. M.

at the latest. He forgot that at Bautzen Ney had been dilatory under parallel conditions. Flahault must have reached Ney by eleven, and Ney thus knew that Grouchy was marching on Sombreffe with Vandamme and Gérard, followed by the Guard to Fleurus, hoping to clear the ground in front of him as far as Gembloux. He was told that he was expected to capture and hold Quatre Bras, so as from there to march on Brussels as soon as the emperor had completed his plans, and that a corresponding order was issued to Grouchy. The whole scheme was clear and specific: to attack the Prussians from such a direction as to throw them away from the English, or if they retired, to so follow them up; having provided for which, the emperor would join Ney for a march on Brussels. Although Napoleon says both to Grouchy and Ney that they apparently will not meet much opposition, yet this was a common assurance of his, and, let it be noted, he directs each to move with his whole force. While blaming Ney, we must not forget Napoleon's duty. We cannot fairly assume that, during the long forenoon of June 16, he was waiting on Ney; or if we do so, we must, trying him by his own standard, blame him for allowing Blucher to get up the bulk of his forces, and Wellington to concentrate at Nivelles and move forward on Quatre Bras. That Ney was lacking in his usual push is true, but it lay on Napoleon to see that he obeyed orders. Ney was not responsible for Erlon's early backwardness, but he certainly was responsible for his own slackness, after he had had his interview with Napoleon. Though the emperor counted on him, the marshal utterly failed his master, as Davout would not have done.

Blucher was standing at the windmill of Bussy, just back of St. Amand, when about one o'clock he saw the French van approaching. At that time Napoleon was on the windmill tower just west of Fleurus, and Wellington was on the way

from Quatre Bras to a consultation with Blucher at Brye. While this consultation was going on, at which no one believed that there was any considerable force opposite Quatre Bras, the French army was debouching from the woods south of Fleurus, and pushing back the Prussian outposts. Though he had but three corps at hand, Blucher accepted the battle; no doubt he would have done so in any event; but he certainly relied upon his colleague's coöperation, either by an effective diversion on Gosselies or a direct attack, and Wellington led him to believe the Anglo-Dutch army much nearer Quatre Bras than it actually was. Gneisenau says he so strongly insisted on the English coming in on the Prussian right that Wellington left promising to do so if he was not himself attacked. Blucher counted on the duke to be on the ground, or so near the ground as to lend actual or moral strength to his own army, and to keep busy a large part of the attacking French. If Wellington told him at Brye that he could not support him, it was then too late to avoid the battle.

Some hours after Ziethen had gone into line behind the brook of Ligny, — perhaps 10 A. M., — Pirch's corps had arrived and placed itself in support in the rear. By noon Thielemann's corps had filed into line with right on Sombreffe. Bülow's corps could not get up. He was distant, and orders to him had been unnecessarily delayed. These positions were substantially held by the three corps during the battle, which was defensive on the part of the Prussians.

From the Prussian centre at Sombreffe, the right wing ran through Ligny, St. Amand and Brye, and was held by Ziethen with Pirch in support, numbering sixty-three thousand men and one hundred and seventy-five guns; but although, as Napoleon testifies, it was "covered by a deep ravine," meaning the brook of Ligny, "his right was in the air," and liable to be turned. The left wing ran from Sombreffe through

Tongrinelle and Balatre, and was held by Thielemann with twenty-five thousand men and fifty guns. These positions were substantially maintained throughout the day. Thus Blucher was preparing to fight with eighty thousand foot, eight thousand horse, and two hundred and twenty guns.

Under the conditions he assumed to exist, Napoleon determined on attack. The most important strategical problem was to cut off possible coöperation by Wellington; and the most natural tactical manœuvre, to turn Blucher's right and throw him off along his line of retreat on Namur. But had the Prussians been simply driven from their position and into retreat on Namur, while they could not have reached Wellington in time for a battle on the 18th, Blucher would still have been intact and ready to operate towards concentration, or upon the French communications when Napoleon should turn on Wellington; and Wellington, if he could later count on Blucher's assistance, might himself have manœuvred for a junction and not have accepted battle on the 18th.

Napoleon was never content to do things by halves: he wanted something more decisive than merely to be rid of the Prussians; he now saw his way open to it, and it is quite in accordance with his battle theories that, as a second and tactical idea, he should strive to destroy the Prussian army rather than merely to force it back discomfited; for by a decisive victory he would, under the existing conditions, accomplish far more than by a minor one. He noticed that the Prussian left was protecting the road to Namur, and would probably stand in place. He might therefore neglect it, and by moving on the Prussian front instead of the right, and attacking in force the centre and right, he was strong enough to overwhelm them; and if by attacking between the centre and left he could cut the centre and right off from the left, he might then destroy these, and win an ampler result than

merely to drive Blucher back on his base and reserves. And if, as he had a right to expect, Ney drove back Wellington, or contained him and then turned with half his forces towards Brye, the battle could be made absolutely decisive of matters in Belgium. It was a beautiful plan and conceived in the emperor's best style, — a corollary to the proposition of breaking through the centre and fighting the allied armies singly.

By one o'clock the French army had reached the battle-field. Gérard, sixteen thousand men with forty guns, filed into place on the right opposite Ligny; Vandamme, twenty thousand men and forty guns, supported on his left by Girard with four thousand men and eight guns, threatened St. Amand; Pajol and Excelmans, six thousand cavalry and twenty-five guns, sustained by Hulot's division, were sent out to observe the Prussian left near Balatre. The Guard and Milhaud, twenty-two thousand strong, with one hundred guns, were held near Fleurus in reserve, and Lobau with ten thousand men was coming up from Chatelet. The force on the field was less than seventy thousand men, of whom thirteen thousand were cavalry.

While marshaling, Soult near 2 P. M. wrote Ney that "a body of troops" was between Sombrefe and Brye, which Grouchy would attack at half-past two. "The intention of His Majesty is that you should also attack what is before you, and that after having vigorously pushed it, you should fall back on us to help envelop the body. . . . If this body is previously beaten, then His Majesty would manœuvre in your direction. . . . Instruct the emperor at once of your dispositions and of what is passing in your front." This looks as if at 2 P. M. Napoleon did not fully understand the situation, nor was ready to order Ney over to help destroy Blucher. He could have ordered Ney to observe the English with cav-

alry, and fall in towards Ligny; or he could have divided Ney in two so as with one half to contain the English and to join the latter with the other half; or he could have instructed him to beat the English and then fall in on his left. If the English were slow, as they proved to be, any of these operations could not fail to destroy the Prussian army; but Napoleon did not at an early enough hour positively order part of Ney over to help him at Ligny.

The action opened at 2.30, by Gérard attacking Ligny and Vandamme St. Amand. The resistance was admirable, and Napoleon soon found that he had substantially the whole Prussian army in his front, and not a mere "body of troops." This opened his eyes, but it only encouraged him in the belief that a victory would be still more decisive; and at 3.15 P. M. Soult again wrote to Ney: "You are to manœuvre at once, so as to envelop the right of the enemy and fall with the utmost vigor on his rear, as his army is lost if you act vigorously. The fate of France is in your hands. Therefore do not hesitate an instant to make the movement that the emperor orders, and move towards the heights of St. Amand and Brye." This in effect meant that Ney was to leave what was necessary in front of the English, and come with the bulk of his forces in to Ligny. To enforce this, at half-past three Napoleon ordered that Erlon should be directed towards the Prussian right.

Here was a change in the conditions, that had been indicated in the orders to Ney as possible: before marching on Brussels the emperor had been compelled to attack Blücher, and Ney was accordingly notified to so modify his operation as to contain Wellington and march over with part of his force to aid in destroying the Prussian army. Although the officers carrying these dispatches could well have delivered them in an hour and a half, it was scarcely to be expected that Ney could

arrive before six or seven o'clock; but the June evenings in Belgium continue till long after nine o'clock, and the battle was actually prolonged until ten. Napoleon never doubted the result. "Gérard having approached the emperor to ask for certain instructions about attacking the village of Ligny, this prince said to him, 'It is possible that in three hours the fate of the war may be decided. If Ney executes his orders well, there will not a gun of the Prussian army escape. It is taken *en flagrant délit.*'"

It was essential that the work should be completed on this day: too much time had already been lost. To give Blucher until the morrow would result in his joining Wellington. Moreover, it was important to keep Blucher's attention fixed on his front, so that he might not heed the danger threatening by the advance of Ney; and to facilitate the main manœuvre, the attack on Blucher's right was made more marked, to induce him to disgarnish his centre to aid it, and open the way for the thrust at that point, which should not only rupture it, but make Ney's work easier and more effective. The Prussians fought nobly, and up to six o'clock nothing had been won by the French. In order to be sure of his result, about 5 P. M. Napoleon sent Ney another order to the effect that what was passing at Quatre Bras had small importance compared to the fight going on at Ligny, and that Erlon was to be at once sent over. But Fézensac describes to us the way orders were carried out or not carried out in these days, according to the means. When orders were issued, they were assumed to have been in due time executed, whether there was a horse fit to gallop five miles or not, whether officers had maps of the country, and whether the roads were possible or impossible. And many of the headquarters dispatches suffered accordingly.

One difference between Blucher's tactical management and

Napoleon's was marked : Blucher gradually used up his troops, putting in fresh ones to take the place of tired ones, until he had placed them all under fire ; Napoleon as usual heeded little the cry for reinforcements from his fighting front, but kept the divisions to their work with his singular power of enforcing vigor and creating enthusiasm, and held intact his reserves at Fleurus for a final blow. It was some time before six o'clock that he made ready to put in the Guard, intending to sustain Vandamme, whose flank was threatened, with Duhesme's Young Guard and half Morand's chasseurs, and to aid Gérard with the other half of Morand ; while Friant and the Old Guard with all its artillery, the heavy cavalry and the cuirassiers, should be thrown in upon Ligny to break through the Prussian centre. Everything had worked to the emperor's satisfaction.

At this moment the head of a column was seen by Vandamme off on the left debouching from woodland a couple of miles distant, heading for Fleurus, somewhat to the south of the line prescribed for Ney. Being nearest to the point, Vandamme should have at once sent out to ascertain what the column was, but he only reported the fact to Napoleon as being a possible interference with his work ; and though the emperor could scarcely believe that the enemy had crept in between Ney and himself, he withheld his centre thrust. "The emperor stopped the march of the Guard, and sent in great speed his aide-de-camp, Dejean, a confidential officer, to ascertain the number, force and intentions of this column," which appeared to annoy Vandamme ; and he did this lest he might need his reserve to oppose the enemy, if it were perchance part of Wellington's force. More than an hour and a half was thus consumed ; and it was time lost. The column turned out to be Erlon, who, belated on the march towards Quatre Bras, had, back of Frasnés, met an aide of the em-

peror's bearing dispatches demanding help, and had of his own motion turned his head of column towards the right wing, which was evidently engaging battle, and might need his corps. There is much dispute as to what the orders were, who bore them, whether addressed to Ney or Erlon, and as to just what occurred. But Erlon did move over towards Ligny, and probably sent word to Ney what he had done. Whether Napoleon should have arrested his attack on seeing the questionable column debouching from the woods, is open to argument: had he forced the attack, and had the column proved to be the enemy's, he might have succeeded, or he might have failed. But from the incident, according to some, the emperor drew the conclusion — somewhat carelessly, it would seem — that Erlon had been sent by Ney, and although he had taken a wrong road, which led him towards St. Amand, that he was equipped with orders, and would file to his left towards Brye, and thereby produce the desired effect. According to others, Napoleon sent Erlon orders to attack. Paying no further heed to this column, but expecting its due coöperation, as repeatedly demanded of Ney, the Guard attack was resumed with accustomed vigor. But so far from putting his divisions to use, Erlon, sharply recalled by Ney, within the hour moved back towards Quatre Bras. Durutte's division, with a hint to be cautious, was allowed to remain near the right wing, to tie him to Napoleon. Erlon should have sought and obeyed Napoleon's orders, not Ney's, and so soon as he got within reach of the emperor, should have sent a staff officer ahead of his column, to request further instructions. His conduct on the 15th and 16th was marked by laxness, as in the days of Sauroren.

Nothing is more dangerous than a turning movement when the turning body is not properly tied to the main body. That it should be so tied is one of the maxims of Napoleon; and

rather than not use Erlon when he was at hand and ready to be used, he would have done better even to leave the conduct of the main battle, well inaugurated, to Soult and have himself gone to head Erlon's troops, and put them in where they would accomplish the view he had in hand. It was a fault — or a misfortune — of Napoleon's, so soon as he saw Erlon's head of column, not to guess what it was, and not thus to tie him to his own operation, for he knew that Ney could hold himself at Quatre Bras, and that in any event he could long enough retard Wellington, who was rather a defensive than an offensive fighter, to enable the French centre and right to destroy Blucher.

There is as much dispute as to who carried several of the orders of this day, as there is as to what occurred with regard to the orders to Erlon. At least three witnesses, among them Durutte, testify that Napoleon gave Erlon orders to attack; but before these actually reached him, he may have received Ney's ordering him back. It is clear that Napoleon got to Erlon no effective orders to move on Brye and help destroy the Prussian right and centre, so that when Erlon received positive orders from his own chief, he obeyed them and retired.

The attack of the Guard was stout. Blucher, who, deeming it the key of the field, had mistakenly concentrated his forces in St. Amand to break down Vandamme, instead of in Ligny to meet the Guard, came up at the head of some cavalry and sharply attacked, but his horse was shot under him, and he himself severely shaken by the fall. But for the darkness he would have been captured in the to and fro dashes of the French and German cavalry. He was finally got from under his horse and into safety, but for some hours disappeared from view, during which Gneisenau acted for him.

The Guard fought on. Despite forceful Prussian resistance, the heavy column could not be stopped; the brook of Ligny was crossed, Ligny was occupied, and by half-past eight the French troops debouched on the heights between Ligny and Sombreffe, and mounted the Bussy windmill hill. The advance of the Guard had been a veritable transformation scene. The Prussian centre was broken, and the right and centre cut off as intended. The battle did not end until ten o'clock. Had Ney, or even Erlon, debouched on Brye, Blucher with a wrecked army would have been thrown off towards the Rhine. As it was, the Prussians were able to file off to the north.

A handsome victory had been won, but not a decisive one. The Prussians lost eighteen thousand men killed and wounded, the French twelve thousand men. Vandamme bivouacked beyond St. Amand and Wagnellé, Lobau in first line on the Bussy heights, Gérard on his right, the Guard in support. Ziethen and Pirch bivouacked between Tilly, Mellery and Gentines, with an outpost at Brye, Thielemann east of Sombreffe. Before the end of the night Ziethen moved by country roads straight north through Tilly, Gentines and Mont St. Guibert towards Wavre, whither Gneisenau wisely ordered a retreat, so as to keep within touch of the English lines. Thielemann with the reserve park moved through Gembloux.

Had Erlon not delayed matters by his inopportune appearance, the battle would have been won two hours earlier, and Napoleon would have had time that night to pursue, and to wreck the Prussian army for the campaign, — as he might, or might not, have done. Had Erlon, on approaching the right wing, sent to the emperor for orders, and been dispatched to Brye, the Prussians would certainly have been crippled and pushed off to the eastward. It has been suggested that Lobau instead of Erlon might have been sent to Brye; but lest he

should be needed at Quatre Bras, he had been kept near the river too long to reach the field; and when Erlon retired, Napoleon imagined that Ney had need of and had withdrawn him, in which case he did not wish to risk too much, but kept Lobau as a reserve. Durutte took position near Marbais. It had been an error that Lobau was not sooner brought up; but he was not ordered forward till half-past three; he did not get the order till after four, and he could not reach Fleurus till six. He would have been better at Wangenies. The difficulty was due to the fact that Napoleon's first orders were not issued until 8 A. M. Had they been issued at 4 A. M., everything should have gone well.

At the end of the battle Napoleon had a fair right to suppose that, while he had not won a decisive victory against the Prussians, he had in all probability thrown them off in a badly disabled condition towards Namur, and that he might now turn on the Anglo-Dutch, and with Ney's assistance beat them still more disastrously. He should have made his supposition a certainty.

Let us turn back, and see why Ney had not helped out his master. After the midnight conference, Ney had rejoined his troops at Gosselies. In view of all the circumstances surrounding the situation, of what was written before, and of the orders which were thereupon issued, we must be persuaded that Napoleon at this interview had given him a fair conception of what he was proposing to do, to wit: to seize both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, fight the Prussians first, as being the nearest, and having driven them back along their line of communications, — or in case they retired, having contained them, — to move over to join the left wing and march on Brussels; or else, if he stood, to overwhelm Wellington. Despite the absence of any record, and even though at Bautzen he had failed to give definite orders, it is reasonable, from Napo-

leon's habit and method, to assume that Ney was well informed of the general plan. It is agreed that, in giving him command of the left wing, the emperor told him to go and drive the enemy back, and it is doing violence to the testimony and existing conditions to assume that for all practical purposes



Wellington.

Ney was not equipped with general instructions as to what he was to do. Indeed, the fact comes close to being proved by the emperor's noting in the Bulletin that Ney's headquarters was at Quatre Bras. How well Ney assimilated the information and instructions can only be guessed; and primarily, Napoleon may have been to blame, as in the case of Grouchy, in leaning too much upon him.

Arrived at Gosselies before daylight, one would expect to see Ney taking immediate measures to assemble his forces for the fight of the 16th. Bachelu's division and Piré's cavalry were in Frasnés, Foy and Jerome were in Gosselies, and Erlon's leading division, under Durutte, had bivouacked at

Jumet. The first thing for any general officer under like circumstances to do was to get his men in hand; but they took no suitable steps to this end. Instead of sending Foy and Jerome to Frasnés, and ordering Erlon up to Gosselies, and seeing to it that these things were done, Ney practically sat down and waited, doing nothing to carry out his presumed instructions, or to act as the commander of forty thousand men should act in preparing for expected battle, except to order Reille to put his divisions in readiness to move. It was eleven o'clock before Foy and Jerome were ordered up to sustain Bachelu and Piré; nor was Erlon promptly brought along to take their place. These are facts shown by Ney's own orders. Had he acted as a man of his calibre should, he might well have been in force at Quatre Bras by noon, in such a position as to be able to spare Erlon. Ney may not have deemed it wise to advance on a line beyond the main army; but he was bound to obey his orders. This he barely did, and in the assembling of his forces and his advance on Quatre Bras he showed marked slackness. Even had there been no midnight interview, Ney, judged by the hour of receipt of the orders of Napoleon, and the issue of his own, must be held to blame for unpardonable delays, if he is not charged with disobedience of orders. If he thought he knew better than the emperor, it was easy to send over to him and ask for fresh instructions; but this he does not appear to have done.

If we seek to excuse Ney, we must place still more blame on the emperor. There was no soldier alive at that time who would have pushed things any more promptly than Napoleon did; but this is not the proper test. He had cut out work to anticipate the enemy, seize the communications between them at Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, fight the Prussians first, and fight or pursue the Anglo-Dutch the next day; and

with his ancient speed, this could readily have been accomplished. According to the measure of his best years, he failed on June 16 in giving the necessary speed to the right wing, and in seeing to it that proper speed was given to the left wing.

Had Ney properly carried out the spirit of the strategic scheme, gathered his troops and moved with rapidity, two things must have resulted. First, Erlon would have got up to a point beyond Frasnés, and would not have been intercepted and sent over to the right wing, where, as events turned out, he proved useless; and second, Ney would have had in hand Reille's and Erlon's corps with Kellermann's cavalry. With this force he would doubtless have captured Quatre Bras, which was then but slightly held, and would have established himself there with one of his corps, with the forest on one side and the upper waters of the Dyle on the other, and could have sent the other corps over to Brye in season to fall on Blücher's right flank, while Napoleon was breaking through between his centre and left. Had he done this, and it was an easy task, Blücher's army would have been broken up for the campaign, so that even Grouchy could have contained him, while Napoleon, turning towards Quatre Bras with Ney and the reserves, would almost certainly have overwhelmed Wellington. Ney did not act with sufficient promptness to get this done. Yet while he must be held responsible for his share of the failure, we cannot lose sight of the fact that Napoleon did not take the means actually within his power to push operations to an issue. With his speed of ten years before, and his habit of seeing that his orders were so given as to be obeyed, Quatre Bras would have been taken early in the forenoon, and the battle of Ligny been fought before Blücher was ready, and with a decisive result.


This may be hypercriticism, and after the event, but we

are not testing an ordinary soldier : it is the last of the great captains who is on trial ; we are not comparing him with others : we are judging him by his own rules. We are used to seeing Napoleon divine things aright, and he was not so doing ; and there is too much evidence to show that he was out of health not to believe that it was his bodily condition with its reflex action on his moral force, which was at fault.

To return to the facts, Ney did not move forward to Quatre Bras, but remained in position at Frasnés. Even after he had received the emperor's and Soult's written orders, he was wanting in decision ; his preparation for battle at Quatre Bras was quite haphazard.

Despite this slackness, however, Fortune — not forgetful of his noble past — seemed to be favoring Ney. When, at 2 P. M., he attempted to carry out his orders with Bachelu, Foy and Piré, he had in front of him only Perponcher's division, and this he could have readily brushed away. Indeed, Ney did make some advance, moving Bachelu forward on the right, and Foy on the left ; but Wellington, fresh from the Brye consultation, reached the field about 2.30, and taking command, approved the seizure of Quatre Bras and leaned his right on Bossu woods and his left at Piraumont. He soon discovered how much misled he had been by the Disposition ; but with that exceptionally cool head which in all his battles stood him in such good stead, he took steps to maintain himself until troops arrived. At 3 P. M. Jerome came up and began to force the wood. At 3.30 Merlen's Dutch-Belgian cavalry and Picton's "fighting division" came up, followed by Brunswick, which gave Wellington a preponderance. At 5 P. M. Halkett and Kielmansegge of Alten's afforded Wellington all he needed ; and while Kellermann came up, when Ney received Napoleon's 2 P. M. orders, he had all he could do to hold him-

self. About 5.15 P. M. he learned that Erlon had left, and angrily ordered him back, as he was hard pressed. Before six Wellington had a marked superiority. Ney continued the fight in his old style, but he was outnumbered, and the British infantry was of a different class from the Dutch. The latter after a couple of hours were tired out, and the Duke of Brunswick was killed, but the British and Hanoverians gallantly



Battle of Quatre Bras.

maintained their ground, holding the wood on their right during the entire action. To withdraw his infantry, Ney threw in Kellermann's cuirassiers and Piré. This enabled him to withdraw, but at 6.30 he received the order from Napoleon to send Erlon, and when Wellington was again reinforced by Cooke, Ney had difficulty in holding himself.

After Cooke's arrival Wellington took the offensive and forced the French back to Frasnes. Ney had used but half of the troops given him, and had not accomplished his task; Wellington's losses out of over thirty thousand men succes-

sively coming up were forty-five hundred men, and the French out of over twenty thousand nearly as many.

Had Erlon not been diverted, Ney, despite his slowness, might still have won the battle before Wellington's reinforcements all arrived. Stanch as the British troops were, under the conditions they could scarcely have resisted Ney's two corps; but it would have been at too late an hour to help Napoleon complete the victory at Ligny.

All Ney had accomplished was to contain Wellington, — of itself an excellent operation, but only half what he might have done. Had Wellington suffered a decided setback at Quatre Bras, Blucher, instead of retiring to Wavre, so as to fight beside him on the 18th, would probably have retired on Namur. In this much Ney had failed. On the other hand, Wellington, with few reliable troops, and these only coming up piecemeal, had held himself manfully, and in part redeemed the extraordinary mistakes of his staff, as shown in the Disposition, and his own misconception of the strategical problem.

Both Ney and Erlon have found earnest advocates. To each laxness may be charged. But the main fault lay with Napoleon, who did not make his orders to either clear and unmistakable.

Still from the broad standpoint, the whole operation, save for fatal loss of time, had been in Napoleon's best style. He had apparently succeeded in carrying out the opening part of his programme. While Ney had not taken Quatre Bras, contained Wellington, joined the emperor with a corps, and made the battle of Ligny decisive, yet he had staved Wellington off from succoring Blucher. Wellington, after viewing Blucher's position at Ligny, had made up his mind and said that the Prussians would get beaten; and as Ney kept him too busy to advance to his colleague's assistance, his eye

was kept more on his line of retreat on Brussels, which a Prussian defeat might jeopardize, than it was on the battle going on to the east of him.

Thus the diverse interests and eccentric bases of the allies on which Napoleon was reckoning had really worked in his favor, and he had beaten one of the allied armies at Sombreffe; and even had Wellington cared to hold Quatre Bras, he could not after Blücher's withdrawal have done so. The allies had apparently been thrust apart; and it was now Napoleon's immediate duty so to manœuvre as to keep them apart, and to fight each again singly. All this was still within reach.

Napoleon's last Bulletin possesses its own interest, despite the usual exaggerations. This is what he says of the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras:—

Bulletin of the Army, Laon, June 20, 1815. "Battle of Ligny, near Fleurus. The morning of the 16th the army occupied the following positions: the left wing under Ney with the 1st and 2d infantry corps and the 2d cavalry corps occupied the position of Frasnes. The right wing under Grouchy with the 3d and 4th infantry corps and the 3d cavalry corps occupied the heights behind Fleurus. Imperial headquarters at Charleroi with the Guard and the 6th corps. The left wing had the order to march on Quatre Bras and the right on Sombreffe. The emperor moved to Fleurus with his reserve.

"After having passed Fleurus, Grouchy's columns on the march noticed the enemy's army commanded by Blücher occupying the plateau of the mill of Bussy, on the left of the village of Sombreffe, and extending his cavalry far in front of the Namur road. His right was at St. Amand, and occupied this big village with great forces, having in front of it a ravine that formed his position. The emperor had reconnoitred the forces and the position of the enemy, and resolved to attack at once. It was necessary to make a change of front, the right in front pivoting on Fleurus.

"Vandamme marched on St. Amand, Gérard on Ligny, and Grouchy on Sombreffe. Girard marched in reserve behind Vandamme's corps.

The Guard was ranked on the level of Fleurus as well as the cuirassiers of Milhaud.


“ At 3 p. m. these dispositions were finished. Lepol’s division of Vandamme’s corps first attacked and seized St. Amand, driving out the enemy with the bayonet. It held itself, during the whole combat, in the cemeteries and near the bell tower of St. Amand. But this village, which is very much spread, was the theatre of many combats during the evening. All Vandamme’s corps was engaged there, and the enemy engaged there considerable forces. Girard, in reserve to Vandamme’s corps, turned the village by his right and fought with his accustomed valor. His respective forces were sustained on either side by some sixty guns. On the right, Gérard fought at the village of Ligny, which was taken and retaken several times. Grouchy, on the extreme right, and Pajol fought at the village of Sombreffe. The enemy exhibited eighty to ninety thousand men and a great number of guns. At seven o’clock we were masters of all the villages situated on the bank of the ravine which covered the position of the enemy, but he still occupied with all his masses the plateau of the Bussy mill.

“ The emperor led his Guard to Ligny, Gérard sent in what was left of his reserve under Pécheux, nearly all his troops having been engaged in the village. Eight battalions of the Guard debouched with the bayonet, and behind them the four squadrons of service, of Delort and Milhaud’s cuirassiers and the horse grenadiers of the Guard. The Old Guard with the bayonet attacked the enemy’s columns on the heights of Bussy, and in an instant covered the battlefield with dead. The squadrons of service attacked and broke a square, and the cuirassiers pushed the enemy in all directions. At 7.30 we had forty guns, many wagons, flags and prisoners, and the enemy was seeking his safety in a precipitate retreat. At ten o’clock the battle was finished and we were masters of the whole battlefield. . . . The *élite* of the Prussian army has been destroyed in this battle. His loss cannot be less than fifteen thousand men, ours is three thousand men killed or wounded.

“ On the left Ney had marched on Quatre Bras with a division which had overturned the English division there placed. But attacked by the Prince of Orange with twenty-five thousand men, part English, part Hanoverian in English pay, he fell back to his position of Frasnes. There multiplied combats were engaged. The enemy sought to force him, but vainly. Ney was awaiting the 1st Corps, which only arrived at night. He contented himself with holding his position. . . . The loss of the

English is estimated at four or five thousand men. Ours at this point was quite considerable, being forty-two hundred men killed or wounded. This combat finished at night. Wellington later evacuated Quatre Bras and moved on Genappe.”

The reference to Ney was made for the eye of the public in the capital ; and the mention of the order to march on Quatre Bras and Sombreffe is as marked as in the orders.



Napoleon's Library Chair.
(Garde Meuble.)

LXXIII.

THE CAMPAIGN LOST. JUNE 17 AND 18, 1815.

ON June 16 Napoleon had made a marked gain, although not all he had planned. He had plenty of unused troops to complete Blucher's defeat, or attack Wellington. An immediate pursuit of the Prussians would have quite broken them up, but again Napoleon wasted the forenoon. At 8 A. M. he ordered Ney to attack Quatre Bras, but himself did nothing until afternoon. He then sent Grouchy with thirty thousand men after the Prussians, with the idea that they had retired towards the Rhine. He had not reconnoitred, and had mistaken the facts: Blucher had boldly thrown up his communications, and had moved towards Wavre to join Wellington. Grouchy was scarcely equal to his task; the Prussians kept well ahead of him. Napoleon marched his reserves towards Ney, who had allowed Wellington, on hearing that Blucher was moving on Wavre, to retire in full daylight of the 17th from Quatre Bras. The French followed, and at night drew up facing the allies at Mont St. Jean. Meanwhile Grouchy had reached Gembloux June 17, and on the 18th had followed Blucher to Wavre, but not on an interior line which would keep him from joining his colleague. At midnight, on reconnoitring Wellington's position, Napoleon saw that he would stand for battle. He expected Grouchy to come in on his right, and had no fear that Blucher would reach the field. Early June 18 Wellington drew up his sixty-seven thousand Anglo-Dutch for a defensive battle, and Napoleon marshaled his seventy-three thousand French for attack. He did nothing to bring up Grouchy, or to hold the roads and defiles against Blucher's approach.

WHILE the operations of June 16 had not accomplished all that Napoleon's vast imagination had planned, yet the gain made was marked. In his advance from Charleroi, and quite in accordance with the course mapped out, he had broken through the allied centre, and had beaten Blucher singly. The immediate thing for him to do was so sharply to follow the shaken Prussian army as to disable it for some days and throw it off in an eccentric direction; whereupon he might turn against the British army, which had held its own at

Quatre Bras, and by throwing his mass upon it, overwhelm it also. No one knew better than he that even a routed army can be collected and made available within a day or two, unless sharply pursued; the conditions were promising for pursuit, and while he was thus engaged he could rely on Wellington undertaking no offensive measures. Busied with his defense of Quatre Bras, the latter had made no attempt to interfere in the fight at Ligny; it was his habit to rest after battle as well as to fight defensively; and Napoleon could with safety detail Ney to observe him, while he himself, or at least a couple of corps, harassed the rear of Blucher. This smartly accomplished, he could turn on Wellington, who, in case he should meanwhile have attacked Ney, would run the greater danger of being taken in reverse the farther back he should have driven the French marshal.

Napoleon had plenty of troops not fatigued by the battle of the 16th; the victorious enthusiasm of all made them easily capable of further, even trying work; and fighting on successive days was no novelty. Lobau had not been put in, the Guard and the cavalry had suffered little; over on the left Erlon had done nothing; only a portion of the troops had exhausted their ammunition; and there was no reason why a start should not have been made at early dawn of the 17th to finish the work of the day before. Napoleon knew that the Prussians had not been decisively enough defeated to be out of the reckoning; and experience and knowledge alike dictated the completion of their overthrow. Had he done this, Wellington would have retired on Waterloo, and, Blucher eliminated, would have had to fight there singly; or else he would have retired on, or given up Brussels, for Blucher could certainly have been prevented from coming to his aid. Such a result might have brought on renewed negotiations for peace. The operation was as plain as that of Napoleon's

first campaign, or as that of Ratisbon; but unless, as in 1796 or 1809, speed was made the first factor in the problem, the same success could not be anticipated.

A well-designed strategic operation often opens a choice of manœuvres, and another chance for Napoleon has been suggested. Wellington knew of the progress of the battle of Ligny, but he did not at once learn of its full result, — a courier sent by Gneisenau had been wounded on the road, — and he was still busy gathering his forces. Only six miles away, he was just in the condition to be successfully attacked. Ney lay in his front, and Napoleon could have brought up troops in good heart to fall on his flank, while a comparatively small force looked after the Prussians for the day. Starting at dawn, Wellington could have been attacked before eight o'clock, and with Ney keyed up by the emperor's presence, the Anglo-Dutch might have been defeated. But sullen over the Erlon incident, Ney had failed to keep his chief posted as to his doings of the 16th; and the emperor took no steps to learn the situation. Neither, indeed, was he in a mood energetic enough to take advantage of it, and Wellington got away by 10 A. M. Yet even so early a morning expedition against Wellington might have been an error, for he had at Quatre Bras and Nivelles, all together, more than sixty thousand men.

From Ligny battlefield Napoleon had personally returned to Fleurus about 11 P. M., — tired out. According to his ancient habit, even in 1814, he would have taken but an hour or two of sleep, and then, the reports of outlying corps being all in, would have issued orders for immediate movement. Nothing, however, was done. When Grouchy came to headquarters, he was told that he would receive orders in the morning. Soult was not instructed to take proper measures. The night passed and no pursuit was ordered. The morning

dawned: Napoleon still loitered in Fleurus, while his army was bivouacked on the battlefield. He was really worked out. The effort of June 16 would have been nothing to him in earlier years, but now it had not only robbed him of his own activity, but of the power of pushing his lieutenants. No report on the battle of Quatre Bras had been received; and Flahault, who had remained with Ney during the 16th, did not get back to headquarters until early morning of June 17. As Ney had not heard the details of the battle of Ligny, after Flahault's arrival Soult wrote him the facts, and added that it would consume the day to finish the business of the 16th, distribute ammunition, and collect stragglers and detachments. This was not Napoleonic alertness. It falls far behind 1809 or even 1814.

It is evident that the emperor was not making ready to do much of anything on the 17th. Assuming that the Prussians had moved on Liège at daylight, Pajol had been sent by Grouchy out the Namur road, and had captured a battery at Le Mazy; Excelmans followed him and filed off towards Gembloux, where he heard there were troops; but no reconnoissance was made towards Tilly and Wavre, although plenty of cavalry, in fresh condition, was at hand. This failure to reconnoitre northward is amazing. While Napoleon had every reason to believe that Blucher would retire on his base, there was always a possibility that he might have striven to join his allies, and it was folly to leave so important a matter to guess-work. If the emperor did not deem this action possible, it accentuates the lapse in his powers of estimating military potentialities. As at Arcis, in lieu of ascertaining the facts, he relied on his own intuitions. Had he supposed that the Prussians had moved to the north, and he could have ascertained the fact during the night, he would at once have suspected the reason; but he was not abreast of his work.

We remember that he wrote Soult from Austerlitz, December 3: "The emperor will personally stick to the heels of the enemy. His opinion is that in war nothing has been done so long as something yet remains to be done; no victory is complete so long as one can do more. . . . In the position in which we find ourselves, there is only one thing to do and one general order: to do as much damage to the enemy as possible, and to complete the victory." What a contrast between then and now!

The first order issued on this critical morning was the one that went out about 8 A. M. to Ney, saying that Pajol was pursuing towards Namur, that Ney was to attack anything in his front at Quatre Bras, presumably only a rearguard, and take possession of the place; should he find stout opposition, Napoleon would come over to take them in flank. The emperor regretted, Soult wrote, that Ney had not held his divisions together; that if Erlon and Reille had been kept in one body, not an Englishman would have escaped; or if Erlon had gone into the battle on the right, the Prussians would have been not merely beaten, but destroyed; and he urged Ney to keep all his divisions within a league of ground. The emperor seemed more occupied with Quatre Bras than with the pursuit of the Prussians.

Leaving Fleurus between 8 and 9 A. M., Napoleon drove towards the battlefield; but the wheeling being irksome, he took to the saddle. At St. Amand, according to Grouchy, he rode to all the village outlets where the heavy fighting had occurred, and thence over the battlefield, examining the prisoners, talking to the wounded men and ordering their careful treatment; he praised some regiments that were standing in line, all of which greeted him with tumultuous cheers; and then he dismounted and talked long with Gérard and Grouchy about public opinion in Paris, about the legisla-

tive bodies, the Jacobins, and other topics quite foreign to the matter which should have monopolized his attention. In another leader this slowness might have been expected, but in Napoleon, striving to wrest from the grasp of united Europe the crown he had forfeited a year ago, it was fatal. In such talk the precious time flew by, and with it was passing the empire which celerity quite as much as skill had built up.

It was approaching noon. A dispatch came up from Ney that the enemy still held Quatre Bras; and Napoleon reiterated his orders for immediate attack, which he would properly support. Gérard's division, which had suffered severely, was left on the battlefield; Lobau, the Guard and Milhaud had assembled at Marbais, ready to move along the chaussée towards Quatre Bras, and the emperor started them to join Ney, — he himself to follow. This was the opening of the second step of the campaign, on the plan already enunciated; but there had been far too much pause between the first and second steps. "Napoleon remaining inactive a whole night and a whole morning following a victory," says Grouard, "without trying to reap its advantages, — that is what we have not seen even in 1813."

To provide for containing the Prussians, Napoleon placed Grouchy in command of Vandamme's and Gérard's corps, Teste's division of Lobau's, and Excelmans' and Pajol's cavalry, over thirty thousand men and nearly a hundred guns, and said to him, as Grouchy subsequently testified: "Start at once in pursuit of the Prussians; complete their overthrow by attacking them so soon as you shall have got in touch with them, and never losing sight of them. I will join Ney's corps with the troops I take with me, will march against the English, and fight with them if they make a stand this side of the Forest of Soignes. You will keep up connection with me by the paved road which leads to Quatre Bras." This last

phrase shows that Napoleon relied on the Prussians having retired on Liège. Had he imagined they had fallen back to the north, he would not have indicated this route to Grouchy, as it was three sides of a quadrangle, although for security a second courier could have been wisely so sent.

Grouchy said his troops needed rest, and that moving towards Namur would isolate him; but this was to be expected. Just now was not the time to rest the troops; if the Prussians had been able to march a distance, so could the French; and Grouchy's turn had come to act independently, as Ney had done the day before. Shortly after talking with Grouchy, a report ran in that some twenty thousand Prussians had been seen near Gembloux, and as this first led Napoleon to question whether they all had retired on Namur, he dictated to Bertrand further orders to Grouchy to march to Gembloux, as well as explore in the direction of Namur and Maestricht, definitely to ascertain the direction of their retreat, and instruct the emperor, so that he might learn their design; and saying, moreover, and this is the gist of the order, that "it is important to penetrate what the enemy are purposing to do, whether they are separating from the English, or whether they are striving still to join them, in order to fight another battle." As things stood, Napoleon could mean only that Grouchy should certainly go as far as Gembloux, and as far beyond as might be desirable to get at all the facts; should keep touch with, and never lose sight of, the Prussians. And Grouchy was bound to act as any general must act when in command of what was in fact an army, and not hampered by hard and fast instructions. Every order is to be construed by its purpose; the primary purpose here was to ascertain where Blücher was, and the secondary purpose to keep him away from Wellington, while Napoleon followed the latter. Napoleon understood the order: was he justified in relying on Grouchy

to act up to it? At St. Helena he said that Grouchy "received positive orders to always remain between the chaussée from Charleroi to Brussels and Marshal Blucher, so as to be constantly in communication with the army and able to reach it." But this is not contemporary evidence, any more than Grouchy's testimony.

In any case, Gembloux was in a wrong direction. Grouchy should have been sent towards Wavre through Mont St. Guibert. Napoleon did not give the Prussians credit for having fathomed his war theory, although they had shown in 1813 and 1814 that they could do so. Blucher had moved from the Elbe to the Saale in 1813 to join Schwartzberg; he had moved from the Marne to the Seine in 1814 to help Schwartzberg, and now Napoleon could not credit his being ready to do the same thing to help Wellington. Was the old power of divination passing from him?

Perhaps Napoleon erred in giving Grouchy so large a force. Had Blucher retired on Liège, much less would have sufficed, although without Blucher's interference Napoleon would, with the rest, have had enough to handle the Anglo-Dutch problem. Had he known, as he ought to have taken means to know, that the Prussians were moving to the north, he then would have made no mistake in giving Grouchy thirty thousand men, but it would have been incumbent on him to definitely order him to move on a line interior to Wavre — to the roads the Prussians were using.

Much obloquy has been heaped on Grouchy for not performing his duty with more energy and intelligence; he has had equally strenuous defenders; but the emperor could scarcely have expected Grouchy to carry out his orders in the manner Davout or Soult would have carried them out. He could not tell him the successive steps to be taken, for he did not know what might happen: he could and did give

only general — in fact crudely partial — instructions. All he could indicate was the possible danger of the Prussians moving again towards the English, and Grouchy had to be left to work according to what occurred. Still, in view of Blucher's retreat to the north, the campaign had already been forfeited by Napoleon's slowness before ever Grouchy started; and it was Napoleon's fault, if he expected an old cavalry general, who, however gallant, had never shown himself equal to the command of an army, to go out with indefinite orders to do an indefinite piece of work, and accomplish it to perfection, when he himself had just been giving this general an example of sluggish conduct in a critical situation. Even Ney had ill done his work. Whatever the criticism of Grouchy, the real blame lies at the emperor's door. He had ill guessed the enemy's operations; he had failed clearly to instruct his lieutenants; he had wasted hour after hour; he had not put to use the best men he had; how could he succeed?

It was 2 P. M. before Vandamme got on the road; and Gérard was an hour late. The weather was wet. Grouchy did not get beyond Gembloux that night, — a matter of five miles; and from there he wrote back word that the enemy appeared to have moved in two columns, one on Wavre and one on Perwez, and that this looked as if the left column, at least, was striving to join the English; if he found the mass of the enemy on the Wavre road, he should follow there, if he found it on the Perwez road, he should follow there. From this report Napoleon drew the conclusion that Grouchy understood that his task was to keep the Prussian army busy, and he turned to more immediate work.

While Grouchy was getting under way, Napoleon had personally reached Ney's position, and his own reserve troops were following along the main road. He was too late: Wellington had already retired. Ten good hours had gone lost;

Napoleon had dallied while Wellington marched ; and with these hours, in view of the alertness of old Marschall Vorwärts, had vanished nearly all hope of a successful issue to the operation of breaking the enemy's centre, driving apart the two armies, and maiming each one singly.

While Blucher may not at first have grasped the broad military problem involved, he and Gneisenau had utilized the night and forenoon succeeding Ligny battle well. The veteran of seventy-three was more alert than Napoleon at forty-five. Ziethen had been left to protect the withdrawal of the other two corps, and to him at Tilly, Wellington early in the morning had sent an aide, who ascertained what Blucher had done and purposed to do. Although the British had so far helped him little, Blucher's mind remained fixed on the one idea of coöperation ; for upon this present success alone depended. In order to work together, either he or Wellington had to imperil his base ; and as it was evident that the British commander was not prepared to do this, Blucher, without a word of comment, but instinct with the desire of working for the general good, threw up his own ; and instead of retiring from Ligny along his natural line of retreat towards Namur and Liège, though this was manifestly his safest road, especially as five miles away was the Orreau, behind which he could draw up a rearguard to fend off French pursuit, he headed from the battlefield, as already shown, on a line parallel to Wellington's communication with Brussels, back on Tilly ; and here the troops lay on their arms. Then, at early dawn, he started Ziethen and Pirch for Wavre, sending Thielemann to Gembloux, so as to be nearer his fresh corps under Bülow, with whom he would follow on other roads ; and by this means prepared to assemble so as to reach out towards the Anglo-Dutch army, when it should stand for battle at Mont St. Jean, as he had understood from Wellington was

the intention. At 10 A. M., June 17, Ziethen and Pirch were beyond Mont St. Guibert, and Thielemann was beyond Gembloux. All were well ahead of Grouchy, who did not start till 2 P. M. Although from Wavre the Prussians might retire towards Maestricht if they desired, it was not as good a line as from Sombreffe, because if from Wavre they advanced towards Brussels, their communications would run in prolongation of their front, and put them in grave danger of having these seized. Yet Blucher's main object was clear, — to join the English and force another battle; and Namur and Liège with all their supplies were deliberately forfeited, despite its being questionable whether sufficient munition could be timely got, if they moved away from there. As to rations, though the Prussians used the magazine system, the troops could live, if need be, on the country. Happily for the allies, this operation was not interfered with, and the four corps gradually reached Wavre, and went into position there or near by; and still more fortunate, the ammunition train, ordered to Wavre, came up in season. Though Blucher had been beaten at Ligny, and this by about an equal force, the time afforded him by Napoleon, and his own honest purpose, had enabled him to turn the strategic tables on the French; and as things now stood, although they were still too far apart, the two allied armies could join on any agreed battlefield in the rear, and by their great superiority in numbers overwhelm the emperor; or should Napoleon stand on the defensive, they could come on at their own good time in double his force to attack him. Splendid in conception as was Napoleon's strategic plan, — and as a plan it yields in naught to the best of them all, — his execution had been so dilatory as to enable Blucher, with not a tithe of his ability, by mere speed, resolution and clean-cut adherence to the idea of coöperation, to escape from the trap into which he had been lured,

and to prepare the downfall of the great master of the art of war. Had Napoleon himself but moved with the energy of his opponent!

Blucher may have made an error in fighting at Ligny, but it was an error in the right direction, that of coöperation with Wellington; and when he was defeated, he exhibited marvelous courage in throwing up his base and moving towards Wavre to again join Wellington. It was a bettering of his march on the Saale in 1813. He cannot possibly be held to have done more. It has been claimed that he should at once, after Ligny, have marched to join Wellington at Quatre Bras, Genappe, or Waterloo, but this would have been to make him more than a Blucher: it would have made him a Bonaparte. If Blucher be held to have done this, by how much more must Wellington be found wanting! One cannot, indeed, too much praise the good-will and ability displayed by all the Prussians in this manœuvre, in which, after a bad defeat, at the moment ascribed by them to Wellington's failure to sustain them, they moved to a junction with their allies in such a manner as to aid them to win a battle on the second day, the manœuvre being hidden to the French, though conducted within easy reach. "No other general of that age, not Wellington himself, would have so heroically risen superior to defeat, and would have made the most hazardous march from Wavre to Waterloo," frankly says O'Connor Morris. However much we may admire the dogged will of Wellington, as he backed up against the Forest of Soignes to fight the battle which was to decide the fate of Napoleonism, yet Marshal Blucher remains the hero of the allied strategy at Waterloo; and this praise to the Prussians implies corresponding blame to Napoleon.

The emperor had definitely lost the campaign of 1815.

To go back to Quatre Bras. Before attacking on the morn-

ing of the 17th, Ney is said to have waited several hours with the impression that a short delay might induce Wellington to stand at Quatre Bras, and enable him to advance on his position in front, while Napoleon came on and took the English in flank, — the pendant of the manœuvre he himself had failed in the day before. This was neither the spirit of the old Ney, nor the tenor of his orders. He might have guessed that the British would not seek to hold the right of the Quatre Bras-Sombreffe line when the Prussians had been driven out of the left of it, although in excuse for this lapse it may be said that he was not early informed of the victory of Ligny. Moreover, Ney erred in not keeping the emperor posted as to his own doings, — and this apparently out of lack of his old frank helpfulness. Wellington had early concluded to retire towards Brussels, basing his action on the same facts as those known or accessible to Ney, and had fallen back at 10 A. M. With Blucher retiring towards Wavre, he knew that not only could he not fight at Quatre Bras with success, but that wherever in the rear he might stand, the Prussian army could debouch upon the flank of the French when they should attack him. Early in the day there came an officer from Blucher, and by him Wellington returned word that he would stand at Mont St. Jean for battle, if Blucher would send a corps to help him. This news reached Blucher about noon, but as he did not know exactly where Thielemann and Bülow then were, and his ammunition had not yet been secured, he could not until later give the assurance asked.

Ney did not penetrate Wellington's design, and until the arrival of Napoleon, nothing of moment was done. Though the English had been for three hours in the delicate position of withdrawing by daylight from the field of battle, Ney had not discovered the fact or taken any action to interfere with them. South of Quatre Bras there is a roll in the ground

that hid the cross-roads. But this is no excuse, as reconnoitring would have disclosed the manœuvre. When, about two, Napoleon reached Quatre Bras, he was seriously annoyed by Ney's indifference; the attack was sharply ordered and at once delivered, the English rearguard under Uxbridge retired, and the French forces in a heavy thunderstorm followed Wellington along the Brussels road until evening. The emperor had recovered from his fatigue, and was active in urging on the men; but he could accomplish nothing, and except for some skirmishes along the road, Wellington escaped unscathed. At eventide, with the French following hard upon, the English army stopped, and deployed in a strong position previously selected in front of Mont St. Jean. Wellington, who had had prepared a sketch of his lines in advance, asked Müffling to draw up a plan for the coöperation of the Prussians, which the latter did on three hypotheses: Should the enemy attack Wellington's right, the Prussians were to move on Ohain by the nearest road, so that Wellington could fall back upon them; should the enemy attack the centre or left of Wellington, part of the Prussians were to move by St. Lambert and Lasne, and strike the French right, and part move on Ohain; should the enemy move on St. Lambert, which is the key of the country, to cut the lines apart, the Prussians were to receive his assault, and Wellington would attack him in the rear.

Deeming it probable that he had the bulk of the English army in his front, and as the day was far spent, Napoleon made no effort to attack that evening, but halted at Planchenoit, with headquarters at Le Caillou. Part of the army did not get beyond Genappe. With a proper start in the morning of the 17th, the French ought to have reached Planchenoit by one or two o'clock, but they did not arrive until seven. Said the emperor, in pointing out the setting sun: "What

would I not give to have to-day the power of Joshua, and retard its movement two hours." Erlon was at the head of column, and bivouacked across the chaussée on the right of Planchenoit; the cavalry was in second line near Rosomme; the Guard was in the rear; and Lobau, Reille and Kellermann lay near Genappe. The forces were neither well closed up, nor in good order.

Instead of following Wellington, or after following him some distance and leaving reasonable forces to contain him, Napoleon might have essayed another manœuvre, have marched towards Wavre, and again on June 18 or 19 have joined Grouchy and defeated Blucher. Wellington would probably have remained where he stood, at Mont St. Jean: it is doubtful whether he would have left his position with speed enough properly to sustain Blucher. But Napoleon did not know the Prussian whereabouts, made the grave error of supposing them unable and perhaps unwilling to come to Wellington's aid, and acted on this belief. This suggestion of a manœuvre has no historical value.

After nightfall Napoleon was inclined to the opinion that Wellington would retreat and join Blucher behind the Forest of Soignes, whereupon "the position of the French army would become very delicate. . . . It was impossible to hazard a crossing of the forest, and to fight at its debouches more than double its own forces, formed and in position; and yet in a few weeks the Russian, Austrian and Bavarian armies would cross the Rhine and move on the Marne. . . . The emperor's design was to follow the English army in its retreat and strive to break it up, despite the darkness of the night, so soon as it should be on the march." Whatever happened, to complete his operation he must bring the Anglo-Dutch army to battle before it could be doubled by the oncoming of the Prussians; and to determine whether Wellington would

stand or not, at 1 A. M. of the eventful 18th of June, Napoleon rode out with Bertrand, and then walked the pickets for over an hour to see what might be discovered. The watch-fires on Mont St. Jean covered so much ground, and such apparent quiet reigned there, that his opinion was changed; and sundry reports by peasants came in to the same effect: the Anglo-Dutch were bivouacking in place.

About 2 A. M. the "Wavre-Perwez" dispatch ran in from Grouchy at Gembloux. It appeared to affect Napoleon little. He had, he supposed, already provided for every contingency, and he assumed that Grouchy understood the importance of fending Blucher off the main French army. He saw Wellington alone in his front, and he was convinced that he should beat him. The danger of Blucher's coming up on his right appeared too remote to consider, and that the main reason why Wellington had stopped and drawn up at Mont St. Jean was that he relied on the Prussian commander to do this very thing, he did not weigh for much. On his part, Wellington was equally certain that he could hold his own until his ally should arrive, although Wavre was a day's march away, and the French would probably be ready for attack early next morning. If everything should prove favorable for such an attack, it was clear that his chances were not of the best; and it must have required all the Iron Duke's resolution — and in battle he had plenty — to draw up on Mont St. Jean with Blucher so far away, to meet what he supposed to be a hundred thousand men. Wellington did not propose to stand where he was, unless part of the Prussian army was sure to come to his support, and this lends some color to the otherwise improbable story that, during the early night of June 17-18, he rode over to Blucher's headquarters, to reassure himself.

It might indeed, as Napoleon avers, have been better strat-

egy for both armies to retire to the north of the Forest of Soignes, join there and await the French oncoming; but Wellington preferred his own plan. It seems, however, certain that, if the weather had been dry enough to keep the ground solid, and Napoleon had opened the battle early in the morning, in view of what did occur on heavy ground and late in the day, the Anglo-Dutch would have suffered as marked a defeat at Waterloo as the Prussians did at Ligny. Said Napoleon at St. Helena: Wellington "could do nothing more contrary to the interests of his party and his nation, to the general spirit of this campaign, and even to the most simple rules of war, than to remain in the position he occupied. He had behind him the defiles of the Forest of Soignes. If he was beaten, all retreat would be impossible to him." Unsupported, in face of Napoleon, this was true.

Wellington, however, at whatever hazard, determined to stand his ground against the French. From what he knew of Napoleon, he had every reason to be cautious, and in a defensive battle he knew he ought to bring into line every available man; and yet, either to protect a retreat by his right towards the sea-coast towns and the English fleet, in case he could not easily retire through the forest, or else from a dread that Napoleon might still essay to turn his right flank (no other good reasons are apparent, and these do not suffice), Wellington had left Colville's division at Hal, and some Netherland troops between Hal and Enghien, in all a force of seventeen thousand men, as a flying strategic right wing. We are told in the St. Helena papers that "a corps of two thousand horse was directed towards Hal, threatening to turn the road of the Forest of Soignes, and to move on Brussels. The Duke of Wellington, alarmed, sent thither his 4th infantry division. During the night the French cavalry returned to camp. The English division remained in observation, and was paralyzed

throughout the battle." This raid, if the emperor's statement is accurate, added to the diversions by the National Guards from the fortresses, in a way accounts for Wellington's nervousness for his right. Colville's orders were to retire from Braine le Comte to Hal, by way of Enghien, or direct, according to news from the enemy; the Dutch troops were to stand between Hal and Enghien, and hold their ground as long as possible. In this detail of seventeen thousand men, Wellington was clearly at fault: they might have been his salvation at Mont St. Jean. The great captain succeeds by divining from the little he can know what the probable action of the enemy may be, and by acting upon this divination according to certain crisp rules. In thus guessing the strategic probabilities, Wellington was far less expert than Napoleon.

There are few sources from which we can ascertain the motives of the Iron Duke in this, his greatest campaign. In 1842 he wrote a Memorandum on Clausewitz's History, which latter was naturally colored by the Prussian idea; and in this paper he made statements which in many respects do not agree with those in his dispatches, or indeed with the facts. Such variations are easily referable to lapses of memory, partaken by all great men who in after years have written of the past. No leader relying upon his own memory and apart from documents and consultation with others has ever succeeded, many years afterwards, in compiling quite accurate accounts of a great campaign. Such narratives are often pregnant with valuable matter; but documents and the testimony of others are essential to the reliable narrative of events. Moreover, in this case, the duke was writing controversially. While nothing in history is more interesting than the view taken at the moment by a great soldier of a situation, about the details of which we are now far better informed than he could then possibly be, and his motives for taking this or the other

action, yet these are the matters most generally hidden from us by time. So here: we do not know just what was passing in the great Englishman's mind at the critical moments of this absorbing week.

As from the inception of the campaign, so the allied leaders had kept up touch during the night of June 17-18, and it was understood that the Prussians should come on from Wavre to sustain the Anglo-Dutch left. Ziethen and Pirch had reached Wavre before noon of the 17th, Ziethen crossing the Dyle; Thielemann through Gembloux had reached Wavre too late to get through the town. Bülow through Waldhain and Corbaix reached Dion le Mont in the evening. Late at night the ammunition train arrived at Wavre; and on getting news that Wellington proposed to fight, about midnight Blucher wrote him that Bülow would move at daybreak towards St. Lambert, with Pirch in support, while Ziethen and Thielemann would be held ready to move. This first promise of aid probably reached Wellington by breakfast time; it must have buoyed him up not a little, and messages passed during the whole day. The Prussian commander did start his columns at an early hour, via both Ohain and St. Lambert; by daylight of the 18th, indeed, the British saw some parties of Ziethen's cavalry van on the hills back of Ohain; the gradual oncoming of the Prussians was fully known; and though Blucher was much delayed by bad roads, he made speed enough to save the battle. The British army had the satisfaction of holding on in their chosen position, with the certainty of support before nightfall.

The Prussians were late in leaving Wavre. Blucher had underrated the difficulties of the march. The country south of Wavre-Waterloo is cut up by little brooks feeding the Dyle, each in a valley with marshy banks, making operations, especially in rainy weather, extremely difficult. These brooks

leave a number of hills between them, along which the roads are apt to run, except when they cross the brooks. Bülow, who was well supplied, and, though he had marched hard, had not been in action, started at daybreak from Dion le Mont, through Wavre towards St. Lambert. Pirch was to follow, but he did not leave Wavre till nearly noon. Ziethen's foot did not start until midday by way of Ohain. Thielemann, unless contained by Grouchy, was to march towards Planche-noit via Couture. Bülow had four miles to move from Dion before he crossed at Wavre, and in moving through the village, a fire delayed his corps two hours. Blucher could have helped Wellington more quickly by first starting Ziethen and Thielemann, who were already on the left bank of the Dyle, but he preferred to put in Bülow, who had not yet fought; and he reckoned on the troops moving faster than they did. Such delays are common in war; late-arriving ammunition and rations had to be distributed; and the troops, coming up in sections, were somewhat scattered. The delays were less, however, than Wellington's on the 16th; and it is a source of wonder that they were not greater. The slowness may have been due in part to a feeling of suspicion at Prussian headquarters. The lack of support at Ligny had not yet been explained, and Blucher and Gneisenau had a right to feel that Wellington, even though unwittingly, had then misinformed them; and from this they drew the conclusion that they must not now rely upon him so far as to risk their last line of retreat to the Rhine. However much Wellington desired to coöperate with Blucher, we cannot wonder that the feeling was strong in the mind of Gneisenau that he was not certain to stand, as he said he would, for battle at Mont St. Jean; and should the Prussians move thither to his support and find that he had retired through the Forest of Soignes, would they not, at a distance from their base, and with their new line run-

ning back in prolongation of the left, be at the mercy of Napoleon and Grouchy? Neither Wellington nor Blucher knew Grouchy's force. Had Gneisenau supposed that Grouchy had over thirty thousand men, he might indeed have dissuaded his aged chief from sending three quarters of his force to join in the battle at Mont St. Jean; but Blucher was more ready to take the risk than his chief of staff, and in the event his opinion prevailed. Whether from one or the other cause, that the Prussian corps started and marched deliberately is not strange; but when once the sound of the guns was heard, every Prussian pressed forward with eagerness. Blucher urged on his artillerymen with, "*Kinder, ihr wollt doch nicht dass ich wortbrüchig werden soll!*" "Boys! you would not have me break my word, would you?"

During the night of June 17-18, then, Wellington was standing for battle at Mont St. Jean; Blucher was making ready to come up on his left; Napoleon was preparing to attack the Anglo-Dutch, quite unaware of the Prussians being near at hand. Where was Grouchy, on whom the emperor was relying to contain the Prussian army?

From Gembloux, early June 18, Grouchy had marched to Sart à Walhain. During the night he had made up his mind that the Prussians were moving on Brussels, and forgetting that the main object of his manœuvre was to prevent their joining the English, he still continued his eccentric direction. To carry out the spirit of his orders, he should have filed towards the crossings of the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, so as both to approach Napoleon and head off Blucher. He could have started at daybreak June 18, and if he did not reach the battlefield, he would at least have in a fashion contained the Prussians, who were marching in three columns not intersupporting, and have given the emperor a freer hand.

Napoleon spent the night at Le Caillou. From the 10 p. m.

report that he received at 2 A. M. from Grouchy, he might have inferred, but did not, that the latter misunderstood the situation. Grouchy had said that he might follow the Prussians on Perwez or on Wavre, and if he did the latter, Napoleon may have concluded that he meant to follow them on an interior line so as to head them off from joining the Anglo-Dutch. It would seem that Napoleon or Soult should have written Grouchy at once to march to Moustier or Ottignies, cross there, and by operating on the left bank of the Dyle, prevent the Prussians from marching through the defile at St. Lambert. It may seem unnecessary to tell an officer intrusted with thirty thousand men, and charged with work like that of Grouchy, that his object was to contain the enemy, and that this could be done only by keeping on an interior line; but better officers than Grouchy have failed to understand the strategy of a campaign, and like him have helped bring on disaster. It is all a part of the haphazard execution of a beautiful plan, the blame for which falls on the emperor. It is probable that Soult, and certain that Davout, would have done this work well, without further explanation; the emperor assumed that Grouchy would do so; and wrapped in the belief that either he would timely come in on his right, or else contain Blucher, he omitted to give him definite instructions, although a body of horsemen was sent to Moustier to meet Grouchy's head of column. It is true that Napoleon (or Soult) literally acquiesced in Grouchy's suggestion that he should follow the Prussians to Wavre; but to follow them to Wavre meant not only to do this thing, but so to do it as to prevent their joining the English, *i. e.* on an interior line, say the Dyle left bank. Grouchy had said he would strive to prevent the Prussians from joining Wellington, and Napoleon relied too much on this assurance. After 1 P. M., June 17, no really important instructions were sent to Grouchy

till 10 A. M., June 18, and these he did not receive until 4 P. M., when he had reached Wavre. Ever since he started, Grouchy had been acting on his own motion under the Bertrand order and the verbal instructions. Napoleon is censurable for giving him so big a piece of work, and for not following him up with suitable orders; but when Grouchy had it hinted to him that the Prussians might try to join the English, and was given a free hand to act as he saw fit, it is fair to hold him to accomplish more than he did. Had Grouchy at daylight marched towards Moustier, he would have crossed the Dyle by ten o'clock, at which time the Prussians were still in their condition of uncertainty, and his presence might have quite shifted the scenes.

As Napoleon must be credited with the splendid plan of campaign, so must he bear the onus of its errors of execution. After winning a brilliant but half success at Ligny, he began making errors. He did not communicate with Ney, or hold him in hand in a manner to insure his prompt action; he did not pursue the Prussians, but gave them the whole morning of the 17th in which to repair their disaster. He did not carefully reconnoitre, and therefore did not send Grouchy on the proper route, through Mont St. Guibert, but on an eccentric route through Gembloux. He did not divine that the Prussians were moving towards the English. The errors which his lieutenants committed were trivial as compared to his own, and those they did commit were always traceable to him. Wellington and Blucher, after a fashion, understood each other, Napoleon and Ney and Grouchy did not.

The campaign of 1815 was lost by Napoleon's laxness. What Grouchy could have contributed to success on June 17 or 18, though it might have won Waterloo, could not have altered the event of the campaign.


On other fields Napoleon had made mistakes, sometimes

grave ones; but as these had been covered up by his speed or able management, or by the accidents of the field, all of which had resulted in success, less examination is made into these errors and less weight is attached to them than to those of 1815. Indeed, it is difficult accurately to gauge errors that do not produce disaster, especially in that much evidence with regard to them is apt to be wanting. But Napoleon's errors in 1815 are amply testified to, and are the more insisted on as belonging to the campaign which wrought his ruin.

From the middle of the straggling village of Waterloo to La Haye Sainte, which was the centre point of the battle which put an end to Napoleon's empire and career, is almost two miles. The village of Mont St. Jean lies just back of the battlefield. The hill so named in a way dominates the surrounding country; and on its gentle southern slopes was drawn up Wellington's army of allies, numbering sixty-seven thousand men, with one hundred and eighty guns; while in its front, along a lower crest, Napoleon marshaled the French army of seventy-four thousand men, with two hundred and sixty guns. The forces have been the subject of endless discussion, and the estimates vary greatly. The above is accurate enough.

The English commander's defensive position, some three miles long, was chosen with fine tactical judgment, and every part of it had been long before studied and charted. There were no field-works, except some abatis across the two *chaussées*, but the slope formed a natural glacis, peculiarly well adapted to artillery fire; and from the elevated English position could be observed all the movements of the French forces, while the reverse slope of the crest enabled Wellington to hide his troops and markedly protect them from the French guns. The hillock of Mont St. Jean descended on the north to Waterloo, on the west to Merbe Braine, on the east to

Waterloo. (Siborne's sketch.)



Ohain, on the south to La Haye Sainte. On the British right the ridge ended in a valley beyond the Nivelles road, on the left in a high open space. The army stood in two lines, the British battalions formed in two ranks, the other troops in three ranks. In places each line was reinforced up to much greater depth. Along the front of this line, part way down the slope, ran nearly east and west the road which came in through Ohain from Wavre. From Ohain to the Charleroi chaussée the road was lined by live hedges; farther west for nearly half a mile it was sunken, and fully six feet deep. A second almost parallel road from Wavre ran through the defile (or difficult crossing of the Lasne) at St. Lambert, and then obliques to Planchenoit, two miles and a half to the south. A third of a mile in front of Wellington's left lay the three hamlets of Papelotte, La Haye and Smouhain, whose buildings and walls were occupied and made available for defense, and between these villages ran the head of a small brook, along whose banks the rains had made the clayey soil almost impassable. His centre stood astride the chaussée, with the village of La Haye Sainte, well held, three hundred yards in its front. His right turned southwesterly so as, a quarter mile in its front, to lean upon the old chateau and farm buildings of Hougomont, which lay in a large grove, and with its inclosing walls stood like a species of fortress. It was an advanced post, one value of which was that, if held, the British line could be moved forward so as to include it, and drive a wedge into the enemy's line without danger to itself. A series of outposts, difficult to capture, thus lay in front of Wellington's main line. Though the ground was everywhere accentuated, the French had to march uphill to the attack. From Le Caillou farm, the chaussée runs up and over the Rosomme hill, which is about as high as Mont St. Jean, down and up and over that of La Belle Alliance, which is almost as

high, and then down into the valley at the foot of Mont St. Jean, and up the slope. Owing to the deep ground as well as the position, the French artillery during the day proved less effective than the British, not getting put to work at as close quarters. Wellington was well aware in what a deadly manner Napoleon could use artillery, and his screening his troops behind the crest of the hill showed keen appreciation of tactical values. He had made his right the stronger flank and posted his reserve near by it, because he continued to fear an attack from there; and his left remained the weaker, because he expected Blucher to sustain it.

As Napoleon claimed, the British position was subject to the defect of having its line of retreat along a single road through a forest; and though the woods were open enough for foot and horse to march on either side of the road, yet in case of disaster, this was manifestly a peril. Some accounts state that the road was much clogged up by the oncoming train and by broken-down wagons and ambulances; and at some stage of the battle this was altogether probable. In later days Wellington said that the road was ample, and that he could also have retired by his right towards the coast; that the French could not have followed him, as he could have defended the outlet of the forest, and this especially as the Prussians would have been upon the enemy's heels. But none the less, Wellington had never yet felt the impact of Napoleon's tremendous blow, and as the 18th of June might have opened clear, and with ground hard enough for Napoleon to move to the attack shortly after daylight, the Prussians being eliminated, the position must be said to have had the defect mentioned. Although the question is a pure hypothesis, the risk did exist. "The English general, in determining to receive battle in front of the Forest of Soignes, counted on the coöperation of the Prussians; but this coöper-

ation could not take place until afternoon. He therefore remained exposed alone from four o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the evening, that is to say, for twelve hours. A battle lasts ordinarily not more than six; this coöperation was therefore illusory," say the Memoirs.

The season had been wet; the men slept in the mud; during the night of June 17-18 it rained heavily, lessening at sunrise and clearing about 8 A. M. "At five o'clock the emperor perceived a few feeble rays of that sun which should before setting light up the destruction of the English army. The Britannic oligarchy was to be overturned. France was to arise again this day more glorious, more powerful, and more grand than ever," wrote Napoleon at St. Helena. But the fields were so heavy that manœuvring until the sun had a chance to dry them would work much against the army taking the offensive. To the troops on the defensive the rain made small odds: it was rather a benefit.

Among the hundreds of charts of this memorable battle, there are no two that agree as to the positions of the troops on either side, at the opening or at any particular moment of the day. But although the accounts of the best authorities vary so greatly as to prevent anything like exactness as to position or manœuvre, these are given in such a manner as not to mislead.

On the English left, from the chaussée east, were Picton's and part of Cole's British divisions, and Perponcher's Belgian division, with the British cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur on the extreme left, partly deployed, partly in column; one hundred and twenty guns were on this wing, of which Picton seems to have exercised the command. The villages in front of the left were held by Bernard, with over three thousand men. The infantry was behind the crest, fairly covered from the fire which would open the battle, except Bylandt's

brigade, which was badly posted near the chaussée on the front slope, where the French artillery could reach it. Behind the left wing near the chaussée was Ponsonby's cavalry. The auxiliaries held several places in the line. The centre, under Orange, was protected by the sunken road, and began at the chaussée with Alten's division, La Haye Sainte being well prepared for the battle. On Alten's right came Cooke's division, a part of whose troops were in Hougomont. The right was under Hill, and Clinton's division and the Brunswickers ran from Merbe Braine westerly, Chassé's Dutch-Belgian division out as a flying right wing at Braine l'Alleud. Behind the centre were Somerset's heavy cavalry near the chaussée, mostly in close column, and the Dutch-Belgian cavalry on his right rear. This made a heavy mass of cavalry behind the right. The artillery was distributed all along the line. The reserve was of foot, thirteen thousand strong.

From the positions occupied during the night, the French troops moved forward in eleven columns, so as to deploy into line of battle. Four were to form the first line, four the second, three the third. At nine o'clock the heads of the first four columns reached their places, and "deployed with great precision and without confusion." All the columns marched to the music of trumpets and drums, "the bands playing the airs which reminded the soldiers of the memory of a hundred victories. The earth seemed proud to bear so many brave men. The spectacle was magnificent, and the enemy, who was placed so as to be able to see the army to the last man, must have been struck by it," say the Memoirs.

The first French line was under Ney, and had Erlon on the right, leaning his left on the chaussée at La Belle Alliance tavern, and with cavalry on the extreme right opposite Smouhain. His divisions stood from the right: Durutte, Marcognet, Donzelot, Allix (later Quiot). Reille was on the

left, with his right leaning on the tavern, and stretched as far as the Nivelles road, the divisions, in order from the right: Bachelu, Foy, Jerome. Piré's cavalry stood astride the Nivelles road. Each infantry division was in two lines, the second two hundred feet behind the first, with artillery in front. In the right wing the artillery was in the brigade intervals. In second line, or as a sort of first reserve, to sustain early assaults, stood Lobau's corps with Domon and Subervie. Kellermann's cuirassiers were between the two roads, off on his left; Milhaud's cuirassiers were some distance off on his right. In third line or reserve stood the foot Guard, in front of Rosomme, with Guyot on the left, and Lefebvre-Desnouettes on the right, but advanced.

The centres of the rival armies were nearly a mile apart.

Though the best British regiments were still in America, from whence they had not returned since the peace, the English troops and the German Legion were excellent. The Hanoverians were militia, but they had been in service quite as long as most of the French levies; and though many nationalities were represented in Wellington's command, it was yet composed of as good material as Napoleon's, save that the French army was homogeneous. That the Belgian and Nassau troops were nervous at fighting Napoleon did not count for more than the fact that the French recruits knew that Wellington had always defeated their veteran comrades in Spain. So far as mere fighting was concerned on this day, both French and English can agree to share the honors. Nothing practically was lost by bad conduct.

The habit of the French was to make their assaults in line of battalion columns, or with deployed battalions in the centre and battalions in column at half distance on the flanks, so as to give good front fire and retain the ability to form square. This formation was also the rule with the Prussians, and with


Wellington's German contingents. But the British troops mainly fought in the two-rank line which gave such effective volleys and had proved so successful in the Peninsula, depth being secured by one or more additional lines or bodies in support, in the rear.

It seems unnecessary to repeat, even for the non-military reader, when the value of line against column is mentioned, that it is not meant that the British troops stood only in one long two-rank line, faced everywhere by a deep column; but rather that for the purpose of best utilizing their defensive fire, the British battalions stood in two ranks, with small intervals between battalions; and that other troops, in their rear, although ready to come forward to support them, were not at the instant engaged, — indeed, often lay down or were concealed out of range; whereas the attacking French columns at deploying intervals were all put in at the same time, and being deeper, suffered more from the fire. Each such column was subjected to direct fire in front, and to oblique fire upon its flanks by the troops which stood opposite the intervals between it and its neighbors. The column had the greater momentum, but much less effective fire until it could deploy. One must constantly bear in mind that the Anglo-Dutch at Waterloo were at the outset nearly as numerous as the French opposing them; that during most of the battle they much outnumbered them; that they occupied a similar space, and that per metre of front as many allies, or more, were in line, differently distributed. It was just in this distribution, and its proper application, that Wellington showed his strong tactical ability.


There had occurred, in January of this year, the remarkable battle of New Orleans, which tends to illustrate what has heretofore been said about the relative value of line and column. To defend the city, after a preliminary manœuvre, General

Jackson had intrenched himself with his Kentucky, Tennessee and Texas sharpshooters, and some militia, three thousand men in all, behind a cotton-bale rampart, clad in mud, with a ditch in front. The British, with nearly double his force, composed largely of the best Peninsular troops, used to victory and led by such veterans as Pakenham, Lambert and Gibbs, assaulted the position with a gallantry rarely equaled, never surpassed. But in less than half an hour they were thrown back with the amazing loss in killed and wounded of twenty-one hundred men to only twenty-two of the defenders.


This battle does not prove that Jackson's sharpshooters were any more brave than the British troops. It was merely a failure of an assault in line. In the open country, or under equal circumstances, the sharpshooters would no doubt have succumbed to the better British discipline. Nor does Talavera or Albuera prove that the British were either more courageous than the French, or that their line as a tactical formation was better than the French column. These and similar instances, such as occurred at Bunker Hill and in the late Boer War, only tend to prove that a certain type of man, regular soldier or not, placed in an advantageous position on the defensive, and handled with determined skill, or actuated by a powerful motive, can maintain his position against the very best of regular troops. The instances of this are so numerous throughout history that it is unsafe to draw from any victory or victories a general conclusion of the value of one formation against another. The battles in the Peninsula and the later battle of Waterloo merely go to show that Wellington was Past Master of Defensive Tactics, and that the French attacks lacked coherence and skill. Wellington had a good class of troops to lead, and he placed them with consummate ability and knowledge of what he had to accomplish. It does not seem as if what he did at Mont St. Jean, or in Spain or Portugal,



A 3-division battalion. Each block is a section.



A 4-division battalion. No. 1 often advanced as skirmishers.



A brigade of 8 squadrons.

A brigade of 8 squadrons, with 4 in reserve.

22 squadrons in 3 lines, 8 in reserve.

Charts of French Troops Ready to Charge. (From "Maximes de 1815.")

proved broadly that the line was superior to the column. It merely was so under the existing conditions.

After a reconnoissance from the Belle Alliance hill, Napoleon returned to the farm of Rosomme and took up his stand on the highest ground near by.

“At eight o'clock the emperor's breakfast was brought,” say the Memoirs, “at which several general officers sat down. He said: ‘The enemy's army is superior to ours by nearly a quarter. We have none the less ninety chances for us and not ten against us.’ ‘No doubt,’ said Marshal Ney, who came in at this moment; ‘if the Duke of Wellington was simple enough to await Your Majesty; but I have come to announce that his columns are already in full retreat. They are disappearing in the forest.’ ‘You have ill looked,’ answered this Prince. ‘There is no longer time. . . . He would expose himself to a certain loss. He has cast the dice and they are for us,’” say the Memoirs.

Napoleon's original idea had been for an opening attack on Wellington's left, which, if successful, would crowd him still farther away from the Prussians, and which was in consistent sequence to the general plan of the campaign. In other words, he would attack with his right wing, so as to crush the English left and throw Wellington back into a bad country. Durutte was to attack Papelotte and La Haye, while Ney led Erlon's other divisions on the east of the chaussée. Jerome was to attack Hougomont, Bachelu and Foy were to operate on his right, and upon Jerome was to be executed a species of echeloned left wheel, sustained by Lobau first and the Guard next. Had this been promptly done, it might have stopped the Prussian oncoming; but Ney early discovered that the brook which runs among the villages opposite the French right, though its banks were low, yet was so deep in mud that not even foot could pass it in good order. He suggested that the assaulting columns should cross farther up the brook; and his report modified Napoleon's action, so as to bring the assault more upon the British centre. This latter was one of Napo-

leon's favorite operations; he had used it at Ligny; and with Wellington's single road of retreat, a rupture of his centre would throw both wings aside where they could not possibly reunite, and each might be badly compromised. That by attacking the Anglo-Dutch left he would have exposed his own right and rear to the onset of the Prussians, was not reckoned on by the emperor.

While the French army was still marshaling, Napoleon sent an

ORDER.

To each Army Corps Commander, June 18, 1815, 11 A. M. Once the whole army shall be ranked in battle order, at about 1 P. M., at the moment when the emperor shall give the order to Ney, the attack is to commence, so as to seize the village of Mont St. Jean, where is the intersection of the roads. To this effect the battery of twelve-pounders of the 2d and 6th Corps will join that of the 1st. These twenty-four guns will fire on the troops on Mont St. Jean, and Erlon will commence the attack, moving forward his division on the left and sustaining it according to circumstances by the divisions of the 1st Corps. The 2d Corps will advance in such measure as to keep on a level with Erlon. The sapper companies of the 1st Corps will be ready to barricade themselves at once at Mont St. Jean.

Napoleon's confidence that he would beat the enemy was founded on the expectation that Grouchy would come in on his right, as Ney was to have done at Ligny on his left; or at least that he would contain the Prussians, as Ney had the Anglo-Dutch. Although it must have occurred to him that Wellington was standing for battle with the belief that the Prussians would come up, yet he was ready to take the risk that they could not do so. Had he deemed the risk serious, he would have attacked Wellington earlier, despite the ground, and he would have sent out at daylight to see that Grouchy hurried towards him by the proper road, — at least in his early days he would have done this. He relied on Grouchy more

than he should, especially with the country roads over which he had to march.

At 10 A. M. Napoleon received a 6 A. M. dispatch from Grouchy, without any explicit news of Blucher, but indicating his own march as on Sart à Walhain. The emperor had gleaned news of a heavy force of the enemy marching on Wavre, and he answered — the first dispatch since 1 P. M. of the 17th — that Grouchy might also move towards Wavre, the natural inference, as he supposed, being that the march would be so directed as to contain Blucher.

The reports received appeared to convey to Napoleon no impression that Blucher could escape Grouchy and take part in the coming battle; and as between eight and nine the troops were being marshaled, with bands still playing and the regiments hurraing, “the emperor rode the ranks. It would be difficult to express the enthusiasm which animated all the soldiers. The infantry raised their shakos at the ends of their bayonets, cuirassiers, dragoons, light cavalry their helmets and shakos on the points of their swords. Victory appeared certain,” say the Memoirs. The emperor felt as much assurance as at any one of his great battles. This unusual pageant was resorted to, to consume the time and keep the spirit of the men at proper tension, and must have been an interesting sight to the allied troops on the hills above. But while Wellington could view the entire deployment, there was nothing that would permit him to penetrate Napoleon’s design.



Sword of the Period.

10. Abstract of the Military Events happening during the Year 1798. 11 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

11. Abstract of the Military Events happening during the First Six Months of 1799. 25 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

12. Abstract of the Military Events happening during the Last Six Months of 1799. 31 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

13. 18 Brumaire. 21 pages.

“This fragment is reproduced according to the *Memoirs to serve for the History of France under the Reign of Napoleon I.* Edition of 1830. We have not got the original manuscript.”

14. Provisional Consuls. 24 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

15. Defense of Genoa by Massena. 20 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

16. Marengo. 25 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

17. Ulm — Moreau. 21 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

18. Diplomacy — War. 42 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

19. Neutrals. 33 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript given in 1841 by General Bertrand to the Library of the town of Chateauroux.”

20. Notes on the Abstract of Military Events, or Historical Essays on the Campaigns of 1799 to 1814. 35 pages.

This Abstract was a work in 19 volumes by General Mathieu Dumas, Paris, 1816–1826.

“These Notes are reproduced according to a copy contributed by Madame la Comtesse de Montholon.”

21. Four Notes on the Work entitled *Memoirs to serve for the History of the Revolution of Santo Domingo*. 12 pages.

This was a work in 2 volumes by General Vicomte de Lacroix. Paris, 1819.

“These Notes are reproduced according to the *Memoirs to serve for the History of France under the Reign of Napoleon I.* Edition of 1830. We have not got the original manuscript of this dictation.”

22. Six Notes on the Work entitled *The Four Concordats*. 34 pages.

This was a work in 3 volumes by Monsieur de Pradt, formerly Archbishop of Malines. Paris, 1818.

“These Notes are reproduced according to a copy contributed by Madame la Comtesse de Montholon.”

23. The Island of Elba and the Hundred Days. 132 pages.

“This portion of the *Works of Napoleon I.*, entirely unpublished, is given here according to the original manuscript, bearing numerous corrections and additions by the hand of the emperor. This manuscript has been contributed by General Henry Bertrand.”

24. Campaign of 1815. 81 pages.

“This portion of the *Works* is reproduced according to the original manuscript contributed by Madame la Comtesse de Montholon.”

25. Notes on the Letters written from Paris during the last Reign of the Emperor Napoleon. Translated from the English of J. Hobhouse. 12 pages.

A work in 2 volumes, published at Ghent and Brussels in 1817.

“The Commission has thought it interesting to issue these Notes heretofore remaining unpublished. They are nearly all by the hand of the emperor. The original manuscript has been contributed by General Henry Bertrand.”

26. Notes on the Manuscript coming from St. Helena in an Unknown Manner. 16 pages.

The Manuscript was by Lullien de Chateauvieux, first published in England in 1827.

“These Notes, of which the original text has not been found, are here reproduced according to the publication made by General Gourgaud, under the following title: *The Manuscript of St. Helena, published for the first time with notes of Napoleon.* Paris, 1821.”

27. Letters from the Cape of Good Hope. 60 pages.

Doctor Warden published in 1817 some *Letters written from St. Helena*. Napoleon, discovering errors therein, wrote this work, which reached Europe in 1817, and was published in English without the name of the author, and afterwards translated into French.

“It is quite probable that these letters are by Napoleon himself, as has been time and again asserted by General Bertrand, General de Montholon and Comte Marchand; the Commission, moreover, has received from General Henry Bertrand the contribution of a first

editing which bears numerous corrections and additions by the hand of the emperor." Napoleon did not at first intend that these letters should be published as from him, but the Commission, as a matter of historical interest, has thought well to include in the *Works of Napoleon I.* the most important of these *Letters from the Cape*. What appears in the Correspondence is a translation from the English work.

28. Eighteen Notes on the Work entitled Considerations on the Art of War. 100 pages.

This was a work by Lieutenant-General Baron Rogniat. Paris, 1816.

"These Notes are reproduced according to the original manuscript, bearing numerous corrections by the hand of the emperor. This manuscript has been contributed by General Henry Bertrand."

29. Notes on the Introduction to the History of the War in Germany in 1756, by General Lloyd. 8 pages.

This was a work published in England and Brussels in 1784.

"These Notes are reproduced according to a manuscript contributed by General Henry Bertrand. The work of Lloyd, with the marginal annotations of Napoleon, has been given to the city of Bordeaux, which keeps it in its Museum."

30. Project for a New Organization of the Army. 32 pages.

"This project is reproduced according to a copy contributed by General Henry Bertrand. There is reason to believe that this copy is not complete, and that the emperor had given to his work a longer development, but it has been impossible to find what seems to be missing."

31. Essay on Field Fortification. 23 pages.

"This Essay is reproduced according to a copy contributed by General Henry Bertrand."

32. Reflections on Suicide. 2 pages.

"These Reflections are reproduced according to the original manuscript contributed by Comte Marchand."

33. Observations on the Tragedy of Mahomet. By Voltaire. 4 pages.

“These Observations are reproduced according to the original text contributed by Comte Marchand.”

34. Note on the second book of the Eneid of Virgil. 3 pages.

“This Note is reproduced according to the original manuscript contributed by Comte Marchand.”

N. B. The Commission has not published the Notes on the *History of the Embassy of Warsaw in 1812*, because they are too short to be understood without inserting the whole volume of Abbé de Pradt. Nor has it published the Notes on the Memoirs of Fleury de Chaboulon, as these were too meagre, and as everything interesting therein is found in the *Island of Elba and the Hundred Days*.

35. Abstract of the Wars of Julius Cæsar. 89 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the original manuscript contributed by Comte Marchand.”

36. Abstract of the Wars of Marshal Turenne. 71 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the *Memoirs to serve for the History of France under the Reign of Napoleon I.* Edition of 1830. We have not got the original manuscript.”

37. Abstract of the Wars of Frederick II. 83 pages.

“This Abstract is reproduced according to the *Memoirs to serve for the History of France under the Reign of Napoleon I.* Edition of 1830. We have not got the original manuscript.”

38. Biographical Notes. 4 pages.

“These Notes seem to have been destined to anonymous publication. They have so far remained unpublished. They are reproduced in this collection according to the original writing, partly by the hand of the emperor, which has been contributed by General Henry Bertrand.”

39. Extracts from the Memorial of St. Helena. 63 pages.

This was a work in 8 volumes, entitled *Memorial of St. Helena, or Journal, where will be found inserted day by day what Napoleon said and did during eighteen months.* By Comte de Las Cases. Paris, 1823.

N. B. The Commission has left out matter already treated by Napoleon in other portions of his works. It has taken from the memorialists of St. Helena only that which is given by each one of them as a dictation of the Emperor Napoleon, or as literal transcription of his words.

40. Extracts from Napoleon in Exile. 24 pages.

This was a work in 2 volumes, entitled *Napoleon in Exile, or A Voice from St. Helena. The opinions and reflections of Napoleon on the most important events of his life and government, in his own words,* by Barry E. O'Meara, Esq., his late surgeon. London, 1822.

N. B. The Commission has left out matter already treated by Napoleon in other portions of his works. It has taken from the memorialists of St. Helena only that which is given by each one of them as a dictation of the Emperor Napoleon, or as literal transcription of his words.

41. Extracts from the *Recitals of the Captivity.* 41 pages.

This was a work in 2 volumes, entitled *Recitals of the Captivity of the Emperor Napoleon at St. Helena,* by General Montholon, companion of his captivity and his first testamentary executor. Paris, 1847.

N. B. The Commission has left out matter already treated by Napoleon in other portions of his works. It has taken from the memorialists of St. Helena only that which is given by each one of them as a dictation of the Emperor Napoleon, or as literal transcription of his words.

42. Extracts from the Memoirs of Doctor Antommarchi. 10 pages.

This was a work in 2 volumes, entitled *Memoirs of Doctor Antommarchi, or The Last Moments of Napoleon.* Paris, 1825.


N. B. The Commission has left out matter already treated by Napoleon in other portions of his works. It has taken from the memorialists of St. Helena only that which is given by each one of them as a dictation of the Emperor Napoleon, or as literal transcription of his words.

43. The Captivity. 86 pages.

This contains sundry letters by Napoleon, preserved by General Montholon and General Bertrand, letters by these two gentlemen and sundry other persons, notes of things said by Napoleon at St. Helena, and much other matter relating to his confinement there.

44. Testament. 20 pages.

"This testament" (last will) "is reproduced according to the original preserved in the archives of the Empire."



Meissonier's French Eagle.

APPENDIX F.

PARTIAL LIST OF SOURCES CONSULTED IN WRITING THIS HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR.

(*Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Frederick and Napoleon.*)

THE full titles are not given. "Alison's Europe," or "Rüstow's 1796-97," or "Jomini's Great Operations," or "Chesney's Waterloo," or "Vegetius de Re Mil." suffices to identify the works in the index of any library which contains the volumes. Most of the titles are given in English.

A. G., Napoleon's Maxims. — Abrantes, Memoirs — Adelung, Pragm. Hist'y. — Adderfeld, Charles XII. — Affaires Etrangères, Archives des. — Albemarle, Fifty Years. — Alison, Europe; Castlereagh; Marlborough. — Allied Armies and Schwartzenberg. — Almanachs, Sundry. — Alombert et Colin, 1805 en Allem. — Alombert, Dürrenstein. — Ammian, Hist. Rome. — Anderson, Sir John Moore. — Andrade, Guerrilleros 1809. — Andrews, Mod. Europe. — Angeli, Ulm and Aust'z; Archd. Charles. — Anhalt, Diary. — Annuals, Sundry. — Annual Register. — Antoine, Godart. — Antommarchi, Napoleon. — Aosta, Archives. — Appian, Hist. Rome. — Archenholtz, Gustavus Adolphus; Seven Years' War. — Archives of Berlin, Vienna, Munich, Stuttgart, Dresden, Paris, many German towns and princely houses. — Arneth, Eugene; Maria Theresa; Austria. — Arrian, Alexander. — Arteche, Independencia. — Artillerie, Archives del'. — Assolant, 1812. — Aster, Leipsic; Dresden; Explanation; Kulm; Sundry Mil. Wks. — Aubrey, Revitaillement.

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THE END.

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